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Abstract 
 
 
Malawi is pursuing democratic decentralisation with duo objectives to enhance 
democracy at the local level and to promote poverty reduction. These reforms are 
largely driven by bilateral and multilateral development agencies as part of the good 
governance agenda, which is polluted with varying interests. This thesis argues that 
while in principle democratic decentralisation is desirable the pre-requisites for 
making it work are absent in Malawi. To a certain extent this is due to the nature of 
the Malawi state, which conforms to the logic of the African neopatrimonial state 
with unique characteristics such as personalisation and concentration of power in the 
dominant patron, dominance of vertical over horizontal ties, and weak separation of 
public and private spheres. Democratic decentralisation threatens ruling elites by 
promising to create spaces at the local level where the opposition can thrive. As a 
result reforms are characterised by centralisation as the ruling elites try to protect 
power and access to state resources. These characteristics can be traced back to the 
colonial regime and the one party state both of which were heavily centralised. At the 
local level chiefs, and members of parliament with ruling party connections have 
captured reforms and are influential in the allocation of resources. In exchange for 
privileges and status these actors are increasingly being co-opted by the centre to 
extend its control of the local arena. The result is the superficial implementation of 
reforms, which may further entrench neopatrimonial characteristics of the state. In the 
absence of strong downward accountability development agencies can play a key role 
to push government towards reforms. Yet local and central interests make this an 
uphill task. This explains the partial implementation of reforms in Malawi.  
Key Words: Decentralisation, Neopatrimonial State, Centralisation, Local Capture, 
Malawi, Good governance 
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Chapter	  One	  	  
1. Introductory	  chapter	  	  
1.1 Renewed excitement with decentralisation 	  
Decentralisation has re-emerged since the early 1990s as one of the key government 
reforms in Africa and other parts of the world in the face of pessimism with the 
failures of the centralised state. One World Bank study has stated that no country in 
Africa today ‘propounds preference for centralised state’ (Ndegwa and Levy 2003). 
By mid 1990s 63 out of 75 developing countries with populations of over 5 million 
were attempting some form of decentralisation (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007: 8). 
According to Ndegwa and Levy (2003: 3) whether arising from dramatic political 
reforms, donor pressure or as part administrative change the recent decentralisation 
efforts are one of the ‘significant facets of state restructuring in Africa since 
independence’. Despite the shortfalls of previous decentralisation reforms, this new 
wave is viewed with optimism particularly from donors who are one of the most 
influential players driving this agenda.  However, as Smoke (2003) has argued there is 
still a lot we do not know about decentralisation. Many questions still remain. Who is 
really driving these reforms, and why? How different are these reforms from previous 
ones? What conditions are in place to support or hinder reforms in the African state, 
and what are the prospects for these reforms to succeed? These and many other 
questions have not been successfully addressed in some of the evidence that is 
available. More studies are required to critically examine whether and how promises 
of decentralisation are being realised in countries that are pursuing reforms. 
 
Decentralisation, which in simple terms refers to the transfer of power and resources 
from higher to lower levels of government, remains a more complex phenomenon. It 
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has several dimensions and those supporting it often have varying interests for doing 
so. In many cases the interest in decentralisation is based on its potential benefits 
rather than the empirical evidence. As Smoke (2003) has put it, there is also a 
tendency to ‘compartimentalise’ decentralisation when looking at the benefits. 
Economists focus on rational-choice argument that stress the role of decentralisation 
in bringing efficiency in delivery of services; political scientists and other 
development practitioners emphasize intergovernmental relations, local elections and 
accountability mechanisms while public administration experts work on institutional 
structures, processes and procedures (Smoke 2003: 8). As chapter two will show, it is 
often the case that reforms will be driven by multiple factors.  
 
The dominant form of decentralisation as pursued by donors and national 
governments is devolution, roughly defined as the transfer of powers and resources to 
local governments that elect their own representatives. These local governments are 
expected to make investment decisions at the local level. Devolution has become part 
of the good governance agenda that is being driven by both multilateral and bilateral 
aid agencies since the early 1990s. Those supporting decentralisation as part of the 
concept of governance point to its ability to ‘accelerate economic development, 
increase political accountability, enhance public participation in governance and 
address bottlenecks in hierarchical bureaucracies, and provide opportunities for more 
resourced local governments to respond to local needs and demands’ (Cheema and 
Rondinelli 2007: 7). Other supporters such as Olowu (1990) have also argued that it 
has more prospects due to its democratic elements, which make local actors more 
accountable to local citizens.  
 
The growing interest in decentralisation in Africa alongside other good governance 
reforms since the early 1990s is not coincidental. Decentralisation is viewed as a key 
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component of the package of democratic and government reforms aimed at improving 
efficiency and local governance in African states. This link between decentralisation 
and democracy might explain the growing preference for devolution, which is seen as 
more pure and effective. Devolution is built around principles of downward 
accountability of locally elected representatives, and significant transfer of powers 
and resources from central governments to local authorities that determine how best 
to address local needs. Efficiency is as a result of this responsive democratic local 
government.  
 
Although supporters of decentralisation (devolution) point to many potential benefits 
it is yet to be seen whether decentralisation will be a panacea for all the failures of 
heavily centralised states. Many countries implementing decentralisation are 
experiencing challenges and this is often blamed on poorly implemented reforms—a 
simple technical problem that can easily be fixed. Yet, the most daunting challenges 
facing reforms seem to be political (Smoke 2003). Reforms are threatening the 
interests of the ruling elites at the centre. Therefore, rather than transferring more 
powers, reforms are resulting in further centralisation with ruling elites co-opting 
some actors at the local level. This is not surprising given that decentralisation is a 
political process, and those who engage in it often have to make political decisions 
about pursuing reforms. Since in most cases it is central governments that decide how 
reforms will be crafted, one has to examine the incentives at central level in order to 
appreciate how reforms work out at local level. So the question is what would be in 
the interest of central governments in Africa and elsewhere to transfer powers and 
resources to the lower levels?  
 
Donors are playing a key role in the pursuit of reforms in many countries in Africa. 
This is sometimes done in an almost blind frenzy that ignores the historical context of 
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the state in Africa, with the dominance of neopatrimonial logic in some countries. 
Several characteristics of the African neopatrimonial state such as personalistic rule 
and concentration of power, weak separation of public and private spheres, 
dominance of vertical over horizontal ties and strong patronage and clientelist 
networks make it difficult for reforms to be pursued to the fullest. When more 
centralisation happens and local elites with strong central ties capture reforms, 
external actors are surprised. Research, such as this thesis must analyse how these 
existing characteristics condition the way reforms are designed and implemented, who 
receives powers, what powers and resources are transferred, and what the interests are 
for those at the centre and local level.  
 
1.2 Malawi, a country at crossroads with reforms 
 
Malawi is one of the countries in sub Saharan Africa where democratic reforms in the 
1990s were accompanied by the transfer of powers and resources to lower levels of 
government. In 1993 Malawians voted overwhelmingly to end the run of the one 
party state. In 1994 a new republican constitution was written, and democratic 
decentralisation became one of the fundamental pillars of the new multi-party 
government system in Malawi. In 1998, a decentralisation policy and Local 
Government Act were finalised and these outline comprehensive package of reforms 
to support implementation of decentralisation. In Malawi, decentralisation has been 
strongly linked with democracy and development. It is being pursued based on its 
potential benefits to enhance local governance and promote development. 
Decentralisation in Malawi has been supported by both multilateral and bilateral aid 
agencies. On paper, these reforms conform to devolution as the preferred form of 
decentralisation. This thesis seeks to investigate whether these decentralisation 
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reforms are creating institutional arrangements that really transfer powers and 
resources to downwardly accountable local actors who can deliver locally appropriate 
policies. It will also shed more light on the extent to which local development policies 
and decisions on resources are likely to respond to local needs.  
 
Scholars such as Chinsinga (2007) have written extensively about the politics of 
decentralisation during the early years between 1994 and 2004. Muluzi’s United 
Democratic Front (UDF) was the governing party during these years. Chinsinga 
(2007) and others have argued that reforms were characterised by centralisation as 
well as conflicts amongst local elites- councillors, chiefs, local bureaucrats and 
Members of Parliament. This thesis explores the roll out of reforms during the reign 
of wa Mutharika as President, and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), as the 
governing party. The thesis focuses on this period due to dearth of academic literature 
on how wa Mutharika approached decentralisation, and the politics and form of local 
government at district level. This is also the period when there was significant 
injection of resources through the Local Development Fund to support district 
councils. The wa Mutharika era is also worth studying in order to examine the form of 
local government given the absence of councillors. 	  
The thesis argues that between 2004 and 2012 public policies in Malawi including 
decentralisation seem to be heavily influenced by neopatrimonialism. Generally, the 
Malawi state shows certain troubling characteristics that include, ‘chameleon politics 
and political opportunism’, weak political parties and leadership dominance, and 
existence of ‘parallel rule’ (with chiefs being connected to the president). These and 
many other challenges are a major stumbling block to pursuit of democratic 
decentralisation. So far the prevailing norm in Malawi has been the capture and 
monopolization of policies and public resources by the ruling parties to establish and 
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entrench their rule at all levels. As a result the so called comprehensive democratic 
decentralisation reforms pursued since 1994 have been characterised by centralisation 
particularly as the ruling elites try to maintain monopoly over power and access to 
state resources. Two former presidents, Bakili Muluzi (President, 1994-2004), and the 
late Bingu wa Mutharika (President, 2004-2012), took steps to consolidate central 
authority at the local level, with the later taking significant steps to amend Local 
Government Act with the aim of centralising rather than decentralising authority and 
resources. As this thesis will argue, both presidents (Muluzi and wa Mutharika) fit the 
characterisation of ‘big men’, and their neopatrimonial practices and interests have 
influenced the implementation of public policy, such as decentralisation in Malawi.  
 
The thesis argues that while decentralisation may have many potential benefits 
(including the those outlined in the Local Government Act and decentralisation policy 
in Malawi), the necessary conditions to make reforms work are absent in Malawi. So 
far the ruling elites with their ‘big man’ are reluctant to open up spaces at the local 
level where opposition can thrive. This ‘big man’ syndrome will be discussed in more 
details in chapter two of this thesis. Suffice to say that with the rise of a first woman 
president in Malawi, Joyce Banda, in April 2012, the concept of ‘big man’ may not be 
adequate. Hence, this thesis uses both ‘big man’ and ‘big woman’ to describe these 
powerful individuals who run political parties and country, and are embedded in 
patronage networks with other political elites and their supporters. Malawi is a typical 
neopatrimonial state where ‘big men/women’ reward their followers in exchange for 
support. This has been clearly demonstrated in this thesis whereby local actors such as 
chiefs and members of parliament with connections to the centre are calling the shots 
in the decisions made at local level and this cuts across the different regimes that have 
been in power since independence.  
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Although this thesis covers the status of reforms mainly under the presidency of 
Bingu wa Mutharika (2004-2012) it has also taken into consideration the significant 
developments that occurred in Malawi following the death of President Bingu wa 
Mutharika on 5th April 2012. While these events demonstrated the fluidity of the 
political situation in Malawi and hence the challenges in carrying out studies such as 
this one, the rise to power of Joyce Banda in April 2012 also provided a small 
window of opportunity to compare her path to reforms to that of her predecessor. So 
far the new president has shown some commitment towards holding local government 
elections, and her pursuit of some reforms has made her a ‘darling’ of development 
agencies in Malawi. These issues are described in brief in the conclusion. Still, with 
one eye on 2014 it is yet to be seen in terms of the extent to which the new president 
will pursue reforms and how different she will be from the  ‘big men’ that have 
centralised power in Malawi in the past.  
 
1.3 Rationale and contribution of research 
	  
The rationale for this study emanates from the researcher’s interest to examine 
whether and how current reforms are different from previous ones, which were 
attempted under the one party state. Therefore the study has a practical purpose to 
inform the implementation of reforms in Malawi.  
	  
The study is also relevant from an academic perspective and it will contribute to three 
strands of literature. The first relates to theoretical and empirical debates about 
decentralisation and more particularly about prospects for pure form of devolution or 
democratic decentralisation in Africa. Devolution is being advanced by theorists and 
development practitioners but with limited evidence about where it has worked. 
Second, it will contribute to the new literature that links decentralisation and 
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governance in developing countries. Third, the research will also contribute to 
literature about the nature of African neopatrimonial state and its influence on how 
reforms are rolled out at various levels. Therefore, this research will provide one more 
detailed study that may generate theories about the prospects for the new wave of 
decentralisation in Africa.  
 
1.4 Research Questions 
	  
The purpose of this case study was to investigate whether the new form of 
decentralisation in Malawi is creating institutional arrangements that transfer powers 
and resources to downwardly accountable local actors who can deliver policies that 
reflect local preferences. To shed more light on this purpose the research focused on 
the following key questions and sub questions: 
	  
1.4.1 Key questions 
 
1. How are social relationships of superiority and subordination created, 
expanded and perpetuated amongst central and local actors? 
2. To what extent do interests of various actors at local and central level 
influence development planning and implementation within the new local 
governments? 
	  
1.4.2 Sub questions 
	  
a.) What are the incentives for central elites, donors, NGOs, and local actors to 
pursue or capture reforms? 
b.) Which local actors are receiving or capturing powers, and why? 
c.) What is the source of authority, status and privilege for actors receiving 
powers? 
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d.) Whose interests (national or local) are served by choice of actors receiving 
power? 
e.) In which accountability relations are the actors receiving powers embedded 
in? 
f.) How and by whom are decisions made about development priorities and 
resource allocations at local level? 
 
The sub questions guided the process of carrying out the research. These questions 
were used in the development of various research tools such as guides for in-depth 
interviews and focus group discussions. They were also used to draw up themes for 
analysing documents. Finally, the sub questions also assisted in the process of 
analysing data and writing up the findings and interpretation chapters.  
 
1.5 Research Approach 
	  
The researcher conducted a detailed case study examination of Salima District 
Council with the purpose of investigating the implementation of reforms. The study 
involved a detailed examination of one local council within a framework of a larger 
qualitative study that examined the role of various national and international actors in 
the implementation of reforms in Malawi. Participants in the study included local and 
national politicians, local and central bureaucrats, donor agencies, chiefs, Non 
Governmental Organisations (NGO) officials, and women and men at village level. 
Chapter four provides more details on the methodology used in this study.  
 
1.5.1 Preliminary Arguments 
 
Based on the literature review one main preliminary argument was made by the 
researcher regarding this study as follows: ‘Although Malawi as a country has 
	   20	  
adopted democratic decentralisation lack of alternative economic and political power 
means that some of the key local actors receiving powers remain primary 
beneficiaries of the state through emoluments, privileges, status and access to 
resources at local level’. This has left local actors at the mercy of serving interests 
from the centre. Yet on the other hand these local actors are superior1 within the rural 
societies that they are part of.  
	  
There are two preliminary arguments related to the main one. First as a result of 
centralisation of reforms and the self-interests of the local actors receiving powers, 
reforms in Malawi are characterised by limited influence of local communities on the 
institutions and priorities of local government. Second, civil society organisations at 
local level are weak and too divided to influence any downward accountability and 
voice of rural communities in key decision making at local level.  
	  
Throughout the study the researcher continuously questioned the validity of these 
preliminary arguments.  
 
1.5.2 The Researcher 
	  
At the time of conducting this study the researcher was one of the recipients of the 
Mo Ibrahim Foundation Scholarship for PhD studies in Governance and 
Development. The researcher has worked in local and international Non 
Governmental Organizations in Malawi where he has been involved in managing 
community projects in health and food security. Thus, the researcher has extensive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Superior is used to define the relationship between the local actors and the citizens 
within the jurisdiction of the local government.  ‘Superior’ in this thesis means being 
above the rural societies, and therefore less accountable downwardly. ‘Superior’ also 
means operating as ‘small big men/women’ at local level.	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working knowledge of district level politics and administration. The researcher has 
also worked for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), a 
Programme of the African Union, where he was involved in the management of 
programmes to uplift the lives of women in Africa. During this period the researcher 
gained important insights into the workings of governments and donor influences in 
Africa. Lastly the researcher has also worked for the UK’s Department for Africa’s 
Development (DFID) where he was a Governance Advisor.  In this position the 
researcher gained significant knowledge of the key governance issues in Malawi, and 
donor approaches on issues such as decentralisation.  
	  
The researcher acknowledges that the same experiences gained in the various 
positions that are so valuable in providing insights in this study could also serve as a 
liability particularly if they lead to biases regarding research design and interpretation 
of findings. To minimise such biases the researcher explicitly acknowledges the 
influence of these factors. Throughout the study the researcher has ensured full 
commitment to critical self-reflection as a way to challenge any prevailing biases. 
Various safeguards were also put in place such as triangulation of data sources and 
triangulation of methods.  
1.6 Definitions of Key terminology used in this study 
	  
This section provides definitions of the key terminology used in this study.  
 
Decentralisation- An act in which the central government transfers some powers and 
resources to actors and institutions at the lower level within a political administrative 
hierarchy of the government.  
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Democratic Decentralisation/ Devolution- An act in which the central government 
transfers some powers and resources to local/ district governments that are 
downwardly accountable to the citizens within their geographical jurisdiction. These 
local governments elect their own councillors through elections, and these 
representatives exercise oversight on local bureaucrats. 
	  
Responsiveness- A situation whereby local policies reflect local preferences, and the 
activities of local government are valued by the public within the geographical 
jurisdiction.   
	  
Incentives- Reasons why certain individuals or groups support or hinder or capture 
implementation of reforms. These are real or perceived interests that actors stand to 
gain or lose as a result of the reforms being rolled out.  
	  
Downward accountability- The ability of citizens living within the geographical 
jurisdiction of a local government to sanction leaders through elections. This also 
includes the responsibility of elected or appointed leaders to act in the interest of local 
citizens, and not to be limited to a particular group such as their own political party.  
	  
Development Planning- The process through which local governments articulate 
district development plans which are based on local preferences and priorities. As a 
process this provides opportunities for interface between technocrats, politicians, and 
citizens.  
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1.7 Outline of chapters 
	  
This thesis has seven chapters. Chapter one is the introduction to the study and 
presents the overall research purpose, research approach, research questions, and 
contributions of the study.  
 
Chapter two reviews the critical literature on decentralisation. This chapter reviews 
three strands of literature on neopatrimonial state, rise of good governance, and 
decentralisation. This chapter also analyses the relationship between decentralisation, 
good governance and neopatrimonialism.  
 
Chapter three has two parts. The first part analyses the neopatrimonial characteristics 
of the Malawi state and focuses on the rule of the three men (Kamuzu Banda, Muluzi 
and wa Mutharika) between 1960s and 2012. The second part focuses on the 
background to decentralisation in Malawi and explores the evolution of reforms 
beginning from colonial period to the present. This chapter also explains in detail the 
type of reforms that are being implemented under the banner of democratic 
decentralisation.  
 
Chapter four discusses the methodology used in this study. It explains the research 
design and the data collection methods used. This study used a qualitative single case 
study design that was complemented by national level data collection through in 
depth interviews. Finally this chapter also provides a description of Salima district 
that was selected as a case worth studying.  
	  
Chapters five and six present the findings and interpretation to the findings. Chapter 
five focuses on the findings from the case study at district level. Chapter six provides 
an interpretation to the findings and focuses on a larger picture by examining the 
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relationship between what is going on at district level to the interests and actions at 
national level. Chapter six shows that the reforms at district level cannot be separated 
from the action or non-action at central level.  
	  
Finally chapter seven is the conclusion to the study. This chapter focuses on two main 
areas: firstly it offers a critical examination of the current structure of local 
government in Malawi; and secondly it examines the key interests in the pursuit of 
reforms in Malawi and provides some reflections on the prospects for devolution 
(democratic decentralisation) in Malawi. It also briefly examines how wa Mutharika’s 
successor, Joyce Banda has approached decentralisation reforms.  
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Chapter	  Two	  
2.	  The	  African	  Neopatrimonial	  State,	  Good	  Governance	  Agenda,	  
and	  Decentralisation:	  Literature	  review	  	  
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides critical review of literature on three strands: (i) 
neopatrimonialism and the African state, (ii) the rise of the good governance agenda, 
(iii) and the emergence of new decentralisation reforms in the 1990s. The review also 
examines the connections between these strands of literature.  
 
Decentralisation re-emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s as part of the good 
governance agenda, which is largely driven by donors, both multilateral and bilateral. 
Numerous countries in Sub Saharan Africa have adopted decentralisation as part of 
institutional reforms to address the inefficiencies of the centralised state. In contrast to 
the reforms in the 1970s the current decentralisation efforts are viewed as more 
comprehensive and they are linked to elected local governments, which have a certain 
degree of autonomy and are accountable downwards. Under the current reforms 
efficiency is considered to be a product of these democratic local governments. 
However, as it will be demonstrated in this chapter many of the reforms in Africa are 
experiencing what Wunsch (2001) has referred to as ‘re-centralisation’. This literature 
review will show that there is dominance of central interests that characterise the way 
reforms are rolled out at local level.  
 
The challenges facing decentralisation (with re-centralisation) are not unique, and 
represent the key limitation with the good governance agenda. Based on the literature 
reviewed here some countries such as Malawi are experiencing challenges with 
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democratic decentralisation largely due to neopatrimonial characteristics of the state. 
In several countries implementing reforms in Africa, the centre is threatened by 
prospects to open up the space at local level for the opposition to thrive. They are also 
reluctant with reforms because decentralisation can lead to transfer of vital resources 
to the local level. These resources are needed by the centre for accumulation of 
personal wealth, as well as to service patronage relationships.  
 
This chapter is divided into three sections (based on the three strands outlined above). 
The first section analyses the origins and characteristics of neopatrimonial state, and 
relates this to the literature on African state as well as the rise of developmental states. 
The second section deals with the emergence of the good governance agenda. The 
third section discusses definition and forms of decentralisation, and how 
decentralisation relates to the good governance agenda as well as the neopatrimonial 
state in Africa.  
 
2.1 Neopatrimonialism: Definition, origins, characteristics 
	  
Neopatrimonialism as a concept has been overstretched to explain all sorts of political 
and economic problems across Africa and in other regions in the world. According to 
Mkandawire (2013: 6), the concept has become ‘the convenient, all purpose and 
ubiquitous moniker for African governance’. Erdmann and Engel (2006: 18) define 
neopatrimonialism as: 
 ‘..a mixture of two partly interwoven types of domination that co-exist namely, 
patrimonial, and legal rational bureaucratic domination. Under neopatrimonialism the 
distinction between public and private at least formally exists and is accepted, and 
public preference can be made to this distinction. Neopatrimonialism takes place 
within the framework of and with claim to legal rational bureaucracy or modern 
stateness. The two spheres, patrimonial domination and legal rational bureaucratic 
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domination are not separated from each other, quite on the contrary they permeate 
each other.’  
 
As demonstrated in the definition above by Erdmann and Engel (2006) 
neopatrimonialism has its origins in the Weberian ideal types of states- 
patrimonialism and rational-legal. Weber used the term patrimonialism to separate 
traditional forms of political authority, domination and legitimacy from the modern 
ones (O’Neill 2007). Informal relationships and rules are the norm in patrimonial 
states. A patron usually presents gifts from private resources to followers in order to 
obtain their loyalty. Thus clients in this relationship receive material benefits and 
protection (von Soest 2006: 7; Booth et al 2006: 9). According to von Soest (2010) 
the relationship between the patron and the clients (followers) is unequal. Rothchild 
(1986) has referred to this relationship as the ‘hegemonic exchange’. In contrast to 
this patrimonial state, in rational-legal states, there is clear separation of public and 
private spheres, and formal institutions and rules guide relationships between 
individuals and organisations. The Weberian ideal types have been ‘pivotal to our 
understanding of development of modern state, and have provided a rich source of 
theory for understanding the modern African politics’ (O’Neill 2007: 2). 
 
According to O’Neill (2007: 2) the term ‘neopatrimonialism’ was first used by 
Eisenstadt (1973) to distinguish patrimonialism in traditional and modern context. 
The basis for neopatrimonialism is that no state in the modern era has pure 
patrimonial tendencies that were outlined by Weber. Neopatrimonialism characterises 
states where patrimonial practices occupy the realm of informal institutions that exist 
alongside formal, legal-rational institutions (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). 
Erdmann and Engel (2006: 17) have pointed out that ‘all attempts to describe 
neopatrimonialism focus on the same complex question- the relationship between 
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patrimonial domination on one hand and legal rational bureaucratic domination on the 
other’. According to Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 62) Weber’s ideal types of 
patrimonial and rational-legal states operate simultaneously in the neopatrimonial 
state. In these states the line between public and private resources is almost non-
existent. Patrons who are largely office holders use public funds or power to build 
personal following, and this allows them to stay in power (Thierkildsen 2005: 37). 
The informal practices are deeply embedded in the state to such an extent that they 
overshadow the formal practices. The dominance of patronage networks is what 
Hyden (2007: 219) has referred to as ‘Weberian deficit’. However, there is no 
agreement in literature on the extent to which the informal practices dominate the 
formal realm of the state. Erdmann and Engel (2006: 17) have argued that the 
tendency amongst some scholars is to tilt the concept too far towards patrimonialism 
and to minimise the legal-rational aspect. Any meaningful conceptualisation of the 
concept must treat both types of domination equally from the beginning (Erdmann 
and Engel 2006: 17).  	  
According to Von Soest (2010: 6) in neopatrimonial states even the president who 
himself/ herself qualifies as a patron cannot change this pattern as s/he pleases since 
other actors rely on and expect these neopatrimonial exchanges. Therefore, the 
neopatrimonial practices are self-perpetuating with followers and other elites 
rewarding only those patrons that bestow gifts and other favours on them.  
 
Neopatrimonial states have weak legal regime (Cammack 2007a). In these states 
formal rules- constitution, laws and behavioral norms- exist and may even be well 
articulated or written down. However, they are weakly applied. One way to ensure 
that rules do not work properly is to ‘suffocate’ institutions that are responsible for 
their application. In many of the neopatrimonial states institutions such as judiciary, 
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watchdog institutions, parliaments, police, media and civic organisations are weak 
(Cammack 2007a: 10). Sometimes the leader captures these institutions, for example 
through his/ her control of the appointment and dismissal process or through 
patronage and clientelist practices (Cammack 2007a: 1). It is also the case that these 
institutions will simultaneously provide services under different set of rules. For 
instance, it does not mean that all drivers’ licenses will only be processed based on 
the neopatrimonial logic. Many people could still be accessing these through formal 
rules and systems.  
 
2.1.1 Elements of the neopatrimonial states 
 
O’Neill (2007) has outlined four elements of the neopatrimonial states. These are: 
institutional hybridity, existence of both patrimonial and legal-rational institutions, 
relative importance of formal and informal institutions, and institutional 
incompatibility.  
 
(i) Hybrid Institutions 
Informal institutions exist in all states, whether in Africa, Asia or the west. These 
informal institutions exist alongside formal institutions. The difference is that in 
neopatrimonial states informal norms and practices are dominant as compared to the 
formal legal-rational rules or institutions (O’Neill 2007: 3). In rational-legal states 
formal rules and institutions regulate relationships between individuals, and between 
leaders and citizens.  
 
(ii) Existence of both patrimonial and legal rational institutions 
O’Neill (2007: 3) stresses that patrimonial practices make use of the rational-legal 
institutions in neopatrimonial states. One of the characteristics of neopatrimonial 
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states is the existence of the formal rational legal institutions (no matter how 
dysfunctional they are) and elite commitment (which may be rhetoric) to separation of 
public and private spheres, alongside informal patrimonial practices (O’Neill 2007: 
3).  
 
(iii) Relative importance of formal and informal institutions 
All modern states exhibit practices that can be ‘characterised as patrimonial’ (O’Neill 
2007: 3). What separates neopatrimonial states from the rational legal ones is the 
dominance of the patrimonial logic (Chabal and Daloz 1999). In these states personal 
networks are more important than bureaucratic rules (Hyden 2007: 219). 
 
(iv) Institutional incompatibility 
In stable polities complementary formal and informal institutions usually govern the 
rules of the game (O’Neill 2007: 3). What distinguishes neopatrimonial states is the 
lack of mutually agreed set of predictable rules, and formal and informal rules are 
often contradictory (O’Neill 2007: 3). According to Leftwich (2000), this creates 
uncertainty about which rules will be enforced since there is contestation about the 
legitimacy of rules of the game.  
 
2.1.2 Characteristics/ Features of neopatrimonial state 
 
Neopatrimonial states have three characteristics as follows: (i) personalism and 
systematic concentration of political power in the patron, (ii) the primacy of vertical 
over horizontal ties, and (iii) use of state resources for political legitimation. These 
three features are described next.  
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(i) Personalism and concentration of power 
In neopatrimonial states there is concentration of power in one individual who acts as 
the patron or ‘big man’. This patron resists delegating all but the most trivial decision 
making to others around him (and rarely her) (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 63). In 
these states the patron/ big man is usually the president. According to O’Neill (1997: 
3) and Cammack (2007b: 600), personalism saturates neopatrimonial states and 
expresses itself both in the form of leadership, which is largely ‘presidentialism’, and 
in the nature of power and relations throughout society.  
 
Scholars such as von Soest (2006: 8) have pointed out that one of the dominant 
characteristics of neopatrimonial states is that the patron stays in power until the end 
of his/ her life (von Soest 2006: 8). To protect their positions and to extend their 
clientelist networks the patrons will usually rotate the political elite, for example the 
cabinet (Snyder 1992: 392). Thus there is usually long tenure for presidents and short 
tenure for other government officials (von Soest 2006: 9). However, this argument no 
longer holds for most of the countries in sub Saharan Africa where emerging 
democracies since the early 1990s have introduced terms limits. For example, in 
countries such as Zambia, Malawi, Kenya, Namibia, Mozambique, and several others 
term limits are now generally respected. However, in these countries the 
neopatrimonial state is not diminishing. Instead, patrons are adapting to the new 
environments, for example by using their terms to accumulate massive private 
resources and also putting in place policies that allow them to exercise patronage long 
after they have left office. One area where patrons are increasingly exercising 
influence is the choice of successors—the purpose is to identify those that will be 
loyal to them.  
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In neopatrimonial states the regulatory environment tends to be weak and is 
‘incapable’ of controlling the dominant patron such that if his/ her leadership is poor 
s/he has the space and freedom to do more damage (Cammack 2007a: 1). Since power 
is concentrated in one person the patron is able ‘to dominate the state apparatus and 
stand above its laws’ (O’Neill 2007: 4). Sandbrook (1985) and Medard (1982) have 
referred to the patron as the ‘big man’ or ‘strong man’, hence the rise of ‘big man 
syndrome’ in reference to the nature of power relations in such states. In 
neopatrimonial states, these ‘big men’ award personal favours to other elite members 
in order to secure their rule. In other countries this is done through expanding the 
cabinet to accommodate a large number of individuals (van de Walle 2001: 32-33). 
For example, von Soest (2006) found out that between 1964 and 2006 the cabinet in 
Zambia had grown from 14 to 23 ministers. President Chiluba who came to power in 
1991 following the transition to multiparty form of government formed a cabinet with 
25 members. A year later this went up to 28 posts (Carey 2002: 60). In contrast, most 
developed countries with larger populations and economies are governed by lean 
cabinets with 15-20 ministers (OECD 2004: 2).  
 
In neopatrimonial states big men (patrons) make decisions about resources. These 
patrons are linked with ‘small big men’ through informal networks that stretch outside 
the formal state, and they ‘follow logic of personal and particularist interest rather 
than national betterment’ (Cammack 2007b: 600). The patron and his/her allies use 
private or personal networks to allocate state resources such as bureaucratic positions, 
and powers to allocate rents, provide services and determine policies and beneficiaries 
(Booth et al 2006; Hyden 2007: 219).   
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(ii) The dominance of vertical over horizontal ties 
Neopatrimonial states are also characterised by weak class formation and individuals 
tend to maintain vertical relationships and/ or those based on primordial ties (kinship, 
ethnicity or religion) (O’Neill 2007: 3). Combined with the weak separation of public 
and private spheres the dominance of vertical ties lead to systematic clientelism found 
within neopatrimonial states (O’Neill 2007: 3). O’Neill (2007: 3) has referred to 
clientelism as the ‘zero sum nature’ of neopatrimonial competition for state power. 
This makes it crucial for both the patron (‘big man’) and clients to maintain their 
relationship; for the patron because of the need to maintain an adequate support base 
to stay in power, and for the clients, because of reliable and universal public goods 
and services, and safety nets that they are able to receive in such a relationship (Le 
Vine 1980). The informal networks in these states stretch all the way from the top to 
the bottom and connect ‘big men’, members of parliament, customary authorities, 
party officials, and government bureaucrats to villagers.  
 
(iii) Weak or no separation of public and private spheres 
In the neopatrimonial state there is weak or no separation of public and private 
spheres. This results in the private appropriation of public sphere and the use of public 
resources to achieve aims such as political legitimacy (O’Neill 2007: 4). Clientelism, 
nepotism, horizontal exchange relationships and corruption are some of the practices 
that exist due to penetration of private sphere in the public domain (O’Neill 2007: 3). 
In these states corruption is one of the manifestations of abuse of resources to 
accumulate private wealth and also to secure loyalty and support for the ruling elites.  
 
In a study of the impact of neopatrimonial practices on tax administration in Zambia, 
von Soest (2006) found that while corruption was rampant the Anti-Corruption 
Commission had remained toothless to counter the systematic misappropriation of 
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public resources. President Chiluba’s government used state resources often to the 
advantage of the ruling party. A number of ministers were involved in corruption 
cases without being dismissed (Von Soest 2006: 12). In Sierra Leone, Stevens’ tenure 
as head of state in the 1970s and early 1980s was characterised by rampant corruption 
as politicians tried to build their personal wealth (Smith 1997). Stevens (and his 
successor Joseph Saidu Momoh) awarded government contracts, business and trading 
permits to party loyalists. The illegal creation of wealth by political elites and the 
awarding of favours to supporters are characteristics of the neopatrimonial state 
(Smith 1997: 58).  
 
The three characteristics discussed here have led to a particular ‘political logic’ 
amongst patrons in neopatrimonial states. Leaders and their opponents use both 
formal and informal institutions, rules and practices to legitimise their authority and 
gain advantage in a ‘winner takes all’ competition for the control of the state (O’Neill 
2007: 4).  
 
2.2 Natural state- understanding the neopatrimonial state 
 
Douglass North et al (2009) has produced ground breaking theoretical work- 
‘violence and social orders’- to contribute to the understanding of the neopatrimonial 
state. North et al has used patterns of social organisation, ‘social orders’ to explain 
how societies transition from one social order to the next. The natural state also called 
‘limited access order’ is a state in which personal relationships, ‘who knows who’, 
form the basis for social organisation and constitute the arena for individual 
interaction, particularly personal relationships among powerful individuals (North et 
al 2009: 2). These natural states limit the ability of individuals to form organisations. 
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The natural state is characterised by slow growing economies which are vulnerable to 
shocks, policies which are developed without the consent of the governed, relatively 
small number of organisations, and smaller and more centralised governments (North 
et al 2009: 12). The dominance of informal ‘personal relationships’ in this natural 
state is similar to the neopatrimonial state.  
 
The opposite of the natural state is the ‘open access order’ in which the state is 
characterised by greater participation of citizens, enjoyment of impersonal political 
rights amongst all citizenry, more transparent institutions, legal support for wide 
range of organisational forms such as political parties and economic organisations, 
political and economic development, rich and vibrant civil society, more decentralised 
governments, rule of law, and widespread impersonal social relationships (North et al 
2009: 2). Open access orders provide public goods and services on an impersonal 
basis while in natural states even something as simple as a driver’s license cannot be 
provided on an impersonal basis (North et al 2009: 11). Very few states such as the 
mature western democracies are in this category of open access orders with the 
majority of states falling into the category of limited access orders. Countries in the 
limited access category can take decades and even hundreds of years before they 
reach the brink of graduating into an open access order. These open access orders are 
similar to Weber’s rational-legal states.  
 
In the natural states powerful individuals align their interests with the interests of 
others with whom they forge dominant coalition (North et al 2009: 13). Reforms in 
such states may not mean institutionalisation of changes. Those who blindly push for 
changes will quickly find that there are greater forces that resist the full 
implementation of such reforms. For instance, existence of elections every four years 
may not inherently produce democracy (North et al 2009: 15). In fact, elite interests 
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may easily be served in the presence of elections and representative assemblies (North 
et al 2009: 257). With reference to the African neopatrimonial state Olowu and 
Wunsch (2003: 18) have argued that establishing free elections, legislatures and 
courts, no matter how well intentioned will not change the underlying conditions of 
the state. Since some of these reforms may threaten the elite interests the dominant 
coalition of elites will do anything to protect access to these privileges.  
 
North et al (2009) has outlined two stages that natural states should meet before they 
can successfully transition into open access. First, natural states must put in place 
institutional arrangements that enable elites to create the possibility of impersonal 
intra-elite relationships. Second, transition will begin when the dominant coalition of 
elites find it in their interest to expand impersonal exchange for rents, and 
institutionalise open elite access to organisations. It can take long time before 
countries knock on the door and events leading to these changes can take centuries as 
countries develop institutions, beliefs and organisations that can sustain the changes. 
A legitimate question can be asked on the extent to which institutions in the West met 
the Weberian standards in the 1800. It is doubtful that democracy and meritocracy 
had been established at this stage. It took several decades (if not centuries) before 
Britain, France and USA arrived at the doorstep in the late 18th century and they made 
the transition successfully between 1800 and 1880 (North et al 2009: 27). For South 
Korea and Taiwan the process seems to have taken about 50 years (North et al 2009: 
27). North et al (2009: 245) has argued that reforms in countries that successfully 
transitioned were a by-product of intra-elite politics rather than as a result of popular 
movement from below. For instance, the formation of rights after the Act of Union 
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between England and Scotland2 in 1707 was as a result of this intra-elite politics. 
Countries also pursue different pathways towards the transition. Countries such as 
USA, France and Britain did not graduate to the open access order along the same 
path or using the same institutions (North et al 2009: 248).  	  
The natural state shares characteristics with the neopatrimonial state, for instance the 
dominance of personal ‘informal’ rules over formal ones, and the centralisation of 
power in ruling elites.  In the natural state public policy has to be understood from the 
perspective of what incentives such reforms offer for ruling elites and their allies. 
Based on these incentives, ruling elites can either capture/ distort or commit to 
reforms. The literature on natural state also provides an additional perspective. 
Reforms are likely to work if they focus on building a coalition of influential elites 
that can relate with the benefits of such reforms and are committed to pursue or push 
for these reforms. In these states it is less likely for the masses to demand for changes 
due to the oppressive nature of these neopatrimonial, limited access states. Douglass 
North’s natural state also demonstrates that changes if pursued in the correct order can 
occur but need to be given adequate time. Furthermore, in contrast to the literature on 
neopatrimonial state, the natural state has provided critical conditions that can lead 
countries to graduate to ‘open access orders’.  
	  
2.3 Neopatrimonialism and the African State 
 
Neopatrimonialism has been used as a universal concept to explain the challenges 
facing the African state ranging from economic crises to democratic problems. 
Proponents of neopatrimonialism such as Englebert (2000) and van de Walle (2001) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Act of union was passed by the English and Scottish parliaments in 1707 and it led 
to the creation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain.	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have argued that there are distinct characteristics that separate governance in the 
African state from countries in other regions of the world. Neopatrimonialism is an 
institutional characteristic of African regimes (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). 
According to von Soest (2006: 1) this African state is characterised by lack of 
separation between public and private sphere, and this negatively affects the state’s 
capacity to deliver goods and services effectively.  
 
Neopatrimonialism in Africa emerged due to the political and economic pressures that 
modernity presented for pre-modern societies (see: O’Neill 2007: 4; Beekers and van 
Gool 2012; Erdmann and Engel 2006). According to O’Neill (2007: 4) postcolonial 
African societies were faced with two forces. First, there was pressure to create a 
modern nation state including formation of necessary centralised structures of power 
and administration. Secondly, there was pressure that arose due to the global spread of 
capitalism and penetration of market economies in Africa. African societies were 
unable to cope effectively with these dual forces of modernity (O’Neill 2007: 4). 
Erdmann and Engel (2006: 19) have argued that at independence the legal rational 
sphere was still limited to the centre of power- the capital. The newly independent 
states begun expanding administrative structures in order to penetrate and provide 
services to various parts of the territories. However these were ‘challenged and 
invaded from above and below by informal relationships’ (Erdmann and Engel 2006: 
19).  
	  
The section below explores the rise of neopatrimonial state in Africa and analyses its 
characteristics.  
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2.3.1 Colonial state, and effects on neopatrimonialism 
 
The colonial state was a superficial imposition on what were previously decentralised 
but hierarchical societies. It was designed to serve the interests of particular colonial 
interests powers including the protection of colonial economic interests, extraction of 
minerals and other natural resources and maintenance of order (O’Neill 2007: 6). 
According to Lawson (2005: 103), the post colonial state did not change the 
underlying social structure. Partly, this was also due to the fact that the colonial state 
had inadequate resources, and therefore the legal rational sphere was mostly limited to 
the centre of power in the colonial capital while in the rest of the country intermediary 
authorities such as chiefs were used to govern the majority of the population (see: 
Erdmann and Engel 2006: 19). In short, African states did not inherit a functioning 
Weberian bureaucracy at independence (O’Neill 2007: 6). And yet, the contemporary 
African regimes are usually judged against the Weber’s modern bureaucracy. Given 
the role of the colonial state in Africa studies that examine the nature of African states 
should also explore in what ways the imposition of the colonial state has had 
implications on how it has evolved. For instance, how did the colonial state deal with 
the informal practices and norms of the previously decentralised but hierarchical 
societies that it found? O’Neill (2007: 6) has pointed out that colonial regimes were 
authoritarian: 
 
‘Political and bureaucratic power was extensive and arbitrary and accountability 
mechanisms that existed were external. Colonial states used patronage extensively 
alongside coercion to ensure compliance or loyalty..’ 
 
O’Neill (2007: 6) 
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The colonial administrations that were set up in Africa were different from the 
Weberian institutions in west. According to Chabal and Daloz (1999), there was little 
effort by the west to ‘transplant’ the western institutions. Instead, the colonial 
machinery sometimes exploited the indigenous system to their advantage the results 
of which have continued into the postcolonial state. For instance, the colonial state co-
opted chiefs into its structure in order to carry out its functions effectively, for 
example on tax collection and maintaining law and order. With the backing of the 
colonial state chiefs became less accountable to their subjects. This has carried on into 
the postcolonial era whereby traditional authorities have the backing of powerful 
central authorities (Kelsall 2008: 7).  
 
There was also weak capitalist class formation during the colonial period, and this left 
a large peasant society (O’Neill 2007:4). In comparison to the colonial state, the 
postcolonial state in Africa remained predominantly agrarian. The African peasantry 
did not develop a common identity, interests or political agency. In short, the 
peasantry did not create a dominant agriculture class. As a result the peasantry has 
largely been organised along vertical lines (O’Neill 2007: 5). Since no substantial 
capitalist class emerged with an independent economic base, the state became the 
primary base for the accumulation of wealth (O’Neill 2007: 5). This has created 
competition amongst political elites as they seek to control the means of earning 
public resources.  
 
At independence the African elites who took over from the colonial rulers only had 
the colonial state model as a frame for reference as they sought to create the 
postcolonial state. The ‘alien’ nature of the colonial state created problems for 
legitimation of power for the new elites (O’Neill 2007: 4). This is what O’Neill 
(2007: 4) has referred to as ‘state artificiality’. Since African elites only had 
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experience with this colonial state, most of its characteristics were maintained after 
independence. However, African elites faced new challenges. The public sector 
lacked financial, human and organisational capacity to deliver. And yet, its role was 
‘increased by the pursuit of state led development in most of Africa’ (O’Neill 2007: 
6). The capability and effectiveness of the state was further undermined by the 
‘suffusion’ of political and administrative structures with patrimonial practices as a 
result of elite contestations for control and consolidation of power, political 
centralisation and the Africanisation of state structures in terms of personnel (O’Neill 
2007: 7).  
 
Therefore, when African elites embarked on nation building they used the tools that 
were available to them (O’Neill 2007: 5). Given these structural challenges (discussed 
above) that African societies faced, personalism and vertical relations constituted a 
key source of social and political capital; and patronage and clientelism was one of 
the few effective tools available to the African elites (O’Neill 2007: 5).  Clientelism 
also provided win-win situation for the wider population. It allowed them to access 
goods and services through familiar existing relations and norms (Brinkerhoff and 
Goldsmith 2012: 11).  
 
The social heterogeneity in many African societies has also made it difficult to build a 
functioning nation state modeled on the west. African countries are made up of 
populations that are ethnically diverse (O’Neill 2007: 5). This has meant that 
‘communal but sectarian identity is primary, and this undermines the formation of any 
form of national identity and loyalty’ (O’Neill 2007: 5). It makes it easier for political 
elites to exploit these divides through use of patronage practices.  
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2.3.2 Ekeh’s primordial and civic publics 
 
Ekeh (1975) has argued that African politics have to be understood in terms of how 
Africans distinguish the two types of public sphere, the primordial public and the 
civic public. Each is characterised by different relationships with the moral principles 
prevailing in the private sphere of a family. The primordial public is made up of the 
individuals’ kinship networks, ethnic group or home village (Booth et al 2006: 17). 
The primordial public is the basis for moral obligations, which are similar to those 
applying within the family. Ekeh (1975) has argued that only the primordial public 
shares common foundation with Africans private morality. On the other hand, the 
civic public which is the public realm of the state is ‘amoral and is therefore not a 
focus of generalised moral imperatives’ (Booth et al 2006: 17). Under the primordial 
public the African citizen acknowledges his/her responsibilities while in the civic 
sphere the emphasis is on his/her rights (O’Neill 2007: 8). In this primordial sphere 
there is a ‘patriarch and he (rarely she) provides for his followers or family, making 
personal donations of food and other resources’ (Kelsall 2008: 7). According to 
Kelsall (2008: 7), it is very difficult to disapprove a leader who nurtures his/her 
clients in this way.  
 
The moral discontinuity between the social order and the state has important and long 
lasting implications. For example, it means that the basic obligation of powerful 
individuals/ dominant patrons to support their relatives and other followers, and of the 
latter to show corresponding support and loyalty has prevailed in most cases within 
the ‘under-formed state’ as well as outside it (Booth et al 2006: 17). Consequently, 
the state has limited capacity to resist capture by patronage and clientelist networks 
(Booth et al 2006: 17). In the African context patronage and clientelist practices are 
only illegal because they are not in line with the ‘imported ideological rational legal 
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government system built on strict separation between private and public spheres’ 
(Kelsall 2008: 11). The lack of fit with local political culture has created incentives 
for rule breaking and opportunities for self enrichment (Kelsall 2008: 11).  
 
 2.3.3 Patronage and clientelism: adapting to evolving circumstances 
 
Patronage and clientelist practices continue to exist in many states in Africa. The 
continued existence of clientelism as a strategy for both elites and poor Africans 
reflects the ability to adapt to new demands and circumstances (O’Neill 2007: 5). 
According to O’Neill (2007: 5), ‘patron-client relations have been fundamentally 
transformed in the process of becoming a mechanism for linking the centre and the 
periphery’. Other scholars such as Migdal (1988) have pointed out that initially 
clientelism had emerged as an essential strategy to address the political and socio-
economic effects of colonialism. According to Migdal (1988), the ‘rapid infiltration of 
market based economies in Africa reduced the effectiveness of kinship based 
strategies which African societies had previously used for survival’. However, this 
rapid penetration of market economies did not provide enough time for evolution of 
new strategies. According to Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2012: 11), the sustained 
dependence on familiar social resources based on existing relations and norms was 
therefore a ‘rational strategy’ based on the reasonable assessment of risk.  
 
According to O’Neill (2007: 6), the neopatrimonial logic can be self-replicating. This 
is because the private accumulation of public resources and clientelism prevents the 
emergence of conditions that are necessary to transform neopatrimonial practices and 
norms. For instance, weakened economies are exacerbated by rampant and 
decentralised rent seeking practices at all levels, and in turn this does not allow for 
significant rise of capitalist or middle classes who rely less on the state for rents. 
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Comparative history suggests that patronage based systems break down as social 
classes are formed through capitalist economic development (Booth et al 2006: 16). 
The emergence of new economic actors upon whom the state relies for taxation 
results in increased calls for the state to be accountable. Yet, as it has been argued 
earlier in most of Africa development of new classes has been slow even with the 
high rates of urbanisation. As a result, both the ruling elites and the wider population 
continue to look to the state as a source of power, goods and services, which in their 
limited amounts lead to patronage and clientelist practices as dominant patrons and 
other elites seek to secure support and loyalty from their supporters. 
 
Patronage and clientelist practices are also widespread in the African bureaucracies. 
In fact, scholars such as Cammack (2007b: 601) has argued that bureaucracies in 
Africa are deliberately structured to meet the interests of the dominant patron and the 
ruling elites. Politicians are well aware of the importance of a well functioning, 
independent and meritocratic state bureaucracy in delivering national development 
policies. However, such bureaucracy, if it existed, would be ‘less pliable and 
politically reliable and more likely to expose abuses’ (Cammack 2007b: 601). So 
what appears to the outsiders, as a weak bureaucracy is in fact an efficient one that 
allows ruling elites at the centre to maximise rent-seeking practices.  	  
2.3.4 ‘Big man syndrome’ in Africa 
 
African neopatrimonial states are characterised by big men who are usually presidents 
and they tend to stay longer in power than their counterparts in Asia and Latin 
America (Bienen and van de Walle 1992: 693). As already pointed out, the trend has 
been that these leaders stay in power for long and sometimes until the end of their 
lives. In Zambia von Soest (2006) noted that the average tenure for the three 
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presidents (Kaunda, Chiluba and Mwanawasa) was 14 years. This is more than the 
11.6 years that African leaders have on average managed to stay in power from 1980 
to 2005 (van de Walle 2005: 74). In Malawi the average tenure for the three 
presidents (Banda, Muluzi and Mutharika) has been 16 years. While these long 
tenures were true in the 1970s and 1980s with life presidents like Banda in Malawi, 
Kaunda in Zambia, and Moi in Kenya, such life long terms are increasingly becoming 
rare. This has mostly been due to the rise of democratic forms of governments (at 
least on paper) since the 1990s, which have brought in periodic elections (regardless 
of the quality of such elections). Democracy has changed how the patrons maintain 
patronage and power. As was already argued, the interest has now shifted towards 
accumulation of ‘adequate private resources’ during the legal terms, and also trying to 
influence succession so that one can still have significant informal powers when s/he 
is out of office. There are few leaders remaining such as Mugabe in Zimbabwe and 
Museveni in Uganda who still conform to this description of life long ‘big men’. In 
few exceptional cases, for example, Muluzi in Malawi in the 1990s, leaders have tried 
to change the constitution to prolong their terms.  
 
O’Neill (2007:4) suggests that ‘big men’ in African need an additional element of 
‘charisma’ which is used to legitimise their authority. ‘The hierarchical nature of 
many African societies and the dominance of patron-clientelist relations mean that 
personalism and ‘big man- small man’ dyads tend to be replicated at and link all 
levels of society (O’Neill 2007: 4). This ‘big man’ draws on traditional rural concepts 
of leadership and dependence and in some cases a mixture of international ideologies 
(Booth et al 2006: 9; Olowu and Wunsch 2003: 19). 
 
Patrons and other elites depend on state resources (including aid) to accumulate 
private income. Losing an election for these powerful individuals and other elites 
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connected to them may mean a return to the village, obscurity and relative poverty 
(Cammack 2007b: 601). Although it has not come out in literature, it is the 
observation of the researcher that recent trends in Africa suggest that one of the 
reasons why big men try to influence succession is to ensure that they can exercise 
informal influence over new patrons who in return for ‘being handed over the seat’ 
will shield them from prosecution—on abuse/misuse of public resources. Recent 
trends in Malawi and Zambia have seen previous presidents (Chiluba in Zambia and 
Muluzi in Malawi) being arrested for abuse of public resources. Since most presidents 
in Africa now have to operate within a specific number of constitutional terms the 
fear of prosecution might provide great incentives to retain informal power through 
other means- putting a family member or a trustworthy lieutenant in office. Such 
actions might also allow the patrons to still exercise influence over state affairs, and 
accumulation of wealth. This area requires further study. 
 
Neopatrimonialism has affected public sector in Africa in several other ways. 
According to O’Neill (2007: 7) ambiguous application of rules greatly influences 
leadership style and this sets the tone for the entire state apparatus. Migdal (1988) has 
argued that the governance in Africa is characterised by the ‘politics of survival’ and 
this produced a ‘calculus of pressure’, which influences the incentives for public 
servants. In these neopatrimonial states resource allocations by bureaucratic actors are 
influenced by ‘relationships of accommodation and the relative bargaining power of 
these actors vis a vis their peers such as other bureaucratic or political actors’ (O’Neill 
2007: 7). In the case of decentralised governments, ‘local strong men’ can also be 
influential in determining the resource allocations by these bureaucratic actors 
(O’Neill 2007: 7).  In most instances, political actors have influence over 
appointments in the bureaucracy. In such contexts rational-legal operations according 
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to formal rules are difficult due to this wide spread use of political, and not always 
meritorious appointments (O’Neill 2007: 7).  So while formal rules exist, bureaucratic 
actors may be prone to informal pressures that may force them to act in ways that 
serve those that have power over them.  
	  
Patronage and clientelist practices heavily influence the design of public policies in 
the African neopatrimonial states. For instance, clientelist relations have an effect on 
who is recruited and the distribution of rents amongst various elites. Bratton and van 
de Walle (1997) have pointed out that due to patronage and clientelist practices some 
regimes have employed ‘state interventionist models’ in order to extend control and 
have greater scope for corruption and generation of rents. Ruling elites ensure that 
policy is driven by the need to service patronage networks of one kind or another 
(Booth et al 2006: 9: Hyden 2007: 219).  
 
2.4 Neopatrimonialism and developmental states 	  
The economic miracle of countries in South East and East Asia has provided the basis 
for new literature on developmental states. The comparison of Africa with these Asian 
countries provides an opportunity to examine whether some types of neopatrimonial 
practices are more developmental than others. In the 1960s most African countries 
had per capita incomes that were higher than those of South East and East Asian 
nations. However, in the subsequent decades African incomes have grown only very 
slowly or stagnated while in several East Asian and South East Asian countries per 
capita incomes have climbed steeply (Kelsall et al 2010: 3). According to Kelsall et al 
(2010: 3), if the narrative about development in Africa is correct then we should 
expect to find that neopatrimonial practices did not exist in the Asian countries and 
that was the reason for their strong economic performance. However, the opposite is 
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true. Democracy has been weak in a number of Asian countries. Large areas of the 
bureaucracy have been personalised and rent seeking and corruption have ‘flourished’ 
(Kelsall et al 2010: 3). These Asian countries have been neopatrimonial states. 
Countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand have or are about to 
become middle-income countries (Kelsall et al 2010: 3). In contrast, many of the 
African countries that experienced growth in the 1960s went through a period of 
economic decline in the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
Therefore, the relationship between neopatrimonialism and development appears to 
be more complex and worth investigating further. Indonesia provides a good example 
of an Asian neopatrimonial state. During the first decade of Sukarno’s rule the 
country went through a period of political crises and economic mismanagement that 
rivaled periods of ‘misrule’ on the African continent (Kelsall et al 2010: 4). The army 
took over control from Sukarno and subdued the population and crashed the 
communist party. General Suharto begun to build a stable state not based on the 
Weberian rational-legal bureaucracy, but on personal exchange of rent seeking 
opportunities between him, the military and business (Kelsall et al 2010: 4). Military 
officers, their wives, brothers and cousins, together with Suharto family itself entered 
into private business in conjunction with commercially skilled indo-chinese 
immigrants (Crouch 1979: 577). As a result a new class emerged, of ‘political-
business families’ (Hadiz and Robison 2005: 224), and they built large business 
empires.  
 
Despite the rent seeking, waste and corruption the business firms performed well and 
the economy grew. According to Kelsall et al (2010: 5), the Indonesian economic 
model was ‘wasteful, politically authoritarian, and destructive to the environment’, 
but its growth potential cannot be denied. Crouch (1979: 579) has argued that 
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Indonesia appears to confirm the idea that in the early stages patrimonial practices 
need not be a stumbling block to capitalist economic development. Between 1966 and 
1977 Indonesia was one of the fastest growing economies in the world with mining, 
agriculture, oil and timber ‘booming’ (Kelsall et al 2010: 5). Kelsall et al (2010: 5) 
has provided several reasons why Indonesia did not collapse into a weak state as 
many of the regimes in Africa have been characterised. First, it was the way rent 
seeking and corruption were organised. The centre was able to have monopoly over 
rent seeking and corruption due to strong monitoring and enforcement. It prevented 
individuals from acting independently and ensured that a large share of the rents went 
upwards to the top (Kelsall et al 2010: 5). In contrast, where rent seeking and 
corruption is decentralised to all levels, there are a lot of competing agents, each 
trying to get maximum revenue possible. In this scenario, officials aim at maximising 
their own take with little or no regard on the effect of their practices on the economy 
as a whole (Kelsall et al 2010: 5). In the case of Indonesia, the potential damaging 
impact of neopatrimonialism was controlled by the centralisation of patronage: 
 
‘Clientelist pressures and corruption did not spin out of control, Suharto took the 
view that regime survival and his own personal fortune depended upon long term 
economic growth, so that when corrupt rents were extracted from the system it was 
with a view for the long term’ 
 
Kelsall et al (2010: 6). 
 
Kelsall et al (2010: 6) suggests that Asian states such as Indonesia have not 
necessarily been less patrimonial, rent seeking or corrupt than African states. 
However, the difference has been on the nature of patrimonial practices that existed in 
Asia.  Khan (2000: 21-22) has pointed out that managing development may require 
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ongoing discrimination of efficient from inefficient rents by policy makers and 
analysts. Some work in Africa has focused on similar issues. According to Allen 
(1995), not all African states were dysfunctional, and more stable and successful 
economies had endured by introducing forms of centralised bureaucracy which while 
retaining forms of neopatrimonialism managed to prevent competition for rents or 
spoils from reaching the damaging levels.  
 
Kelsall et al (2010: 8) suggests that there are countries in Africa that went through 
periods of long horizon, centralised rent systems. Some of these countries are Malawi 
(1961-1978), Kenya (1965-1975), and Ghana (1957-1966; and 1981-1992). Malawi, 
Kenya and Ghana (1981-1992) achieved strong economic performances during these 
periods even when they were under heavily centralised and neopatrimonial regimes 
(Kelsall et al 2010: 12). In contrast, ruling elites in countries such as Malawi (1994-
2004), Rwanda (1962-1973), Cote d’Ivoire (1975-1980) and Uganda (1971-1986) 
focused heavily on rent seeking practices that maximised benefits for the short term 
and ignored the long term effects of such plunder. Rent seeking was also heavily 
decentralised. As a result these countries achieved poor economic performances 
during these periods since rent seeking at various levels depleted resources vital for 
promoting growth (Kelsall et al 2010: 12). Since 2000 Rwanda has been one of the 
models of economic success in Africa. According to Kelsall et al (2010: 21), Rwanda 
has focused on putting the right institutions in place even though its human rights 
record has not always been perfect. The country under the leadership of Paul Kagame 
has centralised rent utilisation. Kagame, and the ruling party, Rwanda Patriotic Front 
(RPF), have used a private company, Tri-Star Holdings to engage in a systematic 
process of rent utilisation that is centralised and also based on long-term perspective 
(Kelsall et al 2010: 22). This has led to significant gains in the economy.  
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The strong economic performance of some neopatrimonial states in Africa (during 
certain periods) has led scholars such as Kelsall et al (2010: 22) to coin the term 
‘developmental patrimonialism’ to categorise these countries where neopatrimonial 
practices have led to significant gains in the economy. However, there is a word of 
caution. While in South East and East Asia regimes with neopatrimonial practices 
have promoted economic growth, in Africa the situation had been less hopeful. 
Kelsall et al (2010: 27) has argued that the conditions in which developmental 
patrimonialism emerge are rare. It seems the model depends on existence of skillful 
leaders with personal authority to put in place a system for centralising rents. The 
leader must have a long-term vision, and should balance ‘the political and economic 
demands of rent creation and distribution, allocating adequate rents both to growth 
spots and to political rivals with the potential to hinder growth through instability’ 
(Kelsall et al 2010: 27). Kelsall et al (2010: 27) also suggests that a well functioning 
system for stable transfer of power must be in place in order to avert ‘growth 
damaging succession crises’. However, developmental neopatrimonialism has also 
not been popular due to its links with dictatorial one party system in Africa. In the 
Rwanda case there is a dominant party regime, which is well known for its political 
intolerance (Kelsall et al 2010: 27).  
	  
2.5 Critique of Neopatrimonialism 	  
One of the main criticisms of the term neopatrimonialism is that it has been over-used 
to explain all the problems facing the African state. Wai (2012:31) has pointed out 
that every failure in Africa seems to be blamed on a crisis of neopatrimonialism. It 
has become a ‘catch all’ framework for analysing African states. Although the 
concept has been applied widely to describe the state in Africa neopatrimonialism has 
not received adequate analysis with regard to its relevance for understanding African 
	   52	  
politics (Erdmann and Engel 2006: 1). This ‘uncritical use of the concept is 
problematic’ (Erdman and Engel 2006: 1). There is also a tendency to ignore the 
extent to which other factors have contributed to the slow and sometimes negative 
pace of development in Africa:  
‘Neopatrimonialism portrays African states as aberrant political formations, 
pathological constructs, dysfunctional entities and criminal enterprises which are said 
to be governed by corrupt, tyrannical and authoritarian regimes of big men whose 
greed, rent seeking behaviors and the intense politics of patronage that they engage in 
more than other factors have led to criminalization of the states and stymied its 
development into full blown modern, rational-legal bureaucratic states and capitalist 
economies. Big men have turned functional states bequeathed to the various national 
entities that emerged as independent states into dysfunctional entities’ 
 
Wai (2012: 27) 
 
The concept also tends to focus on the problems and fails to adequately explain many 
periods of ‘growth accelerations’ that some African countries have gone through 
(Mkandawire 2013: 12). From the literature there are differences in terms of how 
African countries have performed over time and in contrast to each other 
(Mkandawire 2013: 41). There are several countries in Africa such as Nigeria, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Kenya, Zambia and Cameroon, and others 
where the logic can explain for example, the lost decades of the 1980s and 1990s 
(Mkandawire 2013: 49). However, use of the concept to explain every problem in 
Africa is problematic. This undermines the effect of other factors including the role of 
external actors.  	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As already argued, one of the problems with how the concept has been used is the fact 
that more emphasis is placed on patrimonialism, and legal-rational aspect is 
minimised. As Erdmann and Engel (2006: 18) have pointed out there is more to 
African politics than just personalisation/ privatization of formal relations. Not all 
political and administrative decisions are based on ‘informal rules determined by 
private or personal gusto’ (Erdmann and Engel 2006: 18). However, this is not to say 
that there are no cases where public goods are provided based on informal rules and 
networks. By treating neopatrimonialism equally from the beginning  (see Erdmann 
and Engel 2006: 17), one also acknowledges that some of the challenges in Africa 
might actually be caused by many other factors. The problem is that by focusing 
narrowly on the dominance of patrimonial logic, many aspects of Africa’s 
underdevelopment are given a ‘cultural twist’ (Mkandawire 2013: 50). Uncritical use 
of neopatrimonialism ignores many of the real problems that contribute to Africa’s 
underdevelopment; ‘corruption, vertical and horizontal inequality, ethnic and gender 
discrimination, weak state capacity, weak ideas, political chicanery, and the 
machinations of the many external actors that still seek to exploit Africa’ 
(Mkandawire 2013: 50-51).  
 
Neopatrimonialism is problematic because as a single conceptual framework it tries to 
explain ‘multiplicity of complex and varied socio-political realities and in doing this 
makes the concept impossibly elastic, and having a never ending appetite to explain 
everything from the form of the state to the nature of politics and behavior of political 
elites through economic performance, processes of accumulation and economic rent 
distribution as well as development practices and failures’. (Wai 2012: 32). The 
application of neopatrimonialism has also ignored the uniqueness of African history 
and how this might explain the way things happen. Wai (2012: 32) has argued that 
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‘there is an inability to come to terms with the specificity of the African historical 
reality and as a result proponents of neopatrimonialism school of thought have 
resorted to this problematic, eurocentic evolutionist lenses that compares African 
states to the evolution of western states and societies’. Wai (2012: 33) has referred to 
this as ‘vulgar universalism’ that disregards the specific historical context that African 
countries have gone through and which is largely different from that experienced by 
the western countries. There are still key questions around what role the history of 
countries has played in the formation of the current state in Africa.  
 
Neopatrimonialism has also made extensive use of the term ‘big man’ to refer to 
dominant patrons who engage in patronage and clientelist networks with their 
supporters. While this term might have been appropriate in the 1970s and 1980s in 
Africa its continued use needs to be revisited. Two women presidents have emerged 
in Africa since 2000 (in Liberia and Malawi) and this makes the term redundant 
particularly where these women leaders portray the same characteristics as the 
dominant patrons. This study will show that in the case of Malawi although the 
female president is new in office she is already portraying signs of a dominant patron. 
Hence the study uses the term ‘big woman’ alongside the ‘big man’. By extension 
‘small big men’ needs to be extended to also acknowledge women who are emerging 
as key actors at national and local level.  
 
There is also a tendency to criticise African states for poor performance without 
regard for how long such reforms took in the west. For instance, in the United States 
(US), the US civil war occurred about 100 years after the revolutionary and US 
independence. Yet, the US civil war is seen as a critical moment in the evolution of 
the state as a political formation and not as a moment of failure (Wai 2012: 34). In 
France the French revolution is considered as the single most important moment in 
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the formation of the modern French state. However, between 1789 and 1870 France 
was in a permanent state of turmoil, civil strife and political unrest (Wai 2012: 34). 
This did not quality the French state as a failed one during this period.  
 
It is also worth pointing out that no state has met the Weberian ideal types. Le Vine 
(1980) has argued that the Weberian ideal types do not present a clear fit with any 
existing states. Weber regarded his ideal types as ‘abstract methodological and 
explanatory devices and not as a description of any empirically grounded or actual 
existing reality’ (Wai 2012: 34; O’Neill 2007: 2). There is a risk in turning these 
constructions into real states and ‘presumptive norms’ of state rationality constructed 
and based on the ‘specific rendition of history which ignores the specificity of the 
African context in preference for the west’s historical independence as the universal 
form’ (Wai 2012: 34). The ideal types in themselves are not wrong. However, the 
limitation is that as model patterns there is little attention to variations or detail 
(Kelsall et al 2010: 2). Kelsall et al (2010: 2) has pointed out that such 
neopatrimonialism lends itself to simplistic understanding and misleading political 
implications largely due to limited focus on variations or details. There are also very 
little clues given about how a state can transition from neopatrimonial to rational-
legal model (Kelsall et al 2010: 2). O’Neill (2007: 12) has argued that this framework 
is limited because it tends to focus on obstacles to reforms. It fails to articulate the 
conditions that can ‘instigate and consolidate’ reforms under such circumstances 
(O’Neill 2007: 12).  
 
The other implication of this framework is that it focuses on the internal dynamics as 
the causes of the problems and ignores the influence of other factors, some of which 
might be external. Therefore, the solution offered is to follow the western model- 
political, social, cultural and knowledge systems (Wai 2012: 40): 
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‘It legitimises ongoing imperial power relations and impulses as the west intervenes 
and pursues its aim of controlling and shaping histories and destinies of these 
societies by imposing its preferred political, social and economic policies and systems 
on them.’ 
Wai (2012: 40) 
Other scholars such as Kjaer (2004) have argued that in trying to understand the 
challenges facing the African state there is need to examine other institutional factors 
that ‘transcend the neopatrimonial logic’. For instance, how can we explain the 
variations in economic performance between neopatrimonial states in Africa and Asia 
(South East and East), as well as between states in Africa? Kjaer (2004) suggests that 
the ability of patrons to be reformers depend on the nature of institutions and this is 
not particular to neopatrimonialism only. Kjaer has used a ‘new broom thesis’ to 
categorise leadership in two camps as follows: (i) Not all new leaders are reformers 
and their options are expanded or limited by the nature of their support base and their 
institutional legacy; and (ii) Not all old leaders are powerless to reform- their ability 
to carry out reforms is influenced by the strengths of formal institutional 
arrangements including the existence of a strong party and stable succession rules 
which reduce their reliance on patronage based support strategies, and in turn allows 
them to promote further instititionalisation (O’Neill 2007: 13). Therefore, while 
resistance to reform may be strong within neopatrimonial states there might be 
circumstances (for example during periods of stability or after radical transition) in 
which patrons can support and push through reforms (O’Neill 2007: 13).  
 
O’Neill (2007) suggests use of rational choice analysis alongside neopatrimonialism 
as a framework in order to understand these circumstances and how they produce 
variations in the reform process. The focus of rational choice is on decisions taken by 
potential winners and losers in any given policy change, and it examines how their 
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relative power, knowledge and capacity to organise enables them to block policy 
measures that hinder their interests or lobby for those that promote them (Grindle 
2002). Therefore, incentives to reform can exist even within neopatrimonial states. 
Leaders will usually weigh the benefits of reform or failure to do so, against its costs, 
and this is what may explain the variations in the outcome of reform programmes in 
many African states (O’Neill 2007: 13). Since downward accountability tends to be 
weak in most African states it is the elite arrangements that need to be examined in 
order to identify possible challenges to reforms. O’Neill (2007: 14) has argued that 
this might explain why in such states reforms that do not benefit the state are rarely 
implemented. The rational choice is useful in understanding the various actors 
involved in any reform programme, their powers to act, as well as the interests that 
they have in supporting or hindering reforms. Still studies of neopatrimonial states 
provide us with theoretical comprehension of how elites operate and the logic that 
drives them (Cammack 2007b: 600). According to Erdmann and Engel (2006: 30-31) 
although the concept has many conceptual problems many of the studies that are 
based on neopatrimonialism have come to ‘far reaching conclusions’.  
2.6 The era of governance, good governance and development 
 
This section reviews the emergence of the good governance agenda in the 1980s and 
1990s as a response to address the challenges of the neopatrimonial state in Africa. 
Although the good governance agenda has extended to many developing countries its 
popularity and widespread use should not suggest a clear theoretical or practical 
positioning.  In fact, amongst the supporters of the concept there seems to be no 
agreement in how to define it or its elements. In a way this means that developing 
countries have to deal with multiple and varied agendas that are being pushed by 
various donors under the banner of this ‘good governance agenda’. These differences 
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also complicate how success should be measured with governance indices focusing on 
different indicators often based on how each organisation understand the term and its 
elements. This section analyses these inconsistencies in the definition and application 
of the concept, and explores its limitations in relation to the neopatrimonial state in 
Africa. 
 
The good governance agenda has seen many development countries in Sub Saharan 
Africa and other parts of the world experiencing wide ranging political and economic 
reforms. Good governance programmes have focused on changes in the nature and 
quality of institutions and how these matter in the delivery of policies and 
programmes. Beekers and van Gool (2012: 2) have argued that good governance 
arose in the 1990s due to the renewed interest in the role of a strong state in 
development- this has been an era of ‘bringing back the role of the state’.  
 
Scholars and development practitioners have played a key role in the emergence of 
good governance as a concept. The latter have been more influential in terms of 
applying the concept in various development programmes (as focus and conditionality 
for aid) in developing countries. From literature reviewed good governance has 
emerged due to the frustrations with the performance of centralised states in Africa 
and elsewhere. According to Grindle (2010: 3), the 1950s to 1970s was an era of a 
‘strong state in development’. For instance, economists contended that the state (in 
poor countries) needed to provide investments that would stimulate economic 
development while political scientists argued that centralised states were needed for 
nation building and political modernisation’ (Grindle 2010: 3). Therefore, both 
economists and political scientists were in agreement on the need for a strong state to 
direct policy and development agenda. By 1970s a lot of questions were raised about 
the effectiveness of the centralised ‘strong’ state. This era was replaced with the 
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‘rolling back of the state’ in the 1970s and early 1980s. This was a period when 
agencies such as the World Bank and IMF were interested in as little government as 
possible (Jenkins and Plowden 2006: 28). 
 
The era of reduced role of the state was short-lived, and by the 1990s development 
economics specialists became more interested in the role of institutions in market 
economies (Grindle 2010: 4). In a 1989 World Development Report, the World Bank 
argued that African development challenges were as result of a ‘crisis of governance’ 
(Jenkins and Plowden 2006: 28). The role of the state was seen as key to social and 
economic development (Hague and Harrop 2007: 9; Hamdok 2003: 16). This was a 
return to the role of a strong state in development. Grindle (2010: 3) has also argued 
that the idea of good governance emerged from the ‘intellectual resurrection’ of the 
state as a major player in economic and political development. The underperformance 
of the centralised state in Africa had frustrated many in multilateral and bilateral 
development agencies. Beekers and van Gool (2012: 2) have argued that the re-
mergence of the strong role of the state in development was as a result of the failures 
of paradigms such as rolling back the state and free market ideology which led to 
greater focus on the role of the state to create good policy environment. The renewed 
interest in the a strong capable state was also in part due to the experience of ‘Asian 
Tigers’ where the state had played a key role in facilitating development. There was 
one key conclusion in the South East and East Asian State- that it was the quality of 
the state that mattered and not the size (Grindle 2010: 4). 
 
The World Bank is one of the development agencies that have been instrumental in 
bringing ‘governance’ to the top of the development agenda. According to Beekers 
and van Gool (2012: 3) and Hyden et al (2004: 15), donor agencies played a key role 
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in pressurizing the World Bank to take action against economic mismanagement, 
bureaucratic ineptness and endemic corruption in many of the countries that were 
receiving assistance from the Bank. In 1991, the World Development Report released 
by the World Bank focused on democratisation and institution building. In this report 
the Bank pointed out that the public sector reforms (supported by the Bank) were 
unable to make headway due to ‘powerful vested interests’ and therefore there was 
need to address governance as pre-requisite to development (Lawson 2005: 92). As a 
result governance programmes have gained so much popularity within the Bank. 
Since the mid 1990s the World Bank has supported more than six hundred 
governance related programmes in close to 95 countries. Projects include: civil 
service reform, legal and judicial reform, decentralisation, anti-corruption legislation, 
red-tape reduction and the capacity building of accountability institutions such as 
ombudspersons and parliamentary oversight bodies (Beekers and van Gool 2012: 2). 
In 2000, the World Bank spent $2 billion on public sector governance and in 2004 it 
spent $3.4 billion (an equivalent of 17% of all lending) (Jenkins and Plowden 2006: 
29).  
	  
The United Nations (UN), another key actor in the emergence of the concept, has 
spent millions of dollars supporting governance programmes in many countries 
around the world. Between 1992 and 1996 UN spending on government programmes 
increased tremendously. During this period the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) spent $1.3 billion on good government, public resources 
management and coordination (Jenkins and Plowden 2006: 33). By mid 1990s 
programmes were focusing on decentralisation and strengthening civil society. By 
2003 UNDP was supporting public administration programmes in over 100 countries. 
Another actor, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), declared in 1996 that good 
governance- with all its aspects of rule of law, efficiency and accountability of public 
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sector, and tacking corruption- was critical for countries to prosper economically 
(Jenkins and Plowden 2006: 32). In the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID), a new cadre of Governance Advisors was created and by 2005 
there were over 80 Advisers (Jenkins and Plowden 2006: 39). 
 
However, despite its appeal the term is marked by controversy due to among other 
things lack of consensus or common position on how it is defined. Scholars such as 
Hyden et al (2004: 12), Hague and Harrop (2007: 9), Jenkins and Plowden (2006: 8), 
and Olowu and Sako (2002: 1) have argued that even with its wide application at 
practical and theoretical level governance means different things to different people. 
International organisations have played key roles in shaping the definition of 
governance and what elements are constituted in the term. For the World Bank, 
governance means the manner in which authority is exercised in the management of a 
country’s economic and social resources (Weiss 2000: 797; Hyden et al 2004: 15). 
The World Bank definition addresses three separate elements of governance: (i) the 
form of political regime, (ii) the process by which power is used in the management 
of a country’s economic and social resources for development, and (iii) the ability of 
government to design, make and implement policies, and carry out functions. 
Therefore, the Bank has focused on characteristics such as accountability, 
transparency, public sector efficiency in delivery of services, rule of law and political 
order (Grindle 2010: 2). 
 
On the other hand, UNDP defines governance as the ‘exercise of economic, political 
and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels’ (see Weiss 
2000; and Olowu and Sako 2002). UNDP’s definition includes ‘mechanisms, 
processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, 
exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and deal with their differences’ 
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(Weiss 2000: 797). UNDP emphasizes ‘participation, transparency, accountability, 
effectiveness and equity’ as key characteristics of good governance (Grindle 2010: 2).  
For the OECD, governance is the application of control in a society in relation to the 
management of its resources for economic and social development (Weiss 2000: 797). 
According to Weiss (2000: 797), this definition focuses on the role of public 
authorities to establish an enabling environment within which economic operations 
function. These public authorities also have a role to determine the allocation of 
benefits as well as the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled 
(Weiss 2000: 797). The Commission on Governance define governance as the ‘sum of 
the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common 
affairs’ (Weiss 2000: 797). Based on this definition the emphasis is on ‘formal 
institutions and regimes and how they enforce compliance, as well as on informal 
arrangements that people and institutions either have or have agreed to or perceive to 
be in their common interest’ (Weiss 2000: 797). Scholars such as Hyden, Court and 
Mease focus on ‘participation, fairness, decency, efficiency, accountability and 
transparency’ (Grindle 2010: 2).  
	  
Others have also used governance to refer ‘normative concerns about what 
government should do’, for example to ensure macroeconomic stability or provide 
basic services (Grindle 2010: 2). DFID, one of the leaders on governance 
programmes, has identified a series of ‘expectations’ about what governments should 
do. Some of these are: ensure voice, macroeconomic stability, poverty equitable 
growth, policies that address the needs of the poor, universal provision of basic 
services, personal and national security and accountability in government (Grindle 
2010: 2).  
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James Rosenau, a US academic, defines governance as ‘activities of governments, as 
well as many other channels through which commands flow in the form of goals 
framed, directives issued and policies pursued (Weiss 2000: 796). Another scholar, 
Grindle (2010: 2), has defined governance in relation to government or the public 
sector, and in this case it refers to ‘institutional underpinnings of public authority and 
decision making’. According to Grindle (2010: 2), governance includes the 
institutions, systems, ‘rules of the game’, and other elements that influence how 
political and economic interactions are structured and how decisions are made and 
resources allocated. Hyden et al (2004) defines governance as how rules of the 
political game are applied. These rules can be formal or informal. Jenkins and 
Plowden (2006: 8) define governance as activities of government whether democratic 
or not (Jenkins and Plowden 2006: 8). International relations analysts and 
international civil servants have used the term to describe phenomena that relate to 
running of government. These selected definitions of governance amongst some of 
the development agencies and scholars suggest the complexity in its meaning and the 
various ways in which each agency uses it. 
 
In the various definitions of governance there is a tendency to combine the qualities 
of the state and expectations about the kinds of policies that should be delivered. For 
instance DFID’s emphasis is on both qualities and outcomes, while for OECD and 
UNDP the emphasis is on the qualities of the state. Such differences also impact on 
how governance performance is measured and what aspects are emphasized by 
individual agencies. The problem with these inconsistencies is that organisations such 
as DFID and OECD will formulate their international development policies based on 
their own understanding of good governance. With lack of uniformity on what the 
concept stands for or what elements are relevant to pursue or measure (whether 
	   64	  
processes or outcomes), development agencies might find themselves pursuing 
diverse interests. This causes two problems. First, it leads to so many agendas being 
pushed on the developing countries, and often with little success as the ruling elites 
are faced with real pressure on where to begin and which aspects to prioritise. Second, 
it weakens the position of aid agencies to push for reforms since their interests are so 
divided. For example, one aid agency might view the country as being on the right 
path, while for another the same country might be off track. These challenges and 
several others are pursued in detail later in this section.  
 
2.6.1 Good governance- the value judgment  
 
The concept of good governance has emerged with relation to ‘governance’ in order 
to define positive features of a state, which is performing its functions well.  Good 
governance has surfaced as an approach by western countries and development 
agencies to promote a package of western institutions such as separation of powers, 
free press, independent judiciary, pluralistic civil society and respect for the rule of 
law (Kelsall 2008: 1). Good governance represents a value judgment on how a 
political system is functioning within a particular state. Weiss (2000: 801) has argued 
that good governance is aimed at addressing two problems: ‘the unrepresentative 
character of governments and the inefficiency of non market systems’. According to 
Grindle (2010: 1) the concept of good governance is good because: 
 
‘..we would all be better off and citizens of many developing countries would be 
much better off, if public life was conducted within institutions that were fair, 
judicious, transparent, accountable, participatory, responsive, well managed and 
efficient. For millions of people who live in conditions of public insecurity and 
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instability, corruption, abuse of law, public service failure, poverty and inequality, 
good governance is a mighty beacon of what ought to be..’ 
 
Grindle (2010: 1) 
With this value judgment, good governance has appealed to many development 
practitioners and scholars. However, one of the results of this wide-ranging interest in 
the concept has been the stretching of good governance to address multitude of 
challenges facing developing countries:  
 
‘For those on the political right good governance has meant order, rule of law and 
institutional conditions for free markets to flourish. For those on the political left 
good governance incorporates notions of equity and fairness, protection of the poor, 
for minorities, and for women, and a positive role of the state. For..others found along 
the continuum from right to left the concept is attractive for its concerns about order 
decency, justice and accountability’. 
 
Grindle (2010: 3) 
The World Bank views good governance as the absence of ‘personalisation of power’, 
‘lack of human rights’, ‘endemic corruption and unelected and unaccountable 
governments’ (Weiss 2000: 801). While for Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) good 
governance is seen as transparent, representative, accountable and participatory 
systems of institutions and procedures for policy making. Along the way proponents 
with various causes have joined the bandwagon of good governance to define what 
good governance looks like in practice: 
 
‘..human rights community claimed..that countries with good governance respected 
human rights. Environmentalists argued that good governance meant effective 
stewardship of the environment and sustainability of development practices. 
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Empowerment of women, community management of forests, selective affirmative 
action , land use planning, legal aid for the poor, anti-corruption measures and a 
variety of conditions came to be associated with good governance..’ 
 
Grindle (2010: 7) 
 
Grindle (2010: 6) has argued that good governance has provided an important ‘fig 
leaf’ for international development agencies to deal with the dilemma of intervening 
in the inner workings of government in developing countries. Good governance 
provided a ‘technical’ way of tackling issues around political institutions and 
relationships- such as corruption, accountability and leadership- that were seen as 
serious challenges to development and effective use of aid (Grindle 2010: 6). With its 
perceived benefits good governance has appealed to many. Yet, there has been very 
little analysis done in terms of what elements are critical at a minimum given the 
resource and time limitations faced by many developing countries. As it will be 
argued later, there is also little focus on the historical settings in the contexts where 
reforms are being pursued.  
 
2.6.2 Multilateral and Bilateral agencies and the dominance of the concept – 
‘governance’ 
 
Weiss (2000) has provided a thorough account on the role played by the United 
Nations and other international actors in generating ideas about governance. Between 
1960s and 1980s the world experienced a cold war between USSR and the west. 
According to Weiss (2000: 798): 
 
‘…during the cold war government representatives of newly independent states were 
on the defensive within the UN and related international fora; they remained 
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untouched by the [growing] rich scholarly debate about the new political economy, 
social capital, and public goods. They interpreted virtually any serious scrutiny of 
their economic and social choices as a threat to their newborn and weak states. And 
they remained impervious to the international political economy of the 1970 and 
1980s that emphasized public choice theory, rent seeking behavior, directly 
unproductive profit seeking behaviours and the new institutional economics..’ 
 
The new nations were also able to effectively play the East versus the West, and this 
helped them to deflect the criticisms by donors and investors whenever they hinted at 
shortcomings in economic and political management (Weiss 2000: 798). This might 
explain why the 1970s and 1980s saw one party dictatorship survive for long periods 
in many countries in Africa including Malawi, Zambia and Kenya. Any suggestions 
about what was wrong with economic and social policies in the developing and 
socialist bloc countries was viewed as being on the side of the opponent in the East-
West wrangle (Weiss 2000: 798). Nations could easily play off the other side and 
therefore get support while still pursuing their own nationally determined policies. 
According to Weiss (2000: 798), the cold war helped to maintain the status quo in 
many countries as each side (East or West) was in need of allies and could not afford 
to lose them to the other side. These developing countries in Africa were easily 
accepted into the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) with no questions asked on 
‘who or whether the regime governed’ (Weiss 2000: 798).  
 
The increasing oil prices in 1973-74 and 1979 led to foreign exchange shortages and 
rising debt for many developing countries. This transformed the international 
development discourse with countries accepting ‘intrusive structural adjustment 
programmes’ in order access finance particularly from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) (Weiss 2000: 798). Even if countries were not borrowing from IMF they 
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still needed approval from the Fund in order to access funds from other development 
agencies. This role of the IMF has continued to the present.  
 
According to Weiss (2000: 798), the arrival of Kohl, Thatcher and Reagan 
administrations changed the status quo and the Western rhetoric gained significant 
ground in the United Nations, World Bank and the IMF. Initially both IMF and the 
World Bank had refrained from trying to influence domestic policies. By 1990, the 
World Bank had taken a different position, which emphasized the role of political and 
institutional change in leading to effective economic reform (Weiss 2000: 799). 
Within the United Nations too there was a new orthodoxy, which emphasized aid and 
investment in exchange for economic liberalisation (Weiss 2000: 799). The rise to 
power of Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow in 1985 transformed the international 
landscape. With the end of the cold war there was no longer ‘a geopolitical 
counterweight’ in the East to the Western demands for economic liberalisation and 
political democratisation (Weiss 2000: 799). Domestic policies came to the fore, and 
were increasingly analysed in relation to the development challenges faced by 
developing countries. According to Weiss (2000: 799), it became ‘politically right’ in 
international public policy forums to recognise the role of domestic policies in the 
economic challenges facing the developing countries: 
 
‘A discussion about the quality of a country’s political and economic governance 
system became acceptable within international public policy fora….’ 
 
        Weiss (2000: 799) 
 
Weiss (2000) has highlighted four factors that made this discussion possible. First, 
there were several regimes, which were considered illegitimate and were headed by 
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pariahs, for example Uganda’s Idi Amin and Central African Empire’s Jean-Bedel 
Bokassa. African countries had successfully lobbied for the international 
community’s assistance in dealing with the two white majority governments in 
Rhodesia and South Africa. This helped to set precedence for the west to intervene in 
domestic policies of developing countries. According to Weiss (2000: 799) having 
done so, it was not logical for the developing countries to ‘maintain that their own 
domestic affairs were out of bounds’. In addition, the end of the cold war suddenly 
removed the western attitude to turn a blind eye to some of the regimes in Africa as 
well as the incentives for the west to support authoritarian rule (Weiss 2000: 799). 
Secondly, there was a new wave of democratic reforms, which saw countries in 
Africa and Eastern Europe adopting civilian rule, elections and multiparty democracy. 
Developing countries realised that this was the only way to legitimise their rule and 
attract funding from the west (Weiss 2000: 799). Thirdly, there was a proliferation of 
non state actors- such as international non governmental organisations, transnational 
corporations and global media- and these exerted influence on what once had been 
almost exclusively matters of state policy (Weiss 2000: 800). Within the developing 
countries the number of civil society organisations grew: 
	  
‘..in short the economic and social policy is no longer the exclusive preserve of 
governments. Human rights advocates, gender activists, developmentalists and 
groups of indigenous people have invaded the territory of states, literary and 
figuratively..’ 
        Weiss (2000: 800) 
 
The fourth reason is that since the 1990s UN’s has increasingly intervened in 
domestic policies as a way of preventing future disasters actions. This has gone 
against the UN’s own charter of sovereignty. According to Weiss (2000: 800), events 
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such as those in Somalia, former Yugoslavia and Rwanda opened the door to external 
scrutiny over domestic policies that led to massive displacements and even genocide. 
Intrusion into domestic policies was considered as crucial for the UN to prevent any 
future disasters. This was necessary because the cost of cleaning up the disasters such 
as armed conflicts was considered much more than fixing the way politics was done.  
 
As democracy spread to countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe in the 1980s 
and 1990s political scientists begun to focus increasingly on the nature of regimes in 
those countries (Grindle 2010: 4). In addition, political scientists were faced with 
questions around the causes of lack of development in Africa, along with ‘brutal and 
autocratic governments’ (Grindle 2010: 4). Increasingly, research focused on the role 
played by institutions in development. More opportunities for research also emerged 
to study ‘constitutional structures, electoral and party systems, political corruption 
and the management of the state’ (Grindle 2010: 4). Rapidly the 1990s emerged as the 
era of bringing back the role of the state. It is in this context that new literature 
emerged on a new kind of developmental state, the ‘democratic developmental state’. 
Leftwich (1998) defines a developmental state as a transitional form to the modern 
state, which emerged in late developing societies from the nineteenth century to the 
present. The democratic developmental state adds the presence of democracy as a pre-
requisite to the economic development of a country. According to White (1998: 21), 
donors are supporting democratisation as a powerful stimulus to society because it 
supports market led development and carries potential for more efficient, accountable 
and open government. Partly, this push is as a result of developmental success of a 
small group of democracies in the 1980s and early 1990s such as Botswana, Malaysia 
and Mauritius (Robinson and White 1998: 1). With increasing democratisation the 
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role of citizens, elections and civic organisations to push governments to be ‘good’ 
gained prominence (Grindle 2010: 5). 
 
Corruption as one of the manifestations of ‘bad governance’ helped to generate 
popularity around governance as multilateral and bilateral development agencies 
begun talking about how to address it (Grindle 2010: 5). According to Grindle 
(2010:5), this was led, in part by researchers at the World Bank and it became a major 
focus for other development economists. The Bank’s position was that corruption was 
the ‘single greatest’ barrier to economic and social development (Grindle 2010: 5). 
Characteristics such as accountability and transparency emerged as potential 
strategies to address corruption (Grindle 2010: 5).  
2.7 The problems with the concept- governance and good governance 
	  	  
To begin with, there are so many causes that have been (and continue to be) added to 
the good governance agenda. Since for some donors good governance has become a 
political and economic conditionality with regard to aid all these multiple causes 
drastically increase the number of preconditions that developing countries have to 
meet in tackling the good governance agenda (Grindle 2010: 7; Weiss 2000: 801; 
Beekers and van Gool 2012). According to Grindle (2010: 1), good governance, 
which is a good idea in itself, has ‘outpaced its capacity to deliver’: 
 
‘It calls attention to the institutional underpinnings of economic and political 
management. Yet this laudable idea has become conflated with the capacity to 
generate growth, alleviate poverty, and bring effective democracy to the people. 
Rather than discarding it because it has become inflated, scholars and practitioners 
should instead seek a reasonable understanding of what good governance can deliver- 
and what it cannot…’ 
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        Grindle (2010: 2) 
 
According to Weiss (2000: 801), the list of other attributes and culture to accompany 
them is formidable: 
 
‘..universal protection of human rights; non discriminatory laws; efficient, impartial, 
and rapid judicial processes; transparent public agencies; accountability for decisions 
by public officials; devolution of resources and decision making to local levels from 
the capital; and meaningful participation by citizens in debating public policies and 
choices.’ 
 
With these diverse attributes there is a risk that the ‘development agenda’ may be 
overwhelmed beyond the capacities of most countries. The reality is that there are so 
many challenges that developing countries face. There are many valid questions to be 
asked. Where do these countries begin, and who will determine the order of response? 
Where should they prioritise the scarce resources? Who should they listen to first 
(amongst all donors with varying agendas)? When aid is a precondition, how do they 
mobilise their own resources to address the many problems they have? 	  
The opposite side of the coin is that the focus on so many interests might override 
some of the key elements that must be supported at a minimum for reforms to 
succeed. According to Hyden et al (2004: 16), one of the problems with good 
governance is that there are little or no distinctions made as to what is important for 
reforms to succeed. Manor (1998) has identified six elements that must be balanced in 
the implementation of reforms: (i) top-down and bottom up initiatives, (ii) formal and 
informal politics and institutions, (iii) self interests, personalised politics and 
institutionalization, (iv) order and conflict, (v) continuity and innovation, and (vi) 
confidentiality and transparency. However, even this list is a long one, and donors and 
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other agencies may not have the time or resources to address all of them at once. 
Worse still, most bilateral and international developmental agencies are not entirely 
aware of these elements, and tend to be selective in pursuing other aims without 
thinking of the question of balance (Manor 1998: 126). The key question is whether 
there is consensus on the most essential elements amongst proponents of good 
governance.  
 
On the other hand, there is also a narrowest perspective by some development 
agencies that emphasize a few elements such as a judiciary, parliament and elections, 
all of which are based on the western democratic state. Surely good governance is 
more than the existence of institutions and processes. There is need to capture the 
complex reality of governance, which encompasses all the structures and processes 
for determining the use of available resources for the public good of a country (Weiss 
2000: 801). Some agencies also tend to shy away from the politics and instead take a 
more technocratic approach to reforms. For instance, the World Bank removed 
‘politics’ in its official charter and instead it tended to focus more on public sector 
management, the reduction of transaction costs and contract enforcement (Weiss 200: 
804). In contrast, the UN and UNDP focus on provision of tools of democracy and 
freedoms. Since early 1990s UNDP begun moving away from traditional public 
sector management (especially civil service reform) and modest decentralisation 
programmes to addressing such sensitive governance areas such as human rights, 
legislative support, judicial reforms and corruption (Weiss 2000: 804). Responding to 
the growing number of democracies UNDP has emphasized electoral assistance. 
There are new frontiers to governance work such as capacity building of civil society 
and private sector, which reflect the growing understanding of the term to encompass 
both public and private sectors. Weiss (2000: 804) has argued that the UNDP 
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approach to governance will continue to differ from that of the Bretton Wood 
Institutions as long as they view good governance in terms of strict political and 
economic conditionality.  	  
The relationship between democracy and good governance is not straightforward and 
this casts doubts on whether these reforms are enough for developing countries to turn 
their tables around on the path to development. Robinson and White (1998) have also 
argued that so far efforts to show conclusive relationship between democracy and 
development have proven either ‘empirically suspect or theoretically deficient’. South 
East Asian countries have shown that it is possible to have relatively good governance 
with very little democracy and to achieve high levels of economic growth (Grindle 
2010: 10). Countries such as China and Vietnam may score low on a variety of 
measures of good governance, for example the World Governance Indicators and the 
Ibrahim Governance Index. Yet, these countries have shown good performance on 
economic growth. In fact, they may score poorly on areas such as property rights, or 
corruption, some of the key elements of good governance for some development 
agencies such as the World Bank. Bangladesh, one of the countries, which scores 
poorly on the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), has 
recently gone through several years of growth, rates in excess of 5% per year (Grindle 
2010: 9-10). In contrast, many countries in Latin America have democratic 
institutions and yet show high rates of corruption, low levels of transparency and 
other dimensions of bad governance (Grindle 2010: 10).  
 
Good governance is also not always consistently linked to good public performance. 
Grindle (2010) has used the example of the Hurricane Katrina to demonstrate massive 
failures in the United States, a country that can score highly on any of the governance 
measures that are used today. The US economy is well managed and for most part the 
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government is transparent and accountable to the citizens (Grindle 2010: 10). Yet, the 
response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 showed profound leadership failure at national 
and local level.  According to Grindle (2010: 10), institutions, systems and 
organisations failed the poor, racial minorities and the marginalised and this 
underscores the failure of governance. In contrast, Pakistan responded quickly to a 
massive earthquake in 2005 despite its low rankings on governance (Grindle 2010: 
10).  
 
Another criticism of good governance is that its proponents have ignored the 
historical settings in the countries where the concept developed.  What role did the 
historical experiences of such countries play in the evolution of governance? How did 
the countries manage to improve? How long did it take for these countries to 
improve? How long should African countries be given to develop good governance? 
Even with ambiguity on these and other questions the work on good governance has 
continued, ‘outstripping knowledge about how institutions develop over time’ 
(Grindle 2010: 12).  Hyden (2007: 217) has argued that in most places where reforms 
are being pursued it is donors who are the ‘agenda setters’, and often consultants and 
advisers with little knowledge of social and political context design packages with 
little or no regard for their feasibility in the context of the African neopatrimonial 
state. There are also demands placed on countries to show results within a short 
period, and in some of these countries reforms have overwhelmed the national 
leadership (Grindle 2010: 12). With so many development agencies and different 
emphasis on what constitutes governance, countries have to deal with a multitude of 
issues.  
 
As an ideological concept good governance is based on western historical experience, 
and it fails to take into account (let alone represent) the political reality in many 
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developing countries including in Africa. In these states the strict separation between 
public and private spheres may not exist. Instead, personal relationships and 
favouritism are normal aspects of every day’s practices of governance (Beekers and 
van Gool 2012: 4). The personalised rule has its origins in the traditional moral 
economies of patron-clientelism: exchange systems in which dominant patrons 
provided livelihoods and/ or political protection to the poor in exchange for loyalty 
and/or labour (Beekers and van Gool 2012: 4). According to Beekers and van Gool 
(2012: 7), traditional moral economies of patronage can be considered as effective 
and responsive since they entail relations of exchange in which both parties gain and 
in which both find ‘satisfaction of needs’.  They are accountable to the extent that 
clients are able to withdraw their support for certain patrons when the latter fail to 
provide the required protection and support (Beekers and van Gool 2012: 7). What 
appears to be ‘bad governance’ for the west might actually be ‘good governance’ in 
those states where political clientelism or patronage is a reflection of widely shared 
cultural beliefs about good and legitimate governance (Beekers and van Gool 2012: 
25). 
According to Grindle (2010: 13), weak formal institutions are ‘emblematic of and 
sometimes inseparable from poor and developing countries’. Poor countries are likely 
to have weak or non-existent institutions for making public decisions, distributing 
resources and protecting citizens. Hence, one of key challenges with good governance 
agenda is that is tends to place the burden on countries with limited ability to respond. 
Yet, the political elites who run the affairs of government in these countries are not 
always interested in improving governance. This is the case because they are 
threatened by any actions that can easily reduce their powers and limit their access to 
rents and resources  (Grindle 2010: 13). In such an environment capture of reforms by 
dominant elite groups is inevitable (Campos and Hellman 2005: 240). Goetz (2009) 
	   77	  
has identified two types of incentives that may drive or hinder reforms. These are: (i) 
incentive to maintain (or threaten) existing patterns of support based on patronage 
system, and (ii) incentive to generate new sources of support or political alliances. 
Political actors exercise rational choice in making decisions about whether or not to 
surrender their patronage and methods (Goetz 2009: 4; Olowu and Wunsch 2004: 9; 
Goetz 2007; Levy 2009: 98). Resistance will emerge where reforms threaten access to 
support or resources for the political elites. According to North et al (2009), reforms 
in natural states benefit coalition of powerful elites. Hence, when reforms are 
captured it is usually the case that this has been done to benefit ruling elite groups and 
their supporters.  
 
Kelsall et al (2010: 6) has argued that the good governance arrangements are not well 
suited for ‘growth promoting rent management’. In fact, new research on Asian 
economic success suggests that countries in this part of the world rarely followed the 
kinds of policies proposed under the banner of good governance (Kelsall 2008: 1). 
These successful economic models in Asia did not adopt wholesale the western ways 
of doing things as is being promoted under good governance. Rather, they selected 
certain elements of western experience, which they combined with their own 
indigenous strengths, thus creating distinctive new economic models of development 
(Kelsall 2008: 1): 
 
‘They intervened in the market, have got prices wrong, they have engaged in rent 
seeking and corruption, and have used clientelist practices, they have eschewed 
multiparty democracy and so on’ 
 
Khan and Sundaram (2000) in Kelsall (2008: 1) 
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As Kelsall (2008: 1) has argued, the experience in Asia should not come as a surprise 
since the western states themselves developed ‘step wise from patrimonial and 
neopatrimonial foundations’. Hence, good governance approaches driven by western 
countries and development agencies ignore both the importance of indigenous 
knowledge and strengths as well as a crucial element for reforms to materialise- 
‘time’.  
 
Another problem that good governance presents is that it prescribes ‘strict separation’ 
between private and public spheres and obstructs use of political power for primitive 
accumulation (Kelsall et al 2010: 6). According to Kelsall et al (2010: 6), this 
separation also precludes use of corruption and patron-clientelist networks to make 
transfers that if used effectively can contribute to state stability and nation building. In 
addition, the rule of law may be deficient in addressing those types of corruption that 
are ‘growth retarding in states’ where the legal sector is weak (Kelsall et al 2010: 6). 
As Khan (2000) has argued, under certain conditions a strong centralised, patrimonial 
state can direct a route towards achieving an acceptable, growth promoting balance. 
On the other hand, centralisation of rents is not adequate to stimulate growth. This 
‘rent creation, rent seeking, rent distribution and rent utilisation must be oriented for 
the long term’ (Kelsall et al 2010: 7). In this regard, countries that perform well are 
those that are willing to forego consumption’ in the short term in order to maximise 
investment in the future (Kelsall et al 2010: 8).  
	  
2.7.1 Donors, governance and neopatrimonialism- poor results so far 
 
Despite high levels of donor support and intervention the story in many African 
countries is less impressive. Economic growth has been slow to come by and most 
African countries do not appear to be moving in the same direction as the countries in 
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South East and East Asia have done in recent decades (Kelsall 2008: 1). According to 
Cammack (2007b: 599), both campaigners and imported government specialists have 
been disappointed to see how difficult it is to build democratic and accountable states 
in sub Saharan Africa.  
 
So why have donors not succeeded in pushing through this reform agenda? O’Neill 
(2007:12) suggests that African neopatrimonial states have two ways of responding to 
the external push for governance from donors. Either the policy reforms will 
undermine the neopatrimonial practices or the existing political system will adapt to 
the new measures in a way that still allows political elites and their followers to 
maximise benefits but under modified system (O’Neill 2007: 11). The adaption to 
reforms is the most common response by neopatrimonial states in Africa with reforms 
being captured or modified with a view to promote wide scale extraction of rents for 
elites and their followers. Hence, according to van de Walle (2007) most regimes are 
characterised by a ‘partial reform’ syndrome.  
 
The modification or capture of reforms allow the patrons, political elites and their 
followers to access donor funds which many countries rely on for delivery of public 
services and goods. O’Neill (2007: 11) suggests that due to the economic crises in 
most countries African leaders know that showing some kind of reform is essential in 
order to attract external support. However, as it has been argued such institutional 
reforms, for example public sector reforms and others, have been shaped by the 
patrimonial logic (O’Neill 2007: 11). This logic has also penetrated the 
implementation of decentralisation, as part of institutional reform in Africa. The push 
for certain policies under good governance has led to what Kelsall (2008) 
characterises as ‘obscurantization’: 
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‘The formal apparatus of government that is put on show for western dignitaries and 
donors is a little more than a facade. The real business of politics takes place 
elsewhere…’ 
 
Kelsall (2008: 10) 
Such countries display all the outward signs of democratic states- they hold elections 
and have democratic institutions, which on paper may assume the functions as in the 
west (Cammack 2007b: 599).  Scholars such as Reno (1995) and Olivier de Sardan 
(2006: 7) have referred to this space (beyond the reach of the western donors) as the 
‘shadow state’. This shadow state allows the African elites to apply reforms 
selectively, and maintain or develop rent-seeking opportunities, and to still enjoy 
membership of the international community (Kelsall 2008: 10). In some cases these 
benefits trickle down to the communities too. Cammack (2007b: 607) has contended 
that donors can do little to enforce change since they are not privy to this ‘shadow 
state’. The effect of this ‘obscurantization’ is poor transparency. According to Kelsall 
(2008:10), if local people do not have access to information in terms of how much 
money is going to local councils, local cooperative societies, local schools and the 
like, or how this money is used and where it goes, then it is extremely difficult to 
assess performance to hold local officials to account (Kelsall 2008: 10). This is one of 
the challenges that neopatrimonial practices and norms pose for decentralisation. As a 
result, political elites can siphon huge amounts of resources, but with some political 
largesse and well selected words they can paint themselves as good leaders to local 
populations who do not know otherwise (Kelsall 2008: 11).  
 
So what is the role of donors in stimulating reforms? On one hand, the continued 
‘pumping’ of money into neopatrimonial states legitimises those states since they can 
use the resources to service the patronage and client networks as well as provide some 
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resemblance of public services and goods. Cammack (2007b: 607) has argued that aid 
helps to keep such regimes in power. Yet on the other hand, it has already been 
pointed out that donors lack access to the ‘shadow state’ where real decisions are 
made. Donors also lack the legitimacy, staff or power to enforce difficult to accept 
changes (Cammack 2007b: 607). History has shown that it took decades for the 
countries in the west to reach where they are today. In the current environment no 
donor is willing to wait that long for reforms to materialise. This is logical given the 
limited resources, staff, and time. However, the push for reforms to happen quickly 
ignores this obvious challenge in terms of time, as well as other factors such as the 
nature of African societies, and the interests of ruling elites with regard to those 
reforms. Cammack (2007b: 607) suggests that one thing that donors can do is to try 
and understand and support the historical forces that can lead to development.  
	  
2.8 Decentralisation: Definition and Forms 
 
Decentralisation, especially one of its forms-‘devolution’, is one of the many elements 
that have been added to the good governance agenda by some development agencies 
and scholars since the early 1990s. The new wave of decentralisation propounds links 
to better local governance and efficiency in public service provision. This section 
reviews the definition and various forms of decentralisation, and examines its 
relationship (particularly of devolution) to the good governance agenda. It also 
examines the effect of neopatrimonialism on decentralisation in Africa.  
 
Decentralisation is the transfer of authority, responsibilities and resources from 
central government to lower levels of government administration (Cheema and 
Rondinelli 2007: 1, Oxhorn 2004: 4, and Crook and Manor 1998: 6). By 
decentralising central governments cede powers to actors and institutions at lower 
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levels within political-administrative and territorial hierarchy (Ribot 2001). 
Decentralisation changes the nature and structure of relationship between central and 
local actors with the later gaining powers and resources, and the former realigning 
their roles to support decentralised entities. In almost every case decentralisation is 
initiated by the centre taking a decision to transfer powers. According to Litvack et al 
(1998), this transfer of responsibilities between tiers of government is underpinned by 
several fiscal, political and administrative instruments. Thus the political decision to 
transfer powers can only translate into actual powers being shifted if sub national 
governments have fiscal, political and administrative capacity to manage new 
responsibilities (Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998: 6). The most widely used distinction 
for decentralisation has been provided by Rondinelli and it categorises 
decentralisation into three elements as follows: deconcentration, delegation and 
devolution. These three forms are discussed next.  
	  
2.8.1 Deconcentration 
 
Deconcentration involves reallocation of agents of higher levels of government to the 
local arena (Crook and Manor 1998; Manor 1999). Under this form of 
decentralisation the central government is merely delegating some authority, 
responsibilities and control over resources to its agents at lower levels of government. 
Local administrations remain hierarchically dependent on central authority, for 
instance in terms of appointments, salaries, assignments and policies (Manor 1999; 
Crook and Manor 1998: 6). Amongst the criticism of this form of decentralisation is 
that rather than giving up some powers it allows the central government to consolidate 
its position at the local level. Since local bureaucrats are the ones who receive powers 
under deconcentration, they are more interested in serving their masters at the centre 
to whom they are accountable (Mawhood 1983: 2; Manor 1999: 6). Deconcentration 
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has been a prominent form of decentralisation in many unitary states in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s where the focus has been to work with 
field offices of central government to deliver national development programmes and 
improve efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery (Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 
1998: 4; Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema 1984: 11). Many of the failures of past 
decentralisation efforts have been linked to deconcentration. Deconcentration is 
criticised for enabling the state to centralize rather than decentralise authority. 
 
2.8.2 Delegation 
 
Delegation occurs where central government transfers responsibility for decision 
making and administration of public functions to local governments or 
semiautonomous organisations that are not wholly controlled by the central 
government but are accountable to it for delivery of certain functions (Litvack, 
Ahmad, and Bird 1998: 6). These organizations have a lot of decision-making clout. 
Litvack et al (1998: 5) has characterised this form of decentralisation as ‘principal-
agent’ relationship between central government and local government. Delegation has 
led to transfer of responsibilities from central government to public corporations, 
regional development agencies, parastatal organizations, and semi-autonomous 
project implementation units. Delegation is seen as a way to improve efficiency and 
deliver public goods through a more ‘business-like’ organisational structure that 
resembles private sector (Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema 1984). Delegation has been 
used extensively in Africa for example in activities such as infrastructure projects 
(highways, dams, railways, transportation systems and hydroelectric facilities), and to 
organize and manage large-scale agricultural activities such as tea-raising in Kenya 
and cotton growing in Sudan (Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema 1984: 16).  
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2.8.3 Devolution 
 
Devolution involves transfer of responsibilities to local governments that elect their 
own mayors and councils, raise their own revenues, and have independent authority to 
make investment decisions (Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998: 6). These local 
governments follow democratic practices such as electing their own ‘councils’ 
(Manor 1999: 6). Devolution has been attempted by few developing countries during 
the past three decades. Those making the attempt have claimed to transfer broad range 
of activities to local governments (Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema 1984: 21). This 
form of decentralisation was tried in several countries in Africa in the 1960s and 
1970s. For instance, Nigeria devolved wide range of statutory functions to local 
governments in 1976. In Sudan, significant powers were also devolved to provincial 
governments in the 1970s (Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema 1984: 21). Proponents 
argue that it can lead to improved participation of citizens in local decision making in 
order to better match public goods and services with local preferences. Improvements 
in governance are seen as ‘stemming from democratic local governments in which 
citizens exert greater influence on public decision making’ (Crawford and Hartmann 
2008: 12). Any other form of decentralisation is seen as lacking in terms of promoting 
political accountability (Ribot 2002; Manor 1999: 7; Azfar et al. 2004: 19). This 
accountability expectation might be misplaced in a number of cases. According to 
Crawford and Hartmann (2008: 15) powers can be decentralised to ‘actors who are 
not accountable to their constituents or who are accountable only to themselves or to 
superior authorities within the structure of government’. Still, success in achieving 
many of the rationales associated with decentralisation has been linked to the extent to 
which the ‘devolution model’ is implemented (Smoke 2003).  
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Devolution has emerged as a dominant form of decentralisation since the 1990s. It has 
become part of the solution to address the inefficiencies of the centralised state in 
Africa. This centralised government was based on ‘hierarchical deconcentration’ 
associated with authoritarian/ dictatorial political regimes (Brosio 2000: 2). The 
heavily centralised regimes combined with non-democratic political frameworks 
brought in an increasingly unaccountable and corrupt system (Brosio 2000: 2). 
Deconcentration has been swept under the carpet because it tended to consolidate 
rather than reduce centralisation, which is why it was favoured by highly centralised 
states. 
 
In practice, this categorisation of decentralisation into these three distinct forms is 
often difficult because various forms of decentralisation can be carried out 
simultaneously at any given time (Manor 1999: 5; Azfar et al. 2004: 20; Ayee 2008: 
1; Cheema and Rondinelli 2007: 2; Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998: 4). These 
classifications have become tools for making normative judgments as to what is real 
decentralisation, and what is not (Conyers 1989: 17). Deconcentration and devolution 
provides a good example of such complexities.  As Conyers 1989: 17 has pointed out 
the distinction between these forms of decentralisation is based on British and North 
American systems of government where the difference between the two can easily be 
identified. In many developing countries in Africa this is not always the case and it 
has led to long debates about whether reforms such as those introduced in Ghana 
(1971), Tanzania (1972), and Zambia (1980) should be viewed as devolution or 
deconcentration since they had elements of both (Conyers 1989: 17). 
	  
2.9 Decentralisation and good governance 
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As it has been pointed out earlier devolution (decentralisation) is one of the elements 
that have been added to the good governance agenda by some development agencies 
and scholars. Ribot (2001, 2002), Visser (2005: 269), Manor (1999: 14) and Olowu 
and Wunsch (2003: 49) have pointed out that this new wave of decentralisation in 
Africa that started in late 1980s and early 1990s is linked to the pursuit of good 
governance, democracy and a new kind of developmental state in Africa. 
Decentralisation is part of reforms which are aimed at promoting structural changes in 
state institutions particularly political institutions that manage economic policy and 
oversee implementation (Goetz 2007: 404). It is an attempt to ‘get politics right’ 
(Leftwich 1996), promote ‘bottom up approaches’ (Hyden, Court, and Mease 2004), 
and ‘institutionalise participation of the poor in development strategy’ (Webster 2000: 
316) in order to support a new kind of ‘democratic developmental state’. 
Decentralisation has become a strategy of governance that aims to bring government 
closer and make it more easily influenced in order to serve local interests (Bonfiglioli 
2003: 41; Crook and Manor 1998: 1; Crook and Sverrison 2001: 1). Donors are 
embracing decentralisation as part of good governance agenda aimed at strengthening 
local governance (Bonfiglioli 2003). According to  Inman and Rubinfield (1997) this 
link between decentralisation and more accountable government is a more recent 
phenomenon. 	  
Like the good governance agenda decentralisation has also been stretched by those 
who support it to refer to a wide range of benefits that can result from its 
implementation. For instance at process level there is greater focus on bringing 
government closer to the people and making it more easily influenced in order to 
serve local interests (Bonfiglioli 2003: 41; Crook and Manor 1998: 1; Crook and 
Sverrison 2001: 1). Decentralisation is also expected to improve quality, effectiveness 
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and efficiency of local administration and public service delivery; and the manner in 
which power and authority is exercised at local level (Bonfiglioli 2003: 19). For 
actors such as the World Bank and IMF decentralisation promises to address multiple 
issues of restoring markets, strengthening democracy and promoting good governance 
(Cheema and Rondinelli 2007: 4).  DFID (2002) has argued that decentralisation can 
ensure that decisions are made closest to a local constituency, and such decisions can 
better reflect the preferences of citizens. The United Nations Capital Development 
Fund (UNCDF) which is one of the ardent supporters of decentralisation programmes 
around the world has emphasized the role of decentralisation in improving 
governance, which in turn has an impact on poverty reduction (Kullenberg, Shotton, 
and Romeo 2007).  
 
Decentralisation is seen as one ways to allow participation of the public in decision-
making. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006: 4) and Cheema (2007: 171) have argued 
that decentralisation is an important part of participatory democracy in developing 
countries whereby citizens have an opportunity to present their views and preferences 
to elected officials who are accountable for their performance to the citizens. Some 
scholars such as Kauzya (2007) have used the term ‘decentralised governance’ to 
refer to a form of decentralisation that will lead to greater participation of 
communities in problem analysis, project identification, planning, implementation, 
oversight, and ownership.  
 
The new wave of decentralisation (pursued under the banner of good governance) has 
largely been driven by ideological arguments. The relationship between 
decentralisation, governance, and development remains a matter of debate and 
controversy (Campos and Hellman 2005: 237; Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird 1998; 
Brosio 2000). Decentralisation is one of the ‘good things’ that African countries are 
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required to pursue in order to ensure efficient delivery of public goods and services by 
the state. As Hyden (2007) has argued that Africa has become a ‘graveyard’ of 
reforms with various donors supporting a number of agendas in the name of good 
governance- and decentralisation has emerged as one of the reforms. These reforms 
have often ignored the nature and limitations of the states in Africa, including the 
Malawi state.  
 
In Scandinavian countries where decentralisation succeeded reforms were not 
imposed from above (Hyden 2007). Rather they evolved over time from bottom up 
and were largely shaped by social and economic transition that brought people 
together in urbanized communities and social movements (Hyden 2007: 212). In these 
states there was an ongoing struggle between civil society and the state. The victory 
of civil society dismantled the state patronage system that had been in place (Hyden 
2007: 212). In contrast to the Scandinavian countries many of the reforms in 
developing countries are centrally driven and are pushed by donors. The 
neopatrimonial characteristics of the state and the weaknesses of civil society in such 
settings may negatively affect decentralisation. The result is that decentralisation may 
actually work against democracy as reforms are easily captured by ‘corrupt’ non-
accountable elites (Brosio 2000: 4).  
	  
 
2.9.1 New decentralisation, and the ‘allocative efficiency rationale’ 
 
According to Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird (1998), Ahmad et al (2005), World-Bank 
(2008: 3),  Manor (1999: 38), and Crook and Sverrison (2001: 1) ‘allocative 
efficiency’ is the most common theoretical tradition for pursuing decentralisation. The 
main argument here is that since preferences are likely to vary across jurisdictions, 
local government is best placed to deliver goods that match local demands. It is 
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assumed that local people are able to exert pressure on actors at the local level, and 
that local representatives can exercise the necessary supervision over local 
bureaucrats (Azfar et al. 2004: 23). Public choice proponents view ‘effectiveness’ as 
ability to ‘respond’ to local preferences. Responsiveness is defined as attainment of 
congruence between local preferences and public choices such that activities of the 
institution are valued by the public (Crook and Sverrison 2001: 4; Bardhan and 
Morkherjee 2006: 6).  
 
The allocative efficiency argument emanates from the responsibility of the state to 
deliver social services such as health, education, and water and sanitation. The World 
Bank has argued that in many developing countries the state is failing to provide such 
services due to allocative inefficiencies (Ahmad et al 2005). One of the underlying 
problems is centralisation and this has negative impact on efficient allocation of 
resources. This view that centralisation is a problem is based on the critique of 
economic centralism, especially central planning (Campos and Hellman 2005: 237). 
With respect to this intellectual tradition the allocative efficiency is achieved because 
local government is a smaller jurisdiction and this presents informational advantages 
for leaders. Allocative efficiency is also linked to existence of elected representatives 
who are accountable to citizens within the local government geographical territory. In 
the current reforms the allocative efficiency arguments have been reinvented and 
democratic decentralisation is considered more appropriate to lead to greater 
allocative efficiency. In this regard, the ability of local governments to deliver 
services has been tied to extent to which institutions of democracy such as elections 
exist at local level. Thus, good governance at the local level (with institutions of 
democracy) is aimed at ensuring allocative efficiency since the accountability lines 
are shortened and citizens are able to take action on leaders who are not performing.  
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Although the World Bank’s strategy on governance in Africa includes focus at 
intermediate levels of government and devolution of powers and responsibilities in 
client countries ( see: World-Bank 2008: 7-8), in practice its work on decentralisation 
is more focused on this rationale to strengthen service delivery. The World Bank has 
argued that decentralisation is one of the key institutional mechanisms to improve 
service delivery. Therefore, the emphasis for the World Bank and IMF is on fiscal 
decentralisation in order to improve the allocative efficiency by bringing citizens 
closer to decision making and giving them chance to determine how public resources 
should be prioritised (World Bank 2008: 3). From the point of view of the World 
Bank, fiscal decentralisation is also attractive because under certain conditions it can 
strengthen accountability. This is because citizen participation, monitoring and 
control of local governments are relatively easier at the local level (World Bank 2008: 
3). Yet the World Bank has also acknowledged that so far reforms have yielded mixed 
results. There have been some successes in countries such as Bolivia where there was 
dramatic shift in allocation of public resources away from infrastructure and into 
social services. But, in other countries reforms have led to more regional inequalities 
and capture of public resources by local elites (World Bank 2008: 4). Empirical 
evidence to support efficiency and responsiveness arguments is also lacking. Studies 
done in countries such as Uganda, Philippines, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico have 
showed that government responsiveness has been hampered by increased rent 
seeking, waste, inefficiency, corruption, and centralised tendencies (See: Oxhorn 
2004: 14; Azfar et al. 2004:25; Mizrahi 2004: 50). 
 
2.10 Neopatrimonialism and decentralisation 
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The success of decentralisation (especially devolution) is dependent on the extent to 
which balance is achieved between appropriate central control and local autonomy 
(Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema 1984: 28). Mwaikusa (1994: 59), Rondinelli, Nellis 
and Cheema (1984: 28) refer to an optimal balance that reforms should strike between 
centralisation and decentralisation. In an environment (such as in some 
neopatrimonial states in Africa) where central interests of the ruling elites are to 
maintain control over power and access to state wealth such balance is difficult to 
achieve. Conyers (1989) has argued that centralised tendencies are unavoidable given 
that reforms emanate from the top. What would be in the interest of big men/women 
and their allies to transfer powers and lose control over resources, which may be 
essential to secure loyalty and support? It is not surprising that most of the reforms in 
Africa continue to suffer from ‘direct central control over local choices and resources’ 
(Wunsch 2001: 279). As Conyers (1989) has argued no government (especially 
neopatrimonial state in Africa) is likely to give away power without proper incentives 
for doing so. Since decentralisation reforms (like other governance reforms) may be 
part of aid conditionality or other forms of support, central elites may initiate or 
accept them because they believe that they can manage or manipulate the reforms 
(Manor 1998: 129). Rather than give away power, Ribot (2001) has argued that many 
of the reforms in Africa are aimed at enabling the centre to penetrate to the local level. 
The key objective of ruling elites at the centre is to ensure that local actors serve 
central interests. According to Crawford and Hartmann (2008:16), ‘the political will 
of national elites to implement devolution seriously cannot be taken for granted’. In a 
number of cases, the national elites might have accepted externally influenced 
reforms in order to please donors while remaining confident that they will be able to 
maintain control over resources. National elites have the ‘veto power’ to block or 
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manipulate reforms and this is one of the key challenges to decentralisation (Crawford 
and Hartmann 2008: 16).  
 
Generally, in the African neopatrimonial states the patrons (big men) are threatened 
by public policy reforms such as decentralisation (devolution), which seek to transfer 
significant powers and resources to the local level. Cammack (2007b: 604) has argued 
that devolution is an ‘anathema’ to big men. As a result they will usually institute 
changes in order to ensure that people in key positions, for example mayors and 
district commissioners, are answerable to the centre. Crook (2003) has contended that 
political elites have used decentralisation to renew or consolidate the influence of the 
ruling party at the local level, or to deflect pressure in the face of pressures for 
multiparty forms of governments. In this regard, central patronage systems penetrate 
the local level and this provides opportunities for capture and corruption in the 
context of weak accountability mechanisms (O’Neill 2007: 8). The interests of the 
political elites capture or distort the way reforms are implemented, and determine who 
gains and who loses both at central and local levels.  
 
In a study of decentralisation in Uganda, Cammack et al (2007) has pointed out that 
the interests of the ‘big man’ president Museveni undermined reforms during his bid 
for a third term in office. Initially local authorities paid District Chairpersons. 
However, due to disparities between resource rich and resource poor districts some 
District Chairpersons were poorly paid. The centre, in trying to bring equity, started 
paying salaries for the District Chairpersons directly. What this has done is to 
strengthen the link between these officials and the centre. Cammack et al (2007: 37) 
has noted that the District Chairpersons and members of their executive committees 
who are directly paid by the centre have little or no interests in serving the needs of 
the local authority, for example through maintaining or collecting taxes. Museveni 
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also re-centralised the appointment of Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs). This 
means that district politicians no longer recruit CAOs locally. The justification for this 
change was that it would protect the civil servants from the pressures exerted by local 
politicians (Cammack et al 2007: 37). However, the result is that the centre now has 
more control and the CAOs are less inclined to serve local interests as opposed to 
central demands.  
 
Similar to Uganda, in Ghana Crawford (2008) observed that decentralisation reforms 
under President Kufour were undermined by political control which was exercised 
through presidential powers of appointment. According to the 1992 constitution, in 
Ghana the president appoints all the District Chief Executives (DCEs). The DCE is 
the most powerful person in the District Assembly system and acts as the political and 
administrative head. District administration employees are answerable to this DCE 
and not to the Assembly (Crawford 2008: 112). Because the president appoints them, 
DCEs often act in ways that show loyalty and support to the centre (Crawford 2008: 
131). President Kufour and his National Patriotic Party (NPP) used the presidential 
powers when he came to power in 2001 to terminate the contracts for all the 110 
DCEs in the country. In their place he appointed new ones who had close links with 
the ruling party (Crawford 2008: 131). In Burkina Faso the mayor acts as an 
administrative head as well as the representative of the state in the commune 
(Alvergne and Latouche 2010: 472). Such is the influence of the centre on the local 
arena. This influence extends the reach of the centre to the local arena and ensures 
that key policy and resource decisions made at local level reflect central interests.  
 
Pursuit of populist policies by some big men in Africa can also undermine the 
effectiveness of local governments. These policies are aimed at securing support from 
the masses and some of these can have negative impact on the functions of the local 
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governments. For instance in Uganda, Museveni suspended the graduation tax paid by 
adult men and women at district level. The graduation tax was a source of revenue for 
local authorities. During elections the opposition had promised to end this tax and 
their promise seemed to be gaining ground with a lot of people in Uganda. Museveni 
hijacked this agenda and suspended the collection of graduation tax. According to 
Cammack et al (2007: 37), while this might have won him votes it removed a source 
of revenue for local authorities and failed to replace it with other viable means. 
Another of Museveni’s populist policies has led to creation of more districts to please 
local political elites. Cammack et al (2007: 47) has pointed out that more districts 
were created without due legal process or assessment of their viability. This increase 
in the number of districts validates replication of neopatrimonial logic at local level 
and how local elites were also able to instrumentalise reforms processes in their 
competition for state resources (Cammack et al 2007: 47).  	  
As it has argued earlier big men are threatened by decentralisation because it diverts 
some of the resources to the local level. These resources are vital for ‘big men’ to 
accumulate private wealth as well as to exercise patronage with their followers. It is 
not surprising that many decentralisation reforms are characterised by inadequate 
financial resources to the local governments. The big man and other ruling elites 
continue to employ centralised development projects since this allows them to 
exercise patronage- to accumulate wealth and to reward their supporters. Wunsch 
(2001: 278) has noted that most central governments control the capital investment 
budgets and this erodes the powers of the local governments. Where resources are 
transferred from the centre to the local, they are usually in the form of conditional 
grants. Wunsch (2001: 284) has pointed out that conditional grants and transfers are 
the primary sources of funding for local governments in many countries including 
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Botswana, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Tanzania. In Ghana up to 85% of the funds at 
district level are not controlled by District Assemblies and this has undermined local 
planning and budgeting (Crawford 2008: 113). Conditional grants make it possible for 
the priorities of patrons and those of ruling and bureaucratic elites to be implemented 
at the local level. Wunsch (2001) has referred to this as ‘re-centralisation’. In this 
manner the local development planning processes are rendered useless and local 
priorities often represent doctrines, personal and political interests of the centre 
(Wunsch 2001: 278). The powers of local governments to mobilize revenue tend to be 
limited.  
 
The network of the ‘big man’ reaches far and wide into the local arena. As it has 
already been pointed out dominant patrons in Africa (as the examples of Uganda and 
Ghana have shown) exercise political control over the local arena through presidential 
appointment of top bureaucrats in the district. Alvergne and Latouche (2010: 467) 
have argued that in a majority of African countries local officials are still named by 
the centre. Other local elites such as political actors and customary authorities are also 
co-opted by the centre. Wunsch (2001: 278-279) has contended that these local elites 
(with ties to the centre) manipulate distribution of local benefits to suit their own 
needs. In this regard, they act as ‘small big men/ women’ to the local population. 
These local actors exercise clientelism, and capture reforms, which allow them to 
shape their constituencies to their advantage by selectively providing public services 
and other benefits (Campos and Hellman 2005: 237). This clientelism can lead to 
inequalities in provision of public goods and services as political actors at local level 
favour one group over others.  
 
Neopatrimonialism is also evident in the manner in which political elites at the centre 
continue to create discretionary funds that weaken local governments further. In 
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Malawi, Zambia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and other countries constituency 
development funds (CDF) have been set up by the centre as discretionary mechanisms 
to be used by members of parliaments. These funds can be a breeding ground for 
abuse at local level. In Uganda, communities had limited information on the purpose 
of the fund (Cammack et al 2007: 40). There are allegations that some MPs used the 
funds for their re-election bids. Other MPs have also not presented any evidence on 
how the funds were used, and yet they were not reprimanded (Cammack et al 2007: 
40). Hence the CDF might be distribution of rents to MPs as political elites in order to 
secure their loyalty and support particularly towards securing Museveni’s third term 
in office. As Cammack et al (2007: 40) has argued the introduction of CDF during 
period of electoral politicking and without strict parameters on use of funds by MPs, 
and the manner in which the funds were used (with impunity), and the way they 
bypassed formalised local development mechanisms and priorities’ pose questions 
about their use.  
 
Such discretionary funds (placed under the control of members of parliament) also 
undermine the functions of local governments by limiting the amount of resources 
that can be pooled to support local development plans and the delivery of public 
goods and services based on needs. In simple terms since CDF allocates an equal 
amount of resources to each constituency it makes it impossible for the local 
government to invest in services/ functions that cut across two or more constituencies. 
This also means that each constituency has a smaller amount for funds to support ‘few 
items’ which the member of parliament can attribute to himself/herself. Van Zyl 
(2010) has argued that where the CDF is allocated equally between constituencies it 
has a ‘regressive effect’. However, patrons allow such discretionary funds to continue 
to exist and this could be one way of securing loyalty from ‘small big men’.  
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In the neopatrimonial state local elites who are linked to the centre benefit from the 
status quo by ‘capturing’ decisions and resource allocation at local level. 
Decentralisation threatens the status quo enjoyed by these ‘small big men/women’- 
political and bureaucratic elites at the local level. Decentralisation, particularly 
devolution promises to transfer powers to new elite groups such as locally elected 
representatives. Therefore, in a number of countries some local elites are resisting 
reforms, preferring the long-standing status quo. For instance, in Zambia (see: 
Mukwena and Lolojih 2002), Senegal (see: Dibie and Umeh 2008) and Mali (see: 
Ribot 2001), local bureaucrats have resisted decentralisation because it transfers 
supervisory powers to locally elected representatives. In some instances, even though 
powers have been transferred, local bureaucrats still dominate the local agenda and 
manipulate public affairs (Olowu and Wunsch 2004: 5). In part, the dominance of 
local bureaucrats is due to the fact that in countries such as Uganda and Ghana the 
central elites have entrenched their powers at the local level through powers over 
bureaucrats and other local actors.  
 
In several countries in Africa decentralisation reforms are also undermined at the 
local level by customary authorities (chiefs)- influential local elites- that are under the 
control of the president. In countries such as Ghana, South Africa, Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe the centre has ensured that traditional authorities are part of the 
decentralised structures (Buur and Kyed 2007: 2). Ruling elites have maintained their 
powers to reward or sanction these traditional authorities. In countries such as 
Zimbabwe and Malawi the president has powers to remove non-performing chiefs. 
According to Mupedza (2007: 192) in the case of Zimbabwe this has greatly 
undermined the accountability of chiefs to the rural constituencies. Instead chiefs 
serve their ‘big men’ and tow ruling party lines (Mupedza 2007). In South Africa, 
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Mozambique and Zimbabwe chiefs (with their ruling party elites at the centre) are 
emerging as a political force against decentralisation (Ribot 2001: 22). While both 
chiefs and local bureaucrats might be serving central interests, these local actors also 
have their own interests in undermining reforms. For instance, local bureaucrats and 
chiefs may seek to protect their access to power and resources at local level by 
resisting reforms that create new powerful group of elites- local councillors. 
According to Ribot (2001: 22) and Olowu and Wunsch (2004: 59) chiefs  (as one 
group at local level) are threatened by loss of power over land allocation and the 
general undermining of their authority by local institutions.  
 
So while a certain degree of central control (and balance) is appropriate for 
decentralisation to succeed, in a number of countries reforms are characterised by top-
down influence. In several countries big men exercise their control over local 
bureaucrats, customary authorities, and political elites through a variety of ways 
including powers of appointment, promotion, firing, as well as through provision of 
incentives such as discretionary funds. As a result, local elites consider themselves 
upwardly accountable to the centre (Dickovick and Riedl 2010: 64). The centre also 
directly influences the priorities at the local level through conditional grants. As a 
form of political reform, decentralisation (devolution) has been caught up in the 
challenges facing good governance programmes in Africa. According to Dickovick 
and Riedl (2010:71) many aspects of decentralisation remain ‘contingent upon 
incentives of actors at central level’. 
 
Alvergne and Latouche (2010:467) have pointed out that decentralisation is ‘not 
immune from the self interests or free from the political games that politicians like to 
play’: 
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‘…party politics remain a one-way street from the centre down. Party barons will 
work hard at making sure no local autonomous political scene emerges, lest their own 
power base whither away… one does not have to suppose a large degree of rationality 
to national actors to conclude that they are unlikely to support [local political elites] 
who will reduce their own capacity to govern or eventually replace them..’ 
 
Alvergne and Latouche (2010: 467) 
 
Therefore as a political process decentralisation cannot be separated from the interests 
of the dominant patron and the patronage and clientelist tendencies that exist in most 
African countries. This is related to the argument made by Crawford and Hartmann 
(2008:16) that the problem is ‘local democratic deficit’. Many institutional 
arrangements created under decentralisation are insufficiently democratic and do not 
create clear lines of accountability from decision makers to the local populations 
(Crawford and Hartmann 2008: 16). So the way reforms evolve at local level is 
usually a reflection of the nature of politics at national level. If elections are 
manipulated at the national level to ensure the ruling party stays in power, why would 
they willingly open up the space for the opposition at local level where the latter may 
thrive and build a strong base? If dominant patrons use state resources to accumulate 
private wealth or to secure loyalty and support through ‘gifts’ to followers, why 
would they let go control over significant proportion of resources? As a result, the 
centre will intervene at the local level, co-opt local actors or control resources if it 
deems it necessary to do so to ensure that the central interests are served. When 
reforms are rolled out the local political, traditional or bureaucratic elites with ties to 
the centre are likely to have more influence while at the same time serving central 
interests. Therefore, reforms are likely to reflect the interests of the big men/women. 
As Alvergne and Latouche (2010) have argued for decentralisation to succeed it must 
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be recognised as a political process, and it must address questions of incentives for the 
central actors, particularly the big man. Technical approaches on their own are largely 
inadequate. 
2.11 Conclusion 
 
 
To conclude, devolution as one of the forms of decentralisation has been added to the 
package of reforms under good governance. This is an externally driven agenda, 
which is led by donors, and some scholars. The latest wave of decentralisation is 
based on the premise that current reforms will transfer significant powers and 
resources to local governments with elected representatives who are accountable 
downwards to the citizens with the jurisdiction of each local government. New terms 
have emerged to refer to the new wave of decentralisation and these include, 
‘democratic decentralisation’ and ‘decentralised governance’. At the heart of this new 
decentralisation are democratic institutions such as elections, which are based on the 
liberal democratic principles and thus the transfer of power to a new group of elites- 
councillors. In practice, most reforms in Africa show less promise. From the literature 
reviewed, reforms are characterised by centralisation with central elites seeking to 
make their mark on how reforms are being rolled out. These ruling elites exercise 
control over the local arena in a variety of ways including use of presidential 
appointment powers, maintaining control on how resources are used, and co-opting 
various elites at local level in order to influence the ruling elites’ agenda.  
 
As part of the political reforms that shape power relations between central and local 
elites, decentralisation is not immune from the influences of the African 
neopatrimonial state. Although there is a word of caution in ‘over-extending’ use of 
neopatrimonialism as a concept to describe the situation in all types of political 
	   101	  
regimes, it has been demonstrated in this chapter that it remains one of the most 
useful concepts to analyze challenges facing the African state. The neopatrimonial 
state which is predominant in a number of African countries is characterised by 
personalism and concentration of power in the ‘big man/woman’, weak or no 
separation of powers between public and private spheres, the dominance of informal 
over formal rules, and supremacy of vertical over horizontal ties. In these states the 
patron and ruling elites try to maintain their control over state resources as well as 
over policy-making decisions. Since reforms in the African neopatrimonial state are 
mostly formulated from above with little pressure from below, it is not surprising that 
central interests will dominate implementation of reforms, given that decentralisation, 
and particularly democratic decentralisation, is a political process. The key question 
in Africa is whether devolution as a ‘pure form’ is likely to materialise given the 
characteristics of the state.  	  
This literature review has also shown that the Asian tigers were no less 
neopatrimonial than the African states. However, what distinguishes the African state 
is the existence of widespread and decentralised rent seeking practices, which are 
usually short termist as opposed to the ‘centralised long-termist rents’ in the Asian 
tigers. It is also clear that even in neopatrimonial states there might be opportunities 
for reforms if the incentives are ‘right’ for the dominant patrons. But, in many 
countries decentralisation poses many disincentives for the ‘big man/woman’ and the 
ruling and bureaucratic elites. As Khan (2004) has argued many powerful central and 
local actors are threatened by reforms and have ‘vested’ interests to maintain status 
quo. Since decentralisation may be part of aid conditionalities, ruling elites are aware 
that they have to provide some resemblance of reform to attract these resources, 
which may be vital for servicing the patronage networks.  
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The literature on neopatrimonialism has also showed the inappropriateness of the 
term, ‘big man’ due to the rise of powerful women in Africa who do not fit this 
category. This term needs to be revisited. The literature has also demonstrated that 
variations may exist between neopatrimonial states in terms of the incentives that 
ruling elites may have and the way that reforms may evolve. This suggests that rather 
than generalise the failings of reforms all over Africa more country specific studies 
are required to examine the extent to which decentralisation is being pursued and the 
(dis) incentives that ruling elites attach to such reforms.  
 
The good governance agenda emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s as part of 
institutional reforms to address limitations faced by the centralised state in Africa. 
Donors and scholars have been at the centre of this concept. There are many and 
varied interests that have been linked with this concept. With each added element the 
concept has become overloaded. With each donor pushing a set of elements that 
constitute their own understanding of governance developing countries in Africa can 
be overwhelmed in terms of where to begin and how best to allocate scarce resources. 
It also weakens the position of donors since there is no commonly agreed set of 
elements, which all donors can all pursue in their relationship with a specific country. 
Additionally, the literature reviewed has showed that the link between good 
governance and development remains theoretically and empirically weak. The Asian 
tigers, as well as the new countries on the path to economic development (such as 
China) would score poorly on a variety of governance assessments. Yet, their existing 
forms of governing were good enough to lead them on a path to development. As an 
ideological concept, which emerged from the west, it is also criticised for not taking 
into consideration the historical context of the state in Africa- this links back to the 
nature of the neopatrimonial state. There is need to explore more and analyse 
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conditions facing reforms in specific settings, and identify opportunities that exist to 
incentivise ruling elites to push forward with reform agenda. 
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  Three	  	  
3.	  Neopatrimonial	  state	  in	  Malawi,	  and	  the	  history	  of	  
decentralisation	  
	  
	  
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter has two sections: (i) an overview of the neopatrimonial state in Malawi, 
and (ii) the history and nature of decentralisation reforms in Malawi. The first section 
explores the neopatrimonial state in Malawi, and provides comparisons between the 
three presidents who have ruled Malawi between 1960s and 2012. This section shows 
that Malawi is one of the countries where the neopatrimonial logic is particularly 
strong. As Englund (2002) has argued, Malawi is a democracy of chameleons, with 
national elites making a lot of rhetoric on reforms, and yet there are so many troubling 
continuities from the past. Leaders move in and out of political parties and alliances 
largely focusing on private gains rather than collective interests of the party. In its 
worst form, the neopatrimonial logic seems to influence how policies are formulated 
and implemented in Malawi. This is the context within which decentralisation reforms 
are being pursued.  
 
The second part analyses how decentralisation reforms have evolved in Malawi from 
the colonial period to the present. The second section is divided into three critical 
periods: the colonial state, 1891-1960; the post-independence era and emergence of 
the one party state, 1961-1993; and the rise of multi-party form of government and 
democratic decentralisation, 1993- onwards. This chapter lays the foundation for 
presentation of findings and interpretation in chapters five and six of this thesis. The 
overview shows that decentralisation in Malawi is not new phenomenon, and has been 
attempted by various regimes since the colonial era. It also shows that although the 
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official motives and structure of reforms might be different during the three periods 
there are similar patterns in the way that reforms have evolved in practice. In 
particular during the first two periods, from the colonial state to the post-independent 
state, reforms have been led by the centre with ulterior motives that undermine the 
local arena. Central actors have consistently co-opted local elites with the aim to 
consolidate rather than diminish central authority and interests within local 
governments.  
 
In addition to the detailed analysis of reforms during colonial rule and the post-
independence era, this chapter will also discuss the birth of the post 1993 democratic 
decentralisation reforms. The emphasis during this period is to analyse the drivers for 
reforms, and the nature of reforms. The later has been done through review of key 
legal and policy documents that describe the nature of reforms. Finally, the chapter 
also analyses the new development planning processes and financial mechanisms that 
have been put in place to support the new reforms. The post 1993 reforms on 
democratic decentralisation appear to be broad and comprehensive, and promise to 
transfer more powers and resources to local actors who are downwardly accountable. 
However as chapters five and six will show this assumption is highly questionable.  
 
3.2 Neopatrimonialism and ‘big men’ in Malawi 
 
Since independence in the 1960s three ‘big men’ have ruled Malawi and these are: 
Kamuzu Banda, 1964-1994; Bakili Muluzi, 1994-2004; Bingu wa Mutharika, 2004-
2012. This section discusses and compares the neopatrimonial tendencies during rule 
of these three presidents. In 2012, the first woman president in Malawi (and second in 
Africa), Joyce Banda, took office following the demise of wa Mutharika. The 
emergence of Joyce Banda is covered briefly in chapter seven. The section below 
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briefly introduces the three presidents, and provides a comparison on their leadership 
and the impact on public policies and economic development of the country.  
 
3.2.1 Kamuzu Banda and the one party state, 1964-1994 
 
Banda ruled the country for three decades. He was the first president after the country 
gained independence from the British and he ruled the country with an ‘iron fist’ 
under a dictatorial one party system. The impact of his rule on the economy was 
mixed. Between 1964 and 1979 Malawi experienced rapid economic growth. Annual 
increases in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) were over 5% and GDP per capita 
doubled over this period. According to Booth et al (2006: 4), Banda promoted 
agriculture development strategy. Emphasis was placed on estate agriculture, which 
grew by 10% annually while smallholder farming only grew by 3%. However by the 
early 1980s poverty was worsening due to unequal income distribution. Squeezing 
land, labour and profit of the smallholder sector had further impoverished rural 
masses whose land base was also being eroded by population growth (Booth et al 
2006: 5). Therefore, between 1980 and 1994 the country experienced falling per 
capita incomes with GDP averaging 2.5% per year. The policy regime was 
characterised by inconsistencies reflecting a clash between shifting donor approaches 
and government policy (Booth et al 2006: 5).  
 
According to Booth et al (2006: 5), during Banda’s era policy was driven by the ‘big 
man’s’ vision as well as by World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programmes. 
In comparison with other countries in Africa Malawi was fairly compliant. Yet, the 
structural adjustment programmes did not address the underlying programs such as 
population growth, declining soil fertility and unequal land distribution (Booth et al 
2006: 5).  
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3.2.2  Nature of Malawi Politics after the collapse of one party state 
 
Englund (2002: 11) has argued that when the struggle against one party state started 
in the early 1990s with the pastoral letter by Catholic Bishops the divisions seemed to 
be clear. During the multi-party referendum there were those that were in favour of 
the more conservative one party state, and on the other hand those that were against it. 
Since then the allegiances among political elites seem to have become ‘increasingly 
erratic and unpredictable’ (Englund 2002: 11). According to Englund (2002: 12) 
Malawians have witnessed several ‘bewildering shifts in their leaders identity and 
allegiances’. Leaders move in and out of political parties and alliances with little or no 
consultation of their supporters. As a result when people vote for certain individuals 
as Members of Parliament they must be prepared to see ‘baffling maneuvers before 
the next opportunity to vote arises’ (Englund 2002: 13).  
 
Van Donge (1995: 242) has argued that these movements (in and out of coalitions and 
alliances) reflect the search for not always successful ‘consensual politics’. Ruling 
parties pursue this consensus building in order to ensure that they have adequate 
numbers of MPs to carry out procedures in parliament. This is necessary since support 
for political parties in Malawi is heavily fragmented along regional lines. However, 
this quest for consensual politics might also reflect pursuit of ‘political opportunism’ 
(Van Donge 1995: 229). For instance since 1994 Malawi has witnessed strange 
alliances occurring among political parties. Both UDF and AFORD condemned MCP 
as the ‘party of darkness’. Yet in subsequent elections, both have formed electoral 
alliances with MCP (Englund 2002: 12).  
 
Englund (2002: 17) has argued that Malawi politics reflect the continuity of 
‘chameleon politics’ as demonstrated by this ‘haphazard way in which Malawian 
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politicians form alliances’. According to Svasand (2013: 315) the examples of 
coalition governments in Malawi do not conform to the understanding in western 
democracies where parties as organisations decide to join or leave government. In 
Malawi decisions are made by party leaders themselves without any consultation or 
attempt to arrive at consensus in the party (Svasand 2013: 315). In many cases the 
‘benefits of entering a cabinet seem to be primarily for office holders themselves and 
have little to do with negotiating a new policy orientation for the government as a 
whole’ (Svasand 2013: 315). Englund (2002: 17) has described the politics in Malawi 
as follows: 
	  
‘Heroes of yesterday maybe villains of today depending on dynamism of political 
friendship and animosity. Chameleon politics is based on a notion inspired by Jack 
Mapanje’s poem in his poem, Of chameleon and gods, written in 1981 at the height 
of President Kamuzu Banda’s rule. Malawi’s political pluralism is a democracy in 
doubt, a puzzling combination of expedience and idealism, a democracy of 
chameleons. New rhetoric serves to justify old ambitions for unlimited power..’ 
 
The movement between parties and alliances has led to co-opting of many opposition 
party members into the ruling party. In turn, this has weakened the opposition in 
Malawi.  
 
Another characteristic of Malawi politics is that political parties are poorly 
institutionalised and are characterised by central leadership dominance, weak party 
organisation and marginal policy differences (Svasand 2013: 306). As already argued 
one of the demonstrations of central leadership dominance is how party leaders can 
enter into coalition with little or no consultation with the rest of the party members. 
For opposition parties in Malawi, they fit the pattern of opposition parties in Africa 
whereby they are often ‘vehicles for individual politicians, lacking in internal 
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democracy, and dependent on donor contributions for survival’ (Svasand 2013: 316). 
Ruling parties tend to have unfair advantage over the opposition. Ruling parties 
‘monopolize access to state media, state vehicles and other resources are used for 
election purposes, and the police do not intervene to prevent harassment of candidates 
or disturbances at political rallies for the opposition’ (Svasand 2013: 319). According 
to Svasand (2013: 319) the opposition itself has contributed to its weak position with 
regard to ousting the ruling party. Three characteristics of opposition party contribute 
to weaken its effectiveness; ‘leadership dominance, poor organizational loyalty and 
increasing party system fragmentation’ (Svasand 2013: 319). For most of the party 
leaders their main concern seem to be to secure office benefits for themselves rather 
than defeating a ruling party- for example MPs defect in scores towards the ruling 
party of the day (Svasand 2013: 320).  
 
3.2.3  Dominance of chiefs in Malawi politics: The parallel state 
 
Another characteristic of Malawi politics is the influential role of chiefs as one of the 
key actors. This is continuity from colonial era, and one party state. Due to the 
existence of ‘formal government’ as well as the role of chiefs many people in Malawi 
‘experience two parallel state organisations, and individuals are simultaneously 
citizens of the state and subjects under an enforced chieftaincy system’ (Eggen 2011: 
313). This is what Eggen (2011: 314) has referred to as ‘bifurcated state’. According 
to Eggen (2011: 314) ‘the chief represents state fused power in combining legislative, 
executive and judicial state functions at local level’. Since the chief is located in the 
customary domain s/he enjoys wide local autonomy and can deviate from modern 
principles of governance applicable to state elsewhere’. There appears to be very little 
checks and balances on the chief from below. This parallel state runs all the way up to 
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the president who now has two state hierarchies for the exercise of power (Eggen 
2011: 315).  
 
During the one party government the chiefs were effectively subordinated to the 
President and his party. Kamuzu Banda removed several senior chiefs after relatively 
minor hints of disloyalty (Eggen 2011: 318). Therefore, the local autonomy of chiefs 
was undermined. After the return of multiparty politics in 1994 the formal powers of 
chiefs were reduced, for example traditional courts were banned. However, in practice 
chiefs still continued to operate as before. Chiefs could still settle civil disputes and 
also act as judges in cases of petty crime or breach of local rules, and even more 
serious crimes if all parties agree or the chief insists (Eggen 2011: 319). The chief 
occupies a powerful role of a ‘gate keeper between government and the village, for 
example s/he approves and calls for meetings, and organises groups for all kinds of 
development activities’ (Eggen 2011: 320). Villagers depend on chiefs for access to 
government, for example, on land transactions, handling of petty crime, and 
confirmation of identity (Eggen 2011: 320). These roles (and nature of relationship 
between chief and subjects) give chiefs a powerful position in Malawi politics 
especially at local level.  	  
Eggen (2011: 321) has argued that the powers of chiefs have significantly increased 
under the multiparty democracy. Previously the powers of chiefs were challenged by 
the one party state, which has since disappeared. Chiefs draw their legitimacy from 
the state. Some chiefs legitimise their role as representing the government or the 
president over their customary role (Eggen 2011: 320).  According to Eggen (2011: 
321) the powers of chiefs have also increased due to the non-functionality of the local 
electorate and the presence of weak local administration. Donor policies have also 
amplified the role of chiefs, for example by emphasizing community participation and 
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ownership and seeking consent from communities before development projects are 
initiated. In the absence of other local structures the village is considered the relevant 
community, and the only representative of the community is the chief, who 
consequently gets a key role in many development activities (Eggen 2011: 323).  
 
There are also appears to be an informal change in state hierarchy particularly with 
regard to the relationship between the chiefs and the District Commissioner (DC), the 
top bureaucrat at local level. The paramount chief cannot instruct the DC, and the DC 
cannot overrule him. There is a new parallel link that bypasses the DC and the formal 
government and goes straight from the chiefs to the president (Eggen 2011: 328). The 
powers of chiefs discussed here pose significant challenges to democratic 
decentralisation particularly because this might bring tensions with elected 
representatives. There are valid questions to be asked- when councillors return who 
will represent the people in wards? What will be the relationship between chiefs and 
councillors since the later are viewed as responsible for ‘development’ locally? What 
about the role of local bureaucrats? Who will overrule the other amongst the local 
actors? 
 
 
3.2.4 The two Big Men in Malawi after 1994 
 
This section reviews the two Big Men after return to multiparty politics, Bakili 
Muluzi and Bingu wa Mutharika. Generally, as Englund (2002: 19) has argued, there 
have been continuities in political behavior from the one party era. This is not 
surprising given that Kamuzu Banda and MCP dominated Malawi society and the one 
party state has had a ‘ubiquitous influence on Malawi politics’ (Van Donge 1995: 
228). Many of the leading politicians held key positions in Banda’s one party 
	   112	  
government. These two Big Men have operated in the political context discussed in 
sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 above.  	  
(a) Bakili Muluzi, 1994-2004 
Muluzi was the second president in Malawi (and the first since the return of the multi 
party era in 1994). He won the presidency of Malawi in 1994 under the ticket of the 
United Democratic Front (UDF). During his reign the country experienced the worst 
development performance and frequent crises (Booth et al 2006: 5). Annual growth 
rate averaged a mere 2.5%, which was below the population growth rate. According 
to Booth et al (2006: 5) and Cammack (2011: 4), state capacity to formulate and 
implement policies was weakened further and there was massive misappropriation of 
public funds. This period has been labeled by Cammack (2009) as ‘economic free for 
all’ when all forms of patronage, corruption and rent seeking were democratised, and 
Muluzi and his allies accessed state resources successfully. Public service provision 
by the state collapsed and there was extensive fiscal indiscipline and macro-economic 
instability (Booth et al 2006: 5). Inflation hovered around double digits at 27% per 
annum and bank interest rates climbed up to 44%, thus limiting access to credit for 
many businesses. During Muluzi’s rule politics overwhelmed proper public policy 
planning and implementation (Cammack 2011: 4).   
 
Muluzi introduced free primary education and this improved pupil enrolment rates. 
However this policy was not accompanied by investments in training more teachers 
and building more schools. As a result the pupil-teacher ratio rose dramatically 
threatening the quality of education. The sudden increase in the number of pupils also 
overwhelmed existing school infrastructure with many schools resorting to classes 
under the tree. It is not strange in Malawi to find hundreds of pupils learning under a 
tree.  
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(b) Bingu wa Mutharika, 2004-2012 
 
Bingu wa Mutharika came to power in 2004 after he won the presidency on the ticket 
of the United Democratic Front (UDF). Wa Mutharika studied economics in India and 
also received a PhD in development economics from Pacific Western University in 
California. Between 1978 and 1990 he worked for the United Nations where he rose 
to the post of Director for trade and development finance for Africa. Later he joined 
the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) where he worked as 
Secretary General. In 1994 wa Mutharika contested against Bakili Muluzi for the 
presidency of the UDF and he lost. He went back to COMESA where he was fired in 
1997. Wa Mutharika’s patronage and clientelist tendencies were already evident while 
he was at COMESA. A special committee of eminent persons set up to investigate his 
conduct noted that he had strained relations with various individuals and groups 
within COMESA (Cammack 2007a: 2). He was accused of misusing the facilities of 
the institutions by issuing directives that ‘flouted’ financial regulations (Cammack 
2007a: 2).  
 
In 1997, wa Mutharika returned to Malawi and set up his own party, the United Party 
(UP). He run for presidency of the country in 1999 and he lost, winning only 0.5% of 
the vote. Cammack (2007a: 4) has pointed out that the 1999 elections were marred by 
misuse of government resources as Muluzi was determined to stay in power. In 2001 
wa Mutharika was appointed by Muluzi to be the Deputy Governor of the Reserve 
(Central) Bank. In 2003, he entered politics when he was appointed as the minister of 
economic planning and development. In the run up to 2004 elections, Muluzi was 
determined to stay in power beyond the two constitutional terms that he was allowed 
to serve. When the bid amend the constitution and allow him to run for third term 
failed he selected wa Mutharika (an outsider to the party) as the UDF candidate while 
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Muluzi remained head of the party. The choice of wa Mutharika could have been due 
to the fact that as an outsider wa Mutharika had a small support base within the party, 
and could therefore rely more on Muluzi for guidance. Muluzi aggressively 
campaigned for wa Mutharika touting him as the ‘economic engineer’.  
 
A few months after the elections wa Mutharika and Muluzi fell out. The two big men 
expected the other to recognize him as the ‘more powerful’ (Cammack 2007a: 4). For 
example there are rumours that after the 2004 elections Muluzi recommended several 
individuals to be ministers in the wa Mutharika regime. Cammack (2007a: 4) has 
pointed out that Muluzi wanted wa Mutharika to remember who put him in power 
while the president wanted Muluzi to treat him as head of state rather than as a ‘place 
holder set there to take instructions’. Wa Mutharika left the UDF and formed his own 
party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In his first term, between 2004 and 
2009, wa Mutharika set the country on a new and relatively successful economic path 
guided by the then Minister of Finance, Goodall Gondwe. This was a period of 
‘developmental neopatrimonialism’, and according to Cammack (2007a: 4) the 
country experienced some economic success. At one point it was one of the fastest 
growing economies in the world. During his second term the country faced a 
multitude of economic problems. By 2011, there were long fuel queues and shortage 
of foreign exchange in the country. This happened due to a number of reasons 
including the falling price of tobacco and the suspension of donor aid due to the 
country’s poor governance record. Some of these issues have been discussed in detail 
in chapters six and seven of this thesis. By the time of his death in April 2012, the so-
called economic success story had been reversed.  
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3.2.5 Comparing the three presidents in Malawi since independence- Kamuzu 
Banda, Muluzi and wa Mutharika 
 
As already argued Malawi is one of the countries in Africa where the neopatrimonial 
logic is particularly strong. Malawi is a chameleon democracy, where politics is also 
characterised by political opportunism, personalism and concentration of power in the 
dominant patron, weak or no separation of private and public spheres, and the 
dominance of vertical over horizontal ties. In Malawi, just as in several other 
countries in Sub Saharan Africa, the ‘big man’ (and now the ‘big woman’) is one of 
the strong characteristics of this neopatrimonial state. All the three, Banda, Muluzi 
and wa Mutharika, exercised dominance over policy through their informal and 
clientelist networks that stretched outside the formal institutions of the state. Even the 
return of multiparty system did not eradicate the neopatrimonial tendencies. The state 
remains centralised around the president and patterns of patronage and corruption 
have continued (Wild and Harris 2011: 11).  
 
All the three used (misused) public resources to secure loyalty and support. Booth et 
al (2006: 12) has argued that both Banda and Muluzi failed to distinguish between 
public resources, private sector resources and party resources. Cammack (2007a: 5) 
has contended that wa Mutharika just like Banda and Muluzi showed the tendency to 
use the public purse as his own. The general idea under all the three leaders was that 
political loyalty and support could be purchased through material resources. During 
Banda’s reign, government vehicles as well as private ones were used to ferry 
supporters- ‘dancing women and party faithfuls’- to his rallies (Booth et al 2006: 10). 
Muluzi and wa Mutharika did the same. Muluzi went a step further to threaten voters 
that he would not provide development funds for their areas if they did not support 
him and the ruling party (Booth et al 2006: 11). Similarly, as it will be shown in 
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chapters five and six, wa Mutharika and his elites favoured areas which had 
representation from the ruling party. Banda and Muluzi monopolized access to public 
resources and used this extensively to purchase political power (see: Booth et al 2006: 
11), and so did wa Mutharika. It can be argued that under the three regimes the 
distribution of spoils of office took precedence over the formal functions of the states 
and this limited the capacity of public officials to make policies in the interest of the 
governed (Booth et al 2006: viii).  
 
Cammack (2007a: 2) has provided a vivid representation of wa Mutharika as a big 
man: 
 
‘Observing Bingu wa Mutharika at a public ceremony is like watching Dr. Banda in 
his hey day. He sits rigidly in an overly chair on raised dais, his cabinet spread out on 
either side. In front of him are musicians and dancing women..’ 
 
Cammack (2007a: 2) 
 
This trend described above is no different from Muluzi who was also followed by 
dancing women and musicians whenever he held political rallies. According to 
Cammack (2007a: 5), wa Mutharika displayed some characteristics, which were 
similar to those shown by Banda such as hands on approach, arrogance and 
intolerance. Like Muluzi, wa Mutharika also relied on patronage networks and non-
meritorious appointments (Cammack 2007a: 5). 
 
Muluzi and wa Mutharika used their powers to amend rules and to maintain control 
over other elites that were part of their networks. For instance during Muluzi’s 
administration in 1995 a constitutional provision allowing ‘popular recall’ of 
members of parliament by their constituents for non-performance was removed by 
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parliament as it undermined party leaders’ powers (Cammack 2007b: 604). This 
secured positions for members of parliament, and strengthened accountability lines 
between these MPs and their party leader, the patron. The negative effect has been the 
weakening of downward accountability since MPs know they can only be removed 
after five years. Still, public demand for the recall provision has not diminished. 
During constitutional review meetings conducted by the Malawi Law Commission in 
2006/07 the public expressed the need for the recall provision to be brought back. 
They argued that it would ‘induce’ MPs to serve their constituents and not their 
political parties (Chihana et al 2008).  
 
Despite the call from the masses, wa Mutharika’s regime did not bring back this recall 
provision. In fact, during wa Mutharika’s first term there was selective application of 
existing constitutional provisions in order to protect elites connected to him. Wa 
Mutharika had a minority government after he had quit the UDF, and scores of 
members of parliament from UDF followed him to join the new ruling Democratic 
Progressive Party. However, the speaker of the national assembly did not apply 
section 65 which would have rendered the seats of these MPs vacant. Such was the 
influence of the president on the speaker and it protected MPs who had crossed the 
floor. In the absence of section 64, on popular recall, MPs were able to hide behind 
the big man who needed them to govern effectively and to pass laws in parliament. 
Therefore, both wa Mutharika and Muluzi were able to amend or selectively apply 
laws to serve their interests. As it will be shown in chapter seven, Joyce Banda has 
also benefited from scores of MPs that so far have been shielded from section 65.  
 
As already argued the fact that there are a lot of similarities between the three regimes 
under Kamuzu Banda, Muluzi and wa Mutharika is not surprising given the 
connections that exist amongst these big men and those that served them. Muluzi and 
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many of his original cabinet members served in successive Banda governments and 
this was where they learned how to govern (Booth et al 2006: 10). In fact, Muluzi was 
once one of the powerful figures in MCP where rose to the rank of Secretary General. 
Due to the large number of elites that followed him from MCP, Muluzi’s own UDF 
became to be known as MCP ‘B’. Wa Mutharika was followed into the new ruling 
DPP by scores of elites from UDF. Some of these elites had also been part of Banda’s 
government. Hence wa Mutharika’s original DPP can also be considered UDF ‘B’. 
Wa Mutharika accepted into his new party many people from other parties with few 
questions asked (Cammack 2007a: 5). This trend has continued to the current regime 
of Joyce Banda which benefitted from massive defections from DPP, and hence the 
new People’s Party government can also be considered DPP ‘B’. The defections of 
elites show the fluidity of loyalty, which is a reflection of political opportunism. Party 
leaders seem to form alliances or join the ruling party since the President as the 
dominant patron has the means and power to distribute rents. Once a patron 
(president) leaves government he (or very rarely she) has lost access and control over 
public resources, and other elites and followers quickly know that this is no longer a 
‘win-win’ situation. For all the three regimes, presidential patronage has been very 
effective in securing loyalty and support.  
 
Although there are many similarities in terms of how these three big men used 
patronage and clientelist practices, there are also obvious differences in the 
performance of the economy during their reigns. Kamuzu Banda (1964-1994) and wa 
Mutharika (during his first term, 2004-2009) had a clear and articulated development 
vision and policy for the country (Booth et al 2006). Banda focused on agriculture; 
and estate farming for export crops was at the heart of his development policy. During 
Banda’s reign patronage was limited to upper echelons of politicians and civil service 
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and the military (Booth et al 2006: 12). He established a state run private company, 
Press Holdings that had wide ranging focus from agriculture (estate farming), to 
supermarkets and investments in property markets. He linked Press Holdings with 
other state owned companies such as Agricultural Development and Marketing 
Corporation (ADMARC) and two major commercial banks- all of which had 
interlocking directorates. This meant that profits from ADMARC could go via the 
banks to Press Holdings and other favoured politicians without fraud or corruption 
(Booth et al 2006: 12). Banda also used populism to sell his development policies. For 
example he disseminated an ideology of development to rural farmers during his 
annual crop inspection tours where the emphasis was promises on basic necessities- 
shelter, food and clothes, etc (Booth et al 2006: 12). Cammack (2011) and Booth et al 
(2006) have argued that Banda pursued developmental patrimonialism. In his first 
term wa Mutharika focused on eradicating hunger through subsidies programme that 
was aimed at increasing production of maize. He also invested heavily in 
infrastructure development. It can be said that under Banda, and wa Mutharika’s first 
term, patronage followed policy. Thus, wa Mutharika’s first term might also be 
similar to what Kelsall et al (2010) have referred to as developmental 
neopatrimonialism.  
 
In contrast, Muluzi did not demonstrate any clear long-term vision or development 
strategy, and policy was comparatively ad hoc (Booth et al 2006: 12). According to 
Booth et al (2006: 12), Muluzi and his allies developed a patronage network that 
sought business opportunities, and their policies seemed to be dictated by the desire to 
gain. The objective of the ruling elites was to stay in power and get rich (Cammack 
2011: 4). During the 2001/02 food crisis the state owned National Food Reserve 
Agency (NFRA) oversold maize (due to weak oversight) to Muluzi’s cronies who 
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were able to hoard the maize and sell it later at higher prices (Booth et al 2006: 22). 
Therefore, these elites were able to benefit from the food crisis that afflicted the 
country. Muluzi also focused on centralising development projects and he identified 
himself with the World Bank supported Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF), which 
included a community sub programme to fund various community projects. Voters 
were promised access to these resources if they voted for UDF. Muluzi and the UDF 
even included a logo of MASAF on their manifesto for the 1999 elections (van Donge 
2004). According to van Donge (2004: 355), the majority of the projects that were 
funded through MASAF were never finished.  Yet very little has been done to bring 
to book those who are responsible for the unfinished projects. 
 
To a certain extent Muluzi’s excessive patronage practices (and their negative 
influences on policy) are similar to what happened during wa Mutharika’s second 
term. A confidential source at one of the donor agencies indicated that during wa 
Mutharika’s second time big contracts were mostly awarded to one company, Mulli 
Brothers, which had connections to the president.3 What was surprising was that in 
the case of fertiliser subsidy the company’s prices were higher than some of their 
competitors and in most cases their performance in the delivery of fertiliser left a lot 
to be desired. Donors had privately questioned the government’s decisions to award 
contracts to bidders such as Mulli who had presented higher prices.4 There are 
rumours that wa Mutharika also acted as a surety	  for the company to access loans and 
overdraft facilities from private and state owned banks in Malawi (Malawi Democrat 
2012). Currently Mulli Brothers owes the state owned, Malawi Savings Bank K3.2 
billion which the company has so far failed to pay back (Nyondo 2013). In fact in a 
radio interview in 2009 the managing director of Mulli Brothers stated that it was the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Interview, DFID official, 15 October 2011 
4 Interview, DFID official, 15 October 2011 
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policy of company to support the government of the day, which happened to be led by 
wa Mutharika, and the DPP at that time (Malemia 2009). Wa Mutharika also ‘greased 
his new party, the DPP, with a new rural development fund and fertiliser subsidies’ 
(Cammack 2007a: 5). Under both Muluzi and wa Mutharika even mere allocation of 
plots (of land) followed patronage, and this was usually done to reward supporters 
(Booth et al 2006: 22).  
 
It can be argued that under Muluzi (see: Booth et al 2006: viii) and wa Mutharika’s 
second term patronage drove policy and corruption was democratised with 
accumulation of spoils increasingly assuming illegal forms. According to Booth et al 
(2006: viii) Muluzi’s approach (and to a certain extent wa Mutharika’s one during his 
second term) have been more damaging for Malawi’s economy. In these 
environments the ability of public officials to make and implement policies based on 
public interest was deeply constrained by the need to service patronage networks of 
one kind or another (Wild and Harris 2011: 11).  
 
There is something to be said about the instability that second terms have brought in 
Malawi and how sitting presidents have responded to this. In his second term, Muluzi 
supported an open term bill, which would have allowed him to stand for as many 
terms as he wanted. However, this did not garner support. Instead, he opted for a third 
term bill, which was introduced in parliament as a private members bill. Muluzi used 
‘money power’ to bribe some members of parliament to support the third term bill in 
parliament (Booth et al 2006: 14). The bill was narrowly defeated in parliament. On 
the other hand, wa Mutharika used his second term to fight off his opponents, and to 
secure loyalty and support for his brother to become the presidential candidate for the 
ruling party in the 2014 elections. Both presidents have had estranged relations with 
their vice presidents and this is discussed later in this section. Therefore, both men, in 
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their second terms’ were preoccupied with efforts to stay or maintain their control 
over the running of the state. This might have affected their pursuit of a development 
agenda. It may also explain why patronage and clientelist practices and norms gained 
ground both under Muluzi and wa Mutharika as they tried to buy support.  
 
All the three former presidents (and now the current one) have exercised control over 
both party and state affairs. Kamuzu Banda was the head of the Malawi Congress 
Party, while Muluzi and wa Mutharika were also presidents of their own parties. What 
is interesting is that Malawi has a strong presidentialist system and weak parties. In 
fact, the weakness of the parties (even ruling parties) was clearly demonstrated during 
the rule of Muluzi and wa Mutharika. Muluzi owned all the vehicles of the party. He 
also rented office buildings on behalf of the party. In a way this demonstrates lack of 
separation between public and private resources, as Muluzi was able to tap into the 
public purse to fund his own party activities (Booth et al 2006). Wa Mutharika also 
provided financial assistance to the DPP. In fact the DPP’s headquarters in Lilongwe 
was located at one of the houses which he had renovated using public resources.5 Due 
to the existence of weak parties elections tend to focus on personalities and loyalties 
to these big men (woman) rather than the policy appeal (Booth et al 2006: 18).  
 
Presidential powers of appointment have also been used extensively to reward those 
that advance the interests of the president. Muluzi appointed to the cabinet the 
member of parliament who had introduced the third term bill in parliament (Booth et 
al 2006: 14). In addition people who helped Muluzi’s UDF in 1999 election campaign 
received embassy appointments and other senior positions in government and 
parastatal organisations (Booth et al 2006: 14). Wa Mutharika was also well known 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Interview, a couple (neighbors to former President), Area 12, Lilongwe, 1 October 
2011.	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for non-meritorious appointments, which were aimed at serving patronage interests 
(Cammack 2007a: 5).  
 
At local level, Kamuzu Banda, Muluzi and wa Mutharika (and now Joyce Banda) co-
opted chiefs in order to secure rural support. Chiefs were (and remain) at the centre of 
development committees at local level. According to Wild and Harris (2011: 12), this 
entrenched the powers of the chiefs at local level. Wa Mutharika went a step further 
in instrumentalising the role of chiefs through provision of centrally transferred 
honorariums effectively bringing them onto the public payroll (Wild and Harris 2011: 
12). As it will be shown in later chapters of this thesis chiefs under wa Mutharika 
were used to promote the interests of his brother to become his successor.  
 
All the three men showed political intolerance and used state and party machinery to 
deal with his opponents (See: Wild and Harris 2011: 10). During the one party era, 
those who opposed Banda were either imprisoned, or went into exile in other 
countries in Africa and elsewhere. Muluzi openly used ‘foul’ language against his 
opponents. For example, he claimed that the then Vice President Justin Malewezi was 
a sick man who took tablets everyday and could not become president. Wa Mutharika 
also responded to opposition within his own party through expulsion. The then Vice 
President, Joyce Banda, and several party officials such as Khumbo Kachali were 
fired from the ruling party on claims that they were forming parallel structures. Both 
Muluzi and wa Mutharika used youths to deal with political opponents. The Young 
Democrats under Muluzi and the DPP Youth Cadets under wa Mutharika were 
notorious in dealing with those that opposed their ‘big men’. On 18th July 2011, a day 
before the ‘mass demonstrations against wa Mutharika’, three vehicles carrying DPP 
Youth Cadets (with machetes) drove around Blantyre city where they openly 
threatened anyone who would go out and demonstrate against wa Mutharika. In 2011, 
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a number of civil society leaders such as Rafik Hajat and Undule Mwakasungula had 
their offices petrol bombed and it was suspected that this was due to their criticism on 
the then wa Mutharika regime. The use of youths by Muluzi and wa Mutharika to 
terrorise opponents is similar to how Banda, during the one party state, used the 
Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) and Youth League to deal with opposition.  
 
According to Booth et al (2006: 21), the state in Malawi is very strongly reinforced by 
norms and values of traditional society, which are a characteristic of the African 
neopatrimonial state: 
 
‘Malawi’s neopatrimonial state has not yet been modified except in negative ways by 
the introduction of institutions of formal democracy…’ 
Booth et al (2006: 18) 
 
Based on the comparison of the periods under the three men, there were some periods 
of economic growth that seem to reflect Kelsall’s ‘developmental patrimonialism’- 
Banda’s one party era (1964-1979), and wa Mutharika’s first term. However, in the 
period after the return of multiparty form of government in 1994, only wa 
Mutharika’s first term has been promising with the economy growing at a rate of 7% 
annually. In 2009, the Economic Intelligence Unit rated the Malawi’s economy as one 
of the fastest growing, and only behind Qatar (Sunday Nation 2009). On the whole, 
neopatrimonial practices and norms have characterised the reign of all the three men. 
In their worst forms patronage and clientelism has negatively affected the ability to 
make and implement policy in public interest. According to Booth et al (2006: 21), 
this means that real policy in Malawi is ‘purposefully short-termist, driven by the 
immediate political considerations’. It has also been shown here that both Muluzi and 
wa Mutharika, in their second terms, were more preoccupied with staying in power or 
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at least influencing who will replace them. To some extent, this took their eyes off the 
long-term agenda as they focused on this short-term need. Neopatrimonial practices 
and norms are so entrenched such that supporters (even at village level) will follow 
patrons that promise to provide certain rents for them.  
 
Decentralisation as one of the public policies has been designed (and is being 
implemented) in this context. Therefore decentralisation is not immune from the 
neopatrimonial tendencies of the state in Malawi, and the discussion in chapters five 
and six will demonstrate how neopatrimonialism has influenced the way reforms have 
been rolled out in practice. The sections below provide a historical account of 
decentralisation in Malawi, and also describe in detail the design of new reforms that 
were initiated in 2004.  
 
3.3 Colonial rule, and the new experiments with decentralisation (1891-
1960) 
	  
The history of decentralisation in Malawi goes back to the colonial era during which 
the British ruled the country for over seventy years. The British established colonial 
administration in 1891. During the colonial administration the political institutions 
were centralised and excluded participation of the indigenous people (Kaunda 1999: 
580; Patel et al 2007: 61).  The colonial rulers who came and settled in the then 
Nyasaland protectorate were few. Therefore, it was necessary to establish a system 
that would work effectively around these few officials. The colonial government 
settled on Lord Lugard’s indirect rule system, which included chiefs as foot soldiers 
for the few officials. According to Chiweza (2010: 31), indirect rule was a form of 
decentralisation. Wishlade (1961: 36) has pointed out that under indirect rule chiefs 
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who were previously autonomous were re-organised into native authorities and they 
were given roles within the administrative hierarchy of the colonial regime.  
 
Each colonial territory was headed by a Governor (Kaunda 1999: 580). Under the 
Governor were Provincial Commissioners. These Provincial Commissioners oversaw 
the activities of District Commissioners who were the senior officials of the colonial 
government at district level. The District Commissioners (DCs) were in direct contact 
with communities and their role was to manage every sphere of local administration 
including police and security, justice, finance, and tax collection (Kaunda 1999: 580; 
Patel et al 2007: 61). The Provincial Commissioners and District Commissioners were 
the heads of all government field offices at provincial and district levels respectively 
(Kaunda 1995: 310).  
 
Indirect rule was based on one form of decentralisation- deconcentration. 
Deconcentration has been described in detail in chapter two.  Indirect rule allowed the 
colonial regime to manage the local populations by extending central administration 
into rural areas with only few administrators and an army of chiefs. Each district 
administration, led by a District Commissioner, received powers to manage technical 
functions such as planning, resource mobilization and allocation. This form of 
decentralisation was considered essential to improve efficiency in the administration 
of the colony. This rationale is similar to current rationales, which focus on the 
‘efficiency arguments’ for decentralisation.  
 
The district administration ordinance, which was passed in 1912, provided for the 
appointment of village headmen and principal village headmen. This marked the 
formal inclusion of chiefs in the colonial administration.  The roles of chiefs were to 
assist the District Commissioners in the collection of taxes, maintenance of law and 
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order, administration of justice and other functions as directed by the Commissioner 
(Kaunda 1999: 581).  This meant realigning the traditional roles of chiefs to make 
sure that they were serving the interests of the heavily centralised colonial 
administration. The performance of chiefs in carrying out the functions listed above, 
particularly on revenue collection, greatly influenced their livelihoods (Kaunda 1999: 
581). In this case the colonial government captured the traditional structures of 
governance and used them to pursue their own interests. The manipulation of the role 
of chiefs has since continued in subsequent governments, and this has been 
demonstrated in chapters five and six of this thesis. 
 
In 1933, the colonial government passed the Native Authorities ordinance, which 
enhanced the centralisation of local administration. Through these reforms chiefs 
were made more accountable to the colonial government, and the distance grew 
between chiefs and the local people. According to Kaunda (1999: 581), chiefs were 
turned into ‘mere agents of the colonial administration’. The native authorities 
ordinance also stressed the need for strict supervision of chiefs by District 
Commissioners (Chiweza 2010: 36). To survive in their positions chiefs had to satisfy 
the needs of their masters rather than their subjects. The colonial government had 
powers to replace chiefs who were not performing, or were considered not to be 
working in the interest of the colonial government (Wishlade 1961: 38). This is 
similar to the patterns demonstrated later in chapters five and six whereby ruling 
parties has consistently co-opted chiefs to serve central interests.  
 
The 1933 ordinance also provided for the establishment of traditional courts. Chiefs 
were allowed to pass laws in their own areas but these were subject to approval from 
the District Commissioner (Wishlade 1961: 38). The chiefs, also referred to as native 
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authorities, were given powers to sanction those who did not obey their orders. These 
sanctions were reinforced by the colonial government (Wishlade 1961: 38). In return 
for their service to the colonial regime the government introduced an allowance for 
chiefs, which was paid from government coffers. This practice has continued to this 
day.  
 
Figure one below shows the structure of colonial administration under indirect 
rule: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This structure of indirect rule shown in figure one above continued until the early 
1950s when the British policy for administration of colonies underwent changes. This 
happened due to a number of reasons. First, the period after the Second World War 
saw the rise of social liberal parties in Britain and France. These parties were keen to 
implement reforms in the way that colonies were being administered (Chiweza 2005). 
Second, and related to the first reason, British government promised independence in 
return for the support of colonies during the Second World War. The implementation 
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of reforms was one way of delaying independence. This was so because local 
populations in the colonies would focus on the local spaces that were opening up as a 
result of reforms, while allowing the colonial regime to hang on. In this regard, such 
reforms would help to curb the agitation from growing number of educated Africans, 
which had begun as early as 1947 (Chiweza 2005: 4).  
 
Therefore, the period after the Second World War saw a shift in policy which 
favoured democratic system of local government as a way to appease local 
populations while ensuring continued existence of colonial regime. According to 
Chiweza (2005: 4) this period resulted in the development of local government 
system first in Anglophone Africa and later on in Francophone Africa. These reforms, 
which were led by the Secretary of State for Colonies, Creech Jones introduced 
several measures aimed at building democratic and efficient local government 
systems in the colonies (Kaunda 1999: 581). Yet, as it will be shown in the later 
sections of this chapter contrary to what these reforms had aimed to address, the end 
result was more and not less centralisation.  
 
As part of the reforms towards establishment of local government the colonial 
government in Malawi passed the District Council Ordinance in 1953. This ordinance 
led to the establishment of district councils, which were separate from native 
authorities (chiefs) (Chiweza 2010: 36; Kalinga 1996: 450; Chiweza 2005: 4). The 
new councils were to be built around the British model. However, the only difference 
with the British model was that the councils in Nyasaland included native authorities 
(chiefs) as ex-officio members. The new councils were given limited powers to make 
by-laws. They were also responsible for providing services in areas such as health, 
agriculture, education and other areas. The District Commissioner was given authority 
to chair the council. The 1953 ordinance also provided for the existence of elected 
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representatives within the district councils (Patel et al 2007: 61). However, with the 
growing sense of African nationalism in the late 1940s to early 1950s the colonial 
government became increasingly paranoid that the African nationalists would 
‘capture’ the councils and use them to strengthen the anti-colonial struggle (Kaunda 
1999: 582). Therefore, instead of holding elections the District Commissioner was 
given powers to appoint council members in consultation with chiefs (Chiweza 2010: 
36). As another measure to protect the central interests, the colonial government 
stripped the councils of the authority to make rules and rural councils became mere 
‘vehicles’ for delivering social services. The colonial government also tried to use the 
chiefs to check the growing influence of the nationalists (Kaunda 1999: 582).  
 
Figure two below shows the structure of district administration after the 
introduction of councils in 1953 (dual system): 
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new councils in consultation with the chiefs.  With these new powers DCs could 
appoint sympathisers to the colonial regime. Second, reforms moved in circles and 
amendments were passed to limit powers, which were previously transferred. For 
example, after 1953, the government introduced another amendment to strip councils 
of rule making powers. Councils became implementation arms of the central 
government. Chiweza (2010) and Kaunda (1999) have argued that this was done 
because the colonial government was afraid that the growing nationalist movement 
would have captured the local spaces and used them to advance the anti-colonial 
struggle. These elements here sound very familiar with respect to the nature of 
reforms after the colonial era.  
 
In the late 1950s, it was evident to the colonial government that the nationalists were 
not to be denied. Between 1958 and 1960 several African nationalist leaders were 
arrested. Key among these nationalists was Hastings Kamuzu Banda who had 
returned to Malawi from Ghana to lead the struggle against colonial rule. Due to 
continued protests and also possibly the change in colonial policy in Africa the 
country was granted independence in the early 1960s. A new nationalist government 
led by the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) was established in 1961. Hastings Kamuzu 
Banda became the first Prime Minister. The role of this new government in 
implementing decentralisation reforms is discussed in the next section below.  	  
3.4 The era of the Single party state, 1961-1993: completing the circle 
 
The newly independent government, which was set up in 1961, was eager to 
implement radical reforms, which would make it distinct from the colonial regime, 
that was considered oppressive and heavily centralised. Some of these reforms were 
aimed at expanding reforms that had initially been introduced by this colonial regime. 
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For instance the new government led by the Malawi Congress Party passed the Local 
Government Amendment Ordinance in 1961, which introduced statutory district 
councils, and provided for universal adult suffrage in the election of councillors 
(Kaunda 1999: 582; Patel et al 2007: 62; Chiweza 2010: 37; Kaunda 1995: 311). 
These reforms were an extension to those introduced by colonial regime in 1953. 
According to these 1961 amendments the district council could elect a district 
chairperson from amongst its members. The District Commissioner was replaced by 
the elected chairperson as head of the council. However, chiefs remained ex-officio 
members of the councils. From 1963, the District Commissioner was given new roles 
to guide and advise the district councils, and train local government staff (Kaunda 
1999: 582). According to Chiweza (2010), the period between 1961 and 1964 was a 
golden age of decentralisation when the new regime significantly expanded the role of 
district councils, which had initially been set up by the colonial regime. However, this 
period did not last long.  
 
In 1966, the new country became a de-facto one party state after all the Malawi 
Congress Party (MCP) candidates were re-elected unopposed in the April 1964 pre-
independence general elections (Kaunda 1999: 582). Once it was established the one 
party state changed the nature of political and administrative institutions in the 
country. Centralisation, which was the characteristic of the colonial regime, 
reappeared and became further entrenched. The executive, led by President Hastings 
Kamuzu Banda became the powerful entity in establishing and implementing rules at 
various levels. This period marked the beginning of the decline of the fortune for 
decentralised governments in Malawi (Chiweza 2010: 37). According to Kaunda 
(1999: 582), and Patel et al (2007: 62) both the civil service and the local 
administration became heavily politicised. In addition, there were increasing demands 
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to implement national social and economic development priorities. The local 
administration was viewed as a mechanism for delivering these priorities. Elections 
were abolished and representatives to the council were appointed by the president 
based on their membership to the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) (Chiweza 2010: 38). 
This pattern is familiar to what happened during the colonial rule. By 1967 the role of 
the District Commissioner was strengthened and s/he was given the responsibility to 
coordinate development activities at district level. The MCP government argued that 
the District Commissioner was better educated as compared to councillors who were 
illiterate and inexperienced. This postcolonial District Commissioner had more 
responsibilities as compared to the colonial District Commissioner (Kaunda 1999: 
583). 
	  
According to Kaunda (1999: 583), the centralisation of the state and executive 
dominance were rolled out at the same time. The new 1966 constitution enforced the 
role of a strong state with resolute leadership, which was considered necessary to 
address the challenges of underdevelopment. This new constitution established 
Malawi, as a one party state and the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) became the only 
party under the leadership of Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda. The state and local 
government institutions were constitutionally subordinated to the party, which was 
synonymous with the government (Kaunda 1999: 583). Dr. Banda was head of state 
and government, as well as head of the party.  
 
The centralisation of the state was accelerated by a cabinet crisis in 1964. The cabinet 
crisis occurred when several ministers openly questioned the authority of the 
President in the cabinet. These ministers were forced into exile. A couple of them 
tried to organise armed coup in 1967 but this failed. To curtail any opposition to the 
government, the MCP government moved in swiftly to centralise power. Political 
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opposition was made illegal in the country. In the subsequent years hundreds of 
Malawians were imprisoned without trial.  Based on the researcher’s own experience 
growing up in Malawi there are many stories of people being fed to the crocodiles or 
being sent to prison without trial (see: Mthatiwa 2012: 97). The government targeted 
those who were viewed as a threat to the rule of Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda (Kaunda 
1999: 583). Political intimidation and mysterious disappearances became common. 
To survive this political environment party officials, MPs, chiefs and councillors were 
eager to show their loyalty lest they be branded ‘rebels’, lose their positions, be 
detained without trial or even disappear (Kaunda 1999: 584). Those who opposed 
Banda were severely dealt with. For instance, in 1983 three senior cabinet ministers 
and a member of parliament were killed in what appeared to be a car crash. A 
commission of inquiry in 1995 after the advent of multi party politics in Malawi 
found that the four individuals were clubbed to death before being put in car and 
pushed down into a ravine (Robinson 2009: 12).  
	  
The relationship between the executive and the local government institutions was one 
of ‘superiority and subordination’ (Kaunda 1999: 584). The role of the executive was 
to decide on priorities, and the role of the local administration was to implement these 
centrally formulated priorities. All members of parliament and councillors at district 
level had to be MCP members who were bound to the party’s constitution and rules 
and regulations (Kaunda 1999: 584). They were expected to be loyal to the party in all 
their dealings at the local level. Decisions were endorsed at the local level with little 
or no scrutiny, as expressing alternative views to what was coming from the centre 
was considered disrespect for the party, and to the head of the state. MPs and 
councillors were selected rather than elected and the main criterion was that they had 
to be members of the party.  
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As already pointed out earlier, the one party state used the excuse of ineffective 
councillors to cement their control over District Commissioners (DCs). The DC 
became the principal representative and agent of the Office of the President. The 
Minister of Local Government was given powers to dissolve the council, suspend 
councillors, and remove key council officials due to incapacity, negligence of duty, 
and misconduct. Councillors and officers could also be suspended if they were 
suspected to operate in a manner that did not serve the interests of the ruling party and 
the central government. The control over hiring and firing of officials from the district 
council was deliberate strategy to make them more accountable to the centre. The 
same was true for appointed council members who were party loyalists.  
	  
Since district councils were seen as implementation mechanisms for national 
development priorities the centre expanded the role of the District Commissioner to 
make them more ‘developmental’. In this regard the one party state settled on 
deconcentration with more implementation powers being transferred to field units of 
central ministries. Although these field units were supervised by the District 
Commissioner, the parent central ministries maintained huge powers to influence 
policy and resource allocation even at district level.  	  
A District Development Committee (DDC) was set up alongside the District Council, 
and the DC became the Chairperson of this Committee. The role of the DC in the 
DDC was to make sure that the development activities at the district level were in line 
with national development policies and priorities. The DC headed a highly disjointed 
and vertical field administration system that s/he coordinated through the DDC 
(Kaunda 1999: 587). The DDC were also mechanisms to control political leaders 
(MPs, councillors), chiefs and the government field agents by the District 
Commissioner (Kaunda 1999: 587; Cross and Kutengule 2001: 12; Chiweza 2010: 
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39). Through the DDC District Commissioners were able to influence district 
development activities in addition to being the representative of the president in the 
district. Thus the DDC entrenched centralisation and control of rural areas by aligning 
the district development activities and actors to serve central interests. The formation 
of the DDC led by DCs took powers away from the local councils, which were 
constituted of councillors and members of parliament. It meant that the local 
bureaucrats under the leadership of the DC were more influential in determining local 
priorities rather than the representatives of the people. The DDC were linked to Area 
Development Committees (ADCs) and Village Development Committees. All these 
levels were staffed by party loyalists (Cross and Kutengule 2001: 12).  
 
Thus the district administration system under the one party state was characterised by 
existence of several structures some of which had the potential to duplicate roles, for 
example the district council with appointed councillors versus the District 
Development Committee, also with appointed representatives. There was also a 
strong relationship between the party structures at all levels and the decentralised 
structures. The figure below shows the relationships between the various structures in 
the post 1966 era. 
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Figure three: Decentralised structures and relationship with party structures in 
post 1966 era:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in this figure above at district level there were two structures, the district 
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was the case because the DDCs were easier to control as they were staffed by party 
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Apthorpe et al (1995) has pointed out that these party officials often abused the 
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probably because the party officials were working in the interest of the centre, and 
such abuse could have been the benefits of working with the party.  
 
The period after 1967 was generally characterised by heavy handedness over any real 
or perceived opposition to the one party rule. This was at both central and district 
levels where the policies of Dr. Banda and the party could not be debated or 
challenged (Kaunda 1999: 584). Thus, both the political system and the development 
process became heavily centralised. In a way, the characteristics of the district council 
under the one party state reflected those of the colonial era. It can be argued that the 
one party (after independence) did not do away with many of the characteristics such 
as the functions of the colonial District Commissioner (Kaunda 1999: 584). As it has 
already been pointed out, the roles of the DC were further entrenched due to 
arguments made by the centre that the local councillors lacked experience. The centre 
exercised control over DCs through the Minister of Local Government who had 
powers to dissolve councils and also to remove senior council officers including the 
DCs.  
 
Just as chiefs had played a key role in assisting the colonial government, the one party 
state co-opted chiefs at the district level. In addition to being ex-officio members of 
the councils chiefs were seen as key actors to support the DCs in maintaining law and 
order, to contribute to the welfare and development of the district and to cooperate 
with the party at local level (Kaunda 1999: 587). Chiefs were also given the role to 
check the direction of the DC. In a way, this was a two-way relationship. On one side 
the chiefs were to make sure that the DC acted in the party’s interest, and on the other 
hand the DC directly oversaw the activities of the chiefs and reported to the centre.  
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The one party state also reduced the powers of the chiefs to make rules or issue orders 
(Kaunda 1999: 587; Chiweza 2005: 4). This was deliberate in order to dilute the 
powers of the chiefs and make them more subservient to the centre. Chiefs who were 
not on the side of government and the ruling party were dismissed. To survive chiefs 
had to align themselves with the party, and they managed to negotiate ‘space to retain 
their legitimacy’ with the people (Cross and Kutengule 2001: 13). The sanctioning of 
chiefs not aligned with government is similar to the set up during the colonial rule.  
	  
Councillors were also put under the control of the centre. Free elections were 
abolished and instead councillors were chosen through nomination (Patel et al 2007: 
62). Each ward had to nominate between three to five candidates, and the names were 
submitted to the president. The president would then select one candidate to work as a 
councilor for that ward. All councillors had to belong to the Malawi Congress Party 
and were all ex-officio members of the party at district level (Kaunda 1999: 588, Patel 
et al 2007: 62). The process of choosing councillors was also similar to how members 
of parliament were selected.  
	  
Under the one party state the Minister of Local Government was an important actor 
and had numerous powers.  The Minister controlled the local bureaucrats through 
powers to hire and fire senior officers at the district level. Through the DC the 
Minister also oversaw the activities of chiefs. The Minister also had powers to 
approve the by-laws of a local council. The powers also extended to financial 
administration where estimates of revenue and expenditure, acquisition of loans and 
assessment of property rates had to be approved by the Minister (Kaunda 1999: 588).  
	  
This section has shown that under the one party rule the local administrative system 
was heavily centralised with the councils, District Development Committees and 
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chiefs coming under the control of the central government. This was done deliberately 
in order to consolidate central interests at the local level. Therefore, in practice the 
one party state had pursued decentralisation with the aim of extending its reach and 
controlling the local arena. This is similar to the colonial regime that had pursued 
decentralisation in order to expand its control over the local populations. As a result, 
although initially the local councils had received more powers than the colonial era, 
some of these powers were quickly reversed. Thus, after 1966 the powers of local 
councils were limited to implementation. Even that role was complicated by the 
existence of District Development Committees, which had access to more resources. 
The selection and roles of actors such as councillors, MPs, chiefs and local 
bureaucrats were heavily politicised, and membership to both the Council and the 
District Development Committee was based on appointment. The absence of elections 
meant that downward accountability was heavily challenged, and once elected by the 
president both councillors and MPs were eager to please the centre. Both the council 
officials and chiefs also often had to thread a fine line to ensure that they served 
central interests. Therefore, it can be argued that during the one party era the local 
administration system had moved full circle from centralisation to a bit of 
democratisation and back to centralisation. This centralisation continued until 1993 
when the winds of change blew across Africa and Malawi adopted multi party form of 
government.  
3.5 The new promise for broad reforms, 1994-onwards 
	  
The origins of the post 1993 reforms towards democratic decentralisation can be 
traced back to the early 1990s during the last years of the one party state. The steps 
toward the reforms were taken with influence from some donors particularly the 
United Nations (UN). As early as 1987/88 a World Bank country assessment report 
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concluded that the country would not make progress in tackling poverty unless the 
people were directly involved in the development process. This was a clear shift, 
which favoured participatory approaches to development. In a poverty assessment 
report by UNDP in 1988/89 the agency recommended that the country should adopt 
decentralisation as a policy framework (Ndegwa and Levy 2003: 24). Another report 
commissioned by the United Nations and the Government of Malawi jointly in the 
early 1990s noted that the District Development Committees, which were set up in the 
1960s, were not effective in the implementation of rural development initiatives 
(Chiweza 2010:39). The report recommended that the country should adopt more 
participatory approaches to development, which emphasized grassroots solutions to 
tackling development challenges in Malawi (Chiweza 2010: 39).  
 
As a follow up to the joint report, the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) offered to 
work with the Government of Malawi to design and pilot an approach for 
decentralised participatory planning and financing of district level capital 
investments. The project, which started in 1992, was piloted in 6 districts of 
Nkhatabay, Mchinji, Dedza, Nsanje, Thyolo and Mangochi. According to Chiweza 
(2010) this project was part of global effort to generate lessons by the United Nations, 
and Malawi was one of the countries where the project was implemented. It can be 
argued here that although the Malawi Government came on board to implement the 
project the initial push was from external actors. The approach championed by UNDP 
and UNCDF involved the creation of ‘district focus for rural development’, which 
was based on the Kenyan model. Some modifications were made to ensure that the 
districts exercised leadership and autonomy over finances and planning (Chiweza 
2010:40). Under this approach the districts were given powers to prepare and 
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implement their own projects. The UNDP and UNCDF provided grants, which were 
used by the six districts to implement various capital projects based on district level 
priorities. The district focus model fell short of democratic decentralisation because it 
did not provide for elected representatives. According to Chiweza (2010), this form of 
decentralisation resembled administrative decentralisation or deconcentration and it 
emphasized service delivery by line ministries.  
 
As was pointed out earlier, the district focus for rural development was initiated 
during the last few years of the one party state. This form of decentralisation, also 
known as deconcentration, offered an opportunity to improve efficiency in 
implementation of development priorities at district level without compromising the 
position of the central government. It might explain why the government pursued 
reforms since they were considered less threatening. The district focus approach had 
some limitations. According to Cross and Kutengule (2001), there were two key 
weaknesses. First, the dual system of district development committees (DDC) and 
district councils continued, and this system favoured the DDC and the DC. Second, 
the approach reinforced top-down approach since the form of decentralisation was 
deconcentration. Ndegwa and Levy (2003: 24) have noted that the implementation of 
the district focus was significantly challenged in an environment of centralisation and 
authoritarianism under the one party regime.  
 
Given its limitations the district focus, or administrative decentralisation was not 
adequate for some donors who wanted the country to pursue political reforms that 
tilted towards democratisation. The UNDP through its Director, Terence Jones, took a 
lead in pushing for democratic decentralisation in Malawi. In 1995 the UNDP 
commissioned a report, which was done by a team led by Professor Raymond 
Apthorpe. According to Cross and Kutengule (2001: 15), the recommendations from 
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this report led to the drafting of the decentralisation policy. This push for democratic 
decentralisation from external actors coincided with the political changes that 
occurred in Malawi in 1994. In 1993, following pressure from within and also from 
donors, a referendum was held to determine whether Malawians wanted to remain 
under one party or were interested in moving towards multi party form of 
government. Malawians voted overwhelmingly for change. The following year multi 
party elections were held and the United Democratic Front (UDF) won the majority of 
seats in parliament. This new democratically elected government promised 
comprehensive package of reforms one of which was the review of the Local 
Government Act (LGA). Therefore, reforms were pursued as a result of interest from 
donors as well as due to the excitement of a new democratic government.  
 
By 1996 the Cabinet in Malawi had approved the establishment of the 
Decentralisation Secretariat to lead the process of developing the decentralisation 
policy. However, Kaunda (1999: 591) has argued that despite the political rhetoric the 
new regime did not move quickly to amend many of the archaic laws from the one 
party state. A new Local Government Act was only passed in 1998, and even then 
elections were not held until 2000. According to Kaunda (1999: 592) the reasons for 
delaying elections were ‘dubious’. One of the reasons cited was lack of financial 
resources. But this was stated three years after the government had come into office. 
It is quite possible that since the new ruling party did not have a large majority in 
parliament they might have feared opening up local spaces for opposition at district 
level. The UDF as a new ruling party controlled less than half of the 177 
parliamentary constituencies in the country (Kaunda 1999: 593). Most of the 
parliamentary seats for the ruling party were concentrated in the southern region, with 
few seats in the central region, and not a single seat in the northern region. Ndegwa 
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and Levy (2003: 25) have pointed out that since decentralisation did not emerge as a 
result of a push from below it is quite possible that central actors took their time to 
design reforms with their interests in mind.  
 
Since elections did not take place between 1994 and 1999 there were no councillors at 
the local level. Instead local bureaucrats were the dominant actors making all the key 
decisions at the local level. Kaunda (1999: 594) has argued that this status quo 
magnified the role of central government locally with little or no involvement of local 
communities in the making of decisions over local development priorities. Local 
government elections were finally held in 2000 following a landslide victory by the 
UDF in the 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections. This might reinforce the 
argument that elections were held because the UDF party had by then built a large 
support base through out the country as compared to the 1994 scenario where it was a 
minority government. 
 
It is clear that in Malawi reforms were driven by the United Nations through UNDP 
and UNCDF and these agencies were very instrumental in the design of the new 
reforms. Between 1998 and 2001 UNDP worked with the Government of Malawi to 
implement the ‘Local Governance Development Management Programme’. This 
programme had several objectives, which included: to support the development of the 
decentralisation policy, and to replicate district-planning system in all districts 
(Chiweza 2010: 41; UNCDF 2008: 12). The district planning system was based on 
lessons generated from the district focus approach.  
 
The post 1994 reforms in Malawi made explicit links to good governance. According 
to UNCDF (2008) the reforms were aimed at achieving duo objectives to promote 
good governance and to improve service delivery. Cross and Kutengule (2001) have 
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argued that the new reforms were also driven by contemporary understanding of the 
importance of popular participation. 
 
3.5.1 National and local challenges with decentralisation during UDF era, 1994- 
2005 
 
Chinsinga (2008: 74) has argued that decentralisation reforms during the UDF era 
were characterised by ‘inconsistent and ad hoc implementation motivated largely by 
strategic political considerations’. National elites seemed to be interested in 
consolidated their own vested interests. As a result the track record of democratic 
decentralisation in tackling poverty was not very encouraging. According to 
Chinsinga (2008: 87), politicians particularly on the government side did not welcome 
democratic decentralisation in its original form but saw it as means to improve 
administrative capacity rather than allowing ‘large scale devolution of power’. This is 
the only period, after 1994, when Malawi has had councillors and Chinsinga has 
written extensively on the challenges that district councils faced. Chinsinga (2008) 
has highlighted two problems that faced district councils, (i) the power struggles 
amongst local actors in a bid to assert themselves as dominant forces in emerging 
governance and administrative frameworks- the motivation was to appropriate most 
of the power and to direct benefits towards themselves, or to at least maintain the 
existing patterns of distribution, and (ii) district councils operated without adequate 
and reliable funds.  
	  
According to Chinsinga (2008: 88), there were conflicts between MPs and councillors 
due to the fact that MPs perceived councillors to be a threat to their candidacy in 
subsequent parliamentary elections. Generally, MPs wanted to engage councillors in a 
boss- subordinate relationship. There were also conflicts between chiefs and 
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councillors since the former were strongly opposed to the introduction of alternative 
structures of leadership that appear to challenge the power, prestige, authority and 
influence of chiefs (Chinsinga 2008: 89). Chiefs may have felt that councillors had 
stripped them of their powers and experience since chiefs did not have voting powers 
in district councils. On the other hand councillors considered chiefs as illegitimate 
leaders who had no real powers in district councils. It seems that chiefs had an upper 
hand in contrast to councillors since the relationship between chiefs and the national 
elites (in the parallel state) made them powerful actors at local level. As a way to 
consolidate their legitimacy ruling parties have co-opted chiefs and provided them 
with benefits which include promotions, building houses, and offices for them, and 
putting chiefs on government payroll (Chinsinga 2008: 90). On the other hand, 
councillors did not receive anything, and this greatly undermined their relevance in 
the eyes of the public (Chinsinga 2008: 90).  
 
There were also tensions between councillors and local bureaucrats. One of the 
sources of conflict was that in most district assemblies’ councillors and bureaucrats 
never met to agree on common strategic visions. According to Chinsinga (2008: 90), 
other sources of conflict included; lack of remuneration for councillors, the local 
bureaucrats monopolizing control of activities within assemblies, poor 
communication with councillors, regionalism, tribalism and nepotism.  	  
Reforms during the UDF era also experienced several other challenges. Resources 
allocated for poverty reduction were widely abused and diverted for private political 
gains by the then ruling party, UDF, which used the development initiatives as 
instruments to consolidate rural patronage (Chinsinga 2008: 94). Tambulasi (2009: 
180) has argued that decentralisation has created a breeding ground for corruption in 
Malawi. At district level, local elites have access to financial resources and they can 
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exercise discretion for private gains. Contracting out process by the councils 
presented opportunities, motivations and possibilities for corruption (Tambulasi 2009: 
179). This thesis is an attempt to explore the continuities (or discontinuities) that exist 
between the Muluzi and wa Mutharika regimes with regard to the politics of 
decentralisation reforms in Malawi. The next sections of this chapter outline the 
nature of the reforms on paper and the evolution of the development planning process 
under Malawi’s democratic decentralisation. 
  
3.5.2 The 1994 Constitution: The basis for establishment of democratic local 
governments 
 	  
The 1994 constitution is the basis for the implementation of democratic 
decentralisation in Malawi. Section fourteen of the constitution provides the mandate 
for establishment of democratic local governments as an integral part of a functioning 
democracy, economic development, and service delivery improvement. In this regard 
the constitution establishes decentralisation as a state objective (Chiweza 2010: 18). 
The constitution gives powers to the new local governments over welfare provision, 
promotion of local democratic institutions, promoting local participation, and 
promotion of infrastructural and economic development through formulation and 
implementation of local development plans (GoM 1995). These locally formulated 
plans are to be submitted to the central government for endorsement. The 1994 
constitution outlines the following as the functions of the local governments: 
 
• The promotion of infrastructural and economic development through 
formulation and implementation of local development plans and the promotion 
of business enterprise, 
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• The presentation to central government authorities of local development plans 
and raising awareness about local issues which need to be addressed by 
national government, 
• Consolidation and promotion of local democratic institutions and democratic 
participation, 
• Delivery of various services locally as determined in the Act of Parliament. 
The constitution mandated parliament to transfer powers to local governments to be 
responsible for local policies and administration. Councillors were to be elected. To 
break centralisation, the constitution clearly articulated the roles of bureaucratic and 
political central actors over the administration of local governments. For example, 
central bureaucrats are expected to monitor, provide support, and oversee national 
level policy matters. This meant that they were not to engage themselves in 
implementation as well as determination of local priorities.  
 	  
3.5.3 Local Government Act and Decentralisation Policy (1998) 
 	  
Following the 1994 Constitution two other key documents, the decentralisation policy 
and the Local Government Act were finalised in 1998. The decentralisation policy 
provides the overall framework for creating the structure of local government 
institutions at district level, referred to as ‘Assemblies’. The policy specifies the 
actors and accountability lines, powers, functions/ responsibilities, committee and 
financing of Assemblies. With regard to powers, the policy devolves some 
administrative and political powers to the district level. It creates one administrative 
unit at the district through sector devolution and integration of various government 
departments and agencies at the district level. The policy transfers the powers over 
implementation of district level functions to the local governments. Throughout the 
policy document the emphasis is on establishment of elected local governments with 
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the twin objectives of strengthening local governance and poverty reduction. There 
are underlying assumptions about increased people’s participation which will lead to 
demands for accountability from elected local governments and would therefore 
ensure that such governments operate in the interests of the citizens. 
	  
On the other hand, the Local Government Act supports the implementation of the 
decentralisation policy. The policy and the Act spell out the following objectives for 
decentralisation in Malawi: 
 
• To establish democratic environment and institutions in Malawi for 
governance and development at the lower level to facilitate participation of 
local people on decision making, 
• To eliminate dual administration at the district level in order to make planning 
and provision of public services more efficient, economic and more cost 
effective, 
• To promote accountability and good governance at local level in order to 
effectively tackle poverty, 
• To mobilise local people to participate in socio-economic development 
activities at local level. 
	  
Both the policy and Act consistently use the popular language of ‘good governance’ 
or ‘governance’ and see decentralisation as essential to achieve this. In addition, 
decentralisation is considered as a solution to tackle poverty through more responsive 
elected local governments. The institutional structure of Local Governments as 
articulated in the Local Government Act and Decentralisation Policy is discussed in 
the sections below.  	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3.5.4 The institutional structure of Local Government: Devolution of 
Administrative and Political Powers 	  	  
Decentralisation in Malawi has taken the form of devolution of administrative and 
political powers to Local Assemblies (Councils). In Malawi the term ‘devolution’ is 
used interchangeably with ‘democratic decentralisation’ primarily because reforms 
are promoting the existence of elected local governments, which are accountable 
downwards to the local populations. On paper, decentralisation in Malawi has been 
accompanied by wide ranging fiscal reforms, also referred to as fiscal 
decentralisation. Fiscal decentralisation has led to creation of Local Assemblies as 
planning and budgeting units, with the District Commissioner as the Controlling 
Officer across all devolved government units at district level. However, as this thesis 
will show in the later chapters this is only true on paper. In practice, many of the 
promises of decentralisation are yet to be realised with the centre still holding on to 
both resources and functions.  
 
Reforms in Malawi are expected to create a democratic system and culture within 
which local bureaucrats and elected representatives can be held to account by the 
people who they are supposed to serve. The Local Assembly has been created as the 
political body at district level and is accountable to local communities through elected 
representatives who are voted into office every five years. This political structure also 
includes other co-opted officials such as Members of Parliament, Chiefs and special 
interest groups all of which do not have voting rights. Ideally, this means only elected 
representatives have a bigger say in final decisions through exercise of their votes. In 
practice, this thesis will show that the picture is very complicated especially given 
that local government elections have not been held since 2005.  
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The council secretariat is the implementation arm of the Local Assembly. It is the 
administrative structure at district level. It is composed of devolved sectors that have 
been amalgamated into one administrative unit under the supervision of the District 
Commissioner. The secretariat is made up of directorates from devolved sectoral 
ministries such as health, education, agriculture, water, and others. It includes other 
departments, which were already part of the administrative set up of the district 
secretariat, and some of these are: directorates of planning and development, finance 
and administration. The secretariat is responsible for executing plans through 
implementation of various development projects and activities supposedly approved 
by the Local Assembly.  
 
To create the one administrative unit, sector devolution plans were developed. 
However, by 2005 only three of the big sectoral ministries, health, education and 
agriculture, had initiated some form of sectoral devolution. Since then, the process has 
slowed down. In the same year, an inter-government fiscal transfer formula was 
approved by parliament and it is aimed at ensuring that districts have some level of 
fiscal autonomy to implement local plans.  
	  
At sub district level the Local Government Act, section 14 (3) provides for creation of 
committees at area, ward and village level as the Local Assembly may determine. 
Across all districts the decentralised sub district structures are the District Executive 
Committee (DEC), Area Development Committee (ADC), Area Executive Committee 
(AEC) and Village Development Committee (VDC) (Chiweza 2010: 23). These 
structures are critical for the purposes of facilitating participation and local 
development planning within the district development planning process (DDPS). 
Figure four below shows the structure of Local Government in Malawi as per the 
1998 Local Government Act.  
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Figure four: Structure of Local Government in Malawi (1998 Local Government 
Act) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	   	  	  	  
 
 
3.6 The District Development Planning System: Planning from below 
	  
Under decentralisation, devolution of planning and implementation of local projects 
to Local Assemblies was viewed as a more effective and efficient means to reduce 
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preparation and execution of district development plan. Local Assemblies have the 
mandate to form various committees at area and village level as necessary to 
contribute to the process of developing and implementing plans.  
 
The process of coming up with a new planning system for local governments has been 
a lengthy one. A planning handbook for the new local governments was finalised in 
2001. This is three years after the Local Government Act and decentralisation policy 
were put in place. This handbook is the blue print for local development planning at 
district level. It outlines the procedures for the formulation of district development 
plans (DDPs) through identification and prioritisation of development programmes 
and projects. In the context of fiscal decentralisation the DDP is a crucial instrument, 
which assists the Assembly to allocate resources according to set priorities. The 
handbook also spells out the various committees and their roles in the planning 
process. 
	  
Underlying the district development planning process is the principle that district 
plans should reflect local needs and people’s preferences. This expectation is not 
unique to Malawi. In several developing countries that are adopting the new wave of 
decentralisation reforms are aimed at increasing local people’s participation to 
prioritise needs, implement, and monitor and evaluate programmes. The district 
development planning system (DDPS) provides an interface between local 
communities and the Local Assembly. Chiweza (2010: 20) has argued that the DDPS 
offers opportunities for processes of participatory planning and dialogue between 
citizens and their local leaders in order to influence project priorities of local 
government.  
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According to the Government of Malawi, GoM (2001: 4), the district development 
planning process is an integral component of the decentralisation process and focuses 
on a systematic bottom-up approach to development planning. It is a cyclical process, 
which involves a number of stages that lead to formulation of a district plan in each 
assembly. As already stated above, the driving principle is ‘bottom-up’ approach to 
ensure that local communities participate in identification, implementation and 
monitoring and evaluation of local programmes and projects. On paper, the process is 
supposed to facilitate decision making by communities.  
 
 
3.6.1 The district development planning system in practice: How plans are 
developed 	  	  
The District Development Plan (DDP) is expected to outline the specific programmes 
and projects to deliver on the objectives and strategies from the District Development 
Planning Framework (DDPF). The DDP is a guide for allocating resources to areas 
where beneficiaries feel are a priority to uplift their lives (GoM 2001: 33). It is a 
roadmap for implementing specific development projects in a particular district and 
these projects should respond to local needs and priorities within the broader 
parameters of national development interests. On the whole, the process of developing 
a district development plan is supposed to conform to four principles as follows; 
bottom-up, participatory, district focused and people centred (GoM 2001: 33). 
 
The process for developing the DDP is quite technical and intense. It starts with the 
production of Socio-Economic Profile (SEP), which provides the physical, social and 
economic picture of the district. The SEP report contains the necessary information 
for carrying out a situational analysis, which serves as the foundation for the 
preparation of the District Development Planning Framework (DDPF) (GoM 2001: 
21). The production of the SEP is to be led by a SEP Taskforce, which should be 
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created from within the District Executive Committee (DEC). The Taskforce should 
comprise of the Director of Planning and Development as the chairperson and five 
other members selected from amongst DEC members. The data collection process for 
SEP includes collection of primary and secondary data. Once the SEP is written up it 
is presented to the Development Committee and the District Council for adoption.  
	  
When the SEP is in place the district development analysis is carried out to synthesize 
all data from the SEP. The district development analysis (DDA) prioritises key 
development issues, outlines the development objectives and develops strategies for 
addressing the key issues. The DDPS recommends that the process of coming up with 
the DDA should be participatory through use of participatory approaches. In the 
formulation of the DDA the District Executive Committee (DEC) is also supposed to 
review all village action plans (VAPs). A number of tools have been developed to 
assist the DEC to identify and prioritise development issues and objectives. Some of 
the tools include ranking, causal relationships and problem tree/analysis. A District 
Development Plan (DDP) Taskforce selected from within the DEC leads the whole 
process of coming up with the District Development Plan. Just like the SEP 
Taskforce, the Director of Planning and Development also leads the DDP Taskforce.  
	  
Following the completion of the DDA, the DEC develops the district mission 
statement and finalises the development objectives. These objectives are supposed to 
be in line with the national development objectives. From these objectives come 
strategies. The DDA together with national development objectives constitute the 
District Development Planning Framework (DDPF), which is submitted to the 
Development Committee and District Council for approval. The DDPS recommends 
that the final DDPF should be circulated to village development committees (VDCs) 
so that they can prepare specific proposals according to the development priorities. 
	   156	  
The Area Executive Committee is supposed to assist VDCs in the preparation of the 
proposals. The proposals from VDCs are submitted to the Area Development 
Committee (ADC), which reviews and submits the final proposals to the district. The 
DDP Taskforce reviews and appraises proposals received from the VDCs. Some of 
the proposals are also developed by the Area Development Committees and the 
District Executive Committee (GoM 2001: 38). The community proposals, the SEP 
and the DDPF provide the technical inputs required to write up the district 
development plan (DDP). The final DDP is submitted to the District Council for 
approval.  
	  
The DDP is a medium term plan, which covers a period of three years. In each year of 
the DDP the Assembly develops what is knows as the Annual Investment Plan (AIP). 
The AIP outlines specific projects to be implemented in that particular year. The cycle 
for the DDP ends with a review on its performance. There are various structures that 
are involved in the development of the DDP (refer to figure four for the illustration of 
these structures). The structures and their roles are discussed next.  
 	  
(a) Village Development Committee (VDC) 
 
The Village Development Committee (VDC) is a representative body formed at 
Group Village Headman level.  Since the Group Village Headman has authority over 
several villages ideally the VDC should be made up of representatives from these 
villages. The membership of the VDC is supposed to be made up of an elected 
member from each village from the Group Village Headman, councillor from the 
area, four women representatives nominated by VDC members, and one elected 
extension worker representative.  
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Members of the VDC are expected to elect among themselves a Chairperson, Vice 
Chairperson, Secretary and Treasurer. The guidelines have made it clear that the role 
of chiefs is to supervise the activities of the VDC. According to GoM (2001:6), the 
Group Village Headman cannot chair the VDC. But rather s/he is expected to 
supervise the VDC under his/her jurisdiction. The VDC is supposed to report to the 
chief after every meeting and keep him/her informed of the development issues 
discussed in the committee. Chiefs are expected to continue with their primary role to 
settle disputes. However, as chapter five and six will show chiefs have captured these 
committees and have greater influence both in the composition of these committees as 
well as the way projects are managed.  
	  
The total membership for the VDC is expected to be equal to or less than sixteen. The 
term of office for the VDC is three years unless if the committee is replaced. 
However, the guidelines do not provide conditions under which the VDC can be 
replaced. The term of office also matches with the period for the district development 
plan although the two periods may not be concurrent.  
	  
The VDC is responsible for facilitating planning, implementation and monitoring and 
evaluation of projects at village level. Therefore, the VDC is the focus of the district 
development planning process (DDPS). According to the GoM (2001), the following 
are some of the specific responsibilities of the VDC: 
• Work as channel of information on development activities from District 
Executive Committee and Area Development Committee to the communities, 
• Encourage and mobilise community resources in self help activities, 
• Assist in identifying, prioritising and preparing community needs and submit 
these to the Area Development Committee (ADC), 
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• Supervise, monitor and evaluate implementation of development activities in 
the villages, 
• Mobilise external financial resources for priority community based projects 
• Initiate locally funded self help activities, 
• Report to the Group Village Headman (GVH) on all activities and discussions 
of the committee. 
	  
With regard to the district development-planning process, the VDC is responsible for 
coming up with the village action plan (VAP), which is submitted, to the Area 
Development Committee. The VAP is to be developed through a participatory 
process. It describes the specific projects proposed by each VDC and their 
corresponding budget (MOLGRD 2004). The VAP also has a lifespan of three years, 
which is aligned to the district development plan (DDP). The plan is also revisited 
every year to feed into the annual investment plans of the Assembly. According to 
MOLGRD (2004), the VAP offers an opportunity for local communities to participate 
in the formulation of the district development plan. The key assumption is that the 
VDC will act in the interest of the population from the villages that it represents.  
	  
The process of coming up with VAP takes four days. The Village Action Handbook 
developed by the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development in 2004 
provides a number of tools that should be used by communities in coming up with the 
Village Action Plan. This handbook puts a lot of emphasis on technical aspects 
(‘tools’) rather than the political aspects in terms of how different interests can be 
managed. With regard to technical tools, the handbook recommends use of pairwise 
ranking to prioritise issues. It also recommends the development of a village-planning 
framework (VPF), which is organised as follows: issues, cause, long-term objective, 
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medium term objectives, and strategies. Once the VPF is completed communities are 
asked what type of projects are needed to deliver the strategies outlined in the VPF. 
Each VDC submits the village action plan to the Area Development Committee.  
	  	  
(b) Area Executive Committee (AEC) 	  
 
According to GoM (2001: 7) the Area Executive Committee  (AEC) is a technical 
arm that advises the Area Development Committee (ADC) on matters related to needs 
assessment, project identification and preparation of project proposals. The AEC and 
the ADC exist at Traditional Authority level. The AEC is composed of elected 
extension worker representative from each VDC within the Traditional Authority, 
NGO representatives and other co-opted members. In areas with large number of 
extension workers membership has been limited to the following sectors: health, 
education agriculture, community services, forestry, water development and NGO 
representatives. This rule is not cast in stone, and where necessary the AECs are 
allowed to co-opt members from other sectors. In general the membership of the AEC 
is not expected to go over twenty five (GoM 2001: 8). The chairperson, vice 
chairperson and secretary are elected from the membership. The term of office for the 
AEC is two years.  
	  
The District Development Planning Handbook (see: GoM 2001) outlines the 
functions of AEC as follows: 
 
• Assist the ADC in the identification and formulation of project proposals 
• Implement field appraisal of projects, 
• Review all project proposals before submission to the District Executive 
Committee (DEC), 
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• Operate as an advisory arm of the ADC, 
• Support the ADC in supervising project implementation, 
• Conduct data collection and analysis at community level, 
• Prepare monthly reports, 
• Take a lead in the organisation of VDCs, 
• Train VDCs and support them in setting guidelines for development in their 
areas. 
	  
Generally the AEC operates as a technical arm responsible for ensuring that 
appropriate projects have been developed and recommended to the District Executive 
Committee for consideration in the DDP. At VDC level the AEC members manage 
and facilitate the village action planning process. Therefore they are responsible for 
the action plans that are developed by the VDCs and submitted to the Area 
Development Committee.  
	  	  
(c) Area Development Committee (ADC) 	  
 
The Area Development Committee (ADC) is a representative body of all Village 
Development Committees under the jurisdiction of a Traditional Authority. Similar to 
the AEC, the ADC exists at Traditional Authority level. According to GoM (2001: 9) 
the ADC representatives are selected from every Village Development Committees 
(VDCs) in each Traditional Authority. The following are the members of the ADC: 
 
• All chairpersons and vice chairpersons of Village Development Committees, 
• Ward representatives (Councillors), 
• Religious representatives, 
• Representatives of women and youth groups, 
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• Representatives of the business community, 
• Chairperson of the Area Executive Committee (AEC). 
	  
The chairperson of the ADC is elected from amongst the members.  According to 
GoM (2001: 9), the Traditional Authority is not supposed to be the chairperson of the 
ADC. However as it will be shown in the later sections of this thesis Traditional 
Authorities are increasingly capturing these committees. In an ideal scenario, the 
ADC is expected to report to the Traditional Authority who is the patron. The 
Traditional Authority needs to be kept informed on all development issues discussed 
by the committee (GoM 2001:9). The term of office for the ADC is three years except 
for councillors who are members for the entire duration of their term, which currently 
is five years. The ADC has the following responsibilities: 
	  
• Carrying out monthly general meetings, 
• Support identification, prioritisation and preparation of community needs 
which encompass more than one Village Development Committee (VDC); 
these needs are submitted to the District Executive Committee, 
• Supervise, monitor and evaluate projects being implemented in a particular 
Traditional Authority, 
• Responsible for mobilising community resources and identifying other funds, 
• Receive, review, prioritise and prepare project proposals from VDCs, which 
are submitted to the DEC. 
	  
(d) District Executive Committee (DEC) 
 
 
The District Executive Committee (DEC) is a technical committee, which exists at 
district level. The DEC is both a technical and an advisory committee of the District 
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Council. The DEC is composed of representatives from the council secretariat, other 
government departments at district level, representatives from NGOs, and other co-
opted members (GoM 2001: 10). The District Commissioner chairs this committee, 
and the Director of Planning and Development at the Council Secretariat is the 
Secretary. Only the District Commissioner, Director of Planning and Development 
and Heads of the Council Secretariat departments are permanent members. The rest 
serve a five-year term.  
	  
The following are the functions of the DEC: 
 
• Identify, prioritise and carry out preliminary feasibility studies of the 
community needs project proposals submitted by ADCs, 
• Carry out technical reviews of various development proposals, 
• Provide technical input in the formulation of the District Development Plan 
(DDP), 
• Provide technical guidance during project implementation, 
• Provide support in mobilising funds from local and external sources, 
• Provide training in technical, leadership and management skills to Village 
Development Committees (VDCs), Area Executive Committees (AECs), Area 
Development Committees (ADCs) and District Council (DC), 
• Operate as a technical advisory body to the District Council on all matters 
related to local development, 
• Liaise and harmonise district level policies and activities with national policies 
and activities (in line with sectoral interests). 
	  
Within the district development planning process the DEC has been given mandate to 
create sub committees and task forces in order to facilitate effective implementation 
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of certain activities. Some of the sub committees recommended for the DEC are 
District Training Team, Development Advisory Team and District Environment Sub 
Committee.  
 
(e) Development Committee (DC) 
 
 
The Development Committee (DC) is a service committee of the District Council and 
it has the mandate to coordinate development activities at district level (GoM 2001: 
10). The Development Committee leads the process at district level to develop the 
district development plan (DDP). The Development Committee also reviews and 
submits the District Development Plan and Annual Investment Plan to the District 
Council. During the course of implementation of the DDP, the committee coordinates 
monitoring and supervision activities. The district development planning process does 
not provide clear guidance on who the members of the Development Committee 
should be.  
 
(f) District Council (DC) 
 
The District Council is the top policy making body at district level. It is responsible 
for leading and coordinating the infrastructural and economic development in the 
district through the approval and execution of the district development planning 
framework (DDPF) and the district development plan (DDP) (GoM 2001: 10). The 
composition of the District Council, which is also provided in the Local Government 
Act of 1998, includes the following: 
 
• Councillors, 
• Traditional Authorities and Sub Traditional Authorities,  
• Members of Parliament, 
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• Five representatives of special interest groups. 
 
Up until 2010, councillors were the only voting members in the District Council with 
the rest being non-voting members. However, as it will be discussed in chapters five 
and six one of several amendments to the Local Government Act has seen Members 
of Parliament being granted voting rights alongside councillors. The District Council 
has the following functions: 
 
• Facilitating dialogue between government and citizens in the villages during 
identification, planning and implementation of district and area based 
development projects, 
• Promote government policies among the rural population of the district, 
• Coordinate the identification and implementation of any development projects 
in the district.  
 
The District Council (DC) has mandate to form service committees, and these 
include: Finance Committee, Development Committee, Education Committee, Works 
Committee, Health and Environment Committee and Appointments and Disciplinary 
Committee (GoM 2001: 11).  
	  
3.7 District Development Planning System versus National Priorities 	  
The district development planning system discussed above does not operate in a 
vacuum. Although the district is the operational unit for development and 
implementation of local plans, such plans are also expected to conform to national 
priorities such as those contained in the Malawi Vision 2020, Malawi Growth and 
Development Strategy (MGDS), and the Sector Investment Programmes (SIPs).  
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The Vision 2020 outlines long term aspirations of Malawians and form the basis for 
short and medium term policies and strategies. The vision defines national goals, 
strategies, policies and strategies that will lead to better development outcomes for the 
country. The Malawi Growth and Development Strategy is a medium term integrated 
strategy that articulates development policy and strategic priorities, and programmes 
and projects for the country. It provides the focal point for allocation of development 
resources both from the Government of Malawi as well as from donors. The MGDS is 
a successor to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). It covers a period of five 
years. The MGDS identifies Local Assemblies as key mechanisms for achieving twin 
objectives of national development and good governance in Malawi. The strategy is 
based on the premise that equitable economic growth and development can only be 
achieved with good governance. Therefore, democratic decentralisation is viewed as 
essential because it will lead to strong democratic local institutions, which in turn will 
lead to better delivery of public services (Chiweza 2010: 21). The Sector Investment 
Programmes (SIPs) articulate the development priorities, strategies and activities for a 
specific sector, for example health or education.  
	  
The district development planning system recommends that the relationship between 
the national and district level planning should be iterative with the DDPs being 
aligned with national policies and programmes. Therefore, a critical step in coming up 
with DDPs is the articulation of national policy frameworks before the formulation of 
the DDP can start. Ideally, the framers of the district development planning system 
had hoped that district level priorities would also inform policies and strategies at the 
national level. However, as chapters five and six will show districts are increasingly 
being considered implementation mechanisms of centrally formulated priorities.  
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3.8 Roles of the central actors in new reforms: Policy oversight and 
supervision 
 
As discussed above, Local Assemblies operate under a national planning system, 
which includes a number of sectoral ministries. The decentralisation policy has led to 
creation of new roles for central ministries in relation to local assemblies. Central 
ministries are considered vital to provide policy guidance, and technical and financial 
support to local assemblies. One of the key central ministries in the implementation of 
decentralisation is the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development 
(MLGRD). The ministry has a pivotal role to oversee the roll out of reforms. In 
addition to providing guidance to local assemblies it also acts as the link between 
councils and the central government. But, as the later sections of this chapter will 
show the Minister of Local Government has become an even bigger player through 
the new powers that s/he has received to recruit, supervise and transfer District 
Commissioners.  
	  
There are also other specialised government institutions whose work is to ensure that 
local assemblies operate effectively. These include: the National Local Government 
Finance Committee (NLGFC), Local Government Service Commission (LASCOM) 
and others. These structures and their functions are discussed next. 
 
The National Local Government Finance Committee (NLGFC) was established in 
2001 under section 149 of the Republican Constitution. NLGFC monitors and 
manages the fiscal arrangement between central government and local assemblies 
(both recurrent and development budgets). The full functions of the NLGFC are 
described in later sections of this chapter.  
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The Local Assemblies Service Commission (LASCOM) was created to oversee 
recruitment of senior staff at assembly level from the position of director up to the 
District Commissioner. This mandate originates from the Local Government Act of 
1998. In addition, LASCOM is also responsible for promoting and disciplining senior 
assembly officials. However, as this thesis will show the role of LASCOM has since 
been watered down as a result of the amendments to the Local Government Act in 
2010. The aim of these amendments was to transfer powers back to the political elites 
at the centre.  
	  
On paper, there is high-level commitment to implement decentralisation as manifested 
through the role of the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC) in providing overall 
guidance to the decentralisation process through the Cabinet Committee on Local 
Government. The committee is the main policy making body and it oversees functions 
of local government, devolution, and administration of local authorities. The 
committee has eleven members nominated by the president. Below the Cabinet 
Committee is the Inter Ministerial Technical Committee on Decentralisation 
(IMTCD), which acts as a policy coordinating mechanism. It is composed of technical 
experts (bureaucrats) from the Office of President and Cabinet and from all the 
devolving sectors. There are also representatives from other key ministries such as: 
Local Government and Rural Development; and Finance, Economic Planning and 
Development. This committee is responsible for providing technical support to the 
whole decentralisation process, and it reports to the Cabinet Committee on 
Decentralisation. The IMTCD is chaired by the Principal Secretary in the Ministry of 
Local Government and Rural Development.  
	  
The decentralisation policy assigns responsibilities to each of the devolved central 
ministries on the following tasks: policy formulation, policy enforcement, and 
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inspection and supervision, establishments of standards, and training and curriculum 
development for their respective departments at district level.  
	  
3.9 Capacity building for decentralisation 
 
The decision to decentralise has been accompanied by capacity building programmes 
aimed at ensuring that reforms are rolled out effectively. Since 2001 there have been 
two national capacity building programmes, and these are discussed briefly in the 
sections below.  
	  	  
(i) The National Decentralisation Programme I (NDPI 2001-2004) 	  
 
The first National Decentralisation Programme (NDP) was developed in 2001 and it 
covered the period 2001 to 2004. It focused on seven components as follows: legal 
reforms, institutional development and capacity building, building a democratic 
culture, fiscal decentralisation, accounting and financial management, sector 
devolution, local development planning and financial mechanisms. The National 
Decentralisation Programme (NDP) I was an opportunity for donors to support 
implementation of reforms in Malawi. In fact, over seventeen (17) donor 
representatives attended the first donor round table conference that took place in 
2001. Some of the key donors that supported reforms included GTZ (now GIZ), 
UNCDF/UNDP, NORAD, and AFDB. Some of these donors are still playing a key 
role 10 years down the line, for instance GIZ, UNDP/UNCDF and AFDB. As this 
thesis will show new donors have also come forward to support various components 
of the reforms.  
	  
In 2004, a review of the NDP I was carried out and it found that there were high 
levels of commitment towards decentralisation from within the Local Assemblies. 
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However, there was resistance from a number of central ministries to devolve 
functions to the Assemblies. The review also noted weak capacities and shortage of 
staff at local level, ineffective institutional arrangements, poor participation of local 
communities, and inadequate financial resources (Kutengule et al 2004). The review 
made the following four recommendations as a priority: 
	  
• To accelerate the sector devolution process, and also need to clearly articulate 
the incentives for reform, 
• Invest in institutional development and capacity building, 
• Emphasis on fiscal devolution and financial management, 
• Establishing local development planning and financing mechanisms. 
	  
All these four priorities are tasks that central ministries were supposed to carry out. 
Following the first capacity building programme the Government of Malawi 
developed a successor programme, which will be discussed in the next section.  
	  	  
(ii) The National Decentralisation Programme II (NDP II 2005-2009) 	  
 
As the successor programme to NDP I the design of the National Decentralisation 
Programme II was based on key lessons and challenges raised in the 2004 review. 
However according to Chiweza (2010: 25) the NDP II was not brought before donors 
for support because the government failed to justify the programme following the 
postponement of local government elections (MLGRD 2009:6). Due to failure to 
solicit support for this programme the government has not been able to initiate it fully. 
The NDP II has now been revised and it is focusing on the period 2008-2013. The 
revision was necessary since the government has made new commitments to hold 
local government elections. Similar to NDP I the NDP II is aimed at providing a 
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framework for implementing reforms and for coordinating support from development 
partners. Since it was rebranded there has been some support from certain quarters. 
Some of the key development partners currently supporting reforms are discussed in 
chapter six.  
 
3.10 Resources for decentralised entities: Central Grants, and the Local 
Development Fund 
	  
Recognising that the efficiency of local governments depends on resources the 
framers of the 1994 Constitution included a clause under which the central 
government is required to make available adequate resources through central 
transfers. As per the Constitution of Malawi local government entities can also keep a 
proportion of locally generated revenue.  The Constitution provided for the formation 
of an independent National Local Government Finance Committee (NLGFC), which 
would oversee the allocation of resources and also ensure accountability of local 
governments on financial matters (GoM 1995). Within the Constitution the functions 
of the National Local Government Finance Committee were stated as follows: 
 
(a) To receive all estimates of revenue and all estimate budgets from the local 
government entities, 
(b) To scrutinise and monitor accounts of local government entities in line with an 
Act of Parliament, subject to recommendations of the Auditor General, 
(c) To make recommendations with regard to allocation and distribution of funds 
to local government entities (based on a transparent formula), 
(d) To prepare a consolidated budget for all local government entities, and submit 
this budget to the National Assembly before the beginning of each financial 
year, 
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(e) Make applications to the Minister of Local Government for additional funds 
where necessary. 
 
The membership of the National Local Government Committee is multi-disciplinary 
with individuals from different sectors. The persons are selected as follows:  
 
(a) One member selected to represent local government entities (nominated 
through a caucus of local governments), 
(b) Principal Secretary of Local Government Ministry, 
(c) One professionally qualified and practicing Accountant appointed by Public 
Accounts Committee,  
(d) Chairperson of Civil Service Commission or person nominated by the 
Chairperson on his/her behalf, 
(e) One representative from the Electoral Commission, 
(f) Principal Secretary for Finance or his/her representative. 
	  
According to Kaunda (1999: 590), this wide representation in the NLGFC was aimed 
at emphasising the significance of local government in the overall national 
governance. The provisions were also aimed at reducing the powers of the Minister 
over the functions of local governments (Kaunda 1999: 590).  
	  
The Local Government Act of 1998 has also articulated the fiscal reforms necessary 
to ensure that local governments have control over their budgets. For instance, the 
central government is expected to transfer 5% of the national net revenue to local 
government entities. The NLGFC provides budget ceilings to local government 
entities based on the following formula; 80% on the population of the assembly, and 
20% based on the poverty rates. In addition to these central grants local assemblies 
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also generate local revenue through property rates, ground rent, fees from commercial 
ventures and services charges. However, central grants comprise over 80% of all 
resources available to local assemblies. The grants are largely used for recurrent 
budgets at the Assemblies, with little funds available for development (Patel et al 
2007:65). In essence, this means grants are used to meet the costs of paying for 
salaries, running costs for vehicles, maintaining offices, and other related expenses.  
 
The NLGFC also oversees the fiscal performance and fiscal accountability of local 
assemblies. With regard to fiscal accountability the NLGFC is responsible for 
supporting audits of Local Assembly funds, which are conducted by the National 
Audit Office. Between 2009 and 2011 the NLGFC worked with the National Audit 
Office to clear the backlog of audits dating back to 2005 financial year. On paper, the 
NLGFC can also sanction Local Assemblies that fail to submit financial reports by 
withholding their disbursements.  
 
To complement central transfers and locally generated revenues, the central 
government established the Local Development Fund (LDF) in 2008 to operate as a 
basket fund for local development initiatives by local government entities. The LDF is 
a multi-donor fund with funding from the Government of Malawi, sector based 
funding and other resources from development partners (MLGRD 2007: 8; GoM 
2009a: 4; MoF 2009: 4). The goal of the Fund is stated as ‘to empower local 
communities to participate in decision making processes through improved local 
governance and development management, in order to reduce poverty and improve 
service delivery’ (MLGRD 2007: 8). The Fund was created with four funding 
windows as follows: 
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(a) Community window- to provide funds for community level investments 
aimed at reducing poverty- these projects are contained in the Annual 
Investment Plans of the Local Assemblies, and are to be directly managed by 
communities. 
	  
(b) Local Assembly window- to provide finances for capital investments, labour 
intensive public works programmes and other local economic development 
initiatives contained in the Local Authority Development Plans. These 
projects are to be managed by the Local Assemblies.  
	  
(c) Urban window- to provide funding for supply driven projects such as 
infrastructure to support local economic development in urban areas.  
	  
(d) Performance window- to provide funding for capacity development 
requirements of Local Assemblies as they take on more responsibilities.  
 
Chapter five will discuss how the LDF windows operate in Salima district. It is worth 
noting that not all the windows are active or accessible to most Assemblies. For 
instance, the performance window is often under-resourced, and the urban window is 
just being finalised. The urban window is also targeting cities and town assemblies, 
and hence beyond the reach of the majority of assemblies, which are rural.  
	  
The NLGFC has little policy control in how the LDF is managed. The LDF Technical 
Support Team operates as an arm of the Ministry of Finance. On paper allocation of 
funds (central transfers) to Local Assemblies is done based on an indicative planning 
framework. This means funding is allocated based on project submissions from each 
Local Assembly (GoM 2009a: 10). The project submissions are expected to come 
from the development priorities listed in the district development plans of the 
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Assemblies. The Ministry of Finance provides leadership in the mobilisation of 
resources as well as provision of policy guidance to the Fund. A seven member 
Steering Committee (SC) provides the policy oversight in the running of the LDF. 
The SC is composed of the following: 
	  
• Principal Secretary- Finance, 
• Principal Secretary- Economic Planning and Development, 
• Principal Secretary- Local Government, 
• Representative from Council for Non Governmental Organisations in Malawi 
(CONGOMA), 
• 2 representatives from Non State Actors. 
 
Below the SC is the National Technical Advisory Committee (NTAC) that is chaired 
by the Ministry of Local Government. The NTAC reviews and approves project 
submissions from Local Assemblies. It is composed of representatives from sector 
ministries as well as representatives from the National Local Government Finance 
Committee (NLGFC) and CONGOMA. The National Local Government Finance 
Committee (NLGFC) is expected to provide advice to the Ministry of Finance on how 
to allocate the LDF resources based on the fiscal transfer formula. However, in 
contrast to the central grants where the NLGFC is more influential, the Ministry of 
Finance has the final say on the allocation of funds from LDF.  
 
3.11 Conclusion 
	  	  
To conclude, the neopatrimonial logic is particularly strong in Malawi. The Malawi 
state also shows several troubling characteristics, which include ‘chameleon politics’, 
coupled with political opportunism; weak political parties with central leadership 
	   175	  
dominance; and parallel rule with chiefs playing a key role in politics. The period 
between 1960s and 2012 has been marked by the rule of three big men (Banda, 
Muluzi and wa Mutharika), and these leaders were entrenched in patronage and 
clientelist practices. Neopatrimonialism has had significant influence on the design 
and implementation of public policies, with political leaders focusing on short term 
and largely personal gains at the expense of long-term developmental objectives for 
the country. Decentralisation, being a political process, is not immune from the 
characteristics of the Malawi state.  
 
It has also been discussed in this chapter that as one of the public policies, 
decentralisation is not a new phenomenon in Malawi, and has been pursued since the 
colonial era. Under the colonial government reforms were heavily centralised with 
chiefs being under the control of the centre. More democratic reforms were briefly 
introduced in the 1950’s but these were quickly reversed due to fear by the colonial 
regime to open up local spaces to nationalists who were mobilising to push for 
independence. The postcolonial government under the Malawi Congress Party was 
initially more ambitious and open to reforms. However, by mid-1960s powers were 
heavily centralised, and both chiefs and councillors were put under the control of the 
centre. For instance elections were abolished and councillors were appointed based on 
their political affiliation to the single party. More responsibilities were assigned to the 
District Commissioner to act in the interests of the president and the party. Hence, it 
can be argued that the reforms had come full cycle from centralisation under colonial 
rule, to brief devolution under MCP (1961-1964), and back to centralisation from 
1964 onwards. The reasons for re-centralisation under the MCP regime have been 
discussed in this chapter, and these were mainly to protect local spaces against 
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opposition, and also to drive a nationalist development agenda led by the president as 
a ‘big man’.  
 
In contrast to the one party era, the post-1994 reforms appear more comprehensive 
and broad, at least on paper. This chapter has shown that the new reforms are 
grounded in constitutional, legal and policy frameworks. On paper the central 
government has taken steps to put in place the necessary mechanisms and structures 
and implement capacity building programmes in support of the reforms. These steps 
include, setting up financing mechanisms, and organisational structures such at the 
National Local Government Finance Committee, the Local Assemblies Service 
Commission, and others. With regard to how districts can come up with their 
development plans, the central government has developed a comprehensive and 
highly technical step-by-step district development planning system. However, as it 
will be shown in subsequent chapters, the biggest challenges are political, and 
neopatrimonialism seems to play a key role in influencing these reforms.  
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Chapter	  Four	  
	  
4.	  Methodology,	  Data	  Collection	  and	  the	  Context	  
 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the methodology used in carrying out this 
research. This chapter is divided into three sections. First, it discusses why a 
qualitative case study was used in this research and how Salima district was selected. 
Second, it describes the data collection methods used in this study, and the limitations 
in conducting this study. And third, this chapter provides an overview of the socio-
economic, political and administrative context in the district where the research was 
carried out.  
 
4.1 Research Approach: Qualitative case study 
 
The methodology used in this study is qualitative case study. The researcher 
purposively selected one of the twenty-eight districts in Malawi as a case study. The 
case study has used Yin’s ‘embedded design’ and this is discussed in detail in the 
sections below. The study is interpretivist and constructivist. It is based on 
assumptions that all individuals develop subjective meanings of their experiences in 
the world, and these meanings are varied and multiple. Social reality is subjective and 
varied, and there are multiple stories of lived experience (Biber 2010). The role of the 
researcher is to look for complexity of views rather than limiting meaning to few 
categories or ideas (Creswell 2009). The study has used open-ended questions in 
order to allow participants to articulate various meanings that they attach to different 
issues around decentralisation. The study used a combination of single case study and 
qualitative research methodologies at national level. The use of qualitative research in 
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this study is appropriate given that the research is aimed at exploring and 
understanding relationships amongst local and central actors.  
 
The use of case studies is well documented in literature. According to Macpherson et 
al (2000), case studies are research designs aimed at exploring rich complexities of 
social phenomena and the social environments in which there are situated. Tight 
(2010) defines case study as thorough examination of a small sample, and at its 
extreme a detailed examination of a single case. Case study has the advantage of 
providing rich and detailed account about a particular social phenomenon (Hakim 
2000).  Within a case study a researcher can use several sources of information in 
order to explore a particular phenomenon in detail. The use of multiple sources make 
the case study one of the powerful research designs (Hakim 2000; Bernard and Ryan 
2010). The argument by Hakim (2000) and Bernard and Ryan (2010) is relevant with 
regard to the analysis of how decentralisation reforms are evolving in various 
countries. A qualitative case study has the advantage of providing a rich analysis of 
the actors, and the various motives for supporting or hindering reforms. 
	  
Most single cases often contain sub-cases within them. Yin (1989) refers to this as the 
‘embedded design’. This ‘embedded design’ has been used in this study to examine 
decentralisation within a particular district while at the same time relating this to a 
larger study at national level. The study also examines changes over time, as well as 
variations within different parts of the selected district. This is what Gerring (2004) 
has referred to as temporal and within unit variations, and this can increase the 
number of cases. This research design is a hybrid in the sense that it also focuses on 
investigating decentralisation as phenomena at national level. Thus, the single case 
study (of one district) is nested in broader qualitative research design to investigate 
decentralisation in Malawi.  
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There are some concerns that findings from single case studies cannot easily be 
generalised. Gerring (2004) has pointed out that, in addition to generating hypothesis, 
evidence drawn from a single case can be adequate to disconfirm a hypothesis. 
Flyvbjerg (2006) has argued that formal generalisation is not the only legitimate 
method of scientific enquiry. A ‘purely descriptive, phenomenological case study can 
be of value’ and can result in a breakthrough towards scientific innovation. Flyvbjerg 
(2004) uses the test of ‘falsification’ as one of the rigorous tests that a case study can 
be subjected to. Under falsification if one observation does not fit with the proposition 
then it is considered not valid and must therefore be revised or rejected. Flyvbjerg 
(2006) has borrowed the example of the famous ‘black swan’ from Popper (1959). 
Popper used this famous example that ‘all swan are white’ and proposed that just a 
single case of a black swan would falsify this proposition, and in this way have great 
significance and stimulate more studies and theory building. Hence, case study 
research is valuable to identify ‘black swans’ because of the detailed investigations 
(Flyvbjerg 2004: 228).  Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that the ‘force of the example’ 
provided by a single case is undervalued and ‘formal generalisation’ overvalued.  
 
4.2 Selection of Salima district as the case study 
 
According to the Local Government Act (1998), the district is the unit for 
decentralisation in Malawi. It represents the geographical territory within which Local 
Council functions. Therefore, in selecting case studies the researcher used the district 
as the unit for understanding how reforms have been implemented. There are a 
number of reasons why Salima was selected for this study. In the 2009 parliamentary 
elections the ruling party, won all the parliamentary seats in 5 out of 28 districts. In 19 
of the districts in Malawi (68% of all districts), the seats were shared between two or 
more political parties and independent candidates. Salima is one of the 19 districts 
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where more than one party and independent candidates won parliamentary seats. 
Going back to the 2004 elections the district also had at least two parties sharing the 
parliamentary seats. Therefore, Salima is representative of the majority of districts in 
Malawi. The presence of several parties and independent candidates provide basis for 
within-district comparison in contrast to the minority of districts (18%), which had 
ruling party dominance.  
 
Salima is also representative of the largely agricultural based economy in the country. 
76% of Malawians are self-employed rural farmers who mainly produce for 
subsistence faming. In comparison, 76% of the population of Salima are subsistence 
farmers (NSO 2008). Approximately 99.6% of the farmers in Salima produce maize 
mainly for consumption and this is close to the national average of 97% (NSO 2005). 
Salima is also amongst the majority of districts (61%) with literacy rate below 70%. 
In addition, 35.1% of the people in Salima have inadequate housing. This is within the 
national average of 32.7% for Malawi (NSO 2005). According to the Malawi 
Demographic and Health Survey 2010 report, only 8.1% of the population of Salima 
has access to electricity compared to a national average of 8.7%. Based on the 
political and key socio-economic characteristics reviewed here Salima is similar to the 
majority of districts in Malawi. At the same time Salima is one of a third of the 
districts in Malawi with vibrant townships. Such townships provide more 
opportunities to mobilise local revenue for the local assemblies. This is significant 
because one of the assumptions in decentralisation is that availability of locally raised 
revenue has significant effect in influencing whether local priorities will be 
implemented. Large volumes of locally generated revenues may suggest that the 
district can potentially reallocate these resources to address local priorities with 
reduced pressure from central government.  
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Within the district five Traditional Authorities (TAs) were selected where additional 
interviews took place. Systematic random sampling was used to select the TAs. First, 
all the Traditional Authorities were categorised according to each of the five 
constituencies in the district. Thereafter, the researcher used simple random sampling 
to select one Traditional Authority per constituency. The table below provides the 
names of the five Traditional Authority areas selected.  
 
Table 1: Traditional Authorities selected for the study 
 
# Constituency (Political Party in control) Traditional Authority Selected 
1 Democratic Progressive Party Kalonga 
2 Malawi Congress Party Kambwiri 
3 Maravi Peoples Party Ndindi 
4 Malawi Congress Party Pemba 
5 Democratic Progressive Party Khombedza 
 
 
4.3 Data Collection Methods 
 
This study used a combination of methods such as semi-structured interviews, focus 
group discussions and documentary research. Each of the methods is described below. 
Open-ended questions were used in both semi structured interviews and focus group 
discussions. The open-ended questions allowed the researcher to explore various 
issues in detail. The interviews were guided by a set of identical questions that were 
asked to different people sampled in this study. Use of several interconnected 
methods in this research has the advantages of creating a better understanding on the 
key questions of this research. It reduces a ‘tunnel vision’ of reality by ensuring that 
each method contributes to reveal part of the reality (Verschuren 2003). The methods 
used in this study are discussed below.   
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4.3.1 Semi structured interviews 	  
 
 
Semi structured interviews were used at both district and national levels. An interview 
guide with identical questions was developed. This guide was used with different 
categories of respondents. At district level semi structured interviews were used with 
representatives from Area and Village Development Committees, members of 
parliament, the District Commissioner and local council staff, NGO representatives, 
district heads of political parties, religious leaders, civic education volunteers, donor 
representatives in the district, former councillors, and chiefs. At national level, the 
semi-structured interviews were used with government officials, donors, and NGO 
representatives. Semi structured interviews were useful in exploring a range of topics 
during conversations with participants. The semi-structured interviews explored 
various perspectives and roles in the implementation of decentralisation. The 
interviews also investigated the relationships that existed between various groups. 100 
semi structured interviews were conducted at national and district level.  
	  
The semi-structured interviews are useful because they provide an opportunity to 
make comparisons between people or groups of people (Bernard and Ryan 2010: 29). 
According to Bernard and Ryan (2010), semi-structured interviews are also valuable 
since they can produce vast amounts of information within short period of time. The 
use of open-ended questions in the interviews allowed participants to answer in their 
own words and to provide their own understanding of how things work in the district.  	  
Tables two and three below show the type and numbers of respondents at national and 
district levels. 
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Table 2: National Level Interviews (Total=30) 
 
# Type of Respondents Organizations Number of 
Interviews 
1 Multilateral and 
Bilateral 
Organizations 
supporting reforms 
World Bank 
DFID 
African Development Bank 
GIZ / KfW 
Irish Aid 
USAID 
UNDP 
UNCDF 
10 
2 Government 
Departments/ 
Ministries 
Ministry of Development Planning 
Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of Local Government 
National Local Government Finance 
Committee 
Local Development Fund Technical 
Support Team 
Ministry of Education 
Ministry of Health 
Ministry of Agriculture 
National Audit Office 
13 
3 Non Governmental 
Organizations 
Plan Malawi 
CARE Malawi 
Action Aid 
ADRA 
Malawi Local Governments Association 
7 
 
 
At the national level the first step was to map various government ministries that are 
directly responsible for implementing decentralisation. In each of these ministries the 
researcher identified key officers who could provide the information on the research 
questions. Donor organisations were also mapped, and although there are scores of 
multilateral and bilateral development agencies in Malawi this study only focused on 
those that are either funding the roll out of reforms or are channeling funds for 
implementation of activities within district councils. The rest that did not meet the 
criteria were not included for the in-depth interviews. This was deliberate because the 
study focused on examining the experiences of various agencies in supporting reforms 
rather than seeking perceptions. Interviews with NGOs at national level focused on 
those that are implementing local accountability programmes in one or several 
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districts and NGOs that are carrying out various development activities in the case 
study district.  
Table 3: District Interviews 
 
Within the district the semi structured interviews were conducted with the following: 
 
# Type of Respondents Number of Respondents 
1 District Council Staff 11 
2 Members of Parliament (total=5) 5 
3 Former Councillors 7 
4 Traditional Authorities 5 
5 Donor Representatives in the District (German 
Development Agency) 
2 
6 Non Governmental Organizations in the district 12 
7 Chairpersons- Area Development Committees 5 
8 Key Informants  6 
9 National Initiative for Civic Education Volunteers 6 
10 Religious Leaders 6 
11 Village Headmen 5 
 Total=70 
 
Within the case study district the focus was to interview those who are directly 
responsible in making of decisions at council level particularly with respect to 
allocation of projects and resources. All the key formal actors were mapped. These 
included members of parliament, traditional authorities, government officers, and 
NGO representatives. Using purposive sampling and random sampling individuals 
were identified from each of these categories above, and a key criterion was their 
potential ability to provide the information required for this study. The NGO 
representatives selected were those that are implementing various development 
projects at community level. While there are several NGOs in the district the study 
focused on those that cover the five traditional authorities mentioned in the earlier 
sections of this chapter. Within the district the German Development Agency (GIZ) is 
also implementing capacity building activities to support decentralisation. Therefore, 
GIZ representatives in the district were interviewed.  
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At community level, the emphasis was on interviewing individuals that are either 
directly involved in identification and prioritisation of needs channeled to local 
councils, or those that had a good understanding of the local politics in the area. In 
each of the five Traditional Authorities former councillors, political party 
representatives, and one representative of the Area Development Committee (the 
chairperson) were interviewed. Since there is only one ADC per each Traditional 
Authority (TA) this did not require any additional criteria for sampling. With respect 
to religious leaders, the key criteria were to interview representatives from different 
faiths (Presbyterians, Anglicans, Catholics, Muslims). NICE volunteers were 
identified in each of the five traditional authorities where interviews took place. One 
volunteer was randomly selected from each of the five TAs, and the study also 
included one other volunteer from a TA outside the targeted five. Village Headmen in 
table 3 above were randomly selected.  
	  
4.3.2 Focus Group Discussions 	  
 
Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted in the five Traditional Authorities 
that were selected to be part of this study. The FGDs provided critical perspectives on 
how various categories of actors and citizens interacted with the process of 
development planning and allocation of resources within decentralised governance 
system. The FGDs also provided an overview on how local people view government 
responsiveness. In total, 41 FGDs were conducted. Eight (8) FGDs were conducted in 
each of the 4 Traditional Authorities, and 9 FGDs were held in the fifth Traditional 
Authority. In each TA one FGD was conducted with each of the following (i) area 
and village development committee representatives, (ii) political parties- focusing on 
the big three political parties, (iii) women groups, and (iv) community based 
organisations.  
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The selection of Area Development Committee was straightforward because only one 
exists per traditional area. For Village Development Committees (VDCs), simple 
random sampling was used, and one VDC was selected per Traditional Authority. 
Since Malawi has three major political parties in Parliament, FGDs were held with 
representatives of each of the three parties at Traditional Authority level. The study 
focused on party officials rather than ordinary party members. This is because it was 
relatively easier to identify party officials. In Traditional Authority Ndindi, which 
falls under the constituency of a member of parliament from a small party, MPP, one 
FGD was also held with the representatives of this party. As much as possible the 
researcher tried to ensure equal representation of women in the focus group 
discussions. 
	  
Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and Women Groups included in the FGDs 
were selected using simple random sampling in each of the Traditional Authority 
areas. Within each selected CBO and Women Group the researcher purposively 
selected 8-12 individuals. The emphasis was on those that have leadership positions in 
the groups.  
 
Table 4 below shows the numbers of FGDs conducted in each Traditional Authority: 
 
# Traditional Authorities Focus Group Discussions 
1 Kalonga Area and Village Development Committees (2) 
Political Parties (DPP, MCP, UDF) (3) 
Women Group (1) 
Community Based Organization (2) 
2 Ndindi Area and Village Development Committees (2) 
Political Parties (DPP, MCP, MPP, UDF) (4) 
Women Group (1) 
Community Based Organization (2) 
3 Khombedza Area and Village Development Committees (2) 
Political Parties (DPP, MCP, UDF) (3) 
Women Group (1) 
Community Based Organization (2) 
4 Pemba Area and Village Development Committees (2) 
Political Parties (DPP, MCP, UDF) (3) 
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Women Group (1) 
Community Based Organization (2) 
5 Kambwiri Area and Village Development Committees (2) 
Political Parties (DPP, MCP, UDF) (3) 
Women Group (1) 
Community Based Organization (2) 
 Total=41 
 
 
Focus Group Discussions are widely used in qualitative research to gain information 
from a selected group of individuals. Powell et al (1996) define focus group as a 
collection of individuals brought together by researchers to discuss and make 
comments on a topic using their personal experience. Kahan (2001) defines a focus 
group discussion as: 
‘A carefully planned discussion whose objective is to learn about perceptions, 
feelings, attitudes, and ideas of the group participating in the discussion with respect 
to a defined area of interest’ 
	  
In the hands of skilled researchers focus group discussions can allow the researcher to 
collect multiple perspectives on the same topic. Gibbs (1997) points out that the main 
benefit of focus group discussions is that they provide insights into people’s shared 
understanding of everyday life. Focus group discussions also enable the researcher to 
gain a larger amount of information in a short time (Gibbs 1997; Kahan 2001). 
According to Fahad (1986: 315), focus group discussions can easily be adapted to 
different problems and to different settings relatively quickly. This might explain why 
focus group discussions have become one of the popular research techniques in social 
sciences.  
 
In terms of structure, focus group discussions usually involve one person (moderator/ 
researcher) talking to a group of 6-12 people. The individuals within the group share 
certain characteristics, for example sex, village, socio-economic status, and other 
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criteria that are used by the researcher to select members of the group. Generally, 
what links the individuals is possession of knowledge about the topic or issues that 
the researcher is interested in. Compared to other techniques, a researcher is able to 
check the validity of the information from focus groups through non-verbal cues 
shown by the respondents. Focus group discussions can also have a snowball effect 
whereby a comment by one member of the group might trigger chain of responses 
from other respondents (Fahad 1986: 319).  
	  
Focus group discussions also have a number of disadvantages. Interviewer variability 
can result in differences in the type and depth of information collected (Fahad 1986: 
319). Focus group discussions can also be prone to capture by certain individuals who 
may overshadow the rest of the respondents who have something to say on the topic. 
As a result the rest of the respondents might keep quiet. The sample might also be too 
small or not representative to draw generalisations (Fahad 1986: 320). Clearly, there 
are many advantages of focus group discussions, and these tend to outweigh the 
disadvantages. As Fahad (1986) has argued, many disadvantages are as a result of 
practices of the users rather than deficiencies with the technique itself. If done well 
focus group discussion is a reliable method of collecting data. Kahan (2001) 
compared use of focus group discussions and surveys in three studies and found out 
that the two methods provided consistent results.  
 
In this study focus group discussions were critical to explore shared experiences on 
several topics around decentralisation. For instance, focus group discussions explored 
local involvement in identification and prioritisation of needs, and also examined 
whether and how leaders were being held to account for delivery of services within 
those communities where participants in focus groups came from. Focus group 
discussions were appropriate in order to explore the degree of consensus on the topics 
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raised in the interview guide. Identical questions were used with different groups in 
order to ensure that the data could easily be compared and contrasted. The questions 
were open ended to allow for in-depth examination of the issues.  
 
4.3.3 Informal conversations 	  
 
Informal conversations with friends and old acquaintances at district and national 
levels provided valuable information particularly in understanding local politics and 
the relationships between various actors. For instance, some of the conversations were 
on political allegiances and these were useful in the later part of this study to 
understand why certain actors wield more powers than others. These conversations 
formed part of unstructured interviews. According to Bernard and Ryan (2010), these 
informal interviews can provide a wealth of information. Unstructured interviews are 
one of the most valuable means of investigating underlying issues (Wispe and Thayer 
1954). While unstructured interviews are useful for quite sensitive topics, they are not 
without problems. Wispe and Thayer (1954) have highlighted selection of proper 
categories and proper units of measurement as two of the basic problems in the 
analysis of protocols of unstructured interviews. 
 
In the case of a politically sensitive subject such as decentralisation in Malawi 
unstructured interviews provided valuable insights that were pursued through semi 
structured interviews. However, these conversations were hard to do, and in almost 
every case the researcher had to rely on memory to record the important bits of the 
conversation. These conversations were spontaneous and occurred sometimes over 
lunch and also while travelling. At district level the unstructured interviews provided 
insights in the political workings of resource allocation at district level.  The 
researcher used information from unstructured interviews to follow up on a variety of 
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issues during focus group discussions and semi structured interviews with 
respondents in the district. At national level information collected from unstructured 
interviews allowed the researcher to identify other respondents as well as to follow up 
formally with other respondents during interviews.  
	  
4.3.4 Secondary data 	  
 
Secondary data provide a wealth of information for researchers in the social science 
discipline. One of the advantages of secondary data is that it is inexpensive to collect 
since efforts were already made by others to collect it (Bernard and Ryan 2010: 20). 
In the modern age of internet such data is readily available and accessible to most 
researchers. As data, which is already out there, it provides an opportunity for the 
researcher to review it again and again to answer different questions that researchers 
might have.  
	  
One of the key challenges with secondary and archival data is lack of authenticity 
(Bernard and Ryan 2010). Authenticity problem relates to the fact that the data that 
you are reviewing might not have been collected with the purpose that you have in 
mind now. In this case, there is no opportunity to explore or investigate certain 
questions and the researcher is left with information that may not answer all the 
questions that you have. At least with the data that you are collecting yourself you can 
go back and fill the blanks as you find them (Bernard and Ryan 2010). In addition to 
this, the researcher may also not know the motives or influences behind collection of 
this data.  
 
According to Bernard and Ryan (2010), researchers using secondary and archival data 
need to ask themselves the following questions: what is the history of this data? How 
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was it collected? What guarantees are there that it is what it should be? Does the 
document contain any gaps? What is the author trying to achieve? What was the 
document intended for? To what extent was the writer telling the truth? Do other 
documents exist that can tell the same story? Clearly any serious researcher will not 
ignore any potential underlying influences in the way this data is presented. It is 
therefore essential that where possible this data should be triangulated with other 
sources to check for reliability and validity.  
	  
This research has relied significantly on reviewing secondary data, which has 
provided insights in the roll out of reforms in Malawi. The researcher has reviewed 
the following documents: 
	  
(1) Policies. The emphasis in this study was to select documents, which describe 
the reforms. The study has focused on laws and policies passed in Malawi 
from 1998 to 2011, which are related to decentralisation. Government of 
Malawi policies on decentralisation were also reviewed, covering the same 
period.  
(2) Government of Malawi/ Development Partners Programme Reviews. The 
focus here was to investigate decentralisation programme reviews carried out 
by either Government of Malawi or its development partners that are involved 
in supporting decentralisation. The researcher focused on reviews that came 
out between 2004 and 2011. 
(3) Financial Information. Here the researcher focused on analysing budget 
trends for district councils covering the period from 2004 to 2011. This 
information was useful in order to investigate funding patterns over time. The 
study has also reviewed district financial reports on allocation of development 
projects from 2004 
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(4) Newspapers. Newspapers are useful to understand societal discourse, and 
investigate ‘current news’ with respect to how reforms are being implemented. 
However these can also be biased. Setting the boundaries was relatively easy 
in terms of which papers to review. This is because the country only has two 
major newspapers. The research reviewed articles that came out on 
decentralisation and local governance covering the period from 2009 to 2013. 
This meant reviewing ten daily papers and two weekend papers every week. 
Articles written on decentralisation were cut from the papers and reviewed. 
The researcher also used online newspapers covering the same period.  
(5) Journal Articles. A few articles have been written on decentralisation in 
Malawi. The researcher has reviewed articles, which cover the period from 
2004 to 2011. A few articles were also reviewed for the period prior to 2004 in 
order to shed light for the background chapters of this study.  
 
4.4 Data Analysis 
	  
Data analysis can be defined as the process of ‘breaking down’ the data and searching 
for meaning. Bernard and Ryan (2010) define analysis as the search for patterns and 
for ideas that assist to explain why those patterns are there in the first place. Data 
analysis is a painstaking exercise and can be quite lengthy process to undertake long 
after data collection has ended. According to Bernard and Ryan (2010), analysis starts 
before you collect data, when you begin to generate some ideas about what you are 
going to investigate, and it continues throughout the research effort. Data analysis 
involves development of ideas, and testing these against one’s observations. This 
section described how data analysis in this study has been carried out.  
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During the data collection period, on-going preliminary data analysis was conducted 
to check what was coming out of the data. This process enabled the researcher to 
identify areas that required follow up. This process was also useful to determine 
whether the information collected was relevant to address the key research questions. 
During preliminary data analysis the researcher reviewed each transcript and 
secondary data. For each interview the researcher examined the source of the 
information, the contextual issues that might have affected the data, the picture from 
the data, and where follow up was needed. Through this process the researcher was 
also able to follow up on several issues with the some respondents.  
	  
Data was collected in Chichewa (local language). Immediately after completing each 
interview the transcripts were transcribed and translated into English. The immediate 
translation into English was deliberate considering that it also provided an opportunity 
to expand on the information. It has been explained under the ethical section that tape 
recorders were not used because they made some people uncomfortable mainly 
because of the topic and the political environment that existed in the country at the 
time of conducting the study. Therefore, the researcher relied heavily on written notes 
to document the information from each interview.  
 
The study has used thematic analysis to analyse data. Thematic analysis is defined as 
a process of analysing data according to commonalities, relationships and differences 
across the data set (Gibson and Brown 2009). Themes are valuable in the process of 
narrative construction (Gibson and Brown 2009). Through use of themes data is 
broken down into sections that can easily be understood in order to tell the story from 
the data collected. According to Bernard and Ryan (2010), themes can either come 
from the data (inductive) or from our prior theoretical understanding of what we are 
investigating (deductive approach or priori). The themes used in this study have been 
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developed both inductively and deductively. Priori themes were developed based on 
some of the definitions from the literature on decentralisation, and theoretical 
orientations on the same. Additional themes have been developed inductively from 
the data. Bernard and Ryan (2010) argue that there is no way a researcher can 
anticipate all the themes that will come up before data is analysed.  
	  
Themes that were generated from the data inductively were developed through 
looking at repetitions in the transcripts as well as differences and similarities. 
Repetitions refer to the frequency with which a concept occurs in a text (Bernard and 
Ryan 2010). Systematic comparisons across units of data can lead to identification of 
similarities and differences, which in turn can lead to development of themes 
(Bernard and Ryan 2010: 58). Under both techniques (identifying repetitions, and 
similarities and differences) the researcher used simple tools, a pen and pencil to 
underline and highlight sections of texts. These sections were cut and organised 
around themes on flipchart papers. One of the challenges faced in this study was the 
large amounts of data that required to be handled through this manual system as 
opposed to use of computer software packages for analysis. The data analysis was 
painstaking and required patience and sense of organisation, both of which were 
achieved during the analysis. 
 
Several codes were used in the data analysis. Structural codes were used to code 
names and places in order to protect the respondents’ anonymity. In this case codes 
were used as encryption devices with the aim to hide information (Bernard and Ryan 
2010: 87). With respect to themes the study used codes to index text. Using these 
theme codes, sections of data were marked where the theme was mentioned. Bernard 
and Ryan (2010) have pointed out that theme codes show where the themes that we 
have identified actually occur in a text. Theme codes are one of the most common 
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types of codes, and they are sometimes referred to as referential codes (Bernard and 
Ryan 2010: 76).  
	  	  
4.4.1 Validity and Reliability of Results 	  
 
Bias is one of the challenges facing any type of qualitative research. Therefore every 
study needs to ensure that issues of validity and reliability have been carefully 
addressed. Validity refers to the extent to which the study has measured what it was 
supposed to measure, and reliability is the consistency with which it measures over 
time. Although validity and reliability of qualitative research should be measured 
differently from quantitative studies the aim is the same to control for potential biases 
that may exist at various stages of the research.  
 
Throughout the data collection and analysis stages the study has used constant 
validity check to ensure that data is valid and reliable. The researcher has questioned 
data from each method by looking at five guidelines provided by Bernard and Ryan 
(2010) as follows: 
	  
(1) Observing any disagreements among key informants and focus group 
discussions. Where huge differences existed the study tried to explore why. 
(2) Informant accuracy was explored to the extent possible. For example during 
interviews with representatives from political parties the study had to question 
some of the data and explore whether answers was based on political interests 
rather than experience on the ground. 
(3) Negative evidence, which was contrary to the assumptions of the researcher 
was welcomed. 
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(4) Alternative explanations were explored on how things work at district level. 
All explanations were recorded and reviewed during analysis. 
(5) Related to point 3 above, negative cases were reviewed with respect to the 
conclusions drawn up in this study. Conclusions were constantly questioned in 
terms of whether they still stood in light of some negative cases from data 
collection.  
	  
In addition to constantly checking validity of information being collected, this study 
has also used triangulation to ensure validity and reliability of results. Triangulation is 
defined as seeing things from different angles. Simons (2009) has pointed out that 
‘methodological triangulation’, exploring key similarities between methods, and ‘data 
triangulation’, using different data sources to gain an understanding of issues, are 
common in case study research. This study used both methodological triangulation 
(use of different methods) and data triangulation (comparing data from different 
sources). Generally, collecting data from multiple sources can result in rich and 
detailed picture of the issue being studied. In analysis of data the researcher clarified 
his assumption up front, and the steps through which interpretations were made were 
clearly documented in a journal.  
	  
Although it was not the aim of this study to generalise findings across all districts in 
Malawi the researcher has attempted to show that decentralisation in the context 
studied can transfer to another context. This has been done through detailed 
investigations at district level and some analysis of the trends at national level.  
 
4.5 Ethical Considerations 
 
Ethical issues relating to protection of participants are extremely important in any 
research (Berg 2004, Punch 1994, Schram 2003). Every researcher in social sciences 
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has the responsibility to inform and protect respondents. Any social research involves 
seeking voluntary cooperation from people and the basic principle is that all 
respondents will be informed about the purpose of the study. One of the key ethical 
issues with respect to protecting participants is how information is collected. This 
study involved investigations on decentralisation, which had become quite a sensitive 
political issue during the reign of wa Mutharika. The study employed various 
mechanisms to ensure that respondents were well protected.  
	  
As a general principle there was strict adherence to SOAS ethical guidelines. First, all 
participants were asked for consent before interviews were carried out. The purpose 
of the study was explained, and where it was requested a supporting letter from SOAS 
was shared with the respondent. All respondents were informed that they had a right 
to opt out at any stage during the interview process. Signed consent forms were not 
used to reduce any possibility of breach in confidentiality.  
 
Second, the study made sure that no money or gifts were given to the respondents in 
exchange for information. Apart from influencing respondents to go in a certain 
direction or to say more where little is appropriate, gifts and money can have a 
negative impact on future researchers coming to the same communities. Third, to 
protect respondents, names and other identity characteristics were kept confidential.  
In fact, the researcher took deliberate steps to ensure that no personal identifiers were 
stored with the data. A code linking the data to particular respondents was kept 
separately from the data collection sheets.  
 
Fourth, for some respondents interview venues had to be shifted to places where they 
felt secure. For instance, the researcher conducted some interviews at other places 
outside offices because some respondents felt they would be more comfortable in an 
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environment outside the office. Participants were also asked whether they were 
comfortable with the interview being recorded. A large majority of respondents 
rejected use of tape recorder, and the researcher had to adjust and drop the use of the 
recorder for the rest of the interviews. This was understandable given that 
decentralisation had become a hot topic for a variety of actors in the country including 
donors, Government officials, Non Governmental Organisations, politicians, and 
chiefs. Focus group discussions and semi structured interviews at community level 
were held in closed spaces (in a classroom away from the village). This was done 
deliberately to ensure confidentiality, and to protect respondents from any 
repercussions that may arise due to their participation in this study.  
	  
Lastly, the researcher took cautionary measures to ensure that the information 
collected was secure and no one else other than the researcher had access to this 
information. Information was kept in a secure room at home with access to no more 
than two people including the researcher.  
	  
4.6 Limitations of the Study 
	  
In this study the researcher faced a number of limiting conditions some of which were 
beyond the inherent design of this study. Significant effort has been made to minimise 
the impact of these limitations. To begin with because analysis in qualitative research 
rests with the thinking and choices of the researcher, qualitative studies are in general 
limited by researcher subjectivity. Therefore one of the main concerns is that of 
researcher bias which influences interests and perceptions. One of the key limitations 
of this study is issue of subjectivity and potential bias resulting from the fact that the 
researcher is Malawian and has his own political inclinations, which may influence 
how he looks at issues. To address this challenge the researcher acknowledged his 
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assumptions up front. In addition, data was triangulated from different methods and 
interpretations were tested. Interpretations were also crosschecked against other 
decentralisation studies in Africa.  
	  
Aside from issues of bias the study also faced other challenges. In 2010 and 2011 the 
country experienced an economic crisis and this was followed by regular fuel 
shortages. This negatively affected travel plans to the district where the case study 
was carried out. The direct implication is that data collection was collected over a 
longer period than had originally been envisaged. To address this problem, the 
researcher used the time to interview national level actors as well as to begin the 
analysis of data. The ever-changing nature of reforms in Malawi also made it difficult 
to predict what would happen at any particular time. For example, during the time the 
study was being carried out a number of changes were made to the Local Government 
Act, which had huge impact in implementation of reforms. It was difficult to 
demarcate clear boundaries for the period being studied since review of each new 
development was essential to attempt to complete the puzzle. While this was a 
challenge, it also presented an opportunity to analyse what these new actions meant in 
the context of this study.  
	  
Between 2009 and 2011, the country also went through political tensions particularly 
as the ruling party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) tried to consolidate its 
position, and come up with a successor to President Bingu wa Mutharika. There was 
intolerance for government criticism and this put the ruling party at loggerheads with 
the opposition parties, NGOs and some donors in the country. A few incidents 
happened whereby those who voiced criticism were attacked- some had their offices 
destroyed with petrol bombs. With respect to data collection this has an immediate 
effect of shutting people up because they are afraid of the implications of sharing 
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information. Thus decentralisation, which is already political in its nature, was also 
being heavily politicised. It was important to assure respondents that the information 
would be kept securely. Furthermore, for some respondents the interview had to be 
conducted in places outside their offices. The tensions in the country then also meant 
that one had to be careful in reviewing documents such as newspapers and 
programme evaluation reports some of which might have advanced a particular view 
of certain individual(s). The study has triangulated information from different 
methods and sources to address this. To protect the safety of the participants no 
recordings were made of the interviews.  
 
Another challenge, which affected the writing up of this thesis, was the sudden death 
of President Bingu wa Mutharika in April 2012. His death nearly threw the country 
into crisis as the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) were not eager to 
handover power to Vice President Joyce Banda who had been booted out of the then 
ruling party due to succession wrangles. This event had the immediate effect of 
transferring power from the DPP to Peoples Party (PP) a new grouping formed by the 
then Vice President Joyce Banda. Such significant political developments also nearly 
threw this thesis off the mark. It became necessary to factor in the implications of 
these developments on the pursuit of decentralisation. Yet, rather than throwing this 
study off the trail, the events following the death of wa Mutharika have helped to 
enrich the discussions in this thesis. The new reign of Joyce Banda as President has 
provided a small window of opportunity to compare with her predecessors in terms of 
her commitment to reform.  
 
Another limitation in this study was the unavailability of some information 
particularly on locally generated revenues and budgets at district level. This was due 
to poor data management practices in the district. For example, most of the old 
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financial data (>3 years) could not easily be tracked. When the researcher tried to find 
this information one of the data clerks at Salima district council indicated that the 
computer, which had this information, had ‘crashed’. This information was not 
backed up anywhere else. Hence, the researcher could only access financial data for 
locally generated revenue covering two years, 2009/10 and 2010/11 from the district 
officials. Similarly financial reports were only available for the same period. The 
researcher managed to access some financial data on central transfers covering the 
period 2004-2010 from the National Local Government Finance Committee (NLGFC) 
in Lilongwe.  
 
Finally, there were also technical problems. The laptop that the researcher was using 
crashed. The key data for the research was backed up in an external drive. However, 
the researcher still lost significant part of the bibliography. The researcher had to start 
all over again assembling this. 
	  
4.7 Salima: Profile and context of the district 
	  
This section provides an overview of Salima district. It is aimed at providing details 
on the political and socio-economic context within which the study took place. Salima 
district is located in Central Malawi, approximately 100 kilometres from Lilongwe, 
the capital city of Malawi. The district has a total land area of 2,196 square 
kilometres. It is located along Lake Malawi; as such it is one of the tourist attractions. 
The district has a vibrant township where district government offices are located. 
Salima district has a population of approximately 309,300 people (SEP 2006).  57.3% 
of the population lives below poverty line against the national standard of 52.4% 
(SEP 2006). Chewas and Yaos are the predominant tribes in the district, followed by 
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the Tongas. The main languages in the district are Chichewa and Chiyao. Over 60% 
of the district population practice Christianity followed by Islam at 30%.  
 
Subsistence agriculture is the main source of livelihood for the majority of the 
population. Agriculture offers employment to over 80% of the population in the 
district. Maize is the major food crop grown in the district followed by sweet 
potatoes, cassava and rice. Agriculture is facing serious challenges due to inadequate 
extension services, effects of climate change and population pressure on arable land. 
Its entire eastern boundary is almost 100 kilometres of Lake Malawi with numerous 
beautiful beaches. There are over 70 hotels, tourist resorts, cottages and lodges that 
are providing services to an increasingly growing number of domestic and foreign 
visitors annually. The district has a community development department that provides 
community development services through community mobilisation, economic 
enhancement opportunities, capacity building, food utilisation and dietary 
diversification activities, and community based population educational activities. 
However, there are only 9 Community Development Assistants (CDAs) serving a 
population of 309,000. This translates to at least one CDA per Traditional Authority. 
The situation is similar to other districts in Malawi. For instance, Lilongwe district 
has one CDA per Traditional Authority.6  
	  
The district has a variety of social services in the areas of health and education. There 
are 123 primary schools owned by Local Education Authority, CCAP (Presbyterian), 
Anglican, Pillar of Fire and Methodist churches. The government also runs two 
conventional secondary schools and thirteen community day secondary schools. The 
district has its share of socio-economic challenges. Literacy levels are still low at 52% 
for men, and 48% for women. Access to education is negatively affected by host of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Data from Lilongwe Socio-Economic Profile, 2006	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problems such as excessive walking distances, limited number of classrooms and 
shortage of teachers. The teacher-pupil ratio in the district is 1:100 against a national 
standard of 1:60. Salima has one district hospital and twelve health centres that are 
spread across the district. Delivery of health services is seriously handicapped by 
shortages of medical personnel. For instance, there are only 70 nurses against 152 
established positions (SEP 2006: vii). This is not unique to Salima and many districts 
in Malawi are facing shortages in medical supplies and in the number of medical 
personnel available to serve patients. Salima district has high maternal and under five 
mortality rates. Just like in other parts of Malawi malaria and HIV and AIDS are two 
of the major causes of mortality and morbidity in Salima district.  
	  
Telecommunication coverage is expanding in the district. Internet and telephone 
services are readily available at district headquarters. There has been an influx of 
privately run bureaus that are providing internet and telephone services in the district. 
However despite the increase in coverage the majority of rural masses do not have 
access to these facilities. In fact, almost half of the population has no access to 
telecommunication, telephones, or email (SEP 2006: 87). The district receives radio 
and television coverage just like most parts of the country. Use of mobile phones has 
been on the increase and the whole of the district has cellular coverage. Still, the 
majority of the rural populations cannot afford to maintain a cell phone.  
	  
4.7.1 Political and Administrative Structure 
 	  	  
On paper, the District Council (previously Assembly) is the main body that represents 
the system of local governance in the district. The District Council is composed of 
twenty-five wards, which have now been reduced to ten as per the amendments to the 
local government act in 2011. A councillor represents each ward. There are five 
constituencies in the district represented by five members of parliament (MPs) who 
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previously were ex-officio members of the District Council. A detailed figure on the 
composition of local authorities in each district in Malawi as per the 1998 Local 
Government Act has been included as figure four in chapter three of this thesis. 
Following the amendments to the Local Government Act in 2011 MPs now have 
voting powers in the Council. The other members of the District Council are ten 
Traditional Authorities and five members of interest groups representing women, 
youth, religious community, disabled, and business community. These representatives 
have no voting powers. The District Commissioner is the Secretary of the Council. 
However, local government elections have not taken place since 2005. In the absence 
of councillors there is a makeshift District Consultative Forum that comprises of the 
rest of the members other than councillors and other co-opted members such as Non 
Governmental Organizations. The Consultative Forum has no voting powers and 
cannot make binding by-laws.  
 
A District Council Secretariat oversees implementation of directives made by the 
council. This Secretariat is charged with the responsibility to implement policies 
approved by the Council. The Secretariat coordinates programme implementation by 
various sectors and is responsible for ensuring efficient and accountable use of 
resources. The District Commissioner heads the Secretariat and is assisted by four 
directorates namely, Works, Finance, Planning, and Administration.  
	  
Below the Council there is a District Executive Committee as a technical arm. The 
committee is responsible for making proposals to the District Council on various 
projects and plans to be implemented in the district. The District Executive 
Committee (DEC) is composed of heads of departments from the Council Secretariat 
and representatives of Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that are present in 
the district. The Committee has a membership of fifty people. The DEC is responsible 
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for the formation, training and capacity building for development planning for lower 
level planning structures such as Area and Village Development Committees. The 
DEC representatives have the responsibility to implement projects and programmes in 
line with their ministries while reporting accordingly to the controlling officer, the 
District Commissioner (SEP 2006).  
 
There are ten Traditional Authorities (TAs) in the district. In each of the Traditional 
Authorities there is an Area Development Committee, which is a representative body 
for all Village Development Committees under each TA. The Area Development 
Committee (ADC) is responsible for facilitating identification and prioritisation of 
needs that are forwarded to the District Executive Committee. The ADC also 
supervises and monitors project implementation at TA level. The ADC is composed 
of the Chairperson of the Area Executive Committee as the Secretary, ward 
councillors from the Traditional Authority, and representatives from religious groups, 
youth, women groups, and business community. The term of office for ADCs is three 
years except for ward councillors who are permanent members and can only leave 
when voted out during local government elections.  
 
Under each ADC there is an Area Executive Committee (AEC), which is composed 
of extension workers from Government Ministries, NGO representatives and 
Statutory Corporations representatives in each of the Traditional Authorities. In total 
there are ten Area Executive Committees (AECs) in the district. The AEC is an 
advisory body to the Area Development Committee and supports needs assessment, 
project identification and project proposal preparation. A chairperson is elected from 
amongst the members. The AEC also carries out data collection and analysis and 
facilitates training and capacity building in development planning for all Village 
Development Committees within their area of jurisdiction.  
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The Village Development Committee is a representative body from a group of 
villages. Its responsibility is to facilitate planning and development in local 
communities. Village Development Committees operate under the Area Development 
Committees. Therefore, under each ADC there are several VDCs. The VDC is 
composed of one elected member from each village within the area of jurisdiction, 
ward councillor, four women representatives nominated by people from the area of 
jurisdiction and one elected extension worker. The term of office for the VDCs is 
three years. See the table below for the number of VDCs in Salima District. 	  
Table 5: Village Development Committees in Salima district 
Traditional Authority Number of Villages Number of VDCs 
Maganga 62 10 
Kalonga 195 22 
Pemba 87 18 
Ndindi 61 10 
Khombedza 193 25 
Kuluunda 31 3 
Kambwiri 75 23 
Kambalame 28 6 
Mwanza 153 33 
Msosa 46 8 
District Total 931 158 
 Source: Social-economic Profile (SEP) 2006: 5 
 
Figure five below shows the three tiers of chieftaincy at community level and 
corresponding levels of decentralised structures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
4.7.2 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
 
There is lack of data on the exact number of NGOs and CBOs in the district. Even the 
district council does not have an entire list of NGOs operating in the district. Yet, 
Traditional	  Authorities	  (10)	  Group	  Village	  Headman	  (158)	  Village	  Headmen	  (931)	  
Area	  Development	  Committee	  
Village	  Development	  Committee	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after visiting the district headquarters it was obvious that there are many NGOs and 
CBOs in the district due to the number of offices that are occupied by these 
organisations. Some of the big NGOs in the district include ADRA, CARE, Save the 
Children, Actionaid, World Vision, FINCA, Water Aid, and Christian Service 
Committee. These NGOs provide a vast range of services in the areas of water and 
sanitation, health, education, agriculture, adult literacy, HIV and AIDS, microfinance 
and capacity building. There are also numerous Community Based Organisations 
(CBOs). CBOs provide social services such as awareness raising on HIV and AIDS, 
adolescent reproductive health, orphan care, home based care and human rights 
education. CBOs operate at community level usually covering one of more group 
village headmen areas. A network of NGOs exists in the district but this only has 
about 25 members. This is a potential area for mapping to understand the number and 
type of NGOs and CBOs in the district and the type of services that they offer. Some 
NGOs sit in the decentralised structures such as the District Consultative Forum, and 
also the District Executive Committee. At community level some of the NGOs are 
represented in the Area Executive Committees. The role of NGOs in various 
decentralised structures in the district is discussed in detail in chapter five. 
	  
4.7.3 Development Planning in the district 
 	  
According to SEP (2006), development planning in the district is guided by the 
District Development Planning System (DDPS). The DDPS provides guidance on 
people centred and bottom-up participatory approach to planning and development 
(SEP 2006:6). Under this system, planning starts from the Village Development 
Committees and priorities are channelled upwards to the Area Development 
Committee that consolidates and submits priorities to the District Executive 
Committee (DEC). The DEC reviews the proposals before submission to the District 
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Council for approval. In an ideal scenario implementation does not start until the 
Council has approved the plans.  
	  	  
4.7.4 Local Politics 	  
 
There are four main political parties in the district. These are, United Democratic 
Front (UDF), Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Malawi Congress Party (MCP) 
and now since 2012, the Peoples Party. Previously Alliance for Democracy 
(AFFORD) was one of the main parties in the district but its support base has 
dwindled over the years. There are also other smaller political parties such as Maravi 
Peoples Party (MPP). In the 2004 parliamentary elections the Malawi Congress Party 
(an opposition party) won four out of the five seats in the district. The ruling party 
then, United Democratic Front won one seat. After the 2004 Presidential and 
Parliamentary Elections the then President Bingu wa Mutharika left the ruling party, 
UDF to form his own party, the Democratic Progressive Party. The single UDF MP in 
the district followed the President into the new party. In the 2009 general elections the 
parliamentary seats were more divided. The ruling party, DPP, won two seats, the 
Malawi Congress Party won two seats, and one seat went to a small party, the Maravi 
Peoples Party. However, it is worth noting that the MPP Member of Parliament was 
part of the ruling party (between 2004 and 2008) and left after he had fallen out of 
favour with the President. Therefore, he is considered to be relatively more powerful 
than he could otherwise have been with his small party.  
4.8 Conclusion 
	  
To conclude, this chapter has provided detailed description of this study’s research 
methodology. A qualitative case study (with embedded design) was used to explore 
whether the new form of decentralisation in Malawi has led to transfer of powers and 
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resources to local actors who are downwardly accountable. To strengthen prospects 
for transferability of results, the study has included a qualitative study at national 
level where policy is decided. Four data collection methods were used in this study, 
and these include; semi structured interviews, focus group discussions, informal 
conversations (unstructured interviews), and review of secondary data. All in all, 100 
in-depth interviews and 41 focus group discussions were conducted. The data 
collected in this study was reviewed against existing theories and literature on 
democratic decentralisation and devolution. Validity and reliability were addressed 
through various steps in this research including constant validity check during data 
collection, and method and source triangulation.  
 
This chapter has also described the political and socio-economic and administrative 
context of Salima district, which is the main case study in this thesis. Salima is 
representative of the large number of districts in Malawi with proliferation of more 
than one political party, an agricultural based economy with most households 
producing for their own consumption, and poor socio-economic indicators in a 
number of areas.  
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Chapter	  Five	  
	  
5.	  More	  centralisation	  and	  capture:	  The	  case	  of	  Salima	  district	  
 
 
Will benefits of democratic decentralisation or devolution be realised in Malawi? The 
main assumption with this question is that reforms are occurring in a way that they 
were designed to, and therefore one can examine a direct cause-effect relationship. 
Perhaps the first question to ask then is ‘what is the reality of reforms in Malawi’ or 
‘are reforms happening in the way they were expected to, and along the lines of 
devolution and democratic decentralisation’? If reforms do not bear full resemblance 
to the desired form of ‘devolution’ then it is unlikely that intended benefits will occur. 
This chapter examines the implementation of decentralisation in one of the districts in 
Malawi, Salima, and argues that reforms are not transferring powers to downwardly 
accountable actors. Instead, there are so many challenges and decentralisation seems 
to be deviating from the way that it was envisioned in the Constitution and the Local 
Government Act of 1998.  
 
This chapter will show that there is plenty of blame to pass around---political (ruling) 
and bureaucratic elites undermining reforms through centralising tendencies; 
Ferguson’s ‘side effects’ (see: Ferguson and Lohmann 2006) with certain groups of 
local actors capturing reforms and gaining significant powers which are used to 
informally influence decisions; and actions of NGOs and donors that look for quick 
results through bypassing formal decentralised structures and earmarking funds, and 
in so doing undermine the very same decentralisation reforms that they promote under 
the good governance agenda. Therefore, the main finding in this chapter is that 
despite the rhetoric around devolution or ‘democratic decentralisation’ as the 
preferred form the reality in the implementation of reforms is different.  And since 
	   211	  
these reforms do not meet the conditions of devolution discussed in chapter two it is 
unlikely that Malawi will see many of the potential benefits particularly with regard to 
enhancing local democracy and local development.  	  
This chapter starts by discussing the political context and defining the key actors with 
formal and informal influence in Salima district council. The financial mechanisms 
are discussed next before moving on to examine the politics of decision making with 
regard to resource allocation.  
	  
5.1 Understanding of decentralisation in Salima district 
	  	  
There is a legitimate question to be asked in terms of how democratic decentralisation 
is understood in the district and what the expectations are from various groups. All the 
respondents interviewed in this study have heard about decentralisation. In local 
language, several respondents referred to decentralisation as ‘mphamvu ku wanthu’ 
(power to the people). Decentralisation is strongly linked to the development process: 	  
‘It means giving power or chance for the community to decide which development 
projects they want in their areas, according to their needs. We expect the areas to 
develop, as people will be prepared to participate in their own projects…’ 
Focus Group Discussion, Area Development Committee (ADC), Traditional 
Authority 3, 15 August 2010.  
 
Another respondent defined decentralisation as: 
‘Yes I know decentralisation. It means development must start from the people by 
expressing their needs to the government..’ 
Interview, Village Development Committee (VDC) Chairperson, T/A 
Khombedza, 2 August 2010. 
  
	   212	  
A religious leader in the district defined decentralisation as: 
	  
‘Transferring power from the central government to districts down to the people to 
have a right to choose what development projects they need. The expectation is that 
there can be meaningful development in this areas as people’s needs will be 
addressed..’ 
Interview, religious leader, CCAP church, 4 September 2010.  
 
Based on the interviews there seems to be strong understanding of decentralisation 
particularly as it related to development planning process. Responses provided by a 
range of actors including district council officials, chiefs, religious leaders and 
members of political parties describe decentralisation as relevant to ensure that local 
people are allowed to make input into the identification of development priorities for 
the district. In a way this may reflect the enormity of expectations linked to 
decentralisation at the local level, with various respondents expecting reforms to 
address their needs. Decentralisation was also seen as beneficial since it will bring 
back councillors who are considered more effective in contrast to MPs. Several 
respondents pointed out that the district is not faring well now in terms of 
development projects due to the absence of councillors: 
 
‘..Things are worse now as there is no one to lead the communities in development as 
councillors used to do. A school block was built in this community using molded 
bricks at the time…’ 
Interview, Village Headman, Traditional Authority (T/A) Pemba, 11 
November 2010.  
 
In Traditional Authority Khombedza’s area a chairperson for a Village Development 
Committee also claimed that councillors had been very effective: 
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‘During the time there were councillors here, we had some development projects. A 
teacher’s house was constructed here…At the moment nothing is happening..’ 
  Interview, VDC Chairperson, T/A Khombedza, 2 August 2010.  	  
However, other respondents also argued that the district did not see significant 
progress in planning and execution of development interventions during the period 
when the councillors were in place. According to a key informant there was still a lot 
of influence from above which rendered the whole exercise useless since priorities 
were centrally determined: 
 
‘There were a lot of problems here. The district here followed centrally set priorities. 
The Assembly was setting plans but central government would commit limited 
resources. Only councillors on the government side benefitted and this was in the 
Salima South constituency..’ 
Interview, National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE) official, 12 
November 2010. 	  
This second view is supported by scholars such as Chinsinga (2008) who have argued 
that democratic decentralisation in Malawi did not contribute much towards poverty 
reduction during the period when there were councillors. A detailed analysis of 
reforms during the UDF era (when the country had councillors) has been included in 
chapter three.  
	  
5.2 Political context in Salima district 
	  
During the data collection in 2010 and 2011 it was established that there were four 
political parties that were well established at that time in the district, and these were; 
Malawi Congress Party, United Democratic Front, Democratic Progressive Party, and 
Maravi Peoples Party. In 2012, following the death of Bingu wa Mutharika, the new 
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ruling party, Peoples Party, has established itself at district level. Due to the 
fragmentation of political party support alongside regional lines in Malawi, the central 
region has predominantly voted for the Malawi Congress Party, an opposition party 
since 1994. Therefore Salima, which is also in the central region, has tended to vote 
for more MCP MPs rather than for the ruling party. MCP dominated parliamentary 
seats in the 1994, 1999 and 2004 general elections. MCP also had most councillors 
during the only local government elections in 2000. In 2004 general elections only 
one parliamentary seat went to the then ruling party, UDF. In 2009, two out of the 
five seats went to the then ruling party, DPP, and one seat went to a small party, the 
Maravi Peoples Party. So on paper, MCP seems to have had dominance in district 
politics at local level. In practice, subsequent sections of this chapter will show that 
the ruling party, though in minority, has had a lot of influence in the district. Members 
of Parliament are one of the influential actors in district politics.  	  
In addition to the presence political parties described above, other influential actors in 
district politics in Salima include, local bureaucrats (led by the District 
Commissioner), chiefs, and Non Governmental Organisations. Local bureaucrats 
participate in both policy and technical bodies of the local government in the district. 
Chiefs operate in policy making bodies at district level, and also in decentralised 
decision making bodies at community level. On the other hand NGOs are represented 
in policy and technical bodies of the local government. These actors participate in the 
formal structure of local government in Salima district. These actors play key formal 
and informal roles in the local government structure shown below:  
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Figure six: Formal Local Government Structure, and other powerful actors 
outside formal structure 	  
The direction of arrows in the formal structure of local government in the district 
represents accountability lines. At the top of the local government structure in the 
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district is the District Consultative Forum (DCF) where MPs, Chiefs, the DC and one 
NGO representative supposedly sit to make decisions in the district. Below the DCF, 
is the District Executive Committee (DEC) comprising NGO representatives and 
heads of departments from the council secretariat.  The DEC is responsible for 
making recommendations for development programmes, which then are approved by 
the DCF. At community level there are two structures, the Area Development 
Committee (ADC), at Traditional Authority level, and Village Development 
Committee (VDC), which exists in each Group Village Headman area. The ADC and 
VDC are involved in the planning of development programmes in the district as well 
as in the implementation of project activities. Outside this formal structure there are 
numerous NGO formed project committees that are playing a key role in 
implementation of NGO funded development activities at community level. The 
project committees are accountable to the NGOs and not through the formal local 
government structure.  	  
The right hand side of figure six shows the significant role played by NGOs outside 
the formal structure of local government. On the same right hand side, it is also shown 
how the then ruling party had influence over the District Commissioner, the District 
Consultative Forum and the Development Committees at community level. There is 
also de Sardan’s chiefly mode of local governance (see: de Sardan 2011) with chiefs 
exercising formal and informal influence in the formal local government structure in 
the district from the top to the community levels. In most cases the influence of chiefs 
and that of ruling party are not contradictory with regard to each other. Rather, the 
interests of the ruling party are best served through collaboration with chiefs. 
Generally, all MPs (whether from ruling party or opposition) tend to work with chiefs 
from their constituencies to advance their development agenda at district level. 
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However, evidence from this thesis suggests that opposition MPs do not have 
significant formal and informal influence on the decisions made within the formal 
local government structure. These structures, the actors, and the politics of resource 
allocation are described in detail in the subsequent sections.  	  
5.3 Outlook of Local Government without councillors: Functions of key 
structures and actors 	  
The absence of councillors in Salima (and other districts in Malawi) has left a vacuum 
within the councils where these elected representatives had voting powers on various 
policy issues in the district. This means that at the moment there is no formal body 
with binding powers to make local policy and decide on local matters. Only Members 
of Parliament (MPs) and Traditional Authorities are still in place and constitute what 
remains of the council. Up until 2010, both MPs and Traditional Authorities had no 
voting powers. This changed in 2010 when MPs were granted voting powers.  	  
Due to the vacuum left by the absence of councillors the Ministry of Local 
Government and Rural Development issued a directive in 2005 to all districts to form 
a District Consultative Committee. This Committee (shown at the top of the local 
government structure in figure six) plays an advisory role at district level with regard 
to matters which would have previously been dealt with by councillors. The Ministry 
also provided guidance to all districts on the composition of this consultative 
committee. In Salima, the District Consultative Forum was established in 2005. As an 
advisory body the District Consultative Forum (DCF) does not have legal mandate to 
pass by-laws or vote on certain decisions to be implemented by the District. The DCF 
is also referred to as ‘expanded District Executive Committee’ while others describe it 
	   218	  
as ‘District Advisory Committee or Forum’ (DAC/ DCF)7. This lack of common 
name suggests some ambiguity as regards the role of this structure. For instance, 
‘DEC’ is associated with a structure composed of local bureaucrats and NGO staff, 
while ‘Advisory or Consultative Committee’ defines the functions of the committee 
as that of making recommendations. However, it is not clear to whom this committee 
provides ‘advice’ as the DCF/DAC is the highest body in the current structure of local 
government in the district.  
	  
In the district, the DCF or expanded District Executive Committee (Expanded DEC) 
is made up of the ten (10) Traditional Authorities in the district, five (5) Members of 
Parliament (MPs), one (1) representative from each of the three largest sector 
ministries (Agriculture, Education and Health), one representative from NGOs in the 
district, the District Commissioner and the Director of Planning and Development. 
The last two are officials from the District Council Secretariat. Out of these actors, 
only the Members of Parliament (MPs) are elected representatives. The rest, such as 
chiefs and government officials are non-elected officials. In 2010, changes were made 
to the local government act and MPs were granted voting powers in local councils. 
However, since the DCF is only an advisory forum, the MPs are yet to exercise their 
voting powers at local level. The fusion of legislative and executive functions in the 
District Consultative Forum compromises the ability of this structure to provide 
checks and balances (Chiweza 2010). For instance, the DCF membership includes the 
DC and his staff, the very same people that are accountable to the DCF as the highest 
structure at district level.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Interview, German Development Agency (GIZ) official, 5 August 2010; Interview, 
Salima Council Secretariat staff member, 3 September 2010; Interview, CARE 
official and member of Salima District NGO Forum, 3 September 2010.   
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The major difference between the DCF and a Council (with councillors) is that the 
former has several categories of actors who are not elected representatives, and these 
actors are now making decisions on behalf of the district. The DCF in Salima has a 
wide range of functions, which includes; reviewing annual sector plans, budgets, and 
making decisions on how other centrally formulated development projects should be 
implemented. The District Commissioner and sector heads put proposals before the 
forum, which then debates before approving them. In some cases amendments are 
made on these plans. According to key informants, in some cases combative debates 
have occurred when district officials have presented allocations to different 
constituencies based on needs. Here the debates have been along the lines of trying to 
capture the projects so that they should be implemented in one’s area.8  
 
In most cases it seems that the discussions in the forum are amicable with members 
approving the plans and budgets submitted by district officials with little or no 
amendments. Some district officials have observed that members were reluctant to 
question proposals brought before the committee. As a result, discussions mostly 
tended to agree with the recommendations brought before the committee.9 Therefore 
in the majority of cases the DCF may be merely rubber-stamping decisions made 
elsewhere. There are strong indications that there is a lot of informal influencing. A 
council employee noted that there are a lot of visits from MPs and Traditional 
Authorities to the District Commissioner’s office and other sector heads. During these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Interview, Salima District Council Secretariat staff member, 3 September 2010; 
Interview, GIZ official, 5 August 2010; Interview, Adventist Relief and Development 
Agency (ADRA) official, 30 July 2010. 	  9	  Interview, former National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE) Coordinator, 1 
August 2010; Interview, Actionaid official, 18 October 2010; Interview, Salima 
District Council Secretariat staff member 2, 5 September 2010.   
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visits the MPs and chiefs often lobbied for support in their areas.10 The ability of these 
MPs and chiefs to influence decisions varies and is often dependent on the ‘right 
connections’ with the ruling party elites.11 In general, the DCF was considered 
toothless in ensuring proper running of the council. Instead, it endorsed 
recommendations already made. One member of the DCF mentioned that: 
 
‘…we discuss resource allocations mainly from the Local Development Fund. But I 
can tell you that only small changes are made. It appears that whatever is proposed by 
the Secretariat Team led by the District Commissioner is rarely 
questioned..unfortunately we are not told how finances are spent..’ 
Interview, Salima Council Secretariat Staff member 2, 5 September 2010.  
 
NGO representatives who sit in the DCF have expressed similar views on the inability 
of the forum to influence key decisions. Worse still, the meetings of the DCF were not 
regular, and when it met the meetings were mostly to share information on how 
development projects had been allocated in the district.12 There is limited attention to 
the strategic role of the Council, for example the DCF does not periodically review 
the performance of the Secretariat and fails to play an oversight role on how finances 
are allocated and spent.  
 
5.3.1 District Executive Committee 
 
 
Under the DCF, there is a District Executive Committee (DEC), which is a technical 
arm of the council and is responsible for implementing the decisions of the council. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In-depth Interview, Salima District Council Secretariat Senior Staff Member, 8 
September 2010.  
11 Interview, former NICE Coordinator, 1 August 2010; Interview, GIZ official, 5 
August 2010.	  	  12	  Interview, ADRA official, 30 July 2010; Interview, former NICE Coordinator, 1 
August 2010.  
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The DEC also oversees the development and implementation of the District 
Development Plan. The DEC is made up of heads of departments at the Council 
Secretariat, sector heads,13 development partners represented in the district, and NGO 
representatives. These members of DEC can be put into two categories as follows: (i) 
government officials, and (ii) NGO representatives.  
 
The DEC in Salima meets frequently but largely on an ad hoc basis. Usually, the 
meetings are as a result of requests from various organisations that want to present 
their activities or new projects to the district. Council members consider these 
meetings important as they facilitate information sharing and coordination of 
activities at district level. This view is shared by NGOs who consider DEC meetings 
essential to avoid duplication of activities. For example, during DEC meetings 
organisations can be advised on where to take new projects. However, NGO 
representatives found the DEC meetings expensive because government staff 
demanded allowances particularly where NGOs had called for the meetings: 
	  
‘..if a DEC meeting is organized by the Council Secretariat no allowances are paid by 
the Council, but the moment an NGO requests for a meeting to present a project they 
are told that they must pay allowances to participants. Failure to pay allowances 
means that the meeting will not take place…’ 
Interview, CARE official and member of NGO Forum, 3 September 2010.  
	  
To address this problem the NGOs working through their NGO Forum have agreed to 
standardise allowances. The NGOs have also agreed that they need to coordinate 
meetings. For example, rather than each NGO calling for its own DEC meetings, 
several NGOs can work together to present their projects during one meeting.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Sector heads lead the various sector ministries represented at district level, and 
these include health, education and agriculture as the big three, and other smaller 
ministries such as water, gender, forestry, youth, information, etc.	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Although the DEC has the primary mandate to act as technical arm for recommending 
development priorities in the district, the committee members lack the necessary tools 
to work effectively. For instance, most DEC members do not have copies of the 
District Development Plan (DDP). While collecting data for this study the researcher 
could not find a copy of the plan with any of the secretariat staff or NGO 
representatives that were interviewed. None of the people interviewed knew where to 
find a copy. After several days of following up with the Director of Planning and 
Development one copy was finally found. This does suggest that discussions in the 
DEC are not guided by the DDP. 
 
When it comes to debates in the District Executive Committee the heads of sectors are 
careful not to contradict the District Commissioner in public.14 For this reason 
contributions of sector heads and other government officials in District Executive 
Committee are more cautious. On the other hand, NGO representatives in the DEC 
can speak freely possibly because their lines of accountability are elsewhere. A donor 
representative noted that: 
 
 
‘…It was more difficult for Heads of Departments or other Government Officials to 
question the recommendations or decisions from the District Commissioner. Once it 
is presented that something has come from the DC, these people are quiet…the only 
alternative views come from NGOs who cannot be sanctioned by the DC here…’ 
Interview, GIZ official, 5 August 2010.  
	  	  
Although the sector heads take this position in the DEC it still does not take away the 
fact that the powers of the DC over sectoral activities are limited due to the oversight 
role that central ministries continue to play. This is explained in the next section 
below.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Interview, Salima District Council Secretariat staff member 3, 21 December 2010. 	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5.3.2 District Commissioner- The ‘Bwana’ in crisis of control and 
accountability 
 
 
The District Commissioner (DC) is the head of the Council Secretariat in the district. 
He is referred to as ‘abwana’  (‘the boss’).15 As the head of the secretariat the DC 
oversees planning, administration and finance functions of the council secretariat. The 
DC also directly supervises all the heads for the devolved sectors in the district. 
Currently only 14 sector ministries, including the big three (agriculture, education, 
health) have carried out varying degrees of sector devolution in the district.  The DC 
is also the Controlling Officer (CO) and approves budget spending for all devolved 
ministries and departments at district level.  
	  
Up until 2009, District Commissioners in Malawi were supposed to be recruited 
through the Local Authorities Service Commission (LASCOM), an independent body 
tasked with the responsibility to oversee recruitment and performance management of 
District Commissioners. The thinking behind this was to reduce political influence in 
how the DCs discharge their duties at the district level and to ensure that they were 
recruited by a more independent entity.16 If Local Council was not satisfied with the 
performance of their DC it had a right to complain to LASCOM for removal of the 
DC. Between 1998 and 2004 LASCOM was operational under the United Democratic 
Front (UDF)-led Government.  
 
Over time, a combination of changes to the Local Government Act and inconsistent 
policy implementation have eroded the powers of the District Commissioner in the 
district. The previous regime under Bingu wa Mutharika (2004-2012), abolished 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Interview, Salima Council Secretariat staff member, 3 September 2010;  Interview, 
Group Village Headman, T/A Kambwiri area, 14 December 2010.	  	  16	  Interview,  Senior official- Ministry of Local Government, 6 October 2010. 	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LASCOM in 2009 and returned the powers of appointment to the President through 
the Minister of Local Government. This means that the Minister of Local Government 
appoints and removes DC. This has direct implications on the neutrality of the DC. 
Coupled with the informal influencing, which has been discussed earlier, the DC is 
under pressure to serve both central and local interests. The current DC in Salima is 
relatively young in his late thirties. He is just beginning to develop a career in 
Government and this may make him more pragmatic as he juggles to protect his 
position and build his career. It is likely that he will lean towards those who have 
more influence over his career path. One government official within the Ministry of 
Local Government has suggested that the changes to the Act were because the wa 
Mutharika administration wanted to strengthen their grip on local councils. He 
pointed out that: 
 
‘The UDF government was interested in rolling out reforms because they felt that 
they had an absolute majority in terms of the number of councillors in almost all 
districts. The Mutharika administration started as a minority and has to find ways to 
hold on to the Local Councils. By making District Commissioners accountable to the 
Minister, the Government was making sure that these became political appointees to 
serve the interests of the ruling party…’ 
Interview, Senior official- Ministry of Local Government and Rural 
Development, 6 October 2010 
 
At a time of writing up this study the District Commissioner had just received his 
notice from central government to move to another district. A new District 
Commissioner had already arrived in the district and is operating from home. 
According to the Nyasa Times (2012), there was tension in the district as the former 
DC was not eager to leave quickly while the new DC wanted to take up his post as 
soon as possible. Since DCs are at the mercy of central government in terms of 
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transfers and promotions, they are likely to focus much of their attention on how to 
please the centre. This can undermine decentralisation since it places more control 
over the local arena in the hands of the ruling elites at the centre rather than locally 
elected representatives. The Joyce Banda government, which came to power in 2012, 
promised to conduct local government elections in 2014. It is yet to be seen how this 
will change the accountability lines since councils have oversight role on the activities 
of the council secretariat. However, the current status quo whereby the DC is a 
political appointee by the centre, offers little promise that the aims of decentralisation 
as envisaged in the decentralisation policy of 1998 will be achieved.  
 
The slow pace of devolution by sectoral ministries has eroded the authority of the 
District Commissioner (DC) in the district. This is evident in two areas: oversight 
over district sectoral budgets and plans, and supervision and management of district 
staff. So far, only fourteen sector ministries have devolved their functions, and even 
for these it was mostly the ORT budget that had been transferred to the districts.17 
Development budgets still remained under central control. According to a senior 
government official from Ministry of Local Government:18  
 
‘…there is still a lot of resistance from sector ministries to devolve their budgets. 
Holding on the development budgets means that the central ministries still have the 
powers to reallocate resources…’ 
 
This slow pace of devolution and continuing role of central ministries in development 
budgets have led to a lot of vertical planning within each Ministry. For example, in 
the education sector the procurement of teaching and learning materials as well as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Interview, UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) official 2, 15 
October 2011; Interview, World Bank official, 12 May 2011; Interview, Senior 
official- Ministry of Local Government, 6 October 2010.  
18 Interview, Senior official- Ministry of Local Government, 6 October 2010.  
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construction of new schools and school blocks is done centrally.19 As a result, the 
District Commissioner as the ‘bwana’ cannot properly supervise the affairs of all the 
devolved sectors. Key ministries such as education, health, agriculture, water, and 
others continue to develop district (sector) plans that are approved by the headquarters 
of each ministry in Lilongwe.20 According to a key informant: 
 
‘…These plans are formulated through a parallel process, with central ministries 
approving the final plans….’ 
Interview, Ministry of Development Planning and 
Cooperation Staff member, 2 March 2011.  
 
Such practices undermine the role of the DC and the efforts to integrate development 
budgets at district level.  
 
Currently, sector heads are faced with a dual system of accountability – reporting to 
their parent central ministry and to the District Commissioner (DC). When it comes to 
policy the central ministries have more influence and oversight on activities by the 
sectors.21  Central ministries are still responsible for recruiting, firing, and transferring 
all their permanent staff in the district. For example, the District Health Officer in 
Salima can be transferred at any time and without consultations with the DC. In fact, 
the District Education Manager in Salima was at one point transferred and the DC 
only learnt about it after the decision had already been made.22 To make matters 
worse salaries are still centralised, and sector ministry staff are paid centrally. This 
has undermined the role of the DC in overseeing the functions of all government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Interview, Salima District Education Office staff, 7 September 2010.   
20 Interview, Senior official, Ministry of Development Planning and Cooperation, 2 
March 2011.	  	  21	  Interview, Senior official- Ministry of Local Government, 6 October 2010.  
22 Interview, former National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE) Coordinator, 1 
August 2010.	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departments in the district. The various government heads claim that they are in good 
working relationship with the DC because they understand his role as the overseer. 
Yet, on the other hand plans continue to happen without full consent from the DC, 
and staffing is still centrally controlled. The staff members in partially devolved 
sectors report to the DC mainly on ORT issues, and they continue to report vertically 
to their sector ministries on major issues such as recruitment, promotions, training, 
transfers, and management of development budgets. 
	  
The DC leads both the DEC and DCF meetings. This puts the District Commissioner  
(DC) is in a powerful position in the district. However, the real picture is much more 
complex and the later sections of this chapter will discuss how the DC often has to be 
pragmatic and juggle around to ensure support from other actors who have more 
informal influence in the district and beyond. 
 
5.3.3 Chiefs: ‘New Unaccountable Councillors and capture of local committees’ 
 
 
Chieftaincy is a hereditary position in Malawi. No one is elected to become chiefs. 
One becomes chief by virtue of being related to a deceased chief, either as a son, 
brother or nephew. In exceptional cases this can extend to a female relative, for 
example, daughter. The fact that chiefs are not elected representatives mean that they 
cannot be held to account through normal democratic practices such as elections. 
Within the Chiefs Act, the District Commissioner, acting on behalf of the President 
has powers to supervise chiefs. A large majority of chiefs are men. This is because in 
many parts of the country chieftaincy passes either to the oldest son or oldest nephew. 
In fact, all but one of the Traditional Authorities in Salima district are males. All the 
village headmen interviewed in this study were also men. It is an exception rather 
than a norm to find female chiefs in Malawi. As a result, all the chiefs sitting in the 
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DCF are male. Although it was beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the 
implications of such a gender imbalance the sheer lack of women representatives 
amongst the chiefs may limit opportunities for women to influence the decisions in 
the DCF.  
 
Chiefs are one of the key actors in the district development planning process at 
various levels in Salima district. Traditional Authorities (TAs) are non-voting 
members of the Council. In the absence of the elected councillors TAs have even a 
bigger role in the District Consultative Forum. At community level, Traditional 
Authorities supervise the Area Development Committees, while Group Village 
Headmen below them supervise the Village Development Committees. The ambiguity 
in the Local Government Act has allowed the chiefs to become leaders of most ADCs 
and VDCs. According to one NGO official:23 
	  
‘..chiefs are monopolizing Area and Village Development Committees and putting in 
their relatives..Traditional Authority Khombedza has put his relatives in the Area 
Development Committee. He even influences Community Based Organisations to 
include his relatives..’ 
Interview, Actionaid official 2, 18 October 2010.  
 
In another Traditional Authority area a Village Headman defined the influence of the 
Traditional Authority and Group Village Headmen as follows: 
‘..In this ADC members include relatives of the Traditional Authority [T/A]. Most of 
the members have been selected from the area of a Group Village Headman related to 
the T/A. It is only the T/A who can fire them…’ 
Interview, Village Headman, T/A Kalonga, 26 July 2010.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Interview, Actionaid official 2, 18 October 2010. 	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In Traditional Ndindi’s area a NICE volunteer claimed that capture of these structure 
by chiefs was due to self-interests:  	  
‘…Chiefs’ relatives are the main actors in the ADC and VDC. For example in Group 
Village Headman [X] and [Y] the chiefs chose their relatives and imposed them on 
the people despite calling for meetings to conduct elections. Only the chiefs have 
powers to fire these members since they selected them. These people [members of 
ADC and VDC] cannot make decisions on their own without input from the chiefs… 
The decisions they make are those of the chiefs…Chiefs are selfish and think about 
what they will benefit…’ 
Interview, NICE Volunteer, T/A Ndindi, 5 March 2011.  	  
The national elites under wa Mutharika have also sought to influence the loyalty of 
chiefs by increasing the Traditional Authorities’ honorariums (allowances) from 
K5,000 to K50,000. This increase was well received by most chiefs.24 On the other 
hand, amendments were also made to the Chiefs Act to give the President more 
powers to promote chiefs and to sanction non-performing chiefs. Given these powers, 
most chiefs are likely to act in ways that please the ruling party and the sitting 
president. As an example of how these powers have been exercised, the UDF 
government promoted TA Ndindi in the district to Senior Chief because he was 
supportive of the ruling party in the district. During that period Traditional Authority 
Ndindi was one of the chiefs that mobilised support for Hon. Uladi Mussa who won a 
parliamentary seat for Salima South constituency on a ruling party ticket.25 The 
promotion of Senior Chief Ndindi came at the expense of TA Kalonga who was the 
most senior chief in the district and hence a favorite to be given the senior position 
amongst chiefs in the district. Under the wa Mutharika administration, which came to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  In all interviews with chiefs they mentioned that the wa Mutharika administration 
was responsive to their needs based on this salary increase. 
25 Interview, former NICE Coordinator, 1 August 2010. 
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power in 2004, there was chieftaincy wrangle for the position of TA Kalonga as 
different family members claimed rights to the title. Government intervened and 
favored one side. Once enthroned the new chief became supportive of the DPP 
regime.26  
	  
As it has already been argued because of the president’s powers to hire or fire chiefs, 
and also based on the incentive of a higher salary many chiefs are under pressure to 
please the centre, and particularly the president. The role of chiefs in politics was 
clearly demonstrated during the succession wrangles that engulfed the then ruling 
DPP. There were tensions in DPP following the move by President wa Mutharika to 
have his brother succeed him as the presidential candidate. Wa Mutharika and other 
ruling party officials used chiefs to garner support for the President’s brother. Chiefs 
were paraded on public media (TV and radio).27 These chiefs spoke in support of the 
candidacy of the President’s brother. Several chiefs in Salima such as TA Kalonga 
also endorsed wa Mutharika’s brother. This clearly demonstrates exercise of 
patronage and clientelism system whereby in return for favors from the big man (‘the 
President’) the chiefs were ready to act in ways that demonstrated support to the 
centre. To secure loyalty of the chiefs the president and other ruling elites also have to 
ensure that rents are transferred to the chiefs, for example the honorarium and 
promotions. In exchange for this loyalty the president can promote chiefs or provide 
other incentives, for example, in the case of Kalonga he was favored in a chieftaincy 
wrangle. Chiefs are ready to support government policy even when they are not the 
experts on the topic. For instance, several chiefs including TA Kalonga came out in 
the open to support the late President’s stand that the local currency should not be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Interview, former Salima AIDS Support Organisation official, 29 June 2011.  27	  It was a common feature during wa Mutharika’s rule, chiefs were interviewed on 
MBC television and radio (state broadcaster). They would express their loyalty and 
support to the President and extend the same to his brother.  
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devalued.28 This loyalty to the centre comes at the expense of accountability to the 
masses.  
	  
Roles such as dispute resolution and custodianship of land also make chiefs very 
powerful individuals in rural communities. Since the one party government, which 
fell in 1993, chiefs have continued to operate as custodians of customary land. In 
Traditional Authority Khombedza a chairperson of one VDC emphasized this role of 
chiefs as custodians of land: 	  
‘..Our Traditional Authority here is very powerful because chiefs are the owners of 
the land, so what they say is final, nobody can change or object to it….’ 
Interview, VDC chairperson, T/A Khombedza, 2 August 2010.  
 
Increasingly, chiefs are also overseeing sale of customary land to middle and upper 
class citizens. This is illegal as no customary land is supposed to be sold or 
transferred to the ownership of people from outside the village. The huge prices 
pegged to land being purchased by outsiders provide a fertile ground for bribes, which 
are benefitting the chiefs.29  
	  
The role of chiefs in dispute resolution goes back to the colonial period when chiefs 
were given the responsibility to hear minor civil cases at community level. During 
both one party state and under the current regime, chiefs have often ‘over-extended’ 
their powers to criminal cases. It is not unheard of in Salima district to find a chief 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 MBC television and radio interviewed chiefs as experts on devaluation and its 
impacts on the people. They all aligned with the former President wa Mutharika who 
refused to devalue the currency.	  	  29	  It is a well known fact in Malawi. Malawians and foreigners with money are 
buying customary land from the poor, and chiefs usually broker these deals.	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dealing with serious cases including rape. During this study one senior chief lightly 
told the researcher that: 
 
‘..I also have female members in the ADC. Otherwise how can I handle rape cases 
when we may be required to see the physical evidence that rape actually occurred…?’ 
Interview, Traditional Authority (T/A) 1, Salima district, 29 October 2010.  
 
Under the Constitution of Malawi chiefs are not allowed to hear criminal cases, and 
especially those that are very serious such as rape. The role of chiefs in such cases 
seems to be accepted locally by communities, and as a result chiefs often deal with a 
number of such serious cases. This example shows that some chiefs have ‘over-
extended’ their informal powers and are carrying out functions that are beyond what 
is formally written down. This is the challenge for decentralisation in Malawi since 
the informal powers and relationships may dominate over any formal arrangements.  
 
The role of the chiefs over dispute resolution at local level is being revisited with the 
passing of the Local Courts Act in 2011. The Local Courts Act transfers the 
responsibility for hearing minor civil and some criminal matters to Local Courts, 
which will be created below the third grade magistrate tier. A Local Court will 
operate at Traditional Authority level. However, there are already a lot of ambiguities 
with respect to the role of chiefs. For instance the new Act is not clear on whether 
chiefs will stop mediating small disputes at community level. Also, the Act calls for 
identification of assessors to sit in the Local Court. The assessors will review 
evidence and make judgments. The Act has stipulated that assessors must have good 
knowledge of customary law of the land. Chiefs are often the ones with excellent 
knowledge of customary law. Hence, it is possible that chiefs might be selected as 
assessors. So far there is no indication as to when the new Local Courts will be 
implemented. Since this requires a lot of resources it may take years before it is 
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implemented. Meanwhile, chiefs may continue to exercise their powers to solve 
disputes locally.  
 
The relationship between chiefs and the centre has given the former more powers 
locally. Chiefs such as Kalonga who had close ties to the wa Mutharika 
administration had more powers in the district in contrast to Traditional Authorities 
from opposition areas.30 Their influence is exercised on the DC who ensures that the 
needs of certain powerful chiefs are taken into consideration. Other powerful chiefs 
that had aligned themselves with the then ruling party in the district include 
Traditional Authorities Kalonga, Khombedza and Kambwiri.31 These chiefs often 
worked with MPs from the ruling party in their areas to lobby the DC and his staff. 
One needs to pay attention to this informal and underground influencing and what 
role it plays in how final and binding decisions are made in the district.  
	  
The loyalty of chiefs to the ruling party is fluid and change based on who is in power 
at the centre. For instance TA Khombedza has been around since the one party era 
(before 1993). He is considered to be quite a difficult and unreasonable chief.32 He 
was very close to the Malawi Congress Party, which ruled the country prior to the 
democratic winds that blew across Malawi in 1993. He switched loyalty to the UDF 
regime between 1994 and 2004. He also established close links with the DPP regime 
under wa Mutharika (2004-2012). Another chief, Senior Chief Ndindi who was once 
a favored chief (under the UDF Government) lost his powers to lobby the council 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Interview, GIZ official, 5 August 2010; Interview, former NICE Coordinator, 1 
August 2010 001/10.  
31 Interview, GIZ official, 5 August 2010; Interview Centre for Human Rights and 
Rehabilitation (CHRR) staff, 30 October 2011.	  	  32	  Interview, Actionaid official, 18 October 2010. Interviewee cited the chief’s 
demands for allowances and personal favours from organisations that want to work in 
his area. 
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secretariat during wa Mutharika’s rule.33 While chiefs aligned with the ruling party 
are more influential in the district, those on the side of the opposition are less 
influential. For instance, Traditional Authorities Kuluunda, Maganga, Kambalame 
and Pemba are considered less powerful by some of the key informants interviewed.34 
Traditional Authorities Pemba and Kambalame are two of the poorest geographical 
areas in the district. One would argue that these areas require some attention to 
address various socio-economic challenges that communities face. However, as it will 
be shown later the allocation of resources is also hugely determined by who has a lot 
of informal influence in the district.  
	  
One characteristic for chiefs who are very active and more influential in the district 
now is that they are relatively young, educated and energetic. These chiefs were 
considered valuable resource by the then ruling party, Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP). In contrast, Senior Chief Ndindi and Traditional Authority Pemba are quite 
old. Pemba has so far refused to select a successor and has put in place his brother as 
acting chief. According to one key informant35 from his area: 
 
‘… the chief is refusing to go because he receives a lot of benefits. He knows that if 
he quits his position all those benefits are gone…’ 
Interview, National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE) Volunteer, 
Traditional Authority Pemba area, 7 July 2011.  
 
 
From both focus group discussions and in-depth interviews corruption and bribe 
taking by chiefs are some of the main problems in the district. This problem cuts 
across both opposition and ruling party areas. Corruption starts with selection of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 In-depth Interview former NICE Coordinator, 1 August 2010.  
34 Interview, ADRA official, 30 July 2010; Interview, Actionaid staff member 2, 18 
October 2010; Interview, GIZ official, 5 August 2010. 	  
35 Interview, NICE Volunteer, TA Pemba area, 7 July 2011.    
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chief’s relatives to be part of Area and Village Development Committees. This 
extends to other areas such as installation of new junior chiefs and selection of 
beneficiaries for development projects. According to one key informant:36 
 
 
‘…there is a lot of corruption here amongst chiefs. They take bribes. When they are 
installing junior chiefs they ask for money from those who are fighting for the 
chieftaincy. If you can pay more than the others then you will become chiefs…in 
food for work programme these chiefs select their relatives to benefit…in TA 
Khombedza one chief connived with government officials to sell chairs and desks 
meant for distribution to several schools…’ 
Interview, former, Salima AIDS Support Organisation (SASO) staff, 29 June 2011.  
 
 
Since 2004, Malawi has been implementing a farm input subsidy programme. This is 
a centrally controlled project. At community level it involves distribution of coupons, 
which targeted households use to procure cheap fertilizer and seeds. Chiefs are quite 
influential in drawing up lists. There have been many reported cases of corruption 
amongst chiefs (MDPC 2009). In several focus group discussions participants pointed 
out that some chiefs choose their relatives to benefit. The involvement of chiefs in 
selecting beneficiaries for various programmes may influence the relationships 
between subjects and their leaders. It is quite obvious that in such a relationship 
downward accountability will be undermined, as subjects prefer to be on the good 
side of chiefs so that they should also benefit from various projects.  
	  
With regard to the relationship between chiefs and local people in the district it was 
found out that chiefs are valued due to their role and also because they stay in the 
same village as their subjects. Chiefs were seen as being ‘very close to the people, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Interview, former SASO staff, 29 June 2011.	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often played a key role in identifying local needs and leading efforts to address 
these’37. On the other hand MPs were nowhere to be seen after elections and this was 
one of the sources of frustration amongst local people. This support for the role of 
chiefs locally might also be the source of power and authority at local level.  	  
Clearly, the incentives faced by chiefs in the district are complex and variable. Chiefs 
are more interested to see investments in their areas. However, the extent to which 
this happens also depends on a number of factors such as who has power to influence 
allocation of resources, and in turn this depends on their relationship with the ruling 
party.  	  
5.3.4 Members of Parliament: Juggling central and local roles 
 
 
As already pointed out there are five constituencies in the district. In the 2009 
presidential and parliamentary elections, MCP and DPP won two parliamentary seats 
each, and the remaining one went to a small party, the Maravi Peoples Party. In most 
of the in-depth interviews and focus group discussions participants mentioned that 
MPs are quite powerful individuals whether they belong to the ruling or opposition 
party. However, MPs are generally absent from the district as the majority of them 
(four out of five) stay outside Salima district. They only visit once in a while. MPs are 
mostly visible during elections when they want to win votes.38 This is when they are 
campaigning. This has led to a lot of resentment from villagers and chiefs who accuse 
the MPs of only needing them when it is time for elections.  	  
As members of the District Consultative Forum MPs have a key role in influencing 
allocation of resources. The nature of politics in the district is largely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Interview, VDC Chairperson, T/A Khombedza, 2 August 2010.  38	  Focus Group Discussion, Village Development Committee (VDC), T/A Pemba 
area, 16 April 2011; FGD, VDC, T/A Kalonga area, 16 April 2011.  
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neopatrimonialism, and MPs are driven by the need to win elections and reward local 
supporters as compared to their role to make laws and check executive accountability. 
MPs, whether from ruling party or opposition, have to make so many promises at 
community level and their chance to win elections depends on how much they can 
promise. In addition to public goods such as development projects MPs find 
themselves also promising personal goods and services such as provision of coffins 
and other forms of support at funerals, weddings, and other functions. The role of 
MPs in local development projects may put them on a direct collusion course with 
councillors should local government elections happen anytime soon. It might also 
explain why there were a lot of conflicts between councillors and MPs between 2000 
and 2005 when elected representatives were in place.39  
	  
At constituency level, MPs co-opt chiefs to push for an agenda that will serve their 
interests. MPs and chiefs engage in informal influencing of the DC and other council 
staff. One chief has described this as follows: 
 
‘..in each constituency here MPs and chiefs tend to discuss and agree on what to say 
before they go to the boma [district headquarters]. Once they get there they will speak 
with one voice and will not contradict each other…’ 
Interview, Traditional Authority 1, Salima district, 29 October 2010.  
 
 
In some communities chiefs were also seen as advisors to MPs on development issues 
affecting an area: 
‘Chiefs give guidance and advice to MPs on development issues affecting our 
villages. It does not matter whether this is a ruling MP or not. In our case we have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Chinsinga (2007). In his study he reported a lot of tensions between Councillors 
and MPs during the period between 2000 and 2005. 
	   238	  
never had a ruling party MP, but our MP works together with chiefs in 
development…’ 
Focus Group Discussion, Area Development Committee (ADC), T/A3, 15 
August 2010.  
 
Although in general all MPs were quite influential, ruling party [DPP] MPs had more 
authority in the district. This is regardless of the fact that the then ruling party MPs 
were a minority (40% of all MPs) in the district.  The ruling party machinery in the 
district through the District Governor often met with the District Commissioner to 
discuss development projects.40 This is part of the informal influencing to ensure that 
DPP areas benefitted from the little resources that found their way to the districts. 
This situation is no different from what was happening between 2000 and 2005 when 
the district had councillors. During this period MCP had more MPs than the then 
ruling party, the United Democratic Front. Yet, despite this majority, the single UDF 
(and then later DPP) MP who also worked as a government minister had more 
authority over how resources were allocated.41 It was during this period that the 
constituency of Uladi Mussa benefitted most from various development projects.42 In 
2012 Mussa quit his party and joined the new ruling party, Peoples Party. He is 
currently serving as the Minister of Home Affairs in the Joyce Banda administration. 
	  
Generally all MPs in the district are keen to show support to their leaders at the 
centre. For instance, between 2009 and 2012 opposition party MPs in the district were 
in the lead to lobby for local government elections to be held.43 This was a line towed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Interview, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) member, 4 May 2011.  
41 Interview, former NICE Coordinator, 1 August 2010.  
42 Interview, former NICE Coordinator, 1 August 2010; Interview, former United 
Democratic Front (UDF) councillor, 4 May 2011.	  	  43	  Interview, Opposition MP, Salima, 8 May 2011; Interview, Senior official- Salima 
Council Secretariat, 8 September 2010.  
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by their leaders at national level. On the other hand, ruling party MPs took a cue from 
the President and were more cautious in their statements.  
 
 
MPs rarely attended DCF meetings in the district. The pattern was the same for both 
ruling party and opposition party MPs.44 They would only attend meetings where they 
had some interests, for example when the council secretariat was sharing information 
on allocation of development projects. All the chiefs interviewed in this study also 
complained that MPs were only available during campaign periods when they 
required votes.  
 
‘…they only need us during elections. We help them to get votes. After that they 
don’t show up here frequently..’ 
 Interview, Group Village Headman, T/A Pemba, 7 May 2011.  
 
Once they were voted into power MPs tended to disappear from the district: 	  	  
‘MPs are only in good relationship with chiefs during elections. This happens. It does 
not matter whether this is a ruling party MP or not…Once elections are over they 
[MPs] are nowhere to be seen..’ 
Interview, VDC chairperson, T/A Khombedza, 2 August 2010.  	  
On their part MPs claimed that they were busy with their legislative roles at national 
level.45 However, from both FGDs and in-depth interviews the MPs roles were 
considered to be delivering development projects at local level. In all interviews, no 
mention was made of the duties of MPs to legislate and provide oversight of the 
executive. This might explain why MPs try to influence development projects locally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Interview, Senior official- Salima Council secretariat, 8 September 2010; Interview, 
T/A 1, Salima, 29 October 2010; Interview, T/A 2, 30 October 2010.  
45 Interview, Opposition party MP, 8 May 2011; Interview, DPP MP, 8 May 2011.	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because they are responding to local expectations.  Chiefs interviewed in this study 
acknowledged that they worked together with MPs to lobby the DC and other sector 
staff to allocate projects in their areas.46  
	  
In general, the two DPP MPs in the district had an important informal influence on 
decisions in the district and beyond. This is in contrast to the other three opposition 
MPs who had limited informal influence over the decisions of the Council. The 
District Commissioner and his staff were able to stand up to less influential MPs 
particularly those from opposition parties.  A council employee claimed that there 
were no serious consequences on the DC or his staff if the opposition MPs were not 
listened to in the making of key decisions.47 On the other hand MPs (and chiefs) with 
links to the ruling party elites could extend their informal influence by also going to 
the centre if they felt the district bureaucrats were not responsive to their interests.48 
Such powers undermined the possibility that the local councils (even when 
councillors return) could make decisions on the basis of locally determined priorities. 
All the five MPs in the district were also influential because they controlled the 
Constituency Development Fund, one of the largest sources of non-sector tied funding 
in the district.  
 
As pointed out earlier, there was a clear misunderstanding of the role of MPs in the 
district. In the majority of FGD interviews and during interviews with chiefs, 
participants saw the role of the MPs as that of identifying local needs and channeling 
these to local council for action. The MPs role to legislate at national level was not 
identified as their major function. This might be a source of problems since it heaps 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Interview, T/A 1, Salima, 29 October 2010; Interview T/A 2, Salima, 30 October 
2010; Interview, Group Village Headman, T/A Khombedza, 5 May 2011.  
47 Interview, Salima District Council Secretariat staff member, 3 September 2010.  
48 Interview, GIZ official, Salima, 5 August 2010; Interview, ADRA official, 30 July 
2010.	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demands on MPs to act and bring tangible projects to their areas. With limited 
resources available in the district this comes down to who has influence.  
	  	  
5.3.5 Non-Governmental Organisations 
 
 
Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) play a big role in implementation of 
development projects in the district. NGOs were represented in both the District 
Consultative Forum and the District Executive Committee. NGOs in the district vary 
in size and scope of work. They range from very small community based groups 
operating in one group village headman to large NGOs that serve one or several 
Traditional Authorities. Large NGOs also vary between local and international ones.  
The scope of activities also varied from those engaging in social sectors such as 
health and education to those working to strengthen local governance structures in the 
district. The extent to which an NGO is influential in the district seems to depend on 
the size of the organisation. For instance, in this study it was noted that International 
Non Governmental Organisations (INGOs) were more influential and were more 
likely to sit in the District Executive Committee than the local NGOs or the small 
CBOs. The INGO representatives tend to be more educated and therefore spoke more 
in the DCF and DEC meetings as compared to representatives from local NGOs who 
were quiet.49  
 
The council secretariat has put in place guidelines to promote accountability of NGOs 
in the district. One requirement is that NGOs must provide reports of what they are 
doing in the district. The guidelines are not mandatory, and some NGOs have ignored 
calls from the secretariat to submit reports. Even if they were to report to the 
secretariat there is little that the secretariat can do to influence the activities of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Interview, ADRA official, 30 July 2010.	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particular organization as most NGOs come to the district with already pre-conceived 
projects. Out of all the NGOs that were interviewed in this study none had developed 
a project based on the District Development Plan (DDP), which is the key planning 
document for all development activities to be implemented in the district.50 It should 
be noted that there are few NGOs that are sharing plans and budgets with the district. 
For instance, Actionaid, one of the large International NGOs working in the district, 
shares its budgets and annual plans regularly with the council secretariat. The study 
was not able to find out how the council secretariat uses this information other than 
for mere information sharing on what everyone is doing in the district.  
	  
To promote coordination amongst various NGOs in the district, some NGOs in the 
district formed an NGO forum in 2009. The Forum is made up of 25 members, and 
these are largely NGOs with headquarters in Lilongwe or Blantyre (the main cities in 
Malawi). The membership of the Forum is divided into four thematic areas as 
follows; HIV and AIDS, food security, gender, and governance. The Forum signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the council secretariat in 2009 on how to engage 
with each other. The Forum also arbitrates in conflicts between the council and a 
particular NGO. A rotational chair that serves two years heads the Forum. NGOs have 
used this Forum to agree on common positions to be advanced during the DEC 
meetings. On the part of the NGOs, this has helped to ensure consistency amongst 
various NGOs during such meetings. It appears that the Forum has also been 
beneficial in addressing the allowance culture in dealing with government officials in 
the district.51 Previously each NGO calling for a meeting to introduce or share 
progress on a project with the District Executive Committee was required to pay 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Interview, CARE official, 3 September 2010; Interview, ADRA official, 30 July 
2010; Interview, Actionaid official 2, 18 October 2010.  
51 Interview, Actionaid official 2, 18 October 2010.	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allowances to all members of the committee. Since the birth of the Forum members 
have agreed to jointly organise such meetings and therefore cut the number of times 
allowances are paid.  
 
The solidarity amongst members to come up with common positions makes the 
Forum a powerful entity in its engagement with the council secretariat. If this 
influence is not used well these NGOs may just be advancing the position of their 
headquarters. For instance, council staff complained that the NGOs often came to the 
district with their own pre-determined projects rather than discussing with the district 
on the local priorities that needed to be addressed. The engagement between the 
NGOs and the district was more along the lines of where projects should be located 
rather than what they should focus on and how they should be implemented.52 Since 
the majority of these NGOs use donor funds it is quite possible that the need to 
deliver results within a specified time often drove them to bypass the normal 
workings of the decentralised process. Some NGOs complained that the decentralised 
structures were not working well and thus circumventing them allowed the NGOs to 
deliver on their objectives.53  
 
This emphasis on efficient service delivery has led to proliferation of many NGO 
committees that undermine the decentralised structures. Between 2010 and 2011, the 
Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR), a local Non Governmental 
Organization (NGO) implemented a democracy consolidation programme targeting 
all Traditional Authorities in the district. The project was aimed at mobilising 
individuals at community level to demand development projects from their leaders, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Interview, Senior staff- Salima District Council Secretariat, 8 September 2010.   
53 Interview, Actionaid official, Salima, 18 October 2010. 	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and also to hold leaders to account for full completion of projects.54 The model for 
this programme was the creation of Village Rights Committees (VRCs) at Group 
Village Headman level. There were 152 VRCs located in all ten Traditional 
Authorities in the District. The VRCs served as bodies for identifying needs and 
channeling these to Local Councils through the VDCs and ADCs. They were 
expected to serve as mechanisms for holding service providers to account. For 
example, they could monitor the activities of the ADC and VDC from their area. 
According to an official in the programme: 
 
‘VRCs are important because they come up with key issues on development, and 
these are turned into action plans. Members of the VRC then co-opt a representative 
from ADC and VDC from their area, and together they present issues to the Council 
Secretariat..’ 
Interview, Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR) Official, 30 
October 2011. 
 
As a parallel structure the VRCs have added another layer on the structures for 
planning at district level. The VRC seems to serve the same purpose as the VDC at 
the same level. It can potentially create conflicts between these two committees. 
There are also other problems with the VRCs. The members of VRCs were selected in 
consultation with the chiefs. As such chiefs also had influence over who sat in these 
committees. 55  This means that these committees were not spared the informal 
influence of chiefs and thus may not have been the representative bodies that the 
project sought to create. Furthermore, the project had a very short life span,56 and 
there was no clear strategy in terms of sustainability of these committees. In this case, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  	  Interview, CHRR official, 30 October 2011.  
55 Interview, CHRR official, 30 October 2011. 
56 The funding was for a period of one year, ending in 2011. After that the project will 
move on to another theme which may require new structures.	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it is quite possible that such committees might cease to exist after the end of the 
project, as is the case with other committees, which are seen as ‘project committees’ 
rather than as part of the decentralised structure.  
 
The VRC is an example of structures created by NGOs supposedly to bypass the 
formal decentralised structures. Other NGOs that have created their own structures in 
the district include ADRA, CARE and Actionaid. ADRA works through a project 
committee that oversees implementation of activities in several villages while CARE 
has created umbrella committees at village level.57  
 
NGOs have argued that they sometimes have to create their own structures due to the 
problems that they face when they try to work with the formal decentralised 
structures. One NGO, Actionaid has tried to work through Village Development 
Committees (VDCs) and found these lacking in accountability to villagers: 
 
 
‘..we tried working with VDCs and these were not accountable. We were concerned 
because our support was not getting to the beneficiaries. We then made a decision to 
bypass decentralised structures and work directly with community based 
organisations.. we expect these CBOs to work with VDCs..’ 
Interview, Actionaid official 2, Salima, 18 October 2010.   
 
 
The quote from an Actionaid official demonstrates the frustration that some of the 
NGOs in the district have in trying to work with these decentralised structures. Their 
solution to achieving efficiency is to create more committees that bypass the formal 
decentralised structures. This increased emphasis on efficiency by donors mean 
NGOs and INGOs are forced to undertake actions that undermine donor supported 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Interview, CARE official, 3 September 2010; Interview, ADRA official, 30 July 
2010.	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policies on decentralisation. Instead of working to strengthen the existing structures, 
NGOs form their own committees, and in so doing subverts decentralisation. This 
makes it difficult for local people and their representatives to influence decisions 
around resource allocation, and leaves NGOs to make decisions, often with inputs 
from their headquarters, which are far removed from the local scene. As a result, it is 
harder (almost impossible) for local communities to hold NGOs accountable for 
delivery of services that address local priorities. Therefore, donors and NGOs just like 
the state are guilty of undermining decentralisation.  
 
The evidence gathered through interviews also suggest that some NGOs can advance 
their self interests such as barring other NGOs from working in areas where they are 
based to minimise duplication and perhaps to avoid competition. For example, one 
organization based in Nkhotakota, the Nkhotakota AIDS Support Organization was 
denied access to work in the district because NGO representatives argued that there 
were already other organisations during similar work in the district. 
 
 
‘The NGO representatives ganged up and said that this organization should not come 
to the district. Instead NASO [Nkhotakota AIDS Support Organization] should 
provide funds to other NGOs in the district who would implement the project. 
Currently we don’t know whether the NASO people will come back..’ 
Interview, former SASO official, 29 June 2011. 
 
The NASO example demonstrates how NGOs using their one voice can influence 
certain decisions particularly those that are related to the operations of other NGOs.  
 
From this study, NGOs were a viable source of financing for various development 
projects at the district level. Large NGOs were easily accommodated in the DEC, and 
they also had an NGO representation in the DCF. However, other than the fact that 
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NGO representatives were able to speak openly without fear of being sanctioned 
within these committees, there was little evidence that NGOs do influence allocation 
of resources. 
5.4 Central Transfers on the up, but little control locally: The national 
picture 
	  	  
Democratic decentralisation in Malawi has been accompanied by an increase in the 
amount of financial resources transferred from the centre to the local councils. 
However, a detailed observation shows that this increase has not translated into 
meaningful control by local councils over their budgets and development plans.  
 
Between 2004 and 2012, central transfers increased significantly and constituted a 
large proportion of all funds available to local councils. These central transfers 
accounted for over 90% of all the resources that are used by the district.58 The central 
transfers include sector funds to departments/ sectors, the infrastructure development 
fund, constituency development fund and the general resource fund. Out of these 
categories only the general resource fund (GRF) is an unconditional grant, which the 
local councils can use to respond to locally determined needs. The sector funds, which 
represent a significant part of central transfers, are conditional grants with already 
earmarked priorities.  
 
Graph one below shows the increase in the total amount of central transfers to local 
councils from 2006 to 2011. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Based on the figures from the council budgets in the National Local Government 
Finance Committee Budgets reviewed in this study.	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Source: National Local Government Finance Committee (NLGFC) Budget Estimates, 
2006-2011 
 
Despite the increase shown in the graph above the central government has still fallen 
short of the commitment made in 2002. In that year, the Muluzi regime endorsed a 
plan that 5% of National Net Revenue would be allocated to the General Resource 
Fund, with an additional 15% for Health and 9% for Education.59 This meant that at 
least 29% of the National Net Revenue was committed to Local Councils. Chiweza 
(2010:34) has argued that for most part the allocations from central government have 
been less than 1%. A key informant at the National Local Government Finance 
Committee (NLGFC), a government body, which is responsible for budgets and 
expenditure monitoring for Local Councils, put it this way: 
 
‘..The Government has not yet met its commitment to allocate 5% of all domestic 
revenues to Local Councils. Right now we are still at less than 1%...’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Interview, National Local Government Finance Committee staff member, 2 
September 2011.	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Interview, National Local Government Finance Committee 
(NLGFC) staff member, 2 September 2011.  
 
As it has already been pointed out, the bulk of the resources transferred from the 
centre are for conditional grants in the form of sector funds. Only the general resource 
fund (GRF), infrastructure development fund, and constituency fund can support 
activities, which are determined locally. However, as it will be shown later there are 
also limitations with the use of constituency development funds (CDF). Although the 
GRF represents a viable opportunity for Local Councils to fund local development 
activities, there has been limited commitment from central government to put in more 
resources as evidenced by the slow trends in the funds that flow through the GRF. 
Graph two below compares the GRF resources to overall funds available to local 
councils.  
 
Source: NLGFC Budget Estimates for Local Authorities, 2006-2009 
 
Graph two above shows that the GRF constitute a very small proportion of funds that 
flow to local councils. The graph also shows that between 2006 and 2009 the GRF 
has remained about the same. The infrastructure development fund, which only 
supports projects in urban councils, is not accessible to rural councils such as Salima 
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district. In general, most rural councils rely heavily on earmarked funds from the 
centre.  
 
Locally generated revenues provide an additional source of funds to local councils. In 
contrast to central transfers particularly sector funds, locally generated revenue can be 
used to support locally determined priorities. The general trend with these revenues is 
an upward one. However they still remain a small percentage of total funds available 
to local councils. In 2006/07, the locally generated revenue estimates for all councils 
in Malawi were at K2.6 billion, representing 37% of the budget.60 In 2009/10 the 
revenue estimates were pegged at K6 billion. This is 43% of the total budget. As the 
case with Salima will show these budget estimates vary with the actual collections. In 
the 2007/08 budget about 75% of the projected locally generated revenue was 
collected.61 The bulk of this revenue collection is in cities, which seem to perform 
much better than district councils due to the obvious reasons that there are diverse 
sources of revenue in cities. The graph three below provides comparison on locally 
generated revenues between cities and districts in Malawi.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Malawi National Local Government Finance Committee (NLGFC) Budget 
Estimates for Local Authorities, 2006/07. 
61 NLGFC Budget Estimates for Local Authorities, 2009/10.	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Source: NLGFC Budget Estimates for Local Authorities 2009/10 
 
Graph three above shows that the four cities in Malawi combined collected 82% of 
the total locally generated revenue in contrast to twenty-eight district councils, which 
only accounted for 11% of the revenue. This means that although the overall 
projections for locally generated revenue are very high, in practice this is limited to 
few cities that collect a large proportion of the funds. On average each of the 28 
districts collects $22,000 per year in locally generated revenue in contrast to the cities 
where the average is in excess of $1 million per year. At is will be shown in the case 
of Salima such locally generated revenue and the GRF are mostly used to supplement 
the recurrent costs of the districts.  
 
 
5.4.1 Comparing Salima to the national trends on financial transfers 
 
This section provides a detailed examination of the financial resources available in 
Salima and how the district compares with the national picture discussed above. The 
overall picture is that the district relies heavily on central transfers, which constitute 
all the elements discussed above: GRF, constituency development fund and sector 
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funds. Graph four below shows the increasing trend in central transfers to Salima 
district.  
 
Source: NLGFC Budget Estimates for Local Authorities, 2006-2011 
 
As this graph shows, central transfers have been on the increase and sector funds 
represent a significant proportion of these. Between 2005 and 2008 sector funds have 
accounted for approximately 86% of all the central transfers to Salima district. The 
remaining 14% was split across GRF, CDF, chiefs’ honorarium, salary subsidies and 
locally generated revenue. In the 2005/06 fiscal year, the GRF represented only 6.5% 
of the total revenue for the district. Between 2006 and 2008 the proportion of GRF to 
the total budget went down to about 4%. The CDF, which is one of the opportunities 
for supporting local needs at constituency level, only represent a small percentage of 
the budget. Between 2006 and 2008 the CDF only accounted for 4-5% of the local 
council budget. Graph five below compares the various sources of revenue available 
for the district: 
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Source: NLGFC Budget Estimates for Local Authorities, 2006-2009 
 
The graph above shows that while sector funds have been increasing the GRF has 
remained low, and the locally generated revenues are almost insignificant. This 
presents a challenge to the council since the sector funds, as conditional grants, are for 
earmarked priorities determined by the centre. Because sectoral priorities are 
approved centrally it can be argued that the centre directly controls at least 86% of all 
funds that flow to the district. The district is only in control of the GRF and locally 
generated revenue, which between 2006 and 2008 have accounted for between 4.5-
8.5% of the total budget.62  
 
Worse still while the sectoral funds represent a significant percentage of resources to 
the district, most of these funds are used to meet recurrent costs such as internal 
travel, maintenance of public utilities, office supplies, purchase of medical supplies 
and drugs, formation and maintenance of capital assets, rent, and maintenance of 
motor vehicles. In the 2005/2006 local council budget, other recurrent transactions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  National Local Government Finance Committee (NLGFC) Budget Estimates for 
Local Authorities, 2006-2011.	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(ORT) and local salaries amounted to K137,109,75363. This represents 99% of all the 
revenues available to the district council including GRF and locally generated 
revenue. Between 2006 and 2009, approximately 95% of the funds available to the 
district have gone towards ORT and settling local salaries. This suggests that the 
district has to use the locally generated revenue to meet the shortfalls in ORT and 
local salaries. Graph six below shows the comparison between ORT/ local salaries 
and the total revenue comprising of locally generated revenue and central transfers.  
 
Source: NLGFC Budget Estimates for Local Authorities, 2006-2009 
 
As this graph shows the council has very little funds remaining after settling ORT and 
local salaries. This compromises the ability of the council to support development 
activities, supervision and monitoring of sub district activities.64 So while on one hand 
the central government appears to be transferring more funds to the district on the 
other hand it is still starving local councils, which have very little resources to 
respond to locally determined priorities.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  NLGFC Budget Estimates for Local Authorities, 2006/07 revised and 2007/08. 
64 Interview, Salima District Council Secretariat staff member 3, 21 December 2010.	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5.4.2 The Constituency Development Fund: Opportunity for local 
projects, or pocket money for MPs? 
 
Constituency Development Fund (CDF) is one of the mechanisms that have been put 
in place to support local development activities at constituency level. The CDF is part 
of the central transfers and is open to support development activities, which 
supposedly should emanate from consultations with citizens within a particular 
constituency. In 2006/07, K10 million was allocated for CDF in the district and this 
represented 4% of the total revenue. In 2007/08 and 2008/09 the figure went up to 
about 5%.  
 
Under the CDF, each Member of Parliament (MP) received a fixed amount of money. 
In 2006/07 this figure was K2 million per MP. By 2008/09, this had gone up to K3 
million. The MP, in liaison with a constituency project management committee 
decides on the priorities to support. However, in practice there are questions over the 
participation of local people in making decisions on CDF. These issues are discussed 
later. Although the MP and the committee have powers to decide, the district council 
secretariat has been given authority to ensure prudent management of resources. To 
this effect the secretariat is responsible for disbursing the funds as well as ensuring 
that there is transparency and accountability in how these resources are used.  
 
Since these funds are to be used in specific constituencies they cannot be counted as 
part of the resource envelope to support the priorities determined by the district. 
Instead, the efficient and effective use of these resources depends on the intentions of 
individual MPs.65 A major challenge in use of these funds is that MPs can either use 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Interview, Senior official- Salima District Council Secretariat, 8 September 2010.	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them for their own personal interests or to reward their supporters for their support.66 
During the period of this study, the Members of Parliament in Malawi have been 
pushing for an increase in the allocations for the Constituency Development Funds 
(CDF). A detailed analysis of how the constituency development funds work has been 
provided in the later sections of this chapter.  
	  
5.4.3 Locally Generated Revenue: No magic bullet 
 
Given that a large proportion of central transfers is already earmarked for ORT and 
salaries locally generated revenue can provide room for councils to maneuvre and 
focus on their priorities. In Salima, this revenue is generated largely from market fees 
as well as other fees and service charges. However, locally generated revenue is too 
small and is often allocated towards filling the gaps left by the central transfers. For 
instance it is used to supplement staff salaries particularly for locally employed staff 
in the district67. Graph seven below shows the comparison between locally generated 
revenue and central transfers. 
 
 
Source: NLGFC Budget Estimates for Local Authorities, 2006-2009 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  This is discussed in the subsequent sections which demonstrate how CDF has been 
used in some constituencies. 
67 Interview, Senior official- Salima District Council Secretariat, 8 September 2010.	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The graph above shows that although central transfers to the district have been 
increasing the trend for locally generated revenue is disappointing. In the 2005/06 
budget locally generated revenue (LGR) represented 2% of the budget. In 2006/07 
and 2007/08 LGR went down to 1%. Graph eight below compare the trends in LGR 
between 2005/06 and 2007/08. 
                    
Source: NLGFC Budget Estimates for Local Authorities, 2005-2008 
 
The district has failed to make significant inroads to increase the proportion of locally 
generated revenue to fund the overall budget. This leaves the district to rely on the 
centre for support, and thus more prone to influencing in terms of earmarked priorities 
of the centre.  
 
During the period under study two Councils, Salima Town Council and Salima 
District Council have merged into once council. One of the immediate implications is 
that the locally generated revenue might increase due to fees and rents from 
commercial buildings, markets, and bus terminals that previously were in the town 
council. For example, the estimates in the 2010/11 budget for the integrated council 
put the local revenue figures at MK57,216,010.00, which is 11.6% of the total 
revenue estimate for the same period covering both local revenue and central 
transfers. This is significant increase from roughly 1.27% in 2009/10 district budget. 
It would be interesting to examine how the council will handle the new injection of 
2005/06	  
Local	  Revenue	  Central	  Transfers	  
2007/08	  
Local	  Revenue	  Central	  Transfers	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resources in a few years time. However, because this has just happened it is beyond 
the scope of this study to examine its impact on local allocations of resources for 
development. The large increase in the proportion of locally generated revenue as a 
result of this merger of two councils may suggest that urban councils in Malawi are in 
a better position than district/ rural councils to mobilise local resources. However, this 
does not guarantee that the local resources will be used according to priorities set 
locally.  
 
5.4.4 Local Development Fund: Opportunity for locally determined priorities? 
 
As has been shown above, central transfers and locally generated revenue provide 
very little room for the council to support locally determined development priorities. 
The creation of the Local Development Fund (LDF), which is a central financing 
mechanism, provides opportunities for councils to respond to locally determined 
needs. The origins and nature of the LDF have been discussed in chapter three. This 
section focuses on analyzing the resources channeled through the LDF to Salima 
district. As previously discussed, the LDF consists of several funding windows that 
Local Councils can access.  
 
Two windows are of significant interest with respect to Salima district, as well as 
other districts in Malawi, and these are: the urban window, and the community 
window. Since these windows have been described in detail in chapter two in this 
section a short recap is provided with the aim of helping to build an understanding of 
how the LDF works at district level. The urban window funds projects that address 
urban challenges such as infrastructure and provision of public services such as water, 
waste management, and other types of projects. Currently Salima district has not yet 
submitted any proposals for the urban window. The community window on the other 
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hand funds projects, which are decided upon locally by communities. Part of the 
community window also supports cash transfer schemes (cash for work) primarily 
through the public works programme, which is aimed at renovating basic 
infrastructure such as unpaved roads.  
 
In a district where the majority of central transfers are for ORT expenditure, the LDF 
provides a major mechanism to implement locally determined priorities. However, the 
challenges alluded to in the discussion on LDF in chapter three, primarily on the 
earmarking of a large proportion of the funds, also mean that there is little room for 
the district council to maneuver. For instance, since 2009 a large proportion of the 
funds has been used to construct teachers houses. This follows a directive by the 
former Minister of Finance, Goodall Gondwe68. The implication is that although the 
district might have its own local priorities they have to implement the LDF 
community window as per the directives that come from the centre.  
 
Table 6 below shows the LDF community window allocation by sub window for the 
district for the past two years in Malawi Kwacha (MK).  
 
Sub-Window 2010 2011 
Community Open Window MK15,138,079.00 MK7,093,104.00 
Teacher Houses MK60,948,068.00 MK40,524,824.00 
Public Works MK16,772,454.40 0 
Total MK92,858,601.40 MK47,617,928.00 
Source: NLGFC 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 
 
In the table above, the primary teachers’ houses account for 66% of the LDF 
community window resources allocated to the district in 2010. In the following year, 
2011, teachers’ houses were 85% of the LDF resources for the community window. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Ministerial directive led to allocation of a percentage of funds for the community 
window towards constructing teachers houses and school blocks. 
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This is not to say that teachers’ houses are not a need. However, by earmarking funds 
the centre has taken away the ability of the district to determine its own priorities and 
to allocate resources based on these. It suggests the centralisation of development 
projects by the centre with the periphery being seen as delivery mechanisms rather 
than decision-making units. Such centralised tendencies undermine the possibility that 
the district can operate in ways that serve locally determined needs.  
	  
Graph nine below provides a comparison between the different windows for the two 
years that the LDF has been in operation.  
 
 
 
The limited powers of the district to decide are clearly evident with regard to 
teachers’ houses whereby district officials can only control where these houses should 
be built. As will be discussed in the subsequent sections of this chapter, even this 
decision making process is determined by who has both formal and informal 
influence locally and this is often based on connections to the ruling party elites at the 
centre.  
5.5 Politics of resource allocation in the district 
This section examines the politics of resource allocation with respect to the Local 
Development Fund (LDF), the Constituency Development Fund (CDF), centrally 
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driven development projects, and NGO development activities in the district. As it has 
been argued in the earlier sections of this chapter, the DCF, which is the highest 
oversight body in the district, lacks powers to make decisions. Two factors contribute 
to this. First, the DCF has no legal mandate to make binding decisions since it is a 
consultative body constituted as a temporary solution in the absence of a formal 
council. Secondly, as will be re-emphasised in this section most of the decisions over 
allocation of resources are based on informal influencing which goes beyond the 
DCF. In fact, in the majority of cases the DCF rarely makes significant changes to the 
proposals, which are brought by the DC and his staff.69  
 
Evidence collected through key informants and focus group discussions (FGDs) 
suggest that allocation of LDF resources in the DCF is not based on needs. During the 
period between 2009 and 2012, the pattern of resource allocation was consistently 
linked with areas where there were ruling party (DPP) MPs, and powerful Traditional 
Authorities such as Kalonga, Khombedza and Kambwiri who also had strong links to 
the ruling party.70 The pattern in recommendations made by the DEC suggests that the 
District Council civil servants tried to please these powerful chiefs and ruling party 
MPs. Some of the chiefs, for example TA Kambwiri, have had huge influence even 
on NGO activities in the district. TA Kambwiri has exercised his influence in the 
NGO Forum. One NGO representative put it this way: 
 
 
‘..Traditional Authority Kambwiri can come to our NGO Forum to speak to members 
and lobby for support for his area. These chiefs can be quite influential..They can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Interview, Salima District Council Secretariat staff 2, 5 September 2010; Interview, 
ADRA official, 30 July 2010.  
70 Interview, former NICE Coordinator, 1 August 2010; Interview, NICE Volunteer, 
T/A Kalonga, 16 May 2011; Interview, NICE Volunteer, T/A Khombedza, 16 May 
2011; Interview, Local NGO representative and member of District Executive 
Committee, 18 May 2011.	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even go on public radio to talk about their needs…It is these vibrant chiefs who are 
getting most of the LDF resources here…weak chiefs such as Pemba, Kuluunda and 
Ndindi have no influence here’ 
Interview, ADRA Official, 30 July 2010.  
	  
Generally, chiefs are seen as powerful gatekeepers at community level and they play a 
key role in endorsing NGO projects to operate in their areas. Any NGO seeking to 
work in in a particular community had to first of all seek permission from chiefs. In 
fact, NGOs were not allowed to talk or reach out to local people unless the chiefs 
were consulted. In T/A Ndindi’s area the process was described as follows: 	  
‘The NGOs that are interested to work here first talk to the chiefs and then to the 
general public sensitizing them on their programmes. It is only after this that the 
NGOs can form their committees while other select volunteers to work with them 
with the involvement of chiefs’. 
Interview, Village Headman, T/A Kalonga, 2 May 2011. 	  
During discussions in the DCF more influential MPs and chiefs in the district were 
easily considered when it came to allocation of resources. One of the influential chiefs 
interviewed during this study claimed that some of the chiefs who were not 
benefitting from various projects were often quiet during meetings.  
 
‘..How can you benefit when you just sit and don’t talk? In every meeting I try to talk 
about the needs of my subjects. If it requires me to go to the DC I go, If I have to go 
to the (District) Education Manager to get something I go….’ 
Interview, Traditional Authority 2, Salima, 30 October 2010.  
 
A women’s group interviewed in this study claimed that chiefs had a lot of influence 
over allocation of projects in the district: 
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‘The T/A [Traditional Authority] here has a lot of influence over allocation of 
projects and resources. You can see in this area each year that [the distribution of] 
fertiliser coupons concentrate at T/A headquarters. Who can stand up to the T/A in 
this area? Nobody can say no to what he says…’ 
Focus Group Discussion, Mambo Women’s Group, 15 August 2010. 
 
The constituency of Uladi Mussa provides a good case study to examine the benefits 
that come with being close to the ruling party. When Uladi Mussa was part of UDF 
and DPP governments the Salima South constituency received a lot of government 
development projects.71 His constituency is considered by many people in the district 
to be better off than other areas. 	  
‘Uladi Mussa… a single UDF MP [ruling party] had a lot of influence on the district 
council, for example, in the elevation of chiefs….Uladi Mussa also made sure that the 
starter packs [fertiliser and seed] were concentration in UDF areas’ 
Interview with NICE official, 12 November 2010.  	  
 However, when Uladi Mussa fell out of favor with the DPP Government in 2009 he 
lost his powers to influence projects both centrally (national level) and in the district. 
Some of the chiefs who had aligned themselves with him also lost their authority, for 
example Senior Chief Ndindi who was promoted during the period when UDF was in 
Government (1994-2004). Between 1994 and 2004, Chief Ndindi was one of the 
powerful chiefs in the district and was feared by council secretariat staff72. He lost his 
powers in the district due to his continued links with Uladi Mussa, an opposition party 
MP73.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Interview, former NICE Coordinator, 1 August 2010.  72	  Interview, GIZ official, Salima, 5 August 2010; Interview, former NICE 
Coordinator, 1 August 2010.   
73 Interview, former NICE Coordinator, 1 August 2010.  
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In 2012, Uladi Mussa joined the new ruling Peoples Party. It is yet to be seen how this 
might influence the power dynamics of the chiefs who are associated with him. 
However, during the period between 2005 and 2012 some chiefs who were well 
connected politically to the then ruling party, DPP, for example Kalonga, Khombedza 
and Kambwiri have had more informal influence over the DC on how decisions were 
made on various projects.74  On the other hand, Traditional Authorities Pemba, 
Kuluunda and Maganga who were all from opposition constituencies then were 
labeled as difficult to work with and therefore not deserving of any favors.75  
 
Members of Parliament and the Traditional Authorities from their constituencies often 
sit together and agree on what to present to the district when it comes to the decisions 
in the DCF.76 This should not be surprising given that they both have interest to see 
development projects come to their areas. The more ‘tangible’ developments that they 
can bring, the more popular they become amongst the local communities. Since chiefs 
stay within the local communities, and MPs have interest to be voted back in power, 
the support of the local communities is sought by both actors, and thus they often 
work together and agree on what priorities should be pursued in the district.  
 
Both MPs (both opposition and ruling party) and chiefs try to influence decisions 
made in the district by directly engaging with the District Commissioner and Director 
of Planning and Development before they go for the DCF meetings.77 This informal 
influencing is not seen during the DCF meetings. Perhaps this is why very few 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Interview, former NICE Coordinator, 1 August 2010; Interview, Salima District 
Council Secretariat staff 2, 5 September 2010.  
75 Interview, Senior official- Salima District Council Secretariat, 8 September 2010; 
Interview, CHRR official, 30 October 2011.  
76 Interview, opposition MP, 8 May 2011; Interview, DPP MP, 8 May 2011; 
Interview, T/A 1, 29 October 2010.	  	  77	  Interview, ADRA Official, 30 July 2010; Interview, Salima District Council 
Secretariat Staff 2, 5 September 2010.  
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changes are made on the proposals from the office of the District Commissioner 
because most of the powerful actors would already have known that they would be 
favored in the allocation of resources. Therefore, decisions are not being made in the 
formal decision making arenas. This can undermine the decentralisation process in 
Malawi, which presumably is expected to lead to more responsiveness by councils. 
According to one key informant: 
 
‘In each constituency, MPs and TAs discuss and agree on what they are going to say 
before they come to the [DCF] meeting….we do not see them in public trying to 
advance their agendas. Their influence is when they come to the office of the District 
Commissioner for one to one meetings where they press their demands..’ 
Interview, Official- Salima District Council Secretariat, 3 September 2010. 
 
 
The District has a District Development Plan (DDP). The DDP covers a three-year 
period, and the last one, which was developed in 2007 ended in 2010. No formal 
evaluation of the DDP has been done but data collected through both FGDs and in-
depth interviews suggest that that when it comes to actual allocation of resources, for 
example from the LDF, the DDP is not one of the main criteria for identifying both 
the types of projects as well as areas where these projects can be implemented.78 For 
instance, the earmarking of funds in the LDF mean that although the DDP may have 
outlined and prioritied district needs the district has to go with the projects that have 
been proposed by the centre. According to one key informant:  
 
 
‘..we are told in the meeting how many teacher houses will be constructed in the 
district..regardless of whether we need more boreholes than these houses. These 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Interview, Salima District Council Secretariat Staff, 3 September 2010; Interview, 
CHRR staff, 30 October 2011.	  	  
	   266	  
houses are always being built in the same Traditional Authorities, and some of the 
poorest areas here have not benefitted..not even one house..’ 
Interview, local NGO representative, and member of District Executive 
Committee, Salima district, 18 May 2011. 
 
As has been pointed out earlier, almost all the NGOs implementing projects come to 
the district with already pre-conceived projects, and sometimes they may even go as 
far as proposing geographical areas of implementation. This means that as a formal 
tool for district planning, the DDP is often disregarded. As a result of this the district 
has seen proliferation of NGOs in certain Traditional Authorities where the potential 
for duplication is high. Other Traditional Authorities such as Pemba have not been 
adequately covered by NGO activities.79  
	  
NGO representatives were also one of the actors who could openly question decisions 
during DCF and DEC meetings. This was the case because NGOs were accountable 
to their headquarters and could therefore speak freely without fear of sanctions.80 
There were two distinct groups in the DEC meetings: the civil servants on one side, 
and NGOs representatives on the other side. Two key informants put it this way: 
 
 
‘..Heads of Departments and other Government Officials in the DEC don’t speak up 
because doing so would be to openly question the authority of the District 
Commissioner. The only voice comes from NGOs who question some decisions of 
the council…’ 
Interview, ADRA official, 30 July 2010; Interview, Actionaid official, 18 
October 2010. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Interview, former Salima AIDS Support Organisation (SASO) staff, 29 June 2011; 
Interview, Actionaid official 2, 18 October 2010.  
80 Interview, ADRA official, 30 July 2010.	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An official from the District Council Secretariat argued that larger and often 
International NGOs were more vocal in the meetings at district meetings as compared 
to smaller and local NGOs: 
 
‘These educated officers know how to speak during the meetings..while the 
representatives from the small NGOs sit quietly during meetings…’ 
Interview, Senior official, Salima District Council Secretariat, 8 September 2010. 	  
This could be the case because INGOs were able to pay higher salaries and could 
therefore attract more qualified staff.81 The ability of the NGO staff to ask questions 
and probe on decisions made suggest that where NGOs are closer to the interests of 
the local communities they can become one of the key actors to hold the District 
Commissioner and the council secretariat accountable on key decisions over 
allocation of resources. They may in fact be the only alternative voice, where 
powerful chiefs, ruling party MPs and local bureaucrats are on one side. However, 
NGOs can also advance their own interests. It is often difficult to know whether the 
issues presented in the DCF or DEC meetings are as a result of local consultations or 
are a reflection of priorities from the NGO headquarters in Lilongwe and Blantyre. In 
general, there was no evidence to suggest that NGOs had huge influence on the 
allocation of LDF resources or other Government funded (central) projects.  
	  
When it comes to other centrally formulated projects such as the agricultural input 
subsidy programme, the evidence gathered in this study suggests that both the DCF 
and DEC also have limited influence. Ruling party MPs and chiefs from the then 
ruling party (DPP) constituencies often wielded more powers to determine who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Interview, ADRA official, 30 July 2010.  
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benefitted from the programme.82 Using the subsidy programme as an example, 
vulnerable households are identified at village level, and each of these households 
receives a coupon, which is used to purchase seeds, and fertilizer at heavily subsidised 
prices. The Democratic Progressive Party, which was the ruling party between 2009 
and 2012, had a lot of influence over the programme. One NGO has done an 
assessment of the subsidy program in the district and the results are summarized in 
the quote below from one focus group discussion:  
 
‘…the subsidy programme is heavily politicised here. The ruling party influence 
chiefs over the selection of beneficiaries. However chiefs also include their own 
relatives as beneficiaries even when these relatives do not meet the minimum criteria 
for selection..generally pro-government villages get more coupons..’ 
FGD, Village Development Committee, Traditional Authority 
Kalonga, 16 April 2011. 
 
While the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) offered an opportunity to address 
priorities in the DDP, the DCF had little control over it. Between 2005 and 2009, each 
constituency in the district received MK2 million per year for the CDF. A formal 
process exists on paper in terms of how projects should be selected. However, the 
effective use of the funds was often dependent on the individual MPs rather than a 
proper system of determining needs and ensuring accountability in use of the funds.83 
There were also some good examples of how CDF funds were used. In the Salima 
South constituency of Uladi Mussa, an opposition MP (now ruling party member and 
minister) the CDF was used to stabilize the riverbank. This prevented flooding in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Interview, Senior official- Salima District Council Secretariat, 8 September 2010.	  	  83	  Interview, Senior official- Salima District Council Secretariat, 8 September 2010.  
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area.84 Uladi Mussa also influenced the construction of school blocks and boreholes in 
his constituency85.  
	  
Generally, because MPs decide how the money should be spent under the CDF the 
practice is that the projects selected are those that benefit their supporters. Evidence 
from this study suggests that in some areas communities were not aware of the CDF, 
or at least how they could access these funds. 86  Such lack of awareness was 
sometimes exploited by some MPs. In all constituencies, the CDF was run by the MPs 
in conjunction with constituency governor, party structures and chiefs. The district 
planning structures such as Village Development Committee and Area Development 
Committee were in most cases not included in the process of coming up with projects 
to be funded.  
 
In an audit report completed by the National Audit Office in 2010, it was reported that 
projects worth K15.5 million were implemented in the district. However, project 
identification processes had not been followed. This is an irregularity from the CDF 
procedures, which stipulate a more participatory process for identifying needs and 
selecting which projects to support. In the same audit report, several MPs were unable 
to provide documentation to substantiate how funds were used. In fact, the district 
was unable to account for about K9 million. As a result projects rarely reflected 
priorities in the District Development Plan and the village action plans. The 
dominance of the MPs over the running of the CDF is reflected in this quote: 
 
 
‘..the MP in our area decide what he wants to do with the funds… he uses it as a 
campaign tool.. and does not work with the local committees here..’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Interview, NICE Volunteer, T/A Ndindi, 25 February 2011.	  	  85 Interview with NICE official, 12 November 2010. 	  86	  Focus Group Discussion, Women’s Group, T/A Kalonga, 24 February 2011; Focus 
Group Discussion, Women’s Group, T/A Pemba, 24 February 2011.	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Interview, Group Village Headman, Traditional Authority 
Khombedza area, 5 May 2011. 
 
MPs were not the only ones who abused the Constituency Development Funds. 
Because these funds were managed by the council secretariat the staff were also partly 
to blame for the financial irregularities. For example, the same audit report 
highlighted that the secretariat staff had wrongly charged external trip costs (air ticket 
and allowances) to the constituency development fund. The council secretariat 
procured goods for various projects worth K13 million without following standard 
public procurement procedures. The council secretariat was also not able to exercise 
its role fully to ensure transparency and accountability in the use of funds, and in also 
making sure that procurement of items followed set procedures. According to one 
staff member, the failure by the secretariat to exercise these functions was due to the 
powers of the MPs: 
 
‘We are all afraid of the MPs… even the DC does not want to be on the bad 
side since some of these MPs can even talk to our bosses in Lilongwe and we 
can be transferred..’ 
Interview, Salima District Council Secretariat Staff, 3 September 
2010. 	  
The district council staff are thus unable to exercise an important role of ensuring that 
CDF resources are used properly largely because of the nature of the relationship with 
MPs with the later being viewed as quite powerful particularly when they have 
connections to the centre.  
 
One of the key challenges with resource allocations within DCF is lack of adequate 
resources. When combined with powerful interests this means that the little resources 
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available in the district are consistently being distributed to the same areas. The LDF 
is a good example of this. In 2010, the LDF supported 23 teachers houses and in 
2011, 14 houses. If allocations were based on pleasing every Traditional Authority 
then in 2010 they would have constructed 2 houses in each TA. However, this was not 
the case and allocation of LDF houses has favored three powerful chiefs in the 
district, Kalonga, Khombedza and Kambwiri who were closely linked with the then 
ruling party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). One village chief explained 
why there were so many development projects in their area: 
 
‘We have so many development projects in this area because we have a ruling party 
MP. Previously we had an opposition party MP and it was not working….’ 
Interview, Group Village Headman, TA Kambwiri, 14 December 2010.  
 
During FGDs in one of the least favoured Traditional Authorities-Pemba villagers 
claimed that they did not have information on how to participate or benefit from 
development activities in the district.87 The secretariat staff and some influential 
chiefs in the district claimed that some Traditional Authorities were not benefitting 
from development projects because the villagers were less willing to participate.88 
Nevertheless, the least favoured Traditional Authorities were characterised by their 
lack of allegiance to the ruling party, and the fact that they were in an opposition party 
constituency. This may explain why in the then ruling party constituencies, 
respondents from FGDs reported that they were receiving more ‘developments’ 
because their MP was in government.  
	  
Opposition parties interviewed felt that they were not listened to during the process of 
coming up with priorities. They claimed that as parties they were not invited to any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  FGD, Women’s Group, T/A Pemba, 24 February 2011.  
88 Interview, Senior official, Salima District Council Secretariat, 8 September 2010; 
Interview, T/A 1, 29 October 2010.  
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local meetings at village level to decide on needs, and when they contacted local 
chiefs they were always told that they would be invited but this never happened.89 It 
was the same at district level where party officials from the three opposition parties in 
the district felt that they were not consulted. On the contrary, the ruling party officials 
claimed that they are always informed about what is going on in the district, including 
information on any new projects.90 	  
When comparing the relationship between local people and key actors in the district, 
several respondents mentioned that local people value the roles of chiefs and NGOs.  	  
‘Chiefs stay with us in the villages…They lead us and help us to identify our 
needs…’ 
Focus Group Discussion, Women’s Group, T/A Kalonga, 24 February 2011. 	  
NGOs were also valued because they brought projects to the communities. On the 
other hand, as already pointed out, MPs were nowhere to be seen at community level. 
There were also claims by some respondents that MPs did not support 
decentralisation.  	  
‘..we see NGOs advocating for councillors. But we don’t see MPs talking about it 
[decentralisation]. They never advocate for it. They never appear in this area..’ 
Interview with Village Headman, T/A Pemba area, 20 August 2010.  
	  
This section has demonstrated that ruling party MPs and chiefs aligned to the then 
ruling party, Democratic Progressive Party were more influential than the rest of the 
actors when it came to decision-making over allocation of resources at district level. 
For the District Commissioner and his staff these influential actors were to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 FGD, UDF members, 21 February 2011; FGD, MCP members, 21 February 2011; 
FGD, Maravi Peoples Party (MPP) members, 20 February 2011.  
90 FGD, DPP members, 20 February 2011.	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managed carefully. Powerful MPs and chiefs were mostly interested in bringing 
tangible projects to their areas rather than looking at interventions that were aimed at 
improving overall service delivery in the district. The section below describes the 
situation at the sub-district level.  
 
5.6 Planning from below: Limited capacities, capture, and short on 
funds 
 
The process for developing district development plans has been discussed in chapter 
three. In this chapter, the focus is on how the process actually unfolds in Salima 
district. The process of developing a District Development Plan (DDP) starts with 
village planning which occurs at VDC level, where each Group Village Headman area 
determines priorities. The priorities are ranked in order of importance. The plans 
developed at this level are submitted to the Area Development Committee at 
Traditional Authority level, which consolidates all the VDC plans into one ADC plan. 
The ADC from each Traditional Authority then submits a plan to the District Council.  
 
In practice, the process of developing plans faces numerous challenges in the district. 
In addition to the challenges of capture by chiefs discussed in previous sections of this 
chapter, most ADCs and VDCs are considered weak since they do not meet regularly 
and they have not been able to facilitate the process of planning.91 In two Area 
Development Committees respondents were asked how often they meet. Both 
respondents mentioned that they meet regularly, once a month. When asked about the 
last time they met, it was discovered that both committees had not organized meetings 
for over six months. Another challenge facing ADCs and VDCs was weak downward 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Interview, Salima District Council Secretariat staff, 3 September 2010.  
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accountability. There were no proper mechanisms for reporting back to the 
communities on activities carried out by these structures.  	  
‘..I don’t know when our ADC last met.. They do not report back to the community, 
and the people are powerless to ask for fear of reprisals from chiefs’. 
Interview with NICE Community Volunteer, T/A Ndindi, 5 March 
2011.  	  
Where these committees are strong, it is sometimes due to the role of NGOs. For 
example, some of the ADCs and VDCs in Traditional Authorities Ndindi, Msosa and 
Mwanza were more active largely due to the training and support that they had 
received from UNICEF and other NGOs.92 The challenge with such committees is 
that they become more aligned to serve the needs of particular NGOs. For example, 
with UNICEF, the focus was on making them more sensitive to children’s needs. 
Other NGOs might bring a gender focus, or interest in disabled groups. Therefore, the 
capacity strengthening provided by these bodies might not enhance the overall 
capability of the committees to analyse information and prioritise needs for their 
communities as a whole.  	  
In a number of communities it was reported that these decentralised planning 
structures (ADCs and VDCs) were involved in implementation of NGO project 
activities. The participation varied from direct involvement in implementation to 
‘advisory roles’. An example of this advisory role would be support in identification 
of volunteers in the areas where NGOs were implementing activities. As already 
pointed out there was very little role for the ADCs and VDCs to influence priorities. 
They mostly served as implementation mechanisms: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Interview, Senior official, Salima District Council Secretariat, 8 September 2010.  
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‘In this community Mai Khanda project only came to tell us what they wanted to do 
in this area. We welcomed the project since it will reduce the deaths of women and 
children during pregnancy and during birth…’ 
Focus Group Discussion, ADC, T/A 3, 15 August 2010.  
	  
Several respondents claimed that although NGO projects were formulated centrally 
and often with little involvement of the areas, they were still viewed as relevant since 
they focused on important development issues such as health or food security. 
However, there are still cases where ADCs and VDCs felt that certain NGO projects 
were not a priority for their areas: 	  
‘…We had two projects here by two NGOs.. These projects were not a priority for us. 
The NGOs just talked to the chiefs and there was no involvement of our 
committee…’ 
Focus Group Discussion, Area Development Committee, T/A 4, 19 November 
2010.  	  
The last quote demonstrate the powers that chiefs have as gatekeepers to the 
communities despite the presence of decentralised development planning structures 
such as ADCs and VDCs.  	  
Where chiefs have captured local development committees there is a risk that that 
local priorities may not drive the agenda of these committees. Chiefs are 
monopolizing the ADCs and VDCs by putting their relatives and friends into these 
committees. The aim is to capture whatever resources or projects accessible to these 
committees.93 In Khombedza area, the Traditional Authority has a lot of influence in 
the ADCs, which has resulted in manipulation of Local Development Fund projects in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 This came out strongly in most FGDs and key informant interviews in every 
Traditional Authority. 
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the area.94 For example, in the food for work programme, the chief used his influence 
on the committee to select his relatives and other friends to benefit from the 
programme.  
	  
The capacity challenges go beyond the community structures. At secretariat level, the 
finance department, which has overall responsibility to oversee utilisation of finances 
in the district, needs more capacity. So far, the secretariat has faced challenges in 
trying to recruit and retain competent staff. This is due to the largely uncompetitive 
salaries that the Local Councils in Malawi offer. For example, during the period under 
study a new Director of Finance had just arrived in the district. Before he arrived the 
district had stayed for several months without a Director. Generally, there is also poor 
record keeping and inability to produce reports consistently. When the researcher 
tried to examine financial records for the period as far back as 2004 it was found that 
only data for the last two years was properly documented. Although an electronic 
system, the Integrated Financial Management Information Systems was adopted by 
Local Councils in Malawi, it has not been rolled out completely in the district. This 
means that the directorate of finance is still relying on manual records, which can 
easily be misplaced. Between 2005 and 2009, external audits were not done in the 
district. It was only with support from DFID in 2010 that the audits were completed. 
The audit report revealed serious weaknesses in financial management. For example 
there were missing payment vouchers and lack of signed receipts for over K34.7 
million. Project materials worth approximately K2 million for various development 
projects were also procured without any quotation.  
	  
The financial and technical capacity to carry out the monitoring and supervision of 
decentralised structures is also weak. The secretariat has limited financial resources to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Interview, NICE Volunteer, 13 August 2010.	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procure fuel to travel to various parts of the district.95  Within the council budget very 
little is allocated for monitoring of sub district activities and supervision of 
development activities. In addition there is only one Monitoring &Evaluation (M&E) 
Officer in the district who has to support 10 ADCs and scores of VDCs. Up until 
2009, the district did not even have one M&E Officer. The same officer is responsible 
for writing reports, supporting the development of the DDP as well as monitoring 
various projects being carried out in the district. This makes supervision of ADCs and 
VDCs unrealistic and irregular. As a result most of these committees run on their own 
with limited guidance. In such cases the committees are left with long wish lists of 
needs with no thorough analysis. This cascades to the district where the secretariat 
receives 10 ADC development plans, which outline priorities in each Traditional 
Authority. The secretariat then has to try and make sense of these long lists of wishes, 
and somehow put these into a well-orchestrated development plan. This process is not 
easy given the capacity challenges already outlined above: 
 
 
‘…Our DDP expired in 2009 and so far the district has not come up with a new one. 
Consultations were done at community level, but the secretariat has been secretive on 
the DDP.. we just hear that they are developing one, and if we ask we are told to 
wait….’ 
Interview, Centre for Human Rights Rehabilitation 
(CHRR) staff, 30 October 2011. 
 
The fact that the district has stayed for over two years without a DDP may suggest 
that the secretariat is facing certain challenges to complete the task. The implication is 
that the little resources available through LDF, CDF and NGOs cannot be aligned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Interview, Senior official 2, Salima District Council Secretariat, 24 January 2011.	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with district priorities within an existing plan. The absence of a plan provides a fertile 
ground for informal influencing and capture.  
	  
The district has also not been able to carry out any evaluations of previous DDPs.96 
There is nothing in the data collected, which could explain this situation. At 
community level, data from FGDs suggest that communities do not get any feedback 
on the plans that their committees have developed.97Respondents in one Area 
Development Committee (ADC) claimed that they have been submitting proposals 
regularly but with no feedback from the council: 	  
‘We contribute to the setting of priorities on development projects.. we deliver these 
project proposals to the district council. They tell us to wait until when resources are 
available….But they do not respond...’ 
Focus Group Discussion with Area Development Committee, T/A 3, 
15 August 2010.  	  
 At every level of planning, from VDC to district level consolidation of priorities, the 
downward accountability was non-existent, and the process ended with development 
of plans. No follow up was made on what aspects of the plans were achieved. Some 
villagers have tried to by-pass their committees and follow up with the district 
secretariat directly on the status of implementation. One project, implemented by 
Centre for Human Rights Rehabilitation (CHRR) has worked with local people to 
create a mass of empowered individuals who can demand information from the 
district secretariat. However, this project has not gone well with district officials. 
According to a key informant: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  Interview, Salima District Council Secretariat staff, 3 September 2010. 	  97	  FGD, Village Development Committee (VDC), T/A Pemba, 16 April 2011; FGD, 
VDC, T/A Kalonga, 16 April 2011.	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‘…the villagers have adopted a bossy attitude… and they have no respect for what we 
do.. they should come here to submit requests and not demand anything..’ 
Interview, Salima District Council Secretariat staff 2, 5 September 2010. 
	  	  
During FGDs and key in-depth interviews with local chiefs respondents stated that the 
secretariat staff were difficult to work with and ‘had no time for villagers’. Some 
respondents claimed that the secretariat staff were not accommodative because they 
were well educated and did not want to be influenced by uneducated villagers. On the 
other hand district secretariat staff argued that villagers often had unrealistic demands. 
 
‘..every time we put in a lot of effort to develop these plans…but we never get the 
funding necessary to implement them..the villagers think that we are hiding 
resources…’ 
Interview, Salima District Council Secretariat staff 2, 5 September 2010. 
 
What makes the situation complicated is that villagers have no direct means to hold 
secretariat staff accountable. This is because local government staff members are not 
elected representatives. So far the council secretariat has been under no obligation to 
demonstrate transparency in drawing up of plans and development of budgets. There 
are signs that the council secretariat can still improve its transparency in the present 
environment where there are no councillors. For instance, in 2009 the council 
secretariat adopted use of a notice board where they post information about LDF 
allocations and annual budgets. However, this information has rarely been updated.  
 
Overall impressions in the process of developing district development plans are that 
this exercise is largely academic. In addition to local capture and manipulation by 
chiefs and party loyalists most ADCs and VDCs lack capacity to formulate plans. The 
limited capacity also extends to the council secretariat, which has failed to provide 
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support or monitor activities of these sub district structures. Worse still, there is 
limited downward accountability on the extent to which previous DDPs have been 
implemented. As a result, communities are left in the dark with regard to the 
performance of these plans.  
 
5.7 Attempts to strengthen decentralisation process: Inherent 
limitations 
 
This section examines attempts made by various organisations to strengthen the 
implementation of decentralisation in the district. Since 2004, a number of actors have 
supported various capacity building programmes in the district. This support has 
focused on both technical and political aspects of the reforms, and has targeted all 
levels from the district bureaucrats to the structures within local communities.  In this 
section two actors are discussed, namely: the German Development Agency (GIZ), 
and the National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE).  
	  
The German Development Agency98 (GIZ), a bilateral development arm of the 
German Government in Malawi has been implementing various capacity building 
activities to strengthen the capacity of local councils in Malawi. In Salima GIZ 
established its programme in 2004. The programme is supporting the district council 
in several areas including the following: 
• Financial Management, 
• Team Building for staff members, 
• Change management, 
• Provision of office equipment. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Previously the German Development Agency was known as GTZ, and changed its 
name to GIZ in 2011.	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In addition to the areas outlined above GIZ is also providing support to Salima 
District Council in development planning. The emphasis here is development of 
realistic development plans which include budgets. GIZ had also planned to orient 
new councillors on their roles and responsibilities. However, GIZ has not been able to 
focus on the capacity of elected representatives due to the postponement of local 
elections. Hence, the focus has been on staff of the council secretariat. Here the 
program has faced key challenges. First, staff shortages in key departments such as 
finance and district development planning mean that the programme often did not 
have the necessary people with sufficient levels of skills to train. For example, the 
Director of Finance has recently been recruited, and before him there were a number 
of officers acting in that position. At least for the directorate of planning and 
development, the head of the directorate has been in the district for several years. This 
means that GIZ has had a focused capacity building programme with the planning 
directorate. Other challenges faced with the programme are with respect to politics in 
the allocation of resources, which have already been discussed in the previous 
sections of this chapter.  
 
The National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE) is joint programme by 
Government of Malawi and the European Union. Between 2009 and 2011 NICE was 
implementing a Democracy and Good Governance Project. The project was aimed at 
creating awareness amongst community members on the roles of various 
decentralised structures and actors such as councillors, area and development 
committees. In the absence of councillors the projects focused on creating awareness 
on the roles of MPs and chiefs, and training ADCs and VDCs in their functions. The 
project, which ended in 2011, was being implemented in all ten Traditional 
Authorities in the district.  
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Since the creation of the Local Development Fund (LDF) in 2009 NICE also 
undertook the responsibility to disseminate information on how communities could 
apply for funding. NICE claims to have made significant progress in revitalising 
ADCs and VDCs particularly to ensure that there was transparency in election of 
committee members. Still there are huge political challenges.  
 
‘Since 2009 we have received a lot of complaints from villagers who claimed that the 
ADCs and VDCs were being ‘hijacked’ by chiefs. In several of the TAs here in 
Salima the chiefs were handpicking representatives to sit in the ADCs and VDCs… 
So while we have made progress, there have also been many problems…’ 
Interview, former NICE Coordinator, 1 August 2010. 
GIZ and NICE have emphasised several aspects of reforms. GIZ has focused on 
technical aspects of planning and financial management, while NICE is more 
concerned with capacity building of ADCs and VDCs to plan effectively. Both efforts 
have come up against political challenges such as local capture and informal 
influencing. There are also real capacity challenges at all levels from the secretariat to 
community structures.  	  
5.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter begun by asking what the reality is for decentralisation in Malawi, and 
specifically in Salima. An argument has been made in this chapter that the reality of 
reforms is far from what was originally conceived in the Constitution and Local 
Government Act. It also diverts from the literature on devolution/ democratic 
decentralisation. The way reforms have evolved so far show that ruling elites have 
extended their powers to the local arena in the district and hence reforms are 
characterised by centralisation.  
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The centralisation of reforms is evident in a number of ways. First the ruling party 
elites at the centre co-opted certain local elites (chiefs and ruling party MPs) to 
maintain control over the local arena. In return for their loyalty to ruling party elites 
MPs and chiefs (with links to the ruling party) have more informal powers to 
influence allocation of resources. Therefore, local elites draw their powers from this 
relationship to the big man/woman and the ruling party. The centre is also 
maintaining control over local bureaucrats through centralisation of powers to hire, 
promote, transfer, or fire senior officials including the District Commissioner. This 
has placed a burden on these bureaucrats to respond to the ‘requests’ from powerful 
local elites with the right connections, otherwise they can be sanctioned. 
Centralisation has also been manifested in the slow pace of devolution, which has 
resulted in continued influence, by central ministries over formulation and approval of 
sector plans and budgets. 
 
The District Consultative Forum (DCF) is fraught with problems. As an advisory 
body it lacks a comprehensive mandate to make decisions. The fusion of executive 
and legislative functions (based on the inclusion of bureaucrats in this structure) has 
made it complicated for the DCF to hold council staff to account. Worse still, the 
‘side effects’ of reforms have also rendered the DCF toothless with local elites (such 
as chiefs and ruling party MPs with the right connections) calling the shots through 
informal influencing. Generally, the local council has seen its budget increase as a 
result of central transfers (sectoral funds). However, decision making over resource 
allocation is constrained by earmarking of funds by both central government and 
donors, which subverts the underlying principles of devolution/ democratic 
decentralisation. There is very little the council can change, and often its own locally 
generated revenue is too small to invest in anything significant.  
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The Government of Malawi with support from donors also developed a 
comprehensive development planning system for local councils. This planning system 
emphasizes technical aspects of identifying priorities and ranking them. It does not 
provide answers to the difficult questions of how to manage the politics in 
development committees, which supposedly are at the centre of this process. As this 
study has revealed in addition to limited capacity these development committees are 
prone to capture by local chiefs and their relatives/ friends in both ruling and 
opposition party areas. Since chiefs are not elected, it makes it difficult to hold them 
to account, and this undermines the principles of democratic decentralisation. 
 
Donors and NGOs are also subverting decentralisation through their emphasis on 
efficiency, which has led to the setting up of many project committees to facilitate 
implementation of activities. These committees operate outside the formal 
decentralised structures, which make it difficult for local communities to hold them to 
account. Such structures divert the necessary support that local development 
committees need to work. Where these NGOs work with existing structures they 
sometimes rearrange the roles of these committees to serve their interests. Such 
emphasis on technical aspects rather than dealing with the political and ‘easily 
captured’ decentralised structures ignores the realities of development as a political 
process. Yet, even these NGO formed structures are not immune from politics or 
capture. Another problem with these NGOs is that they come to the district with pre-
conceived projects, which mostly respond to interests of the donors. So while some 
donors lobby Government to implement political aspects of decentralisation (as the 
next chapter will show) the actions of donor funded INGOs and NGOs at district level 
ignore the politics of development and emphasize the technical aspects.  
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So given this context—of centralisation of reforms by ruling elites, the undermining 
of reforms by donors and NGOs—and ‘side effects’, mostly due to informal 
influencing and capture by local elites, it is yet to be seen whether and how the 
benefits of decentralisation (devolution) will be realised in Salima district.  
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Chapter	  Six	  
	  
6.	  ‘Mission	  Incomplete’:	  Actors,	  and	  incentives	  for	  reform	  and	  
non-­‐reform	  in	  Malawi	  
	  
6.1 Introduction 	  
The previous chapter has focused on presenting findings from the case study that was 
conducted in Salima district. This chapter aims to position these findings within the 
broader implementation of reforms in Malawi and elsewhere. This chapter will argue 
that ruling elites in Malawi particularly under wa Mutharika subverted the successful 
implementation of decentralisation. Wa Mutharika and his Democratic Progressive 
Party took steps to consolidate control over both local actors and funding available to 
local councils.  
 
It will also be shown that actions by donors have undermined decentralisation and this 
raises questions on the good governance agenda supported by many of these donors. 
For example, there are a lot of inconsistencies between the official positions and 
reality in terms of how donors pursue the good governance agenda—while on paper 
there might be claims that crisis of governance has to be dealt with in order for Africa 
to develop in practice millions of (earmarked) dollars are injected into the country 
with very little asked about the quality of politics. Worse still, there appear to be no 
common position which donors can push in their interaction with the central 
government in Malawi. This chapter will show that these inconsistencies have 
allowed the neopatrimonial state to access vital resources to service its patronage 
networks.  
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The chapter starts by analysing the various actors driving or stalling decentralisation 
in Malawi, and their incentives, and it relates this to literature on decentralisation. It 
then moves to a critical analysis of the extent to which the main research questions 
and hypothesis in this study have been satisfied. 
 
6.2 Key actors and interests in pursuing/ stalling decentralisation at 
national level 	  
This section analyses the key actors and their interests in the pursuit of 
decentralisation in Malawi. From the findings there are various actors who are either 
supporting or stalling reforms in Malawi. Evidence suggests that political and 
bureaucratic actors at central level have certain self-interests, which are making the 
reforms difficult to implement as it was envisaged in the decentralisation policy and 
Local Government Act. Evidence also shows that the role of foreign actors in Malawi 
cannot be underestimated, particularly the multilateral and bilateral agencies that also 
have varying interests in the reforms. The picture that emerges with reforms in 
Malawi is complex with a big gap between the rhetoric and how reforms evolve in 
practice.  
	  
Key informant interviews and document review suggest that pursuit of democratic 
decentralisation followed the rise of multi-party politics in 1994 in Malawi. This trend 
is similar to what happened in several countries in Africa that adopted democratic 
form of governments starting from early 1990’s. And since the adoption of 
decentralisation policy in Malawi in 1998 a number of donors have come to the fore 
to support roll out of reforms. In fact it can be argued that some of these donors have 
now become the main driving force towards democratic decentralisation in the 
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country.99  This does set the interests of some of these donors on a collision course 
with those of political and bureaucratic elites at national level in Malawi. The later 
sections of this chapter will show how the central government and donors interact in 
pursuit of their varying interests.  
	  
6.2.1 Donor Interests in Malawi’s reforms 
 
There are several donors supporting decentralisation in Malawi. The majority of these 
donors are part of what is called the Common Approach to Budget Support (CABS) 
Group. The CABS Group acts as a common front for several donors in engaging with 
the Government of Malawi particularly over macro-economic and political reforms in 
the country. These donors provide general budgetary support in return for the Malawi 
Government’s commitment to implement agreed reforms. Members of CABS are: 
Germany, United Kingdom through the Department for International Development 
(DFID), Norway, European Union, the World Bank and the African Development 
Bank. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is included as an 
observer.  
	  
According to a key informant100 from CABS Secretariat, every year the group 
together with the Government of Malawi agree on a country performance assessment 
framework (PAF)101 which outlines economic and governance indicators and targets 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  UNDP/UNCDF, GIZ, USAID and DFID are supporting political aspects of 
decentralisation, while World Bank and AFDB are focusing on fiscal decentralisation 
and Local Development Fund. 
100 Interview, former Common Approach to Budget Support (CABS) official, 4 April 
2011. 
101 The performance assessment framework is jointly developed by Government of 
Malawi and CABS donors. It is an unpublished document, which is used to assess 
performance in a number of areas. Donors make decisions based on the results. For 
example the Common Approach to Budget Support (CABS) Review in 2007, 
commissioned by European Commission et al (2007), pointed out that the results of 
the assessment were satisfactory leading to the release of about K16 billion by the 
CABS donors.  
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that have to be met. Different agencies put emphasis on government’s performance on 
certain indicators as a precondition for continued support. For example, others stress 
macro-economic reforms while others put emphasis on political aspects of reforms. In 
addition to different interests of agencies in the various indicators in the PAF there is 
also consensus that all general budgetary support is based on the performance of the 
Government in implementing the IMF extended credit facility (ECF) programme. The 
CABS review, which happens annually, comes up with recommendations, which the 
government of Malawi should focus on. For instance, the 2007 CABS review 
highlighted various problems that needed to be dealt with such as over expenditure 
and failure to hold local government elections (European Commission et al 2007). 
The individual CABS members and other influential donor agencies in Malawi are 
discussed next.  
	  
The World Bank is one of the key development agencies supporting the Government 
of Malawi.  The World Bank has been a key partner in the implementation of 
development programmes in Malawi since the 1960s when the country gained 
independence. This support has come in the form of grants and loans. Along with this 
financial assistance the Bank has also been instrumental in providing policy guidance 
particularly in the area of economic reforms. The impact of this financial assistance 
has been mixed in Malawi. The national elites in Malawi have been able to provide 
certain public goods and services as a result of this support. For instance in the 1960s 
and early 1970s the country developed its power system through assistance provided 
to the Electricity Supply Commission of Malawi (ESCOM). World Bank support has 
also been invaluable to develop road infrastructure, for example, the highway project 
that connected the southern region to central and northern regions. More recently, the 
Bank has been providing assistance to the Government of Malawi to implement a 
	   290	  
nutrition and HIV/AIDS project. Under this project, the government has provided life-
prolonging drugs (antiretroviral drugs) to thousands of women and men in Malawi. 
The project also enhanced prevention efforts through supporting prevention of mother 
to child transmission of HIV and voluntary male medical circumcision.  	  
There are also negative outcomes from the assistance. Mainly, this relates to the 
impact of advice provided by the Bank, as well as the manipulation of financial 
assistance by ruling elites in Malawi. With regard to policy direction, in the 1980s the 
World Bank together with other agencies such as IMF embraced a set of neoliberal 
economic policies, which were known as the structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs). SAPs were aimed at reducing the size and reach of the state. In Malawi, the 
reforms had negative effects. According to Fritz and Menocal (2006: 3) some of the 
areas that were negatively affected include, provision of basic social services, 
maintenance and modernisation of civil services and financing of the state. SAPs also 
led to decline in decentralised state capacity due to the reduction of the number of 
staff in civil service especially at lower levels (Eggen 2011: 322). This negative effect 
on decentralised state capacity extends to the implementation of current reforms, 
whereby local councils suffer from inadequate staffing. With regard to economic 
performance, SAPs weakened the country’s economy with growth averaging only 
2.5% per year between 1979 and 1996. During this period, Malawi’s GDP fell to one 
of the lowest in Africa (Booth et al 2006: 5). In several other African countries SAPs 
did not perform well. In Nigeria, a comprehensive structural adjustment programme 
initiated in 1986 by the Babangida military regime in collaboration with the World 
Bank, registered some modest successes in stabilizing an ailing economy in the early 
years of implementation. However, over time ‘economic management weakened as 
the ruling elites showed greater signs of economic indiscipline and despotism’ (Lewis 
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1999: 50; also see: Lewis 2006). In contrast to the situation in Nigeria, the Banda 
government in Malawi was fairly compliant in implementation of SAPs (Booth et al 
2006: 5). However, the measures failed to take into consideration the underlying 
problems- population growth of 3.2%, declining soil fertility, unequal land 
distribution and many other factors. This has been one of the perpetual problems with 
regard to advice provided by external actors in the sense that in a number of cases (as 
this example of SAPs demonstrate) there has been lack of adequate analysis of factors 
related to poor governance and economic performance in Malawi. Instead of pushing 
through economic reforms to developing countries, the World Bank and other 
development agencies should have done better analytical work to understand to the 
contexts and issues affecting development in each of these countries including 
Malawi.  	  
The national elites in Malawi have also benefited from support by World Bank and 
others by capturing these resources to implement their own policy direction. For 
instance, in 1986, despite strong donor pressure, the country re-introduced subsidies. 
Some observers believed that this would result in a cut off of USAID and World Bank 
funds (Booth et al 2006: 31). But it did not. According to Booth et al (2006: 31) 
having presented Malawi as a shining example of SAPs in Africa the Bank would 
have found it difficult to pull out. This failure to decide on, and apply effective 
sanction in the case of elites not following agreed plans has been a constant theme 
since the era of the one party state. This represents very complex situation- donors 
such as the World Bank and others have invested a lot in the country for many years. 
Pulling out aid in the case of non-compliance might be seen as an acknowledgement 
that donors have also failed. On the other hand, staying the course on the part of the 
donors provides an opportunity for them to ‘hope’ that the country will pursue 
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reforms, given to continued flow of aid and the conditionalities attached to it. 
According to Englund (2002: 19) since the return to multipartysm in Malawi reforms 
have been shallow with ‘leaders’ demonstrated capacity to continue with corruption 
and plunder’. The ‘shadow state’ has allowed the state to ensure flow of aid as 
political leaders have pursued some (not all) aspects of good governance reforms.   	  
World Bank’s support to decentralisation in Malawi is provided in this context of the 
shadow state whereby political leaders have demonstrated capacity not to pursue 
reforms to the fullest especially where such policies are detrimental to political 
leaders’ interests. In terms of the current decentralisation reforms, the Bank is one of 
the key actors supporting the Local Development Fund, which up to now is the largest 
mechanism for funding development projects within local councils. As a member of 
the CABS the Bank is mainly interested in the country’s performance on economic 
indicators, and this is also reflected in its interests for fiscal reforms in support of the 
Local Development Fund. This is in contrast to the picture at global level where the 
World Bank has adopted a position, which tilts towards democratic decentralisation. 
Globally the World Bank views decentralisation as critical to improve transparency 
and accountability at the local level, and primarily to enhance service delivery. In fact 
on its website the Bank has mentioned that councillors are necessary for the 
operations of councils in Malawi (World Bank 2012). But in practice the officials of 
the Bank in Malawi are reluctant to engage in what may be referred to as ‘interfering 
in political issues’ for example, pushing for local government elections in Malawi. 
This is expressed in a quote from one of the key officials at the Bank in Malawi: 
	  
‘Our country agreement with Malawi does not allow us to get involved in politics, 
and therefore doing so would be directly contravening this agreement…we watch 
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from the sidelines as the other donors base their country assistance on political 
indicators’ 
    Interview, World Bank Official, 12 May 2011. 
 
The actions of the World Bank reflect huge contradictions in the implementation of 
their own policy. As already pointed out in chapter three, as early as 1987 the World 
Bank had released an assessment report in Malawi which concluded that the 
government would not make progress in tackling poverty unless if the people were 
directly involved in the development process. Prior to this, in the 1970s and 1980s the 
World Bank and IMF had pushed for ‘rolling back the state’ (Jenkins and Plowden 
2006:28). In 1989 the World Bank in its report argued that Africa’s development 
challenges were due to a crisis of governance (Jenkins and Plowden 2006: 28). The 
emphasis was on how to make central governments more efficient. By the late 1980s 
the World Bank was explicitly mentioning the role of governance in addressing 
Africa’s development challenges. In 1991, the World Bank went further in its review 
of public sector programmes and acknowledged that powerful vested interests were 
one of the major challenges to successful reforms. Therefore, African countries 
needed to address governance as pre-requisite to development (Lawson 2005: 92).  
 
According to Hyden et al (2004: 15), the World Bank’s analytical work from the 
1980’s has focused on three elements of governance as follows; form of political 
regime, a process of exercising authority in managing economic and social resources 
for development, and the capacity of government to design, manage, and execute its 
policies. Despite this rhetoric with its analytical work on governance, the World Bank 
has shied away from political aspects of reforms, and Malawi is one example of this 
case. Since the late 1990s and early 2000s, the World Bank has supported 
deconcentration in several countries such as Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Nepal, Burkina 
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Faso, and Madagascar. In these countries reforms were aimed at improving service 
delivery (World Bank 2008). Yet, in many of these countries decentralisation reforms 
are failing largely due to political factors. As Jenkins and Plowden (2006: 1) have 
argued this policy of non interference has led to the World Bank supporting 
incumbent regimes with no regard to the quality of government.  	  
In the case of Malawi the inconsistency between the rhetoric on democratic 
decentralisation (on paper) by the Bank and how its officials interact with government 
in Malawi has provided an opportunity for political leaders to access vital resources 
and to pursue their interests.  For instance, although on its website the Bank has 
insisted on the importance of elected representatives at local level (councillors) the 
fact that at country level it is pursuing an apolitical approach, means that the 
government does not feel significant pressure from the Bank to conduct local 
government elections. It complicates matters for the donors by denying space for a 
common position, and in turn this allows political leaders to access resources from 
some donors even when others freeze or withdraw aid.  
	  
As a major funder of the Local Development Fund (LDF) the World Bank has 
committed $65 million for the period 2009-2013.102 The Bank’s support comprises of 
a loan and a grant. The Bank had also supported, the Malawi Social Action Fund, a 
predecessor to the LDF. From key informant interview with the World Bank’s 
officials in Malawi, the areas of support for the LDF are negotiated between the Bank 
and the Government, and it is these negotiated priorities that are put in the Bank’s 
country development strategy. However, this may be far from the true picture of how 
the funding is allocated. As an interested party motives of the World Bank have 
shaped the way that decentralisation reforms are being implemented in Malawi 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  Interview, World Bank official, 12 May 2011.	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particularly with regard to financing of development activities at council level. The 
interests of the Bank in the LDF are evident with respect to earmarking of funds to 
support specific tangible development projects particularly in the education sector and 
public works programmes. If this support through the LDF was to be meaningful to 
districts, the Bank should have seriously considered provision of ‘un-earmarked 
resources’, which would fund priorities in the District Development Plans, rather than 
districts trying to re-align their priorities to suit the interests in the LDF windows.  
 
The Government of Malawi has vested interests in the funds that it receives from the 
World Bank. The funding to the LDF is used to deliver tangible projects such as 
constructing teachers houses, or renovating roads as part of public works 
programmes, and many other projects. Such projects may present an opportunity to 
the ruling elites at the centre to reward their supporters as it has been demonstrated in 
chapter five. Therefore, it can be argued that the World Bank is a source of funding 
for the neopatrimonial state. As already argued, the inconsistency between donor 
approaches in Malawi provides an easy ground for political leaders to access 
resources and to deliver on their various promises to their supporters. In the case of 
the Bank the strict emphasis on economic reforms rather than political means that it 
has (and continues) to provide assistance even when other donors withhold theirs due 
to lack of progress on certain political reforms.  
 
Ruling elites in Malawi have demonstrated responsiveness to the advice from the 
World Bank with regard to the management of the Local Development Fund (LDF). 
For instance, due to the influence of the World Bank the LDF closely resembles its 
predecessor, the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF).103 It is quite possible that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  Interview, Local Development Fund (LDF) Technical Support Team Staff, 14 
March 2011.  
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technical aspects of reforming the LDF driven by the World Bank are less threatening 
as compared to political reforms such as holding of local government elections. 
According to a key informant at the Local Development Fund, the World Bank has 
been given a lot of leeway to influence how resources are earmarked. 104  The 
government has put in place technical guidelines in terms of how local councils can 
access the funds and these were formulated with technical leadership from the Bank. 
Just as in the MASAF model, in the LDF the World Bank has promoted the formation 
of project committees at community level to manage community projects.105 As it was 
observed with the NGO committees in chapter five, these project committees 
promoted by the World Bank also undermine the relevance and authority of formal 
decentralised structures such as the ADCs and VDCs.  
 
The ruling elites at the centre have maintained control over the LDF by housing the 
fund within the Ministry of Finance under the leadership of the Finance Minister. This 
is contrary to the original concept whereby the LDF would have been an independent 
mechanism to channel resources to the local councils.106 And as has been argued in 
the previous chapter, the Finance Minister has been able to issue directives to 
influence how resources are implemented. So far the World Bank, at least in public, 
has not questioned these decisions. This might partly be due to the fact that most of 
the funding is allocated based on the similar guidelines which were used under 
MASAF and hence meets the standards of the Bank. It can be argued here that the 
interests of the Government of Malawi and the World Bank merge in the 
implementation of the LDF. The focus by the World Bank on efficient delivery of 
specific projects allows the ruling elites to use the funds in ways that entrench the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Interview Local Development Fund (LDF) Technical Support Team Staff, 14 
March 2011.  105	  Interview, World Bank official, 12 May 2011.  
106 Interview, Senior official- Ministry of Local Government, 6 October 2010. 	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neopatrimonial state in Malawi. This is because, as it has already been argued, the 
World Bank has so far shown less concern on political reforms such as the role of 
local elites in making decisions over the allocations. Since what counts is delivery of 
the projects, the ruling elites can easily influence where such projects are 
implemented, with little or no consequences from the World Bank. The World Bank 
and other donors supporting the Local Development Fund (LDF) should have done a 
better job to agree on common positions and advance these as a set of conditionalities 
that all donors are interested in, rather than each donor applying its own interests as it 
sees fit.  
 
As already argued above, the earmarking of resources by the World Bank and the 
Government of Malawi is against the spirit of decentralisation policy in Malawi 
whereby local councils are expected to formulate their own local plans, within the 
framework of a national policy. As the previous chapter has shown earmarking of 
funds renders useless the time and labour intensive process of the district 
development planning system. For example it means a council whose priorities are to 
construct a health centre in a particular community is forced to instead renovate roads. 
An official at the Local Development Fund (LDF) pointed out that the funding 
provided by the World Bank is not a blank cheque, but rather earmarked funding to 
which Councils must adhere.   
	  
‘..Earmarking of funding has limited the extent to which Local Councils can use 
funding to respond to priorities within their district development plans….It is our 
hope that in future the Bank will change its position..’ 
Interview, LDF Technical Support Team staff, 14 March 2011. 
 
As has been pointed out earlier comparisons can also be drawn to the LDF 
predecessor, the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF). The World Bank and the 
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Government of Malawi provided funding in MASAF, which was largely earmarked. 
It is therefore not surprising that when the former Minister of Finance, Goodall 
Gondwe made a ministerial decision for the LDF community window to focus on 
teachers houses, the World Bank supported the decision with large proportion of its 
funding to the LDF going towards this.107 As a result other funding windows 
providing less tangible services, for example, the performance window, have always 
been underfunded.  
 
The Africa Development Bank, another CABS member also shares World Bank 
interests in the fiscal aspects of decentralisation in Malawi. Like the World Bank its 
policy is not to get involved in the political issues. AFDB emphasizes technical 
aspects of reforms, a position which is similar to the World Bank’s non-interference 
policy. A senior advisor at AFDB claimed that they do discuss governance issues but 
only behind closed doors as opposed to other agencies that do make their positions 
known in public.108 The AFDB has also earmarked its funding to the local councils, 
with the bulk of resources going towards the Local Economic Development project 
which has been designed outside the LDF. Similarly the AFDB has been accused of 
imposing vertical programmes within the LDF.109  
	  
Other development agencies, namely UNDP/UNCDF, DFID, Norway, USAID and 
German Development Agency (GIZ) are on the other side of the coin and are more 
pronounced in their support for democratic decentralisation. Out of these, Norway, 
Germany and DFID are members of the CABS group while UNDP is an observer. 
Perhaps a characteristic shared amongst this category is that they are all bilateral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  Based on Interviews, World Bank official, 12 May 2011; LDF Technical Support 
Team Staff, 14 March 2011.  	  108	  Interview, African Development Bank (AfDB) official, 26 January 2011.  
109 Interview, LDF Technical Support Team staff, 14 March 2011. 
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agencies with the exception of UNDP/UNCDF, which is a multilateral agency. Key 
informant interviews with all of these agencies revealed that are strongly grounded in 
democratic decentralisation, and see the role of locally elected representatives 
(councillors) as critical to ensure responsiveness of local councils.110 These agencies 
are pursuing the political aspects of ‘governance’ and have not shied away from 
openly trying to influence the government to pursue certain political reforms around 
decentralisation.  
	  
These agencies have public policy positions on decentralisation, and are 
implementing various governance programmes to strengthen citizen participation and 
create awareness on the roles of various duty bearers. As chapter three has shown, the 
UNDP was very influential in the development of the decentralisation policy in 
Malawi. Another bilateral agency, the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) runs a governance programme with over 7 million pounds every 
year. A large component of their programme is support to the civil society fund, 
which is aimed at increasing accountability and citizen participation in service 
delivery. Other partners in the civil society fund include Norway and Irish Aid. DFID 
is also supporting a local accountability project in 10 districts where communities 
score services through use of a scorecard.111 As previously pointed out, DFID is 
amongst donors that openly support the role of the councillors and according to an 
official from DFID’s Governance Team, the agency has been allocating funds in its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Interviews;  USAID Governance official, 2 February 2011; DFID official 2, 15 
October 2011; DFID official 3, 15 October 2011; United Nations Capital 
Development Fund (UNCDF) staff, 29 September 2010; GIZ Governance official, 3 
October 2010. 111	  The scorecard is considered as a tool through which communities can hold service 
providers to account. The scorecard is a compilation of indicators generated at local 
level about a specific service, e.g. health centre, school, or agricultural programme. 
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governance portfolio since 2008, towards supporting local government elections.112 
Each year when elections failed to take place DFID would reallocate the resources to 
the next annual budget with the hope that elections would finally materialise.113 The 
agency has also openly expressed its concerns to the Government of Malawi on the 
postponement of the local government elections in Malawi.  
	  
USAID, Norway and German Development Agency (GIZ) also share DFID’s 
concerns over absence of councillors in Malawi. These development partners are 
actively supporting programmes aimed at clarifying roles of various actors involved 
in decentralisation at district level. One form of this support is the funding provided 
by DFID and USAID to a civic education programme, which aims at educating 
communities about the roles of councillors. This was done in preparation for local 
government elections (LGE), which were expected in 2010 and later on in 2011.114 
GIZ, a German Government Development Agency has been supporting the 
Government of Malawi to develop educational materials on the roles of various actors 
and structures at district and community levels, particularly the role of councillors vis 
a vis other actors.  
	  
GIZ, USAID and UNCDF are also implementing capacity building projects at district 
level to enhance technical capabilities of staff in council secretariats. UNCDF and 
GIZ are working in several districts in the country to strengthen capacities in planning 
and financial management. USAID has supported the provision of technical support 
in financial management. This is done through public-private partnership with a local 
Bank, Standard Bank, which has provided a group of chartered accountants to coach 
district staff. In addition to the work of USAID on financial management, Irish Aid, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Interview, DFID official, 15 October 2011. 
113 Interview, DFID official 3, 15 October 2011.	  114	  Interviews, DFID official 2, 15 October 2011; USAID Governance official, 2 
February 2011.	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development agency outside the CABS group and GIZ are funding the placement of 
financial analysts on non-established contracts at every council as one way to address 
shortage of key staff within council secretariats.  
	  
One of the key findings from this study is that the second category of donor agencies, 
which comprise DFID, Norway, Germany (GIZ), UNCDF/UNDP and USAID, are 
focusing on both political and technical aspects of reforms. This is in contrast to the 
position of the World Bank and Africa Development Bank (AFDB), which is largely 
on economic affairs. Largely technical reforms have been well received by central 
actors. The reasons for this are presented in later sections of this chapter.  	  
Amongst this second category of donors, only Germany through KFW, a German 
Government-owned Development Bank, provides support to the Local Development 
Fund (LDF). DFID was involved in the conceptualisation of the fund but so far has 
not put in any resources into the fund. Similar to the World Bank and AFDB, KFW 
has also earmarked its funding in support of the urban window which can be accessed 
by urban councils only for the development of various social infrastructure. This 
means a large majority of rural district councils cannot access these funds, and yet 
they may be the ones with the lowest capacity to generate local revenue. In contrast to 
the World Bank and AFDB, the Germans have linked their contribution to progress in 
political aspects of decentralisation. To make this position clear the Germany 
government withheld funding to the Government of Malawi (about $7 million) in 
2011 due to the postponement of the Local Government Elections, which they 
consider essential for a democratic society (Sonani 2011).  The Head of Development 
Cooperation at the German Embassy in Malawi has pointed out that the holding of 
elections was one of the conditionalities for disbursing funds under the LDF. A 
statement from the Embassy reviewed in this study indicated that: 
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‘The German government was committed to supporting the decentralisation process 
and democratic participation of the people in developing Malawi…and would support 
elections when they were held..’ 
       Quoted in Sonani (2011) 
 
This analysis of various donors who are involved in decentralisation has shown that 
interests are varied, at least by what these agencies do in public. This diversity of 
interests by donors in Malawi’s decentralisation reflects what de Sardan (2011) has 
characterised as ‘pollution of governance’ with each agency defining and approaching 
governance in its own way. Nanda (2006) argues that the term governance is 
‘unsettled’ with donors defining its elements differently. Donors such as World Bank 
focus economic aspects of good governance, while other donors attach political 
conditionalities (Nanda 2006). The different approaches to governance reforms put 
donors in a weak position to negotiate with countries on how and which reforms 
should be prioritised. As the case of Malawi has shown with regard to decentralisation 
such varying positions by donors allow the state to pursue its own agenda. This is 
because there is no common position, and the government can play the right cards 
with some donors in order to receive funds. For instance while Germany had withheld 
aid to the LDF during the wa Mutharika administration, the World Bank and African 
Development Bank still disbursed funds which enabled the government to implement 
its programmes with little or no consequences. In addition, although DFID suspended 
general budgetary support during the wa Mutharika regime, the agency still provided 
sector budget support, and this allowed the state to still access vital resources to run 
its programmes.  
 
In a multiple case study research of several countries implementing decentralisation 
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Jutting et al (2004) has shown that successful performers were characterised by strong 
government commitment and ability to pursue reforms. Some of these successful 
countries include: Bolivia, Philippines and India (West Bengal). In these countries 
reforms were inspired by the need to change political, social and economic conditions 
in the context of measures such as democratisation, participation and poverty 
reduction (Jutting et al 2004: 15). All good performers were also characterised by 
strong donor involvement (Jutting et al 2004: 19). However, this does not guarantee 
successful reforms, for example in Egypt and Nepal (Jutting et al 2004). In poor 
performers such as Mozambique, Nepal and India (Andrah Pradesh) donors lacked 
coherent strategies to support reforms. Jutting et al (2004: 22) have quoted a 2003 
OECD-DAC report on decentralisation and local government, which concluded that 
although there were some examples of effective coordination between donors, in the 
majority of cases coordination was generally weak at both national and local 
government level. This is also the characteristic of donor approaches in Malawi.  
	  
According to Nielsen (2002: 176) donors provide 70-80% of the funds for 
development investments in Malawi. These funds are earmarked for specific 
priorities, which are ‘donor designed’ (Nielsen 2002:176). Such huge amounts of 
funds can easily be exploited to service the neopatrimonial state in Malawi. In fact, 
the lack of common position by donors in their engagement with government make it 
easier for the neopatrimonial state to ‘capture’ these resources and to use them in 
ways that ensure that the patron (usually the president) builds support and loyalty.  
 
One way through which ruling elites are able to ensure continued flow of these 
resources from donors is the balancing act in dealing with interests of these donors. 
For example, the LDF is a major source of development funding in local councils, and 
ruling elites may have strong interests to capture this funding in order to reward their 
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followers. This might explain why the LDF remains a priority since its inception in 
2009 as it provides funding through which political actors can be seen to provide 
public and private goods in exchange for support. As has already been pointed out, 
the government has addressed the technical aspects of reforming the LDF, the results 
of which have meant continued funding from the World Bank and others. On the 
other hand ruling elites at national level in Malawi have not responded well to the 
push for political aspects of decentralisation to be rolled out, for example holding of 
local government elections. The consequences for this have not been as serious when 
one compares the funding withheld by KFW and the amount of money that the World 
Bank puts in. Therefore, knowingly (or unknowingly) donors are providing vital 
resources for the neopatrimonial state to ‘oil’ its patronage networks.  
	  	  
6.2.2 The ‘Big Man/ Big Woman’, ruling party elites and centralisation of 
reforms 
 
As has been argued in chapter three, Malawi is a typical Africa neopatrimonial state. 
Some of the key elements of this state which are useful for the discussion below 
include the ‘personalistic rule with the big man/woman syndrome’, ‘dominance of 
vertical over horizontal ties’, and weak or no separation between public and private 
spheres which is demonstrated through the use of public resources to reward 
supporters’. Ruling elites try to stay in power through maintaining control over 
distribution of public resources at national and local levels. These characteristics of 
the neopatrimonial state are driving the implementation of public policy in Malawi, 
including decentralisation. Politics in Malawi are also characterised by ‘political 
opportunism’, chameleon politics, weak political parties, and ‘parallel rule’ with 
chiefs also playing huge formal and informal roles.  
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Since 2005 the interests at national level amongst ruling elites have been varied and 
present a complex picture rather than straightforward causal-effect relationship. The 
UDF Government, which came to power in 1994 following the first multi-party 
elections, initiated the roll out decentralisation in Malawi. However, it still took four 
years before the decentralisation policy and Local Government Act were in place. The 
first ever-local government elections only took place in 2000; six years after the UDF 
government had come to power. In fact, when the UDF government allowed the 
elections to happen, it had gained a significant majority in parliament. The results 
from the local government elections were positive for the ruling party, which won 
over 80% of the local council seats in Malawi.  
 
In contrast to the UDF regime, the former DPP government, which was in power 
between 2004 and 2012, was not willing to hold elections. After postponing the 
elections from 2006 to 2011 the late President wa Mutharika finally cancelled the 
elections and directed that they should be held together with parliamentary and 
presidential elections in 2014 (Munthali 2011). Prior to the cancellation the late 
President had closed the Malawi Electoral Commission for months due to suspicions 
of fraud and financial mismanagement at the Commission. Nobody has been brought 
to book for these fraud charges. Others have argued that this was done deliberately to 
stop local government elections (See: Nation Newspaper 2011).  
	  
A number of reasons might have contributed to this postponement since 2005. Key 
informant interviews with senior local government official and donor agencies 
suggested that elections were initially postponed in 2005 because the DPP was a 
minority government.115 At that time the president had resigned from the party that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Interviews: DFID official 2, 15 October 2011; Irish Aid, 5 October 2010; and 
Senior official- Ministry of Local Government, 6 October 2010.  
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ushered him into power, the UDF. Only about 30 MPs followed him to the new party 
that he formed, the DPP. During this period his government faced huge resistance in 
passing bills within the predominantly opposition legislature. Given the large 
opposition majority in the national legislature at that time it is possible that the 
president and his new party feared that holding the elections would have brought in 
opposition majority in local councils. This would have been a breeding ground for 
discontent and control of local councils. The DPP got absolute majority in 
parliament116 in the 2009 parliamentary elections winning 120 out of 193 seats.  
 
Cammack (2011) has argued that elections did not take place under the wa Mutharika 
administration because ruling elites doubted their popularity. From 2010 the 
performance of the then President wa Mutharika was increasingly being questioned 
by donor agencies and NGOs in the country. In 2011, the British High Commissioner, 
Fergus Cochrane-Dyet, was declared persona non grata, and was forced to leave the 
country after a wikileaks article mentioned that the High Commissioner had reported 
to his government that the Malawian president was becoming autocratic (See: The 
Guardian 2011). NGOs also questioned the failure by the wa Mutharika 
administration to hold local government elections. In 2011, the US Government 
through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) withheld over $350 million in 
aid due to what the US government claimed was poor governance record. The 
criticism from donors as well from some sectors of the Malawian society may have 
created doubts about the popularity of the president and the ruling party. One key 
informant from an opposition party claimed that: 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  The DPP won majority, largely drawing on sympathy from voters who saw the 
opposition parties as a stumbling block due to failure in passing of bills and national 
budgets. 
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‘The President is afraid of elections because the DPP are afraid that they have lost the 
confidence of the electorate..’ 
  Interview, MP-opposition party, 8 May 2011. 	  
A press statement released by the Public Affairs Committee (PAC) a membership 
group of faith-based organisations in Malawi claimed that: 
	  
‘PAC has long held the position that delay by government to hold Local Government 
Elections is against constitutional requirements as well as the democratic principle 
requiring regular elections. We see the continued absence of elected councillors as a 
sign of bad governance. We expect the government to stop creating excuses and 
promptly ensure that local elections are conducted in 2010 as required’. 
       Quoted in Nyasa Times 2009 
 
The failure to hold local government elections in Malawi was one of the 
manifestations of the influence that wa Mutharika had in the roll out of 
decentralisation in Malawi. Wa Mutharika may have feared opening up spaces for the 
opposition to thrive and build bases of support.  Between 2009 and 2011, the DPP 
government implemented a number of measures to centralise power in Malawi. Partly 
this was done through co-opting local elites who largely depend on the state for 
access to privileges, status and wealth. For instance, chiefs were used by the DPP 
regime to support various agendas of the then president, and the ruling party.  
 
Centralisation of power by ruling elites under wa Mutharika and his party allowed 
them to maintain monopoly over state resources. Cammack (2011: 1) has argued that 
for such ruling elites losing an election is the same as returning to hardships for most 
politicians. The use of state resources allowed them to reward their supporters, and 
therefore to win votes and maintain their support base. This might be one of the major 
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reasons why President wa Mutharika and the ruling party used their majority in 
parliament to effect a number of amendments to the original act with the aim of 
consolidating powers at the local level.  
 
Previously the constitution provided for local government elections to be conducted a 
year after holding presidential and parliamentary elections. Constitutional amendment 
number two of 2009, section 147, changed this. With the amendment, the president 
was given powers to decide the date for local government elections. Since the passing 
of this amendment, the then President wa Mutharika was able to effectively use his 
new ‘powers’ to postpone and finally cancel local government elections. Hence wa 
Mutharika run the show as he deems fit with regard to holding of the local 
government elections. Cammack (2007a: 5) has argued that the actions of Mutharika 
reflected those of ‘big man’ trying to gain control of his own people. He was 
intolerant of criticism, and he relied heavily on patronage networks (Cammack 
2007a:5). The new administration led by Joyce Banda passed the tripartite bill in 
2012, which would see local government elections happening alongside presidential 
and parliamentary elections in 2014. But some of the contradictions such as powers of 
the president to decide the date for local government elections have not yet been 
amended.  
	  
Another amendment was also made to the Local Government Act in 2010 by the wa 
Mutharika administration to make local bureaucrats accountable to politicians. 
Amendment number six on sub section two of the Local Government Act passed in 
April 2010, transferred the powers to appoint the District Commissioner to the 
Minister of Local Government. Previously the Act had stipulated that the powers to 
appoint and transfer lay with the more independent Local Government Service 
Commission (LASCOM). The implications of this change are described in the next 
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section, which will examine the relationship between central and local actors. But 
suffice to say here that by making the top bureaucrat accountable to the minister, the 
changes effectively brought the DC under the control of the ruling party. Since 
ministers serve the interests of the president it can be argued that these changes 
effectively increased the powers of the president to influence what happens at the 
local arena.  
	  
During the wa Mutharika administration ruling elites also used their majority in 
parliament to increase the influence of the Members of Parliament (MPs) at local 
level.  Amendment three of 2010 of the Local Government Act gave MPs the right to 
vote in local councils. Previously MPs were ex-officio members with no voting 
powers, and they watched from the sidelines as councillors voted on council matters. 
Since Malawi has not had elections since 2005 it is not yet known how MPs will 
exercise these powers. Another related amendment, number one of the Electoral 
commission Act (2010) reduced the number of wards to two per constituency. This 
has reduced the ratio of councillors to MPs in the district. The implication is that it 
can effectively dilute the role of councillors who might now be viewed as deputy MPs 
rather than powerful elites with control over the local arena. It can be argued here that 
these amendments are aimed at consolidating the role of MPs at the local level at the 
expense of councillors.  
 
Another change effected by the wa Mutharika administration, amendment four (c) of 
2010 of the Local Government Act, took away the policy-making powers of councils. 
Instead councils were directed to implement national plans and priorities, and not to 
formulate their own local policies. This amendment suggests that political actors, 
particularly the president and ruling party were not only protecting local spaces from 
opposition and other new elites, but were also centralising the development process. 
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In this regard it can be argued that the other interest for these ruling elites was to see 
decentralisation deliver national development goals and priorities rather than as a 
mechanism to address locally determined priorities within a national policy 
framework. This could mean that councils are viewed as implementation mechanisms 
rather than decision-making bodies. This is a contradiction to the spirit of devolution 
or democratic decentralisation, and is in fact similar to how deconcentration was 
pursued in the period up to 1993 in Malawi.  
	  
To establish the new role of councils as implementing mechanisms amendment two 
(c), 2010 of the Local Government Act changed the name of local governments from 
‘local authorities’ to ‘local councils’. The rationale presented for the change is that the 
name ‘authorities’ assumed that these entities were independent, while the term 
‘councils’ is more relevant as these mechanisms should serve national interests. From 
the perspective of ruling elites, the ‘new councils’ might actually serve the central 
interests of both politicians and bureaucrats better. To put it in a narrative, the central 
political actors still need popular support to win votes. In a poor country like Malawi 
these votes are usually in return for some public and private goods. Therefore the 
centre holds on to some big development projects, which are then implemented 
through local mechanisms. Take for example, the farm input subsidy programme, 
which is a multi-million dollar centrally driven project, which provides subsidised 
seeds and fertilizer to vulnerable households. The selection of households is at district 
and community level with chiefs playing a key role in selection of beneficiaries.  The 
centre has used this project to reward supporters, or in the case of chiefs to favor 
friends and relatives.117 The Public Expenditure Tracking Survey in Agriculture 
(2009) revealed that at least 52% of the coupons for the farm subsidy programme did 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  Interview, Kalondolondo (Community Based Monitoring project) staff, 13 January 
2011; also see: MDPC (2009).	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not go through the normal channels. These were distributed through ruling party MPs 
and other ruling party politicians. Control of these projects is necessary to provide 
public goods in exchange for votes. At community level, it was mentioned in some 
FGDs with community members that chiefs identify their relatives and friends as 
beneficiaries of the subsidy programme.118  
	  
The actions of ruling elites in Malawi are not unique. In many developing countries 
experimenting with reforms there is resistance by politicians and bureaucrats (De 
Sardan 2011: 26, Ahmad et al 2005: 24, Olowu 1990, Wunsch 2001). Jutting et al 
(2004) has argued that bad performers such as Uganda, Nepal and Mozambique were 
characterised by considerable resistance from central leadership. This resistance was 
due to the desire to maintain control over local governments and can take various 
forms such as; control over local decisions, inadequate support to local governments, 
and unclear distribution of resources (Jutting et al 2004: 19). And even in situations 
where reforms are carried out the intentions might be to expand the reach of ruling 
party to the local arena and ‘recruit new cadres’ (De Sardan 2011). Generally, ruling 
elites will resist decentralisation if it directly threatens their ability to access such 
rents (Ahmad et al 2005: 24, Olowu 1990, Crook 2003, O’Neil 2007).  This explains 
why in some countries (including Malawi as shown in this case study) key changes 
are made to existing legislation and regulation to strengthen the position of the centre 
(Wunsch 2001: 277). Wunsch (2001) refers to this process as ‘re-centralisation’ or 
recapturing of power by the centre. There is also a case to be made that the push from 
donors can result in some steps being taken. But with huge political disincentives 
these steps will remain incomplete. For example in Benin reforms have remained 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  Focus Group Discussions; FGD, Women’s Group, T/A Pemba, 24 February 2011; 
Women’s Group, T/A Kalonga, 24 February 2011; and VDC, T/A Pemba, 16 April 
2011. 
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incomplete since 1993, and elections were only planned in 2002 following pressure 
from bilateral donors, in particular Germany and France (Bierschenk and de Sardan 
2003).  
 
 
The capture or resistance to reforms by ruling elites particularly under the wa 
Mutharika administration set them up for a collision course with some multilateral 
and bilateral agencies, such as UNDP/ UNCDF, USAID, DFID, GIZ and Norwegian 
Government that were pushing for political aspects of reforms to be rolled out. As has 
already been pointed out, the German government withheld its support to the LDF 
due to failure to hold local government elections. US Government through the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the UK’s DFID also withheld some 
aid citing poor governance by the wa Mutharika regime on several issues including 
decentralisation. In response the rhetoric by the ruling elites also changed- and wa 
Mutharika promised to hold tri-partite elections in 2014. This rhetoric might have 
been an attempt to buy some time as donors waited impatiently for the 2014 elections. 
On the other hand, the donors were stuck with few democratic institutions such as 
elections and were not paying attention to the potentially damaging effects of the 
policy reversals particularly with regard to accountability of local bureaucrats to the 
centre, the earmarking of funds, and the influence of chiefs at the local level.  
 
Under the wa Mutharika administration the varying focus on political versus technical 
aspects of governance also allowed the government to continue accessing some 
resources, particularly from agencies such as the World Bank and Africa 
Development Bank (AFDB). However the reality was that donor aid was shrinking as 
a result of withholding funds by some agencies. As a strategy to find more resources 
the wa Mutharika administration begun looking towards the East, to China to access 
new grants and loans. The Chinese Ambassador in Malawi has made his 
	   313	  
government’s position clear that they do not meddle in the host country’s politics 
(See: Kakande 2012). 119 This seemed to work well with the Government of Malawi 
under the wa Mutharika administration. Between 2009 and 2011 the government 
signed several grants and loans with China for infrastructural projects. These grants 
and loans from China were heavily earmarked for specific infrastructural projects 
such as construction of roads, hotel, national stadium and a university. However, 
grants and loans from China are still far from matching the resources coming from 
other donors. This means that the government will continue to play its cards well to 
project an image of being reformist while also capitalising on the different approaches 
to governance by donors. The wa Mutharika government also started looking up to 
other countries such as Nigeria to solve some of the economic problems, for example 
the fuel crisis, which were happening partly due to the aid freeze by some donors.  
 
As it has already been argued not all donors froze their aid to Malawi during the wa 
Mutharika administration. And even for those who did, such as Germany and DFID it 
was only part of resource envelope that was frozen. For instance, in the case of DFID 
despite the general budget support suspension more aid continued to flow in through 
the sector budget support. On one hand, this meant government had less ‘general 
money’ that it can allocate as it sees fit. On the other side, government still had funds 
to implement sectoral priorities in health, education and agriculture where donors 
were still providing aid. The total amount of money withheld by DFID in 2010 was 
20 million pounds of general budget support. The total UK aid for Malawi for that 
year was expected to top 90 million pounds with this general budget support. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  In interviews with journalists in 2012 the Chinese Ambassador blamed other 
countries for the domestic problems such as riots that Malawi was facing. China has 
taken a position of non-interference in Malawi and other countries where China 
provides aid and loans. 	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However, what the UK government did was to reallocate this 20 million pounds to 
sectoral budget support as well as funding to NGOs. In the end the UK government 
still spent 90 million pounds within Malawi, with a large proportion of this going 
through the same wa Mutharika government- in sectoral budget support to health, 
education and agriculture.120  
 
So while donors might perceive their withholding of aid as damaging and an adequate 
incentive for Malawi to pursue reforms, the true picture is that even amongst donors 
the position is inconsistent allowing the Malawi government to continue accessing 
millions of dollars through sectoral budget support. Perhaps the only negative effect 
that the ruling elites might have experienced under wa Mutharika regime is that they 
had less general budget support money to utilise as they saw fit. With respect to the 
Local Development Fund, when the German Government withheld aid, World Bank 
and the African Development Bank continued to put in a lot more funds. One can 
argue that wa Mutharika and the ruling elites were also thriving on these 
inconsistencies, in addition to looking at other sources of funding such as China.  	  
6.2.3 Central Bureaucrats: Clinging on 
 
The donors and political actors are not the only ones with interests in decentralisation. 
The bureaucrats at central level also have vested interests to stall reforms. These 
bureaucrats are mostly civil servants at the sectoral ministries headquarters in 
Lilongwe. It has already been shown in the previous chapter that only few ministries 
have devolved their functions and personnel to the districts. Even those that have 
devolved, they have not matched this with devolution of resources. This was clearly 
evident in Salima where central bureaucrats had control over staff at district level. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  Interview, DFID official, 15 October 2011.	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This is not a unique case to Salima. The sectoral development budgets and personnel 
budgets remain centrally controlled in all districts in Malawi. One key informant from 
the Ministry of Development Planning and Cooperation argued that councils were 
being set up to fail so that these officials can say ‘we told you so’.121 The central 
ministries are reluctant to transfer resources, because doing so would erode their 
powers and relevance. Therefore either willingly or unwillingly bureaucrats are allies 
of ruling party elites who are reluctant to transfer political powers to the local level. It 
is not surprising that the big three ministries, education, health and agriculture have 
still not devolved personnel and development budgets to the local councils.  
	  
Studies done by Sarker (2006) in Bangladesh and Ndegwa and Levy (2004) in 
Senegal have presented similar findings. The studies showed that the central 
bureaucracy was reluctant to transfer or share powers and resources with government 
elected offices. This was more evident in the fact that staff in local governments were 
still representing their respective central government departments. In Uganda, the 
main resistance to decentralisation has come from administrative structures of line 
ministries (Steiner 2006: 9). Smoke (2003) has suggested that this resistance is 
because the central agencies are losing powers and resources. These interests 
combined with interests of ruling party elites make it difficult to implement reforms in 
a way that meaningfully transfers powers and resources to the local level. Manor 
(1999: 61) has argued that high-level bureaucrats are often allies to politicians in 
resisting the transfer of power to decentralised bodies. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Interview, Ministry of Development Planning and Cooperation (MDPC) staff, 2 
March 2011.  
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6.2.4 Summary of key actors and interests at national level 
	  	  
This analysis shows that there are multiple actors at national level with varied 
interests in decentralisation reforms in Malawi. Interests of ruling elites make it 
impossible to translate the rhetoric of reforms into reality. It shows that President wa 
Mutharika and his ruling party took hold of reforms and begun changing the 
landscape with several amendments in order to centralise power and consolidate their 
position over the local arena.  
	  
Therefore, it can be argued that reforms were deeply characterised by elements of 
neopatrimonialism with ruling elites seeking to protect their political space and 
consolidate their access to resources. Patronage and clientelism have influenced 
decentralisation as well as other public policies in Malawi. This can be seen from two 
perspectives discussed above. First, there have been political changes to expand 
powers of the president and MPs at local levels and to limit the authority of local 
councils. Second, the centre is controlling both the LDF and other big central projects. 
The councils are increasingly being viewed as mechanisms for implementation of 
national development priorities rather than semi-autonomous entities to develop and 
carry out locally formulated priorities within a national framework.  
 
As has been shown in the earlier sections of this chapter, so far the push by donors 
has not led to any significant progress in implementation of political reforms 
particularly the holding of local government elections. Donors in Malawi have had 
varied interests in decentralisation and this had led to lack of coherence in pushing 
through reforms. The ruling elites under the wa Mutharika regime benefitted from this 
incoherence as resources continued to flow even though a few donors had suspended 
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some aid. Indirectly this lack of better coordination seems to entrench the 
neopatrimonial state in Malawi.  
 
There is some progress in administrative decentralisation particularly with respect to 
delivering centrally formulated projects such as LDF. This might be due to the fact 
that external funding for LDF provide resources which ruling elites need. On the other 
hand, other donors advocating for elections have been less successful maybe because 
they are directly challenging the interests of central actors for self-preservation. This 
is leading to a situation that Addison (2003) has referred to as ‘partial-equilibrium’, 
which means that some reforms (and not others) will be implemented.  
	  
6.3 Relationship between central and local actors, and impact on 
reforms 
	  
The key finding from this study that ruling party elites and bureaucrats at the centre 
are influencing the reforms may explain the nature of relationships between these 
central actors and certain groups of local elites. On the surface the finding reveals that 
there is strong centralisation of reforms. A closer look shows that in a bid to 
strengthen their control over the local councils ruling elites are co-opting local elites 
through an exchange of privilege and status. In return for the privileges and status 
local elite groups act in ways that serve to strengthen central interests. The co-opting 
of certain groups of established local elites is at the expense of any new groups of 
elites at the local level that may be interested to contest for the spaces provided at 
local level. These established elites who are receiving powers are chiefs, ruling party 
MPs and the DC.  
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6.3.1 Traditional Authorities, co-option and local capture of reforms 
 
As pointed out in chapter five, chiefs are one of the key elite groups that have 
captured reforms. The existence of parallel state means that some of these chiefs are 
well connected to the President. Political leaders need chiefs to buy support at the 
local level. Due to formal and informal roles excised by chiefs they have tremendous 
powers at local level. In many areas chiefs have captured decentralised development 
structures- Area and Village Development Committees. Even with limited mandate 
and capacities control of these committees offer ‘dangling carrots’ in the form of 
participation in implementation of development projects. A chief who controls these 
committees can thus be assured of direct involvement in key development activities, 
and this includes selection of beneficiaries for various development projects. One of 
the findings is that most of the chiefs are male. In Salima, all the senior chiefs and all 
but one Traditional Authorities were male. All the village chiefs interviewed in this 
study were also male. It was often an exception to find a female chief. This is the case 
in all districts in Malawi. This is one area that needs to be explored further in terms of 
the extent to which the presence of male chiefs is affecting decisions made in the 
district. All chiefs have ‘advisors’ and this is where women could sometimes be 
found. However as chapter five showed such women were included as a strategy to 
deal with disputes brought to the chief by women. The absence of women amongst 
the traditional elites (chiefs) which when combined with absence of local 
representatives (especially women) mean that there is limited space for women to 
engage in decision making in the district.  
	  
The decentralisation policy articulates the role of chiefs in development committees at 
various levels from Village Headman to Traditional Authority. The fact that the 
development committees are created according to levels of chieftaincy rather than 
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linked to wards or constituencies suggest the huge influence that chiefs have at local 
level. The findings in chapter five show that all chiefs, whether in opposition or ruling 
party constituencies have powers over community level decentralised structures. In 
fact chiefs were capturing these committees either by directly chairing the structures 
or through putting in their relatives and friends.122 The dominant groups of chiefs are 
Traditional Authorities (TAs) and Group Village Headmen (GVH). This is because 
the TAs control the Area Development Committees (ADCs) in their areas, while the 
GVHs oversee the Village Development Committees (VDCs).  
	  
A case study conducted in 48 villages in Indonesia in the 1970s showed that chiefs 
were influential in choosing members of the local councils and downward 
accountability to villagers was weak (Ahmad et al 2005: 4). These members were thus 
largely accountable to chiefs rather than to the community members. De Sardan 
(2011: 24) has pointed out that: 	  
‘Chiefs systematically select collaborators among their relatives and dependents and 
these are rewarded by him and only beholden to him’  
 
The chiefs’ capture of local spaces in Malawi is also manifest in the ways that they 
influence the District Commissioner, the top most bureaucrat at district level, to 
allocate certain development projects under LDF to certain Traditional Authorities. 
However, since only those chiefs aligned to ruling party seem to have more 
dominance, it can be argued that influential chiefs at local level draw their power 
from the connections with these ruling elites. The privileges and status are also not 
constant, and can change with transitions between governments. For example, as was 
shown in chapter five, Senior Chief Ndindi in Salima district was more powerful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  This has been discussed in chapter five based on findings from the study. 
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under UDF, but less influential under the DDP regime. On the other hand, Kalonga 
was less influential under the UDF Government, but because he was in ‘bed’ with the 
then ruling party, DPP, he had become quite influential.123 It should also be noted 
here that all chiefs in Salima district are considered to be in one political camp or 
another. The less influential ones are all in opposition areas.  
	  
To make sure that the ruling elites have control over chiefs, the president has been 
given powers, within the Traditional Authorities Act, to appoint, promote or remove a 
chief. As pointed out in in chapter five, both the UDF and DPP governments have 
used these powers to promote or appoint chiefs in Salima district, as well as in other 
districts in Malawi. The new Joyce Banda administration has also made a number of 
promotions of its own. Control over chiefs is also exercised through the District 
Commissioner who is mandated to supervise the activities of chiefs at district level on 
behalf of the president.  However this relationship between the DC and chiefs is 
complex. On one hand, chiefs report to the DC on their activities, and the DC in turn 
reports to the Ministry of Local Government. On the other hand, powerful chiefs such 
as Kalonga in Salima district have direct access to ruling party elites and this makes 
them more influential at district level. Such chiefs are feared even by the DC who is a 
bureaucrat interested to develop his/her career further.124  
 
During his tenure President wa Mutharika increased the allowances (honorarium) for 
chiefs by 900%. This is an example of ‘rents’ shared with elites at the local level. The 
monthly honorarium is paid directly by central government. This was a substantial 
increase and it may force chiefs to look favourably on the interests of the ruling party. 
In addition, the president has powers to install, promote or fire chiefs, which means 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Interview, former NICE Coordinator, 1 August 2010. 
124 Interview, Senior official, Ministry of Local Government, 6 October 2010. 
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they [chiefs] have to consider their interests carefully should they want to be 
promoted or to stay in power. This may force chiefs, particularly ambitious ones such 
as Kalonga in Salima, to align themselves with ruling party elites in exchange for 
privileges and status at local level.  
 
The co-opting of chiefs is a win-win situation between central elites and these local 
chiefs themselves. Centrally, the chiefs can deliver support through mobilising their 
subjects to vote for the ruling party, as seen from the issue of presidential candidate 
for the then ruling party, DPP. During the wa Mutharika administration chiefs were 
constantly paraded to show support for the former president’s brother even though the 
party had not yet held a convention to select a presidential candidate for the 2014 
presidential elections. On the part of chiefs aligning themselves with ruling party 
means that they can access both local and centrally formulated development projects. 
With these projects in their areas, chiefs acquire even more popularity and support 
from their subjects. This is why in areas where chiefs were more influential FGDs 
consistently revealed that people could directly connect the presence of various 
development projects in their areas with the fact that their MPs were from the ruling 
party and their chiefs were also aligned with the ruling party. 
 
Similar to the situation in Malawi, in various developing countries implementing 
decentralisation in Africa chiefs avoid any form of formal accountability. The only 
major threat to their position is the dismissal by central authorities if they displease 
them too much (de Sardan 2011: 24). Therefore chiefs are likely to behave in ways 
that please central actors. As a reward for supporting ruling elites chiefs are being 
given various responsibilities at the local level. For example, de Sardan (2011) has 
shown that in West Africa chiefs are being delegated certain powers by the modern 
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state, for example in the areas of justice, arbitration and financial regulation (de 
Sardan 2011). De Sardan (2011: 24) has also suggested that there are some common 
characteristics in terms of how chiefs behave and these include patrimonialism, 
predation, patronage, absence of real accountability to the people, confusion of 
powers, and defense of an aristocratic and patriarchal ideology. In Sierra Leone, 
chiefs are associated with various forms of corruption, bias and injustices (Casey 
2009: 127).  	  
6.3.2 Members of Parliament: Accumulation of power at the local level 	  
As already pointed out in earlier sections of this chapter, MPs have both central and 
local roles. As central actors ruling party MPs under wa Mutharika used their powers 
in the legislature to push through changes that transferred more powers to the 
president and to themselves. Some of these changes that give them more powers at the 
local level have been described in detail earlier; for example granting them voting 
rights in local councils as well as reducing the number of councillors per 
constituency.  
	  
MPs are also pushing for changes in the execution of the Constituency Development 
Fund (CDF). There is a proposal to increase the CDF allocation per constituency from 
K2 million to K5 million. This represents a 250% increase. As seen from chapter five 
the constituency development fund (CDF) provides access to resources that can be 
used to reward supporters or for personal interests. This is the case in both opposition 
or ruling party controlled areas. The evidence presented in the previous chapter on 
abuse and misuse of constituency development fund in Salima is similar to the picture 
from other districts in Malawi where the funds are manipulated by MPs and projects 
designed and implemented without following the necessary steps (NAO 2010). In the 
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presentation of findings from a study of CDF in sixteen constituencies in Central 
Malawi, a representative of Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace claimed that 
the funds were not benefitting ordinary people:  
‘If I were to rate the implementation of the fund in all constituencies, I would give 
them (MPs) 28 out of 100 which is a fail with distinction. The best way would be to 
ask for suspension of disbursement until chiefs, MPs, and people themselves set up a 
structure to handle money. MPs have politicised and personalised everything. They 
are using the funds to reward their supporters’ 
	  
Peter Chinoko, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) in, 
    Nation Reporter (2008a) 
 
Another study done by CCJP in 2008 in eleven constituencies in Nsanje and 
Chikhwawa in Southern Malawi showed that only one MP had put in place 
mechanisms to consult widely with Area and Village Development Committees on 
priorities to be funded (Nation Reporter 2008b). For the rest of the MPs, community 
level decentralised structures were bypassed.  
	  
Government officials have also acknowledged the influence of MPs over CDF 
resources. The former Minister of Local Government, Dr. George Chaponda indicated 
that: 
	  
Some Members of Parliament put undue influence in the operation of Constituency 
Development Fund (CDF) managed by local assemblies thereby leading to a loss of 
funds through white elephant projects or the money remaining idle for the whole 
financial year. And in some cases, some MPs overrule the recommendations of IPC 
[Internal Procurement Committee] of the assembly in the choice of suppliers of 
materials. There is also general disregard of procurement guidelines by some MPs 
leading to loss of funds through payments of white elephants.	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Nation Reporter (2008c).  
	  
 
One Member of Parliament from the then ruling party, DPP claimed that there are 
valid reasons why they sometimes disregarded the standard procurement procedures:  
	  
‘That is very true in some cases but there are reasons for disregarding procurement 
procedures… for example where there are undue delays by the assemblies to procure 
materials. Therefore an MP as an individual is bound to get frustrated and would do 
anything to get the needed materials to the constituency. There are also some officials 
in the assemblies who are aspiring to become MPs and will do anything to frustrate 
you. Sometimes the quality of the materials sourced by the Assembly is poor and an 
MP want to identify suppliers….and also some suppliers identified by the Assembly 
will provide less the amount of goods ordered and paid for.’ 
	  
Interview, DPP (the then ruling party) MP, Salima district, 8 May 2011. 	  
A study of the constituency development fund in twelve districts in Malawi, which 
was conducted by the Malawi Economic Justice Network, showed that there was 
reluctance by MPs and district council officials to use set procedures (MEJN 2009). 
In this environment of limited transparency and accountability increase in allocations 
to CDF might in fact provide greater opportunity for MPs to abuse or misuse funds, 
and use them to woe votes from their supporters. This is at the expense of general 
resource funding increases that councils require for the delivery of the district 
development plans.  
 
Despite its challenges, the CDF might continue to exist probably because it is part of 
the patron-clientelist relationship between ruling elites at the centre and MPs. CDF 
resources are useful for MPs to reward their communities, and in so doing ‘buy’ votes 
during the next election. MPs have control over this Fund, and it is nearly impossible 
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for the president to influence changes over this Fund. So far all the presidents since 
1994 have shied away from the confrontation with MPs over the CDF largely because 
doing so might lead to less support for the presidents. MPs, across the board, from 
both opposition and ruling parties, have a big stake in the continued existence of this 
CDF. For the opposition it might be the only way to access vital resources to provide 
tangible goods for their supporters.  
 
The CDF in Malawi is funded wholly by the Government of Malawi. So far donors 
have stayed away from this fund, choosing instead to work within the framework of 
the Local Development Fund. The continued existence of the CDF does undermine 
decentralisation. This is because MPs control how funds are used, and their priorities 
might not be in line with those contained in the district development plan. So again, 
the painstaking district development planning process is rendered useless. The 
effectiveness of the CDF also depends on the approach (and integrity) of individual 
MP, and some MPs may choose to abuse/ misuse the resources as it has been shown 
in this thesis.  
 
At district level MPs are bedfellows with chiefs. MPs need chiefs to mobilise support 
for votes. On the other hand chiefs need good working relationship with their MPs so 
that they can work together particularly to influence local bureaucrats to make 
decisions that favour their areas. It is in the interest of both MPs and chiefs to see 
development projects come to their areas. Evidence from the previous chapter has 
consistently showed that MPs and chiefs from same area often spoke with the same 
voice in the council meetings. Chiefs and MPs also worked together to exercise 
informal influence over the DC. However, a number of chiefs and community 
members also accused MPs of only wanting chiefs during campaigns. 
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‘Our MP was only visible here during the campaign period…Since he was elected he 
does not come anymore. It seems that he only wanted votes….’ 
 
Interview, Group Village Headman (GVH), T/A Kambwiri, 14 
December 2010; and GVH, T/A Pemba, 7 May 2011. 
In ruling party constituencies in Salima several chiefs mentioned that their close links 
with the MPs were crucial to attract development projects to their areas. It could be 
the case that these projects would have come anyway given that the influence from 
the ruling party. However, it suggested that chiefs and MPs were allies with vested 
interests to attract projects to their areas.  
 
Generally ruling party MPs seem to be more influential than the rest. They have a lot 
of informal influence over decisions at district level about location of development 
projects. For example the previous chapter has shown that areas under ruling party 
were consistently favored in terms of decisions about where development projects 
such as teachers’ houses should be located. As national actors, ruling party MPs also 
had access to centrally controlled development projects. The results from the 
Agriculture Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) conducted in 2009 suggests 
that when it comes to central development projects such as the farm input subsidy 
programme, MPs and chiefs aligned to ruling party had access to more coupons that 
they could share with their supporters. In FGDs, various groups of people claimed 
that MPs and chiefs targeted their relatives, friends and supporters in the distribution 
of these coupons.  
 
As the ‘big man/ woman’ the powers of the president reaches far and wide, and s/he 
has tremendous influence over the ruling party MPs. S/he can sanction MPs 
considered to be critical of his views. For example, between 2009 and 2011, several 
MPs were fired from the then ruling party, DPP for criticising the party’s agenda.  In 
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Salima district, one MP, Uladi Mussa was removed from the party after claims that he 
was becoming more powerful and independent. 125  Uladi Mussa was then Vice 
President of the ruling party. In 2011 several MPs within the then ruling party, DPP 
formed a coalition to fight the president from within. In retaliation, it is claimed that 
the then ruling party blocked off access to government contracts for most of these 
MPs who run various businesses (Nyasa Times 2012a). As a result of this the so-
called ‘Hope Alliance’ collapsed with several MPs coming forward to say that they 
had ‘repented’ and were ready to support President wa Mutharika.  
	  
The backing of the president is the source of informal powers by MPs to influence 
various decisions in the councils. MPs also influence decisions that enable them to 
accumulate private wealth using their access to government contracts. One official at 
district level126 claimed that the MPs put pressure on secretariat staff at district level 
to award contracts to their firms or those belonging to their friends and relatives.  	  
6.3.3 Local Bureaucrats and links to the centre 
 	  
The position of District Commissioner (DC) is a crucial one, and hence the DC and 
his/her staff are one of key elite groups at the local level who are receiving powers, at 
least on paper. The findings in this study have revealed that the situation is much 
more complex in practice with central actors- politicians and bureaucrats, seeking to 
control the local arena. The amendments to the Local Government Act discussed in 
earlier sections of this chapter have resulted in the transfer of appointing powers of 
DCs to the Minister of Local Government. This has effectively put the DC under the 
control of politicians. DCs can be transferred to another district or to the central local 
government ministry at any time and without notice.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Interview, Senior official 2, Ministry of Local Government, 1 July 2011.  
126 Interview, Senior official, Salima District Council Secretariat, 8 September 2010.	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To protect and grow their careers, DCs have to be strategic in how they respond to 
pressures from various elites, particularly ruling party elites. The control of local 
bureaucrats by central elites is what Crawford (2009) has characterised as ‘the whole 
rhetoric of decentralisation’, which he argues is ultimately about expanding central 
control over the local arena. Similar to the situation in Malawi, in Ghana the District 
Chief Executive is appointed by the president.  
 
As a top most civil servant at district level the DC has some powers in rallying all 
sectors to support his/her interests. Findings from this study have shown that other 
sector heads in district level meetings rarely question the decisions and 
recommendations of DC. However, the powers of the DC seem to be limited when it 
comes to oversight over sectoral activities. Largely, this is because central bureaucrats 
are eroding powers of local civil servants through slow devolution. As shown in the 
case study the three big ministries, health, education and agriculture, have not 
transferred their development budgets to the district. Human resource management 
and personnel budgets have also not been devolved fully. This means that various 
sector heads at district level still report vertically to their central ministries. This is 
also the case when it comes to transfers and allocation of staff from sectors.  
	  
This trend is similar to the one in Ghana where devolution has occurred on paper but 
control over service delivery in key sectors remains in the hands of deconcentrated 
sector departments with lines of accountability going upwards to their respective 
central ministries (Crawford 2009: 74). In Pakistan where devolution occurred in 
education teachers remain employees of provincial government (Ahmad et al 2005: 
4). In Sierra Leone, the central government still pays salaries for local bureaucrats in 
devolved sectors (Kargbo 2009: 20). As Ahmad et al (2005: 11) has argued, this can 
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force local civil servants to act in ways that respond to incentives from the central 
government.  
	  
The District Commissioner and the rest of the local bureaucrats are also under strong 
influence from the centre largely because the councils depend on central transfers, 
which come with earmarked priorities. As the case study in chapter five has shown, 
this limits the ability of the council to implement programmes according to the district 
development plans. There are similar examples of overreliance on central transfers 
coming from Sierra Leone (Kargbo 2009), Nigeria, Swaziland, Uganda, Botswana, 
Zimbabwe and Tanzania (Wunsch 2001) According to Wunsch (2001: 284), local 
governments cannot rely on their locally generated revenue as in most cases this only 
raise ‘pennies’. One case study in Ghana showed that between 1999 and 2000 locally 
generated revenue was 12% and 13% respectively of the total revenue (Inanga and 
Osei-Wusu 2004: 85). Over-dependence of local councils on central transfers can 
undermine accountability of local governments (Ahmad et al 2005: 10). In Ghana, 
Kenya, and Uganda the central government can exercise arbitrary oversight on local 
government budgets and this has created problems of continued central control over 
local priorities and resources (Wunsch 2001: 279). This means that in practice central 
ministries select their priorities and determine what should be done at the local level 
through top-down processes. So in reality the efforts from local councils are always 
for ‘nothing’  (Wunsch 2001: 278). 
 
It is not only politicians and bureaucrats at the centre who have imposed their 
interests on decentralisation at district level. The earmarking of funds by donors in the 
LDF as shown in the earlier sections of this chapter has limited the extent to which 
local actors can act in the interests of the local arena. With limited local revenue, 
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earmarking of funds renders the extensive and costly district development planning 
process useless.  	  	  
6.3.4 NGOs: ‘Educated local elites’ and service delivery 	  
Ribot (2001: 23) has argued that NGOs have a key role in supplementing services 
provided by the government, and also in creating awareness about people’s rights 
with respect to provision of better services by local governments. The findings in 
chapter five have shown that in light of overreliance of local governments on 
earmarked central transfers NGOs represent a viable complementary source of 
development funds. Because they are considered an important partner in addressing 
various local challenges, NGO leaders are key members in both the District Executive 
Committee (DEC) and the District Consultative Forum (DCF). However, one cannot 
generalise the influence of all NGOs at district level. In this study, staff members of 
international and some local NGOs with headquarters in the cities tended to be more 
educated and elitist. To some extent this might explain why they are well represented 
in both the DEC and DCF in contrast to community based organisations and small 
NGOs in the district. Larger NGOs might also easily find a seat in DEC and DCF 
since they bring development projects to the districts. Key informant interviews with 
both council staff and NGO representatives suggested that these educated elites were 
able to question decisions of the council, but with no real influence to change the 
proposed course of action. NGOs seemed to have influence over the activities of other 
NGOs in the district.  
 
The NGO elites considered themselves more informed, and were likely to design 
projects that reflect their own and their donors’ interests rather than based on the 
district development plan. Council officials claimed that the NGOs only came to the 
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DEC meeting to introduce projects, which had already been designed elsewhere127. 
The only influence the other elites; such as MPs, chiefs and bureaucrats had on NGOs 
was when it came to location of projects. NGOs at district level were mainly involved 
in service delivery in the areas of HIV and AIDS, agriculture, education, health and 
water and sanitation.  
 
At community level NGOs were responsible for implementing their own activities, 
and this included formation of their own parallel committees. It was not surprising to 
see some committees being called ‘ADRA committees’ or ‘Actionaid Committees’ or 
‘CARE Village Umbrella Committees’ because these were the organisations that 
formed them. These committees were also prone to capture by chiefs as shown in 
previous chapter.  
	  
De Sardan (2011: 25) describes this formation of ‘development committees’ by NGOs 
and development agencies as associational mode of local governance.  The result is 
formation of dozens of management committees in one village, each independent of 
the other (de Sardan 2011: 25). These structures often disappear with the end of the 
project. This can create instability at local level. Malawi is not unique, there are few 
other countries where NGOs created their own structures rather than working through 
the formal systems. One case study in Ghana showed that NGOs directly contacted 
communities in implementation of projects and there was little involvement of 
councils (Schiewer 1995: 302). In a case study of local governance in Arumeru 
district in Tanzania Kelsall (2004: 54) has shown that NGOs with large 
developmental presence such as World Vision had not yet made progress in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  Interview, Senior official, Salima District Council Secretariat, 8 September 2010;  
Interview, Senior official 2, Salima District Council Secretariat, 24 January 2011.	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empowering the target communities to hold their leaders to account. Another problem 
is that these structures can be captured by chiefs (de Sardan 2011: 26). 
	  
6.4 Revisiting main research questions 
	  
This section analyses whether main research questions and preliminary arguments 
have been satisfied. As outlined in the introductory chapter two main research 
questions were formulated to examine the extent to which downwardly local actors 
were receiving powers under the democratic decentralisation in Malawi. These 
questions are as follows: 
	  
(a) How are the social relations of superiority and subordination created, 
expanded and perpetuated within decentralisation in Malawi. 
(b) To what extent do interests of various actors, including central actors and 
local elites, influence development policy planning and execution within 
democratic local government in Malawi. 
 
In seeking to answer the first question the thesis has demonstrated that wa Mutharika 
and his ruling elites created and sustained relationship of superiority and 
subordination over local actors through several means. The DPP led government 
increased the powers of the president through the minister of local government to 
hire, promote, transfer and fire senior bureaucrats at local level. This created greater 
incentives for senior bureaucrats to serve central interests in return for ‘rewards’ such 
as promotions.  
 
The increase in the honorarium for chiefs and the powers of the president to confirm, 
fire and promote chiefs is also a source of superiority and subordination. This is 
because chiefs that act contrary to the interests of the ruling elites can face 
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consequences which include being dethroned. As shown in this thesis, members of 
parliament particularly from the ruling party serve the interests of the party (led by the 
president) and in return they have a lot of influence at the local level. These relations 
of superiority over local elites such as chiefs, MPs and bureaucrats are a deliberate 
strategy by ruling elites to penetrate the local arena.  
 
The thesis has also shown that interests of ruling elites, local actors, donors and 
NGOs undermine local development planning. Ruling elites through centralisation of 
reforms (control over local actors) and earmarking of funds have rendered the 
extensive development planning system ineffective since most of the priorities at local 
level reflect central interests. Councils have effectively been reduced to 
implementation mechanisms. This is contrary to the original objective of 
decentralisation to promote and enhance local democracy and development in 
Malawi. Earmarking of funds by donors, and the bypassing of decentralisation 
structures by donor funded NGOs have also constrained the ability of councils to 
respond to local needs and to ensure accountability to the local population. 
Responsiveness is also difficult to attain due to the capture of reforms by local 
elites—chiefs and MPs with the right connections (to ruling party) who have a lot of 
informal influence to determine where projects and services are implemented. Given 
this scenario the local development process is muddled with interests from a variety 
of actors, and so far there are no indications that plans developed effectively address 
local priorities. Instead, such plans reflect priorities of the centre. And even if local 
priorities can make it into the development plans, implementation is limited due to 
inadequate ‘un-earmarked funds’. Local elites (with ruling party connection) seem to 
have influence over the location of various projects in the district.  
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6.5 Re-examining the preliminary arguments 
A main preliminary argument was presented at the beginning of this study and was 
based on the literature review on democratic decentralisation. The main preliminary 
argument and two sub arguments are discussed next.  
	  
One of the key arguments about merits of democratic decentralisation is that it brings 
government closer to the people, which make it easier for local people to influence 
decisions about services that suit their local needs. In seeking to examine this merit of 
decentralisation the researcher made the following preliminary argument: 
	  
‘Although Malawi is undergoing democratic decentralisation the lack of alternative 
economic and political power means that some of the main actors at local level such 
as Members of Parliament, chiefs and civil servants remain primary beneficiaries of 
the state through emoluments, privileges, status and access to resources at local level, 
and thus are eager to work in ways that serve the state’. 
	  
This preliminary argument has been confirmed by the findings in this chapter and also 
in the previous chapter. It is clear that the links with ruling party provide access to 
privilege and status for MPs, chiefs and local civil servants. Evidence also 
consistently showed that in addition to serving central interests these actors 
particularly those with ties to the ruling party were capturing reforms and influencing 
allocation of resources and composition of various committees.  
 
One of the sub arguments was that ‘both centralisation and self-interests of the local 
actors are responsible for limiting the extent to which rural societies can influence 
institutions and priorities of local development under democratic decentralisation’. 
Results in chapter five and in this chapter show that the reforms are heavily 
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centralised with central political actors seeking to control the local arena possibly to 
prevent the opposition from controlling these spaces. Self-interests at the local levels 
are also predominant with MPs accumulating powers such as voting and manipulating 
the constituency development funds. Chiefs have also captured various development 
committees at community level. A constant theme is that elites closely aligned with 
ruling party are more influential than the rest. Therefore contrary to the rhetoric on 
democratic decentralisation reforms are heavily centralised with some local elites 
capturing reforms.  
 
In seeking to answer what sort of conditions are necessary for successful reforms we 
need to look at the example of reforms in Bolivia where Faguet (2003) has argued that 
decentralisation led to a more responsive government, which redirected investment 
towards areas of ‘greatest need’.  For example, there was increased investment in 
education and water and sanitation to address huge illiteracy rates and sanitation 
problems. Faguet (2003) has pointed out that this responsiveness was also 
demonstrated through channeling of resources to poorer districts. The quote below 
explains what made the reforms successful: 
	  
‘Superior responsiveness of local governments is a product of the structure of local 
governance in which power and influence are nurtured and ultimately channeled by 
voting and information…By locating real resources and political power in municipal 
institutions decentralisation reached out to the rich and poor strata alike offering them 
the means to improve their lives and a concrete incentive to participate. 
Decentralisation created local authorities beholden to local voters..’ 
Faguet (2003: 34) 
 
Similar to arguments made by Faguet (2003), Jutting et al (2004) have pointed out 
that successful examples of decentralisation such as West Bengal, Bolivia and 
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Philippines were characterised by strong political commitment by both political 
leadership and central bureaucracy. Manor (1999) has listed four conditions for 
successful decentralisation. These conditions are (i) adequate powers transferred, (ii) 
sufficient financial resources to carry out tasks, (iii) administrative capacity to carry 
out tasks, and (iv) reliable accountability mechanisms for elected representatives and 
bureaucrats (Manor 1999: 55). To a large extent these four conditions depend on the 
willingness of the centre to transfer powers and resources (financial and human).  
	  
If these conditions presented by Faguet (2003), Manor (1999) and Jutting et al (2004) 
explain success of reforms, then their absence would be directly linked to failure of 
decentralisation. According to Cammack (2007b) distortion or failure to implement 
reforms must be understood from the neopatrimonial logic of African states where the 
objective for ruling elites is to retain power and control state resources. Therefore 
centralisation of reforms ensures that central interests are served at the local level. 
This quote from Cammack (2007b) summarises the key arguments very well: 
	  
‘In neo-patrimonial or hybrid states real powers and decision making lie outside 
formal institutions. Decisions are made by big men and their cronies who are linked 
by informal networks that exist outside state structure and who follow a logic of 
personal and particularist interest rather than national betterment. Networks reach to 
the very top ‘big man’, connecting him with MPs, chiefs, party officials, bureaucrats 
to the villagers. The interest of such a regime is to gain and retain powers at all cost. 
This has an impact on how funds are used, what policies are promoted, how 
appointments are made, and how decisions are taken.  In such contexts accountability 
is upwards and not downwards. Because decentralisation fosters devolution of central 
power, an ‘anathema to big men’, changes in laws and regulations have been 
instituted to ensure that people in key positions are answerable to the executive.’  
Cammack (2007b: 600-601) 
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Cammack’s arguments reflect the situation in Malawi. The evidence has shown that 
wa Mutharika as the president consolidated his position with regard to 
implementation of political aspects of decentralisation. His powers and control 
reached out to ruling party MPs, chiefs and local civil servants who were mostly 
upwardly accountable. At the local level these local actors particularly those with 
ruling party connections are small ‘big men and big women’ themselves with 
informal networks that extends to the villages. As Cammack (2011) has argued that 
patronage politics reaches down all the way to the village and sees the exchange of 
rents for votes (Cammack 2011: 3).  
	  
There are other various examples of the centre reaching out to consolidate their 
interests in Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe (Crook 2003). As Smoke (2003), 
Manor (1999), Crook (2003) and Hadiz (2004) have argued in most developing 
countries the real goal is to consolidate central power through local elites. Due to this 
neopatrimonialism the formula for success as outlined by Faguet (2003) and Jutting et 
al (2004) is absent. Hyden (2007: 219) has argued that most African governments 
operate on the basis of patronage rather than policy, and personal networks tend to be 
more influential than formal rules.  
	  
A second sub argument was that local civil society organisations are weak and 
divided to influence any downward accountability and voice in key decision making 
at the local level. This study has mainly focused on the role of NGOs which who are 
just one of the forms of civil society. According to Jutting et al (2004), local civil 
society can play a significant role in pushing for transparency and participatory 
processes by local governments. They can also support service delivery at the local 
level. In the case study in chapter five NGOs, both local and international, are 
providing services in several areas including health, agriculture, water and sanitation 
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and education. This study has also shown that international NGOs and large 
Malawian NGOs have some influence and do sit in district level development 
committees. These NGOs are led by young educated elites who are able to question 
council decisions. However, NGOs have limited influence on the nature of decisions 
made in the committees. NGOs were also to blame for undermining decentralised 
structures through creating their own parallel structures at community level, as well as 
running their own projects with limited reference to district development plans. The 
council had very little control over the formulation and implementation of the 
projects, other than influencing location.  
	  
In revisiting the preliminary argument above the study has confirmed that reforms are 
distorted by centralisation and local elite capture. In addition, chapter five in which 
the case study results were presented has also shown that there are technical 
difficulties with the district development planning process. Two years since the last 
district development plan expired Salima district has not been able to develop a new 
one. This was mostly attributed to lack of capacity. The council receives long lists of 
needs from various parts of the district, which must be prioritised and costed into a 
plan. The council secretariat only has one Director of Planning and Development and 
one M&E Officer. Between them their plates are full with various other activities 
including planning, implementation and monitoring of centrally formulated projects. 
This situation is not unique to Malawi. Manor (1999: 113) has argued that planning 
from below is challenged by weak administrative capacity by the local bureaucracy to 
develop plans. The earmarking of funds described in this chapter also limits the extent 
to which planning from below can be effected.  
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6.6 Conclusion 
 
In summary, decentralisation reforms in Malawi are heavily centralised with the 
centre seeking to extend its control to the periphery. The centralisation of reforms is 
part of broader characteristics of the neopatrimonial state in Malawi, which is 
influencing the implementation of public policy. It has also been argued that reforms 
represent complex and varied interests at national and local levels. These interests are 
evident in how different actors seek to influence or capture reforms. These interests 
can be categorised into those of donors, ruling elites, central bureaucrats, and local 
elites.  
 
Ruling elites at the centre are exercising more influence over the design of reforms to 
limit spaces for opposition at the local level, and to strengthen their hold over key 
actors at the local level. The ruling elites are willing to use powers of privilege and 
status to reward or sanction local elites depending on the level of support that they 
receive from these actors. At the local level chiefs, MPs and the DC are being co-
opted largely due to the fact that they do not have an alternative source of power, 
privilege and status. Links to the ruling party provide the privileges and status, and 
with this comes power to control the local arena, and in so doing access resources.  
	  
The extent to which reforms are centralised or captured by local elites is a reflection 
of prevailing political realities in the country (Ndegwa and Levy 2004: 284). Ndegwa 
and Levy (2004: 313) have argued that in Malawi reforms have been rolled out with 
the aim of centralising power and extending it to the periphery without undermining 
the centre, and especially the ruling party. In this context the centre, which is 
responsible for designing reforms, is very much seeking to consolidate its position 
through these reforms. As Crook and Sverrison (2001) have pointed out the politics of 
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central-local relations explain what interests might gain or lose from a particular set of 
policy reforms. Clearly, in the Malawi context the president and ruling elites such as 
MPs, and central bureaucrats are influencing how reforms are rolled out. In addition 
to central-local relations, the local-local relations are also critical to understand how 
the local politics play out and who gains or lose from the process. In a case study of 
decentralisation in Nepal, Meagher (2004) has shown that there can be ‘winners’ and 
‘losers’ at both national and local level.  
 
It is also clear that district councils in Malawi, such as Salima, have limited ability to 
respond to local priorities largely due to earmarking of funding by both central 
government and donors.  For instance, the interests of donors such as the World Bank, 
AFDB and KFW in funding earmarked activities within the Local Development Fund 
mean that local councils can only influence location of projects and not the nature of 
priorities to be tackled. On the other hand, NGOs are providing key services at district 
level to complement the activities of the local governments. However, they are often 
responsible for forming parallel committees, which bypass the government’s 
decentralised structures. The projects run by NGOs are also rarely decided locally. 
This means that the district council has very little influence over what projects should 
be implemented.  
 
What is also evident from this chapter is that there are varying interests from donors 
with some pursuing technical reforms while others are focusing on political reforms. 
Such lack of common position by donors is easily exploited by ruling elites who are 
able to access resources even when some donors are withholding aid as part of their 
statement on lack of progress on political reforms. The ruling elites are also 
increasingly looking up to other countries particularly China, which does not have aid 
conditionalities particularly, related to political reforms. As long as the government is 
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seen as pursuing certain reforms and speaking the right rhetoric ruling elites might 
have access to resources.  
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Chapter	  Seven	  
	  
7.	  Conclusion	  	  	  
The Malawi decentralisation policy and the Local Government Act of 1998 proposed 
significant institutional changes in government structures and decision-making 
processes at district and sub district level. These changes were formulated following 
the winds of democracy that blew across Malawi and Africa in the early 1990s. These 
decentralisation reforms are expected to transfer powers to locally accountable actors 
who can be sanctioned by the local population. At district level these actors are 
supposed to oversee a process of formulating locally determined development 
priorities within a national development framework.  
 
The main finding in this thesis is that contrary to the intentions of donors, 
decentralisation in Malawi presents a complex picture which does not fit the neat 
synthesis as promoted under this new wave (devolution) that links reforms to pursuit 
of good governance. Ruling elites at the centre have manipulated reforms to suit their 
interests. At best, reforms have led to increases in the allocation of funds to local 
governments (councils). Other improvements include more powers to the councils to 
develop district development plans. However, the centre continues to direct the 
priorities at the local level through earmarking of funds and control over bureaucrats 
and other local elites. There is also the unfortunate reality of limited local revenue, 
which has made it virtually impossible for the councils to address specific needs in 
their areas.  
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7.1 A weakened local government system, with limited powers and 
resources 
 
So how does local government look at present? Failure to hold elections under wa 
Mutharika administration means that there are four key actors in the current local 
government system: chiefs, members of parliament, bureaucrats and NGOs. In terms 
of oversight and local policy making functions the absence of councillors has led to 
creation of makeshift District Consultative Forums (DCF) as the highest body in local 
governments. All the four key actors described above are represented in this DCF. 
The DCF has limited mandate, and it mainly operates as an ad hoc decision-making 
structure—mostly focusing on information sharing and providing advice to council 
bureaucrats. This Forum is unable to exercise oversight over strategic matters or 
financial issues. The inefficiency of the DCF is clearly evident when it comes to 
allocation of resources in the district. Chiefs (with right connections) and ruling party 
MPs have significant informal influence over the DC and senior council staff.  As a 
result priorities are likely to be determined by who had more informal power (usually 
due to right connections) rather than based on needs.  
 
Generally, resource allocation at district level is prone to patronage from the ruling 
party MPs and chiefs. This connection to the big man/ woman at the centre is a source 
of privileges, status and power for these elites. For chiefs the benefits include 
promotions and access to development projects. The consequences for undermining 
the ruling party includes being removed from the throne. As this thesis has shown 
chiefs have both formal power (responsibilities delegated by the state such as minor 
dispute resolution) and informal influence. This chiefly mode of local governance in 
Malawi just like elsewhere (see: de Sardan 2011) is characterised by patrimonialism, 
corruption, and weak downward accountability. Ruling party MPs, an influential 
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group of local actors locally, can access projects in addition to being looked upon 
favourably for ministerial appointments and government contracts. This is in return 
for their loyalty to the president. During wa Mutharika’s administration ruling party 
MPs used their formal powers in parliament to make changes to the design of local 
government reforms in order to grant more powers to the president (and to the centre).  
One of the changes transferred powers to the minister of local government, to appoint, 
transfer, or fire the DC and other senior local bureaucrats. This has opened up reforms 
to greater political influence from the centre. This situation has been worsened by the 
absence of councillors, which means that currently the direction of accountability is 
towards the centre rather than to the masses.  
 
Under the current local government system in Malawi the District Executive 
Committee (DEC) is expected to play a crucial role to support design, implementation 
and monitoring of development programmes at district level. Local bureaucrats and 
NGOs are key actors in the DEC. As shown in this study the DEC was unable to 
exercise the full breadth of its functions, and it tended to limit itself mostly to 
information sharing just like the DCF. Discussions were guarded, and government 
staff were more likely to support the position of the District Commissioner.  NGOs 
had a louder voice in questioning proposals made before the DEC but in the end there 
was limited formal influence to change proposals made before the committee. The 
challenge faced by DEC was similar to the DCF since proposals brought before the 
committee might have been made in line with the interests of powerful actors in the 
district. Using the example of Salima district, the DEC was also ineffective due to 
limited technical capacity. Two years after a district development plan expired, the 
DEC had not been able to facilitate the development of a new one. Members of the 
committee did not even have access to a single copy of the last district development 
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plan. The existence of so many INGOs and NGOs should have been reassuring to 
district councils like Salima since these organisations bring valuable resources to 
respond to priorities in the district. However, most NGOs come with pre-conceived 
projects, and this has made it difficult for the DEC to influence the priorities.   
 
The local government system in Malawi is also characterised by sub district 
structures, Area and Village Development Committees, which have been formed to 
promote bottom up development planning and to enhance coordination in planning 
and implementation of development activities. Therefore, these structures are 
important to promote community participation in the affairs of the local government. 
In practice many of these committees are not functional, and where they still exist, 
ADCs and VDCs are prone to capture from chiefs and ruling party elites. These 
structures also showed limited capacity, and their local plans often reflected long wish 
lists that were not ‘implementable’. The proper functioning of these structures is also 
undermined by the existence of parallel committees formed by INGOs and NGOs.  
This has been described by de Sardan (2011) as associational mode of local 
governance. These parallel structures are often formed on the pretext that they will 
lead to efficient delivery of projects as opposed to VDCs and ADCs, which are very 
political and prone to capture. Yet, these ‘NGO committees’ are not immune from 
politics and capture at district level. In addition, by staying away from the ADCs and 
VDCs donor funded INGOs and NGOs subvert decentralisation since the parallel 
structures are not accountable to the local population. Such actions by donors also 
divert vital resources from the decentralised structures. It seems even though 
decentralisation is viewed as a process, donors and NGOs are not willing to wait.  
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7.2 Hope for local government elections in 2014 under new President, 
Joyce Banda 
	  
During the writing up of this thesis President Bingu wa Mutharika died after a short 
illness. Following this death the Vice President, Joyce Banda, took over as President 
in April 2012 as per the constitutional provisions of the country. This ushered in a 
new ruling party, the Peoples Party (PP) that was formed by Vice President Joyce 
Banda after she was forced out of the then ruling DPP. This section has been included 
as a postscript to analyse the extent to which the new president is pursuing 
decentralisation. 	  
Amongst several of the political reforms pushed through by President Joyce Banda is 
the passing of tripartite bill. As a result of this Act, the long awaited local government 
elections are expected to happen alongside presidential and parliamentary elections 
scheduled for May 2014. This bill attracted the attention of donors who see the new 
government as more reformist128 and willing to pursue the agenda towards good 
governance.  
 
7.2.1 Continuities from the past: Peoples Party and the co-opting 
opposition MPs and chiefs to work for the ruling party 
 
 
The new ruling party, Peoples Party (PP), ascended to power with no members of 
parliament of its own.  Englund’s ‘chameleon politics’ continue to be at play even 
under the Joyce Banda administration with scores of parliamentarians and senior 
officials from opposition parties switching sides to join the new ruling party, PP. One 
of the key defectors was the former minister in the wa Mutharika regime, Goodall 
Gondwe, a seasoned economist that had worked with wa Mutharika between 2004 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  The German government had suspended part of the aid to the Local Development 
Fund due to absence of councillors. This decision has been reversed and the German 
government has released the funding to the LDF. 
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and 2012. Before his defection Goodall Gondwe was a senior figure in the DPP. 
Gondwe was given the position of Minister of Economic Planning and Development 
in the PP government. Another high profile defector from the opposition parties was 
Ibrahim Matola, the Deputy Chief Whip for United Democratic Front (UDF) in 
Parliament. Matola was also given a ministerial position in the PP led government. In 
April 2012 alone following the swearing in of the new President over 22 MPs from 
the former ruling DPP switched to PP. One of the defectors, Ken Kandodo, a former 
Minister of Finance in the DPP government mentioned that: 
 
‘We want to help the Vice President to govern this nation and rebuild the country. 
Malawi is facing a lot of challenges and the new president can only deliver if she 
works together with MPs. The Peoples Party has no MPs in Parliament and we, as 
representatives of the people, decided to work with the vice president so that our 
people can benefit from development projects’. 
       Maulidi (2012) 
Salima district where this study was done has also experienced defections with Uladi 
Mussa, an MP from Salima South constituency and a member of the Maravi Peoples 
Party (MPP) defecting to the ruling Peoples Party. In his speech Mussa urged all 
members of his party to disband and support the ruling party as he had done 
(Maganga 2012). To reward him for his actions Uladi Mussa was given the position 
of minister responsible for home affairs (Msonkho and Nhlema 2012). According to 
the key informant in Salima, Uladi Mussa is re-emerging as a powerful figure in 
influencing decisions of the Salima District Council.  
‘A ruling party is a ruling party, and they are gaining some control. The minister is 
able to direct for example distribution of maize and other things… However as a new 
party they are still building their structures on the ground…The DPP MPs who were 
influential last time are no longer feared here by the Council…’ 
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Follow up Interview with former NICE Coordinator, 30 
November 2012. 
 
As shown above ministerial and party positions are some of the rewards to defectors 
in return for their support towards the president.  	  
There has been growing pressure from civil society organisations and the opposition 
parties for the speaker to evoke Section 65. Under Section 65 any member of 
parliament who leaves his/her sponsoring party to join another party is deemed to 
have crossed the floor. Technically this should lead to a by-election. However the 
speaker is still required by law to formally declare the constituency vacant and after 
that by-elections can be planned. The speaker, a member of the now opposition DPP 
did not apply this section when many members of parliament defected to the DPP 
during the time that it was a ruling party. Over fourteen months into the reign of Joyce 
Banda and her Peoples Party the speaker did not evoked Section 65 arguing that there 
were several court injunctions restraining him. Both UDF and DPP also manipulated 
Section 65 to the advantage of the ruling party during periods when they were in 
power. The crossing of the floor by MPs means that constituents have to be prepared 
to witness political maneuvers, which they did not sanction when they voted for a 
particular candidate.  
 
 
Just as her predecessors had done President Joyce Banda has also used chiefs to her 
advantage. When she came to power she made public declarations that chiefs should 
not be involved in partisan politics129. Instead they should work with government of 
the day to address development challenges facing local communities. The 
politicisation of the role of chiefs in the Joyce Banda administration came to the front 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	  In several public speeches on the state broadcaster the President asked chiefs to 
focus on development activities and not politics 
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during the parliamentary by-elections, which were held in Mzimba North on 9 
October 2012. During the campaign period Paramount Chief Mbelwa IV130, one of 
the most influential chiefs in Malawi, went round communities with the Vice 
President mobilising support for the ruling party candidate. In one of the community 
meetings the paramount chief told his subjects to vote for the ruling party candidate as 
a ‘thank you’ to the President for selecting a Vice President from the Northern region 
(Nyasa Times 2012a).  
 
The President has promised to support chiefs in return for their role in assisting the 
government. For instance she has distributed fertiliser to chiefs for their own personal 
use. During the installation of Chief Dzoole in Lilongwe the President distributed 
hundreds of bags of fertilizer to three senior chiefs (Nyasa Times 2012b). In 
December 2012 the President hosted parties for chiefs to reward them for their 
contributions.  
 
Between April 2012 and January 2013 the president promoted several chiefs across 
the country. In August 2012 the President elevated two chiefs in Lilongwe and one 
chief in Dowa (Nyasa Times 2012b). In December 2012 the President elevated Chief 
Liwonde to Senior Chief (Nyasa Times 2012c). These are just few examples of the 
many promotions that the President has awarded to chiefs. This control over the 
promotion and removal of chiefs remains the underlying cause of the politicisation of 
their roles.  
 
So while Joyce Banda (with a minority government) has taken a big step to move the 
country towards local government elections, there many troubling continuities that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Paramount Chief Mbelwa IV passed away in February 2013 after short illness. His 
eldest son is expected to take over the chieftaincy	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threaten the prospects for decentralisation in Malawi. MPs continue to switch sides in 
favour of the ruling party, and chiefs openly support the President and her party.  	  
7.3 Decentralisation, good governance and neopatrimonial state in 
Malawi 
 
This thesis has shown that devolution is far from being achieved in Malawi. In fact 
legitimate questions can be asked about whether the kind of devolution that donors 
are interested in will occur in Malawi. As has already been argued, since 2005 there 
have been no councillors in place and the wa Mutharika administration took several 
steps to dilute reforms and to ensure that the centre was gaining control over the local 
arena. Powers of councils to formulate local policies and plans were reduced in order 
to ensure that they served centrally determined priorities. Centralisation is also 
evident at administrative level whereby the majority of central ministries are still 
reluctant to devolve functions, powers and resources. So far there have only been 
limited political and fiscal reforms to support devolution. Therefore, the Malawi 
model is predominantly deconcentration with limited devolution. The findings in this 
thesis confirm what Crawford (2009) found in Ghana where he observed that ‘politics 
of decentralisation’ are responsible for a design that is intentionally aimed at 
strengthening central control and reducing the discretionary powers of local 
government. Since current decentralisations are designed by the top, the dominance of 
central interests is inevitable.  
 
The decentralisation policy in Malawi has made explicit links to good governance 
with reforms expected to deliver on duo objectives of promoting development and 
enhancing local governance. However, the roll out of decentralisation in Malawi 
reflects the complexities with the good governance approach by donors. As it has 
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already been pointed out in chapter two, donors are one of the key players driving this 
good governance agenda. Yet there is no consensus among donors as to what the term 
means, or which aspects are important at a minimum for each country to pursue. Nor 
is there consensus on what the best indicators are to measure governance. As a result 
each donor policy on good governance reflects their individual understanding of what 
this term means, and the key elements that constitute the term. In Malawi this has led 
to the emergence of two distinct camps, with one side, mostly UN and bilateral 
donors promoting political and technical reforms around decentralisation, while 
multilateral donors such as World Bank and African Development Bank emphasize 
technical and fiscal aspects. This lack of common position on reforms by donors has 
played into the hands of the neopatrimonial state in Malawi. This is because the ruling 
elites can pursue less threatening aspects of reforms, and this might be adequate to 
please some donors.  
 
The position of donors is also weakened due to lack of uniformity on what sanctions 
to apply and when in order to push government to reform. In one example, the 
German government (through KFW) withheld some funding to the LDF due to the 
postponement of local government elections, and yet the World Bank and African 
Development Bank went ahead to disburse millions of dollars to the fund. Another 
donor, DFID suspended general budget support, but still pumped in millions of 
pounds in sector budget support. DFID also provided support to the farm input 
subsidy programme (FISP), which was used extensively by the wa Mutharika and his 
ruling party to secure loyalty from party supporters and to build new support bases. 
Thus the actions of donors have enabled the neopatrimonial state to capture vital 
resources and to use these to service patronage networks and to accumulate personal 
wealth.  
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Even amongst those donors that are pushing for political reforms, there is sometimes 
a simplistic view and shortsightedness, which has seen some of them promoting the 
local government elections as a solution to problems facing councils. This ignores the 
complex picture; for example how to deal with capture of reforms by ruling elites and 
well connected local actors; or how to address the technical and financial problems 
facing decentralised structures. So the presence of diverse donor agendas on 
decentralisation means that the state in Malawi is faced with pressure to reform from 
several fronts. So where does the country begin? Should it start with political or fiscal 
reforms, or both? What about technical capacities of various structures? And who 
determines the starting point or at least a set of priorities to be addressed first? 
 
Donors and other players pushing for reforms might be surprised that Malawi, 
particularly under wa Mutharika was unable to show strong political will towards 
reform. Scholars such as Smoke (2003) have highlighted the importance of political 
will as one of the key ingredients for reforms to take place. However as Crawford 
(2008) has argued this seems ‘paradoxical and naïve given the truism that 
governments rarely give up power’. In fact central governments look for various ways 
to manipulate reforms. The Malawi state shows strong neopatrimonial characteristics 
such as personalism and concentration of power in the dominant patron (big 
man/woman); dominance of informal over formal rules; and use of state resources for 
political legitimation. Opposition parties remain very weak, and politics of ‘personal 
opportunism’ mean that opposition political leaders can switch sides at any time and 
with little consultation to join the government of the day and the ruling party. There is 
also the issue of parallel rule with chiefs playing a key role at local and national level. 
This complicates the transfer of powers to elected representatives.  
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So far the three presidents in Malawi (wa Mutharika, Muluzi and Kamuzu Banda) 
managed to maintain support through ensuring concentration of power and access to 
state resources by the ruling party. Decentralisation is feared because it could actually 
lead to opening up of spaces for new elites to thrive, and most importantly for 
opposition parties to gain ground. It is therefore not surprising that Kamuzu Banda 
chose to appoint councillors from his party (under one party rule); Muluzi only had 
local government elections when he was assured of a large victory; and wa Mutharika 
decided to postpone local government elections all together fearing loss of ground to 
opposition.  
 
The Malawi case has also shown that where reforms are perceived to be a threat to the 
big man and the ruling party, steps can be taken to change the design or to stall 
pursuit of devolution. This is similar to arguments made by North et al (2009) that in 
natural states pursuing processes such as elections does not mean that reforms have 
been institutionalised. On the contrary ruling elites can manipulate these processes 
while pretending to be reforming. Since donors do not have access to the inner circles 
where real decisions are made, it is difficult to influence what final actions are taken 
in the country in pursuit of reforms. When wa Mutharika used his DPP majority in 
parliament to amass more powers over reforms there was little that anyone else (even 
donors) could have done to stall this. With little or no accountability downward, 
ruling elites are driven by what incentives or disincentives reforms offer, and capture 
is one way of ensuring that decentralisation is pursued in a manner that serve their 
interest. In the case of Malawi wa Mutharika was able to give himself more powers to 
determine when to hold elections, and to establish control over local bureaucrats and 
ensure councils became mere implementation mechanisms of centrally formulated 
priorities. These reforms enabled him to concentrate power. The resultant effect has 
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been the emergence of a model that resembles deconcentration rather than devolution. 
It can therefore be argued here that devolution was feared particularly by wa 
Mutharika due to its prospects to open up spaces for the opposition, and to transfer 
powers to councils.  
 
The quest to monopolize access to state resources for political legitimation greatly 
influences how and which reforms ruling elites will pursue. All three presidents since 
independence have personalised state resources, and have accumulated huge personal 
estates through dubious means. Former President Muluzi’s is accused of having 
abused state resources by depositing billions of kwacha from donors into his personal 
account. His trial has been going on for over five years at the High Court in Blantyre, 
Malawi. The late President wa Mutharika’s wealth is estimated at over $185 million 
(Mzungu 2012: 1). Yet when he came to power in 2004 he had declared assets worth 
only $450,000. The government is currently investigating how wa Mutharika 
managed to accumulate such wealth in less than eight years. In the case of the new 
president (Joyce Banda), despite pressure from various quarters in the country she has 
refused to declare her assets claiming that the law does not require her to do so since 
she had already declared assets when she was Vice President. Law experts have noted 
that the asset declaration law is silent on whether a president should declare assets on 
leaving the office (Mzungu 2012: 2). The speaker is also not mandated by law to 
provide information on the assets declared by public officials. This means that 
presidents can easily accumulate vast wealth and finish their terms without declaring 
how much they are leaving with.   
 
So far presidents in Malawi have also used state resources to service patronage 
networks, which extend all the way to community level. Local elites such as chiefs 
and MPs who serve the big man/woman’s interests expect ‘rewards’ (such as projects 
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or contracts or positions) which they can use at local level to build support. 
Decentralisation threatens to ‘reduce’ the amount of resources at the disposal of the 
president. Most importantly where such resources are transferred to the local arena 
ruling elites may fear that the opposition can ‘capture’ them and use these resources 
to service their own patronage networks, which can lead to opposition parties gaining 
support.  
 
Since the three men (Kamuzu Banda, Muluzi and wa Mutharika) needed resources for 
personal gains and to legitimise power and service patronage networks, they tended to 
focus on centralised development projects. For instance Muluzi (1994-2004) 
established the targeted input programme (TIP), which distributed free seeds and 
fertiliser to vulnerable households. With funding from the World Bank Muluzi also 
set up the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF), which supported community 
projects in various communities in the country. Hence, TIP and MASAF are 
synonymous with Muluzi. Wa Mutharika set up a multi million dollar farm input 
subsidy programme (FISP), and the Malawi Rural Development Fund (MARDEF) to 
provide loans to community members. As it has been shown in this thesis FISP, 
which is bankrolled, by both donors (such as DFID and Norway) and Government of 
Malawi was politicised (under wa Mutharika) with ruling party elites and chiefs 
influencing (informally) distribution of coupons to their supporters, relatives and 
friends. At national level wa Mutharika also awarded expensive fertilizer distribution 
contracts to his cronies. In his second term Wa Mutharika established a multi million 
dollar Youth Enterprise Development Fund (this was a campaign promise in 2009).  
The fund was also been marred by favouritism towards party loyalists.  
 
Wa Mutharika’s successor, Joyce Banda has plans to double the funding for FISP 
(still bankrolled by some donors) to K60 billion (US$185 million), and has also 
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promised to create a parallel FISP, which will provide fertilizer (on loan) to farmers. 
She also set up the Presidential Initiative against Hunger, which among other things 
has been distributing maize flour in various parts of the country. In the 2013/14 
national budget the president was pushing for K2 billion (US$6.15 million) to set up a 
Cow a Family Initiative. In a state of the nation address during the opening of 
2013/14 national budget session at parliament, Joyce Banda also promised to establish 
Mudzi Transformation Trust131, which resembles the Local Development Fund and 
will be involved in funding community development projects (Munthali 2013).  
 
So what effect does these central projects have on reforms? From decentralisation 
(devolution) literature transfer of adequate resources is a significant requirement for 
devolution as it allows councils to address priorities at local level. However since 
presidents and ruling parties need these resources to accumulate private wealth and to 
legitimise their rule (through servicing patronage networks and rewarding supporters) 
it is unlikely that councils will see more funding allocated for the general resource 
fund. Instead, councils might continue to operate as implementation mechanisms, and 
thus promoting the deconcentration model rather than devolution. The setting up of 
‘special central projects’ by big men/women also show the extent to which both donor 
and state resources can be captured by the neopatrimonial state. In 2009 donors 
questioned the government based on results from the public expenditure tracking 
survey, which showed that at least 52% of coupons to vulnerable households (for the 
farm input subsidy programme) were distributed outside the formal channels. Donors 
were also concerned with the awarding of contracts (to supply fertiliser) to companies 
that had bid higher prices. Yet, there is very little influence that donors have had apart 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  131	  Mudzi Trust will register 20,000 village heads that will work with the Trust to 
mobilise communities for implementation of various community development 
projects.	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from getting promises from the government that it would ensure efficiency in the 
subsequent year. This is what has been referred to as the ‘shadow state’ with ruling 
elites making all the right noises and putting recommendations on paper on how to 
improve efficiency of the programme. Meanwhile, capture and corruption have 
continued. This ‘shadow state’ is predominant in the implementation of 
decentralisation in Malawi. 	  	  
Rural communities have also learned to respond to leaders that promise and deliver 
‘handouts’. This might explain why each new government has tried to overdo the 
previous one on promises and the type of handouts to be provide. The use of state or 
donor resources to the advantage of ruling party is in line with arguments by Wunsch 
(2001) who has noted that authority and resources are captured by either (or both) 
central or local actors who are interested in keeping them from reaching local 
governments.  
 
The nature of neopatrimonial state also seems to be adapting, in the sense that there 
are now only very few life long leaders in Africa (‘life long big men’). With the 
emergence of democracies in a number of countries, presidential elections take place 
regularly.  The new big men (and women) are instead interested in serving all 
constitutional terms allowed and in ensuring that their chosen successor continues to 
rule after them. Muluzi selected wa Mutharika as his successor, while wa Mutharika 
tried to push for his brother to succeed him. This adaptation of the neopatrimonial 
state has extended to decentralisation where ruling elites consciously make decisions 
on which aspects of reform are less threatening and easier to pursue. Fiscal reforms 
around the Local Development Fund have allowed the state to access millions of 
dollars from the World Bank and other donors. Yet, political reforms have been slow, 
and in some cases progress has been reversed. Generally, the way in which donors 
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and other external actors have engaged with the state (with inconsistencies, and lack 
of common approach) has enabled ruling elites to capture reforms and implement 
decentralisation in a way that is advantageous to them.  
 
So what can be said about the prospects for local development planning in Malawi? 
Both Muluzi and wa Mutharika ‘s administrations invested heavily in the formulation 
of a comprehensive district development planning system. This system emphasizes 
technical aspects of carrying out planning at local government level. Yet as this thesis 
has shown, the local development process is muddled with many challenges including 
informal influence (and capture), earmarking of funds and limited technical 
capacities. Worse still the majority of resources flowing to councils are for ORT with 
very little remaining for anything else. At community level development committees 
were captured by chiefs and the ruling party. These development committees also 
have limited capacity to plan, implement and monitor community projects, and they 
often came up with long wish lists. As has already been argued, to some extent the 
weak capacity of decentralised structures is due to actions by donors and NGOs that 
create their own committees in a quest to achieve greater efficiency. However, these 
‘NGO committees’ are themselves not immune from capture or the politics. As a 
result the district development planning process has not shown promise to lead to 
greater responsiveness to local priorities.  
 
Smoke (2003) has highlighted the importance of a ‘broad vision for what the 
decentralised system should be and what it is expected to achieve over time; a 
framework that elaborates the elements of the system and linkages among them; and a 
pragmatic way for bringing the system into existence and to adjust and support its 
evolution over time’. Malawi has demonstrated that this broader vision can change 
between leaders, for instance between Muluzi and wa Mutharika. This change in the 
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vision also has an effect in how ruling elites manipulate the elements of what the 
system should be to their advantage. In the case of wa Mutharika he used the very 
same democratic institutions promoted by donors—parliament—to pass laws that 
changed the design of reforms and enabled him to centralise powers. This 
demonstrates how the neopatrimonial state is adapting in a new environment.  
 
So what can be done about decentralisation in Malawi? The emergence of Joyce 
Banda and her rhetoric suggest that there can be small windows of opportunity when 
some big men/ women show interest in pursuing reforms. Joyce Banda’s minority 
government, facing a deepening economic crisis has looked to donors for support. In 
return for this assistance, the president promised to embark on a road to reforms. 
Tripartite bill was passed paving way for local government elections alongside 
presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014. This in itself is a significant step for 
a minority government (and a new ruling party), which might not be sure of the size 
of its support base at local level. Rather than view elections as an end in itself, there is 
need for better coordination amongst donors, the government and other actors, to 
agree on a set of key political and technical reforms that the government needs to 
pursue at a time—and to ensure that adequate time is indeed allowed for reforms to 
materialise. Donor aid can then be applied strategically as an incentive for pursuit of 
these packages of reforms. It is worth acknowledging that withholding of aid has not 
worked in the past, this could have largely been due to problems amongst donors 
themselves—inconsistencies in approach and too many agendas.  
 
Nevertheless external actors must also acknowledge that the most important 
transformation will occur from within when elite groups and non-state actors, other 
than ruling elites begin to push and negotiate for reforms. For instance, while donors 
played a key role in pushing for the change to multi party form of government in 
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Malawi in 1993, in the view of the researcher who lived through the experience it was 
probably the emergence of a coalition of elites from within—pressure groups, 
university students, and civil society organisations such as religious groupings-that 
finally forced the one party state to collapse.  In a way this means donors should be 
prepared to leave their comfort zones and allow for politics to take the centre stage. It 
is also worth investing in programmes that strengthen capacity particularly to address 
weak opposition parties and to strengthen civil society organisations at national and 
local level. With time this might just create a dominant coalition of elites interested to 
pursue decentralisation.  
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